Judgment :- The revision petitioner/petitioner/first defendant has filed this civil revision petition as against the order dated 18. 2006 in I.A.No.333 of 2005 in O.S.No.111 of 1998 passed by the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Villupuram in dismissing the application to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree dated 38. 2000. 2. The trial Court, while passing orders in I.A.No.333 of 2005, has inter alia opined that as per the version of P.W.1 he has come to know of the dismissal of the application in October 2001 and the present application has been filed on 04. 2002 after a delay of 186 days and as such, the reason assigned by the petitioner is not an acceptable one and consequently, dismissed the application without costs. 3. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the trial Court order in I.A.No.333 of 2005 is against law and further, the trial Court should not have approached the matter in issue in a technical manner and also it ought to have provided an opportunity to the petitioner to put forth his defence, which has been denied by the dismissal of the application under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code and in fact, the dismissal of Section 5 application as per Limitation Act has caused great prejudice to the petitioner and therefore, prays for allowing the civil revision petition. 4. This Court has heard the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and noticed the same. Previously the matter has come up for hearing for three times i.e. on 27. 2009, 30.7.2009 and on 08. 2009 but none has appeared for the respondent/Bank. 5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relies on the decision of Honble Supreme Court in Bank of India V. Metha Brothers and others (2009) 1 MLJ 81 (SC) wherein it is held that "Under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been clarified that an ex parte decree is ordinarily to be set aside only as against the defendants against whom the decree has been ex parte and the suit is to be revived only qua the defendant who applied for setting aside the ex parte decree. However, proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code clearly confers powers on the Court to set aside the entire decree where the said decree was of such a nature that it is expedient in the interest of justice to set aside the decree as against any or all of the other defendants also?" Further, in the aforesaid decision, it is also held as follows: "With regard to the question as to whether a contested decree by some of the defendants can be set aside while considering the application for setting aside the ex parte decree against one of the defendants, the answer would be that it would certainly depend on the nature of reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in his plaint and the nature of the decree in question. If the decree is indivisible, the Court would be at liberty to set aside the decree not only against the defendant who applied for setting aside the ex parte decree passed against him, but also as against all or any of the other defendants." 6. He also cites the decision in Bank of India V. M/s.Mehta Brothers and others AIR 1991 Delhi 194 at page 209 wherein it is held that Though the ordinary rule would be that where an ex parte decree is passed against other defendants, it should be set aside only against those defendants who apply for setting aside the same but the proviso enables the court to set it aside even as against other defendants who had appeared and contested the suit, even if the nature of the decree requires that it should be set aside against all other defendants as well. The object of the proviso is to provide for cases where it may be necessary for the ends of justice to set aside the decree not only against the defendant applying to have the same set aside but also against other defendants as well. There are two views one is that if the decree is one and indivisible it must be set aside in its entirety and not simply against the party or parties who had made applications for setting aside the same and this would be irrespective of the fact whether the decree has been passed in favour of some of the defendants. There are two views one is that if the decree is one and indivisible it must be set aside in its entirety and not simply against the party or parties who had made applications for setting aside the same and this would be irrespective of the fact whether the decree has been passed in favour of some of the defendants. The other view is that if the suit has been contested by some defendants and it has been dismissed on merits against them, such a decree is not against them and so the proviso would not empower the court to set aside the same. This, to my mind, seems to be the extreme view to take. I will opt for the first view. In the aforesaid decision at para 32 it is held as follows: "Now in this case, once the default in appearance was committed, it continues on all subsequent dates as there was no entry in the diary of the lawyers and every thing was forgotten about the case. Defendant No.6, however, remained under the belief that its case was being conducted all this time by its lawyers and the moment it was informed of the ex parte decree, it took immediate steps in the matter. From the evidence on record, therefore, I am quite satisfied that as far defendant No.6 is concerned there has been sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte decree and also for condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the same, gross negligence of its counsel notwithstanding. But then again that is not the end of the matter. The question which still remains to be decided is: If the decree is to be set aside only against defendant No.6 or even against defendants 1 to 5 as well and connected with this are the questions: if the plaintiff should have filed an appeal against the ex parte decree against defendant No.6 when its suit against defendants 1 to 5 had been dismissed and if the plea that the decree could not be set aside qua defendants 1 to 5 is barred by res judicata or principles analogous to res judicata or by principles or precedence." 7. He also invites the attention of this Court to the decision in Byilvan alias Ramasamy V. Mathiazhagan (2002) 1 MLJ 344 wherein it is held as follows: "Even though the defendant was different, lethargic and his conduct and attitude show that he was delaying the matter without approaching his counsel in time, in the interest of justice an opportunity can be given to the defendant to put forth his defence. If really the defendant has any valid defence in his case, he could not be deprived of opportunity of contesting the suit. The trial Court has also considered that aspect only and has found that the defendant can be given an opportunity to put forth his defence and accordingly, allowed the petition. Taking into consideration, the conduct and attitude of the defendant in conducting the case, the Court feels that cost of Rs.1,000 was awarded by the trial Court is not sufficient and the defendant must be directed to be paid some more cost." 8. Continuing further, he also seeks in aid of the decision of this Court in Syed Nusarathullah V. Natarajan and others (2006) 1 MLJ 630 wherein it is held as follows: "The words "Sufficient Cause" found in Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and while giving opportunity to the revision petitioner, the right accrued to the respondent is also to be kept in view and balance has to be struck and has to be applied." 9. It is useful to refer to the averment of the revision petitioner/first defendant made in I.A.No.333 of 2005 inter alia stating that he has been bedridden because of his heart illness and therefore, he has not appeared before the trial Court and he has not been able to file the written statement and he has not been negligent deliberately and he has filed an application to set aside the ex parte order dated 11. 2000 on 16. 2001 as per Order 9 Rule 7 C.P.C. and the same has been dismissed on 27. 2000 on 16. 2001 as per Order 9 Rule 7 C.P.C. and the same has been dismissed on 27. 2001 and after receipt of copy of the order, when he went for filing of an appeal at that time he has come to know through his counsel that there is no scope of filing an appeal against the order passed in I.A.No.564 of 2001 in law and therefore, the Section 5 Limitation Act application praying to condone the delay of 185 days in preferring the Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. application to set aside the ex parte decree dated 38. 2001 may be condoned in the interest of justice. 10. In the counter filed by the respondent/plaintiff Bank, it is among other things mentioned that the revision petitioner/first defendant has engaged counsel and has taken several adjournments till 12.01.2000 without filing written statement and later the revision petitioner and Madharsha who are the defendants 1 and 2 have remained ex parte and Tamilnadu Civil Supplies Corporation has filed the written statement and contested the suit and further the Officer of the Bank has been examined as D.W.1 and cross examined and the plaintiffs side has been closed and thereafter, the matter has been posted to 16. 2001 for the examination of the third defendant and only on that day, the revision petitioner has filed an application under Order 9 Rule 7 C.P.C. along with his written statement and the Bank has filed counter to the interlocutory application filed under Order 9 Rule 7 and the trial Court has held that the revision petitioner has been only watching the proceedings and with a view to drag on the proceedings the petitioner has filed the application and that the suit has been decreed against the revision petitioner/first defendant and the second defendant on 38. 2001 and moreover, no appeal has been filed by the revision petitioner/first defendant and later the respondent/Bank has filed an application praying for the passing of a final decree and as such, the revision petitioner has no right to file an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. and also the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that the judgment has been delivered in the suit as per Order 17 Rule 1 C.P.C. after a full fledged trial and hence, the application has to be dismissed. 11. 11. A perusal of the B Diary extract shows that on behalf of the first defendant, vakalat has been filed by his counsel on 08. 1998 and the matter has been posted for filing of revision petitioner/first defendant statement by 011. 1998 etc. On 011. 1998 the second defendant has been called absent and set ex parte and for filing of the written statement of D.1 and D.3, time has been extended till 01. 1999 and later the time has been extended from 01. 1999 to 13. 1999 and from 13. 1999 the time has been extended for filing of written statement of D.1 to D.3 to 30.6.1999 in respect of all the defendants and on 30.6.1999 the matter has been posted as last chance for filing of written statement to 011. 1999 and on 011. 1999 in view of Advocates Boycott the time for filing of written statement of D.1 to D.3 has been extended till 12. 1999 and on 12. 1999 for filing of written statement of D.1 to D.3, the matter has been adjourned to 11. 2000 as last chance and on 11. 2000 the written statement has not been filed and D.1 has been called absent and set ex parte etc. 12. It is true that the expression sufficient cause is elastic enough to apply the law in a purposeful way to secure the ends of justice. Equally while dealing with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the approach of Court of law ought to be in the manner of delivering evenhanded justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles on merits. Generally speaking, refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the early stage and the cause of justice being defeated. Overriding technical considerations the aim of achieving the substantial justice deserves to be preferred but one has to see whether the delay has occasioned on account of culpable negligence, wantonly, or on account malafides. It is needless to emphasise when a litigant causes delay, he runs a serious risk. 13. At this stage, this Court recalls the observation made in Myla Belli and others V. B.Rajagopal (2005) 3 M.L.J. 86 wherein it is laid down as follows: "In the case on hand, no sufficient cause is found. It is needless to emphasise when a litigant causes delay, he runs a serious risk. 13. At this stage, this Court recalls the observation made in Myla Belli and others V. B.Rajagopal (2005) 3 M.L.J. 86 wherein it is laid down as follows: "In the case on hand, no sufficient cause is found. While dealing with an application under Sec.5, of the Limitation Act, The Court ought not to light-heartedly disturb the legal right accruing to the opponent by the applicants failure in filing application in time." 14. In Mahabir Singh V. Subhash and others (2008) 1 MLJ 1214 (SC) the Honble Supreme Court has held thus: "Admittedly, an ex parte decree was passed. Defendant for getting it set aside was required to establish that either no summons was served on him or he had sufficient cause for remaining absent on the date fixed for hearing the suit ex parte. Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for 30 days time for filing such an application. Even assuming for the sake of argument that no proper step was taken by the appellant herein for service of summons upon the respondent and/or the service of summons was irregular, evidently, it was for the defendant-respondent to establish as to when he came to know about the passing of the ex parte decree. Even in his cross-examination, the first respondent has categorically admitted that he had approached the appellant herein for not giving effect thereto one and half year prior to filing of the application, and, thus, he must be deemed to have knowledge about passing of the said ex parte decree. The period of limitation would, thus, be reckoned from that day. As the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed one and a half year after the first respondent came to know about passing of the ex parte decree in the suit, the said application evidently was barred by limitation." 15. Furthermore, in A.P.Ramasamy V. Dhanalakshmi 2004-1-L.W. 406 wherein it is observed as follows: "A perusal of the particulars for the entire period, would make it clear that the conduct of the petitioner was consistently indifferent. In fact, though he has shifted his residence in May 2000, he has not cared to give the change of address to his lawyer and he has approached the Advocate only after two years, namely in 2002. In fact, though he has shifted his residence in May 2000, he has not cared to give the change of address to his lawyer and he has approached the Advocate only after two years, namely in 2002. He though it fit to file the application to condone the delay only after receiving notice in the application filed by the respondent/ plaintiff for passing final decree. Thus, it is clear that the reasons for the delay have to be held as unreasonable and the same would not show that he is bona fide." 16. It is relevant to make a mention that in I.A.No.333 of 2005 the revision petitioner/first defendant in his affidavit has not averred specific date on which he has come to know through his counsel that in law there is no scope for filing of an appeal but only in his evidence in cross examination as P.W.1 in I.A.No.333 of 2005 he has among other things deposed that he has come to know about the dismissal of application dated 27. 2001 in I.A.No.564 of 2001 under Order 9 Rule 7 C.P.C., after a lapse of 100 days from the date of its dismissal and only on 04.04.2002 after passing of the decree on 38. 2001 the present application I.A.No.333 of 2005 has been filed. The respondent/plaintiff Bank has filed I.A.No.123 of 2004 for passing of a final decree in regard to the sale of hypothecation under Order 34 Rule 5 read with Section 151 C.P.C. in which on 12. 2004 notice has been ordered to the respondents therein returnable by 08.03.2004. On 03. 2004 in I.A.No.123 of 2004 batta has been paid and the same has been ordered to be issued for respondents 1 and 2 returnable by 05.04.2004 and on 05.04.2004 in I.A.No.123 of 2004 Notes Paper which has been endorsed in blue ink as R1 and R2 has no residence, copy is returned and therefore, the Court has ordered steps through paper publication in daily newspaper (Makkal Kural) by 24. 2004 and again on 22.04.2004 fresh paper publication for R1 and R2 in the same Tamil paper has been ordered to be made by 26. 2004 and on 26. 2004 paper publication has been effected and R2 has been called absent, set ex parte and for R1 Mr.P.Govindarajan, who has already on record for R1 has been given time for filing counter by 27. 2004 and on 26. 2004 paper publication has been effected and R2 has been called absent, set ex parte and for R1 Mr.P.Govindarajan, who has already on record for R1 has been given time for filing counter by 27. 2004 and again for counter of R1, the same has been extended by 18. 2004 and again for filing of counter, the matter has been adjourned to 18. 2004, 28. 2004 and the matter has been posted on 20.09.2004 for counter of R1 as last chance by 010. 2004 and since the Judge was on CL on 010. 2004 the matter has been reposted to 110. 2004 and again from 110. 2004 the matter has been adjourned to 210. 2004 for filing of counter of R1 and on 210. 2004 the counter has been filed and the matter has been posted for enquiry by 011. 2004 etc. and on 29.08.2006 in I.A.No.123 of 2004 the final decree has been passed by the trial Court. As a matter of fact, though in I.A.No.123 of 2004 notice has been ordered on 13.02.2004 by the trial Court, only on 210. 2004 the revision petitioner/first defendant/first respondent has filed his counter after nearly a lapse of eight months. 17. It is quite evident that the respondent/plaintiff has averred in the plaint in O.S.No.111 of 1998 before the trial Court praying for the relief of a preliminary mortgage decree against the defendants 1 and 2 and a personal decree against all the defendants directing them to pay the sum of Rs.1,78,753/-with subsequent interest at 21.42% per annum from the date of the plaint till the date of discharge of the amount in full, as per Section 34 of Civil Procedure Code, within a time stipulated by this Court and in default of such payment, a final decree be passed for the sale of the hypotheca and the sale proceeds be paid to the plaintiff etc. 18. Admittedly, the final decree has been passed in I.A.No.123 of 2004 in O.S.No.111 of 1998 on 28. 2006. The revision petitioner/first defendant has filed his counter to the final decree proceedings in I.A.No.123 of 2004 and after contest, final order has been passed by the trial Court. 19. 18. Admittedly, the final decree has been passed in I.A.No.123 of 2004 in O.S.No.111 of 1998 on 28. 2006. The revision petitioner/first defendant has filed his counter to the final decree proceedings in I.A.No.123 of 2004 and after contest, final order has been passed by the trial Court. 19. On a careful consideration of respective contentions, even though the revision petitioner/first defendant in his affidavit in I.A.No.333 of 2005 has averred that he has been bedridden because of heart illness and therefore, he has not filed his written statement and consequently, set ex parte on 11. 2000, inasmuch as he has deposed in his evidence as P.W.1 in I.A.No.333 of 2005 to the effect that he has come to know about the dismissal of the I.A.No.564 of 2001 Order 9 Rule 7 application after a lapse of 100 days from the date of order of dismissal dated 27. 2001 and in reality, when he has projected the I.A.No.333 of 2005 only on 04.04.2002 after a gap of 186 days delay, this Court is of the considered view that the revision petitioner/first defendant has not shown sufficient cause to the subjective satisfaction of this Court in regard to the condonation of delay application in preferring Order 9 Rule 13 application to set aside the ex parte decree dated 38. 2001 (admittedly no semblance of proof by means of documentary evidence in regard to the heart illness has been adduced or produced) and as such, I.A.No.333 of 2005 cannot be allowed in a caviler fashion and on the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to take a liberal view of the matter and resultantly, the order passed in I.A.No.333 of 2005 dated 18. 2006 by the trial Court in dismissing the same is proper and valid one in the eye of law and consequently, the civil revision petition fails. 20. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The order passed by the trial Court in I.A.No.333 of 2005 is confirmed for the reasons assigned by this Court in this revision. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.