Order By Court.-The appellant was tried for charge under Section 304B of Indian Penal Code. By the impugned judgment, appellant has been found guilty and convicted under Section 304B I.P.C. and has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. 2. The prosecution was lauhched on the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant-Surthu Thakur-father of the deceased (P.W.6). 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the appellant was married to the informant's daughter-Nirmala Devi. After marriage, Nirmala Devi• used to reside with her husband at Village-Brinda. On 23.3.1995 one Ganga of Village-Brinda informed him that his daughter was burnt. On hearing the same, he alongwith Ganga went to Sadar Hospital, Gumla where her daughter was admitted. He found that her daughter having burn injuries above was. It is alleged that Nirmala Devi told to the informant (father) that her husband burnt her. It was stated that there was quarrel between her (wife) and the appellant (husband) whereupon the appellant assaulted her and sprinkling Kerosene oil, set fire with a match stick, which caused her• burn injuries. The occurrence took place on 15.3.1995 at Village Brinda and since then the girl was in the hospital, who ultimately succumbed to injury on 25.3.1995. 4. On the basis of the said fardbeyan, police registered a case and after conclusion of trial, submitted charge-sheet under Sections 302 and 304B I.P.C. 5. Charge under Section 304B I.P.C. was framed against the appellant. The appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. He was put on trial. The defence was that Nirmala Devi was trying to light (Dhibri) when her sari caught fire as a result, she was burnt. Accused-appellant tried to put off the fire and save her wife and as a result thereof he has also sustained burn injuries in both of his hands. 6. The prosecution in order to establish the charge against the appellant altogether examined eight witnesses. P.W. 1Mangra Baraik, who happened to be the Chawkidar, stated that he arrived in the hospital alongwith one Md. Sattar for treatment, who was ill and there he learnt about the incident; P.W. 2-Akhileshwar Hazam happened to be the nephew of the informant; P.W. 3 is the doctor, who had treated Nirmala Devi since 15.3.1995 while he declared her death and had also held Post Mortem on her dead body; P.W.4Binod Baraikalso claimed to have. accompanied Md. Sattar for treatment, who was ill and there he learnt about the incident; P.W. 2-Akhileshwar Hazam happened to be the nephew of the informant; P.W. 3 is the doctor, who had treated Nirmala Devi since 15.3.1995 while he declared her death and had also held Post Mortem on her dead body; P.W.4Binod Baraikalso claimed to have. accompanied Md. Sattar to the hospital where he came to know about the" incident; P.W. 5-Md. Ali Hasan also came to know in the hospital about the incident through tl1e informant; P.W. 6 is the informant-Surthu Thakur; P.W.7 is the Investigating Officer; P.W.8 is a formal witness and has proved the relevant Station Diary (Exhibit-6). ' 7. The defence has also examined two witnesses and proved two documents (Exhibits-A "& 8). D. W. 1-Bandhu Pradhan and D.W. 2-Rajendra Pradhan happened to be the close door neighbours of the appellant. They have supported the defence version that Nirmala Devi was burnt due to accidental catching of fire in her sari. Exhibit-A is the Sanha, which" was recorded on 15.3.1995 on the information given by the hospital; Exhibit-B is the statement of the appellant recorded on 15.3.1995. 8. Learned trial court on conclusion of trial held the appellant guilty for the charge under Section 304B I.P.C. The court below relied on the evidences of P.W.6, P.W.2 supported by the medical evidence of doctor-P.W.3 and held the appellant guilty for the said charges and convicted the appellant aforesaid. 9. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has assailed the said judgment of the court below and submitted that the conviction of the appellant is wholly perverse. There is no element of Section 304B I.P.C. and there is no whisper for any demand of dowry and cruelty thereto. It has come in the deposition of the Investigating Officer that Nirmala Devi (deceased) immediately had given statement after she was admitted in the Hospital, but that statement has been suppressed. She had told that she was burnt due to accident while lighting lamp; her sari came with the contact of fire. F.I.R. had been lodged after about ten days of the incident when Nirmala Devi died on 25.3.1995. P.W. 3-Doctor said that there was no smell of Kerosene oil. In para-3 of the deposition, the doctor stated that the police was informed immediately after admission of Nirmala Devi in the Hospital. F.I.R. had been lodged after about ten days of the incident when Nirmala Devi died on 25.3.1995. P.W. 3-Doctor said that there was no smell of Kerosene oil. In para-3 of the deposition, the doctor stated that the police was informed immediately after admission of Nirmala Devi in the Hospital. The police came with Sanha entry of the appellant (Exhibit-B). No statement was given by the- deceased before the police. P.Ws. 1, 4 & 5 said to have arrived subsequently. u. the hospital' and came to know about the incident from the informant-Surthu Thakur that the accused-appellant had burnt her daughter. P.W. 6-informant himself stated that he had gone to the hospital and in the hospital; his daughter has told that accused had set fire on her, but he did not disclose this fact to the police on 25.3.1995. P.W- 7 I.O. in paragraph-10 had proved Exhibits A & B, which was recorded on 15.3.1995, which go to disclose that burn was accidental. 1.0. in paragraph-15 stated that Chawkidar had not told that the accused appellant had set the deceased on fire. In paragraph-20, he stated that he examined independent witnesses, who supported the defence version. All the P.Ws. are of different villages. The defence examined the close neighbourers. D.Ws. 1 & 2, who stated that Nirmala Devi was burnt due to accidental fire. Learned counsel submitted that there is no iota of any' evidence nor the statement of P.W. 6-inlormant that her daughter told him that the accused-appellant had set her on fire is admissible as dying declaration. The said statement in view of other cogent facts and materials goes to falsify the said version of the informant. Since there is no whisper of any demand of dowry, the offence under Section 3048 I.P.C. itself was not constituted. There was, thus, no legal ground for conviction of the appellant for the said charge and the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence cannot sustain. 10. Learned Addl. P.P., appearing on behalf of the' State, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment. He submitted that though the informant had not uttered any word regarding demand of dowry, but P.W. 2,.who is nephew of the informant, at one place in his deposition stated that the accused used to demand cycle and watch as dowry. 10. Learned Addl. P.P., appearing on behalf of the' State, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment. He submitted that though the informant had not uttered any word regarding demand of dowry, but P.W. 2,.who is nephew of the informant, at one place in his deposition stated that the accused used to demand cycle and watch as dowry. He further submitted that the informant had no enmity with the accused as he was the son-in-law. There was no malice intention for implicating in the false case of dowry death. Contradiction should be ignored. The informant, who is the father, clearly stated that the deceased-Nirmala Devi had told that the appellant had set her on fire, which caused her burn injuries to which she ultimately succumbed. The burn injuries are supported by the medical evidence. The deceas8d was married a year ago. Taking into consideration the said chain of circumstances, learned trial court has found charge under Section 3048 I.P.C. against the appellant and has rightly convicted and sentenced him. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Addl. P.P., we scrutinized the materials on record. We find from Exhibits-A & 8 that this accused-appellant had himself given the statement, which was recorded on 15.3.1995 immediately after Nirmala Devi was admitted in the hospital. The doctor said that at that time Nirmala was in a position to speak. We find that Nirmala Devi had not given any ,such statement either before the doctor or before the police is has been told by the informant that this accused-appellant had set on fire after assaulting. We also find no reason for not giving this information to the police before 25.3.1995. Admittedly, there is no eye witness in this case. The only evidence to support the prosecution case is a so-called statements made by Nirmala Devi (deceased) to the informant and that of P.W. 1. 4 & 5. The said statements are not corroborated by the medical evidences and the other credible evidences. I.O. in palagraph-16 stated that Mangra Baraik had not earlier said to him that such version was given by the deceased-Nirmala Devi. Mangra Baraik happened to be the Chawkidar, but he also did not inform the police earlier. Such version was not disclosed by anybody else before 25.3.1995 i.e. for ten days when Nirmala Devi was under treatment and alive in the hospital. Mangra Baraik happened to be the Chawkidar, but he also did not inform the police earlier. Such version was not disclosed by anybody else before 25.3.1995 i.e. for ten days when Nirmala Devi was under treatment and alive in the hospital. P.W. 7-I.O. has further clearly stated in paragmph-20 of his deposition that the independent witnesses had told before him that Nirmala Devi was burnt due to accidental fire, and the same was not caused by the accused-appellant. The informant (PW.6) in paragraph-1 stated that he had sent his wife on hearing that her daughter was burnt by the accused, but he did not go himself. Naturally, the informant's wife, who had reached there, could have the first hand account of the incident, but she had not been produced by the prosecution. The informant stated that Ganga Sao had come to inform him and he had gone to the hospital accompanied by said Ganga Sao, but said Ganga Sao had not bee" examined by the prosecution. That apart in the earlier prosecution version, there is no ailegation of any demand of dowry or torture relying thereto by the informant. The very ingredient of Section 304B I.P.C. is also missing in the foundation of the case. 12. In the case of Satvir Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another [ (2001)8 SCC 633 ], the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 3048 and held: "The essential components of Section 3048 are: (i) Death of a woman occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances, within 7 years of marriage. (ii) Soon before her death she should have been subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. When the above ingredients are fulfilled, the husband or his relative, who subjected her to such cruelty or harassment, can be presumed to be guilty of offence under Section 3048. To be within the province of the first ingredient the provision stipulates that "where the death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances". It may appear that the former limb which is described by the words "death caused by burns or bodily injury" is a redundancy because such death would also fall within the wider province of "death caused otherwise than under normal circumstances"." 13. It may appear that the former limb which is described by the words "death caused by burns or bodily injury" is a redundancy because such death would also fall within the wider province of "death caused otherwise than under normal circumstances"." 13. In the case of K. Prema S. Rao & Another vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao & Others [AI R 2003 Supreme Court 11], it has been further clearly held that if the main ingredient of the offence of 'demand of dowry' is absent, the accused cannot be said to have committed offence under Section 3048 I.P.C. and he cannot be convicted for the said offence. 14. Apart from the said legal lacuna and the very basis of the case, we find no positive evidence to suggest that the appellant set Nirmala Devi (wife) on fire, which caused her burn injury. The appellant is said to have sustained burn injury in both the hands in the process of saving his wife. He himself had given, the said statement before the police. He had taken his wife to the hospital and remained there. Even subsequently he did not escape; rather he surrendered himself in the court on 28.3.1995. D.Ws. 1 & 2 are the close door neighbours of the appellant. They have supported the defence version that it was accidental fire, which caused burn injury on the person of the deceased. 15. In view of the aforesaid contradictions, infirmity in the prosecution version and the evidences as also the surrounding circumstances, as discussed above, we find no ground for conviction of the appellant. The impugned judgment of conviction and the order of sentence of the appellant is, thus, not sustainable in law. 16. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the appellant. The appellant, who is in custody, shall be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not wanted in any other case.