JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—The dispute in the present second appeal is about half share in Arazi No. 491, area 4 Bigha 9 biswa 6 Dhoor situate in Mauza Menai, Pargana Bhuili, District Mirzapur. 2. The defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh executed a sale deed in respect of the above land in favour of his daughter Smt. Beily Devi on 22.1.1982. 3. The plaintiffs who are all sons of Jagarnath, step brother of Bhonu Singh instituted original suit No. 141 of 1982 for cancellation of the above sale deed on the ground that Bhonu Singh had no transferable right in the said land. The suit was dismissed by the Court of first instance. However, in appeal preferred by the plaintiffs, the judgment and order of the Court for first instance was set aside and the suit was decreed ordering cancellation of the sale deed. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment, order and decree dated 13.9.83 passed by the lower appellate Court, the defendants have preferred this second appeal. 5. At the time of admission of the appeal the sole substantial question of law as to whether the suit was barred in view of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was formulated. 6. The learned counsel for the defendants/appellants has submitted that apart from the above, the suit itself for cancellation of the sale deed was not maintainable as it was executed in respect of the agricultural land. Therefore, apart from the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission this question of law is also substantial in nature and is required to be determined. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents was put to notice on the above question of law as well and he agreed to address the Court on the same during the course of hearing. Accordingly, I have heard Sri Prabhakar Singh, learned counsel for the defendant/appellants and Sri M.N. Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents on both the above points. 8. In brief, the plaintiffs/respondents had instituted the above suit for the cancellation of the sale deed dated 22.1.1982 precisely on the ground that the defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh had no right to transfer the land in dispute and, therefore the sale made in favour of defendant No. 2 is null and void. 8. In brief, the plaintiffs/respondents had instituted the above suit for the cancellation of the sale deed dated 22.1.1982 precisely on the ground that the defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh had no right to transfer the land in dispute and, therefore the sale made in favour of defendant No. 2 is null and void. It was contended that after Jagarnath separated from his brother Bhonu Singh and father Bhagwan Singh, he took land of Arazi No. 513 area 18 Biswa, Arazi No. 515 area 4 Biswa, Arazi No. 556 area 14 Biswa, Arazi No. 580 area 19 Biswa and Arazi No. 872 area 1 Bigha 19 Biswa, total area 4 Bigha 14 biswa situate in Mauza Gauri, Pargana Muli, District Mirzapur from erstwhile Zamindar on a ‘Lagan’ of Rs. 37.25 per annum. On the abolition of Zamindari he became Sirdar and subsequently acquired Bhumidhari rights and, as such, he was the exclusive owner in possession of the said land, which was later, during the consolidation proceedings, was allotted chak No. 491 area 4 Bigha 9 Biswa 6 Dhoor. This land after Jagarnath devolved upon plaintiffs/respondents with which defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh had no concern and, as such, had no right to transfer it. 9. The defendants/appellants set up the defence that the above land was ancestral property of both Jagarnath and Bhonu Singh. It was acquired by the joint family fund and, as such, both of them had ½ share each. Accordingly, their names also came to be recorded in the revenue record. Therefore, it is totally wrong to contend that Bhonu Singh had no right to transfer the share in the said land. 10. Apart from the two issues framed on merits i.e. whether the plaintiffs/respondents were the exclusive owners of the land in dispute and whether the sale deed dated 21.1.82 was liable to be cancelled, as stated in the plaint, a further issue as to whether the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was framed by the Court of first instance. The Court on merits held that the land in dispute was joint property in which Bhonu had ½ share and, therefore the sale deed was not liable to be cancelled. The suit was also held to be barred by Section 49 of the Act and was accordingly dismissed. 11. The Court on merits held that the land in dispute was joint property in which Bhonu had ½ share and, therefore the sale deed was not liable to be cancelled. The suit was also held to be barred by Section 49 of the Act and was accordingly dismissed. 11. In appeal, the lower appellate Court formulated two points for determination; whether plaintiffs/respondents were the sole owners in possession of the land in dispute and if so was the sale dated 21.1.1982 liable to be cancelled; and whether the suit was barred by Section 49 of the Act. On the first point, the lower appellate Court reversed the finding of the Court of first instance and held that the land in dispute to be the exclusive property of the plaintiff/respondents and as such Bhonu Singh was not competent to make a sale of the same in favour of his daughter. The suit was held to be maintainable as the revenue entries were treated to be wrong and the result of some fraud. 12. I have to first answer the question of law with regard to the suit being barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and before attempting to answer the above question I would like to place the provisions of Section 49 of the aforesaid Act itself : “49. Bar to civil jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area for which Notification has been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 4, or adjudication of any other rights arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act.” 13. The aforesaid provision provides that with the issuance of notification under Section 4 regarding consolidation, all rights of tenure holders in respect of land under consolidation or consolidation proceedings or in regard to any other matter for which the proceedings under the Act could or ought to have been taken in respect to the rights of the parties in such land shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not before any civil or revenue Court. To put it more simply, (i) declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of the land covered by the notification; (ii) adjudication of any right arising out of consolidation proceedings with regard to proceedings which could or ought to have been taken under the Act; and (iii) in respect of rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act are cognizable by the consolidation authorities and the jurisdiction of the civil or revenue Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in that regard is expressly barred. 14. Thus, the aforesaid provision expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil or revenue Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding with respect to the rights in the land under consolidation or with respect to any matter for which a proceeding could have been taken under the Act. 15. In Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 their Lordships held that object of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is to remove from the jurisdiction of civil or revenue Courts all disputes which could be decided by the competent authority under the said Act during the consolidation proceedings. The object of the aforesaid provision is to place all disputes before one particular forum concerning the land under consolidation during the consolidation so as to avoid conflicting decision of two parallel Courts and consequently clash of interest between such two Courts. 16. Undisputedly, the village was subjected to consolidation proceedings wherein the disputed land was allotted chak No. 491. One of the three plaintiffs, i.e. Brijnath also admitted that the village had been under consolidation. 16. Undisputedly, the village was subjected to consolidation proceedings wherein the disputed land was allotted chak No. 491. One of the three plaintiffs, i.e. Brijnath also admitted that the village had been under consolidation. The revenue documents produced by the plaintiffs themselves as well as Exhibits A-1 to A-3 produced from the side of defendant No. 1, Bhonu Singh proved that the name of both the parties was recorded as co-owners of the land in dispute, both prior to start and after closure of the consolidation proceedings in the village. Even the certificate dated 22.12.49 Exhibit A-4 establish that the land in dispute was lease out to both the parties and the name of both the parties came to be jointly recorded as co-owners even before the abolition of Zamindari system. None of the four witnesses produced by the plaintiff stated anywhere that the aforesaid land before the consolidation was ever settled by the ex-zamindar exclusively in the name of Jagarnath. During the consolidation both the parties were also found to be in possession. In view of Section 57 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 and Section 27 of the Act the law presumes such revenue entries to be correct unless contrary is proved and established before the competent Court. Accordingly, there was a presumption in favour of defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh that he is the co-owner of the land in dispute along with Jagarnath, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. 17. The aforesaid Jagarnath or the plaintiffs were entitled to get the aforesaid revenue entries corrected prior to start of the consolidation proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 or by getting the rights over it adjudicated by the competent civil/revenue Court. After the commencement of the consolidation proceedings they had the remedy of filing objections and to get the necessary rectification done with regard to their exclusive right/title over the land in dispute. However, nothing of the kind was done by the plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest, thus, accepting the entries to be correct and the allocation of new chak and recording of the name of defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh as co-owner. 18. However, nothing of the kind was done by the plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest, thus, accepting the entries to be correct and the allocation of new chak and recording of the name of defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh as co-owner. 18. The lower appellate Court, on the basis of a solitary extract of Khatauni of 1347-F (paper No. 22-C), wherein the name of Jagarnath alone was recorded, ignoring the subsequent entries of the revenue records, which existed prior to the consolidation or after the close of the consolidation, manifestly erred in holding the plaintiffs to be exclusive owners; the revenue entries to be incorrect and the result of fraud; and consequently, that the bar of Section 49 of the Act would not operate. 19. The relevant aspect for the applicability of the bar of Section 49 of the Act is not the legality or illegality or even the correctness of the entries of revenue made prior to, during or after the consolidation operation but the existence of the entry itself coupled with the fact as to whether the plaintiff/respondents could have objected to the said entries during the course of consolidation. As stated earlier, the purpose of Section 49 of the Act in barring jurisdiction of civil and revenue Courts in relation to the matters which could be adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities is to get all such disputes decided by a common Court of jurisdiction, i.e. Courts of consolidation to avoid two parallel Courts from exercising jurisdiction in respect of same kind of matter. The provisions of Section 49 patently demonstrates that all disputes with respect to the rights in land under consolidation or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act shall be adjudicated by the consolidation Courts and the civil or revenue Courts shall have no jurisdiction in such matter. Therefore, the dispute with regard to the correctness of the revenue entry in respect of the land in dispute on the village being brought under the consolidation could have been raised and adjudicated upon by the consolidation Courts only. 20. Therefore, the dispute with regard to the correctness of the revenue entry in respect of the land in dispute on the village being brought under the consolidation could have been raised and adjudicated upon by the consolidation Courts only. 20. Apart from the above, in the instant case, the plaintiffs themselves have pleaded that the sale deed dated 28.1.1982 is a void document, inasmuch as defendant No. 1, Bhonu Singh had no right or title over it and, as such no authority to execute the same. 21. It is trite to point out distinction between a void and voidable document. A void document is one which is inoperative and can be ignored, whereas a voidable document is one which remains in force until it is avoided and is set-aside by a competent civil/revenue Court and a suit for that purpose would be maintainable. Since a void document is inoperative and can be ignored, the matter with regard to the same could be decided by any authority before whom it is produced, including the Courts of consolidation. In Gorakh Nath Dubey (supra) the Supreme Court has further laid down that suits in respect of void documents abate by reasons of Section 5 of the Act, but the suits for voidable sale deeds do not abate. 22. Section 49 of the Act expressly provides that no civil or revenue Court shall entertain any suit in respect to rights in such land which are under consolidation or even in respect of the matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken before the consolidation authorities. The plaintiffs could have certainly filed objections during the course of consolidation for expunging the name of the defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh, if they really felt that the land in dispute was their exclusive property and he had no share. However, by not objecting to the same, they impliedly accepted the co-ownership of defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh over the land in dispute and at the same time that it was an ancestral property in which he had half share. The consolidation proceedings having become final and conclusive, it no longer remained open for the plaintiff/respondents to take this objection by filing a civil suit for cancellation of the sale deed on the ground that the defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh had no right to transfer and the sale deed is void. The consolidation proceedings having become final and conclusive, it no longer remained open for the plaintiff/respondents to take this objection by filing a civil suit for cancellation of the sale deed on the ground that the defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh had no right to transfer and the sale deed is void. The rights of defendant No. 1 Bhonu Singh stood established during the consolidation proceedings. Thus, the plaintiffs not having taken the aforesaid objection at the appropriate time before the consolidation authorities are not entitled to maintain the present suit and it stands barred by Section 49 of the Act. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court manifestly erred in treating the suit to be maintainable. It is no ones case that the sale deed in question is tainted by fraud. 23. The view taken by me above finds support from a decision of this Court in the case of Pravir Singh and others v. Board of Revenue, 2003 (1) CRC 557 wherein the land in dispute came to be recorded as Banjar and no objections were preferred against the same during the consolidation. It was held that the subsequent suit for declaration under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in respect of the said land on the ground that they have perfected their rights over the same by virtue of their uninterrupted possession is barred. Similar is the view expressed by their Lordships of Supreme Court in Smt. Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh and others, AIR 1990 SC 1173 wherein a suit was filed to set aside a sale deed alleging the sale deed to be totally void, it was held that as the document was void the suit is not maintainable by reason of the bar contained under Section 49 of the Act and the proper remedy for the plaintiff lies in the proceedings before the consolidation authorities. 24. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that the suit for cancellation of the sale deed as void, under the facts and circumstances of the case, was not maintainable and was barred by Section 49 of the Act. 25. 24. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that the suit for cancellation of the sale deed as void, under the facts and circumstances of the case, was not maintainable and was barred by Section 49 of the Act. 25. The suit being barred under the provisions of Section 49 of the Act, the other question with regard to the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the suit for cancellation of sale deed completely pales into insignificance and need no adjudication/answer under the facts and circumstances of the case. 26. In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment, order and decree dated 13.9.1983 passed in civil appeal No. 114 of 1982 is set aside and that of the lower Court dated 30.8.1982 dismissing the original suit No. 141 of 1982 is restored holding the suit to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 27. Appeal allowed. No costs. ————