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2009 DIGILAW 314 (MAD)

Venkatarathinam v. Pramila Jain

2009-01-23

G.RAJASURIA

body2009
Judgment :- Animadverting upon the order dated 26.08.2008 passed by the XIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai in M.P.No.307 of 2008 in RCOP No.2016 of 2007, this civil revision petition is focussed. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the respondent. Despite printing the name concerned, neither the counsel nor the petitioner appeared. 3. An epitome and summarization of the relevant facts which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this revision petition would run thus: The respondent/petitioner filed the RCOP No.2016 of 2007 for eviction as against the revision petitioner herein on the ground of wiful default in payment of rent. On the respondent/petitioners side, the petitioners Manager was examined as P.W.1 and documents were marked and he was also cross examined by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. when the matter has been posted for respondents evidence, the M.P.No.307 of 2008 came to be filed by the revision petitioner herein praying the Court to summon the respondent/petitioner, the land lady for being examined as one of the witnesses along with two other witnesses. Whereupon, the Rent Controller, by his order dated 26.08.2008 allowed the prayer of the petitioner to summon one witness and disallowed the prayer regarding two other witnesses including the respondent/petitioner herein. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of the lower Court, this revision is focussed on various grounds. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent/ petitioner would submit that the order of the lower Court is correct and legal and no interference with it is warranted; on the respondent/petitioners side, her Manager was examined; simply because the revision petitioner alleged that the said Manager of the landlady had not deposed relating to various facts which the revision petitioner wanted him to depose, it cannot be a ground for summoning the principal, namely the landlady. In support of his contention, the learned counsel would cite the decision of this Court reported in 2005 CTC 773 [Minor Arumugam @ Logesh and another vs. State Bank of India, Karur Road, by its Chief Manager and others]. The warp and woof of the dictum as found enunciated in the cited decision is to the effect that when there is conflicting of interests between the person who seek to summon the witness, then the Court should not be justified in summoning such a witness at the instance of the said witnesss opponent. 5. The warp and woof of the dictum as found enunciated in the cited decision is to the effect that when there is conflicting of interests between the person who seek to summon the witness, then the Court should not be justified in summoning such a witness at the instance of the said witnesss opponent. 5. No doubt at this juncture I would like to call up and recollect Order 16 Rule 21 of C.P.C by way of taking a cue from it. Simply because there is a provision for one party to summon another party, mechanically the same should not be adopted irrespective of the attending circumstances in a case. Even assuming that the landlady is brought before the Court as a witness, the question arises as to whether straightaway any fruitful chief examination could be conducted by the tenant. At the most, the tenant would be liking to cross examine the landlady by treating her as a Court witness. Apparently, there is no prayer in the petition to that effect. Simply the petitioner wanted to summon the landlady because her Manager replied to certain questions as though he had no personal knowledge about the auction. In my considered opinion, in a petition filed by the landlady for eviction as against the tenant, normally the tenant would not have the right to summon the landlady when she herself has not preferred to appear as a witness. In the meantime I would like to refer to the following decisions of the Apex Court. (i) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1341 (Iswar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behera and another) "29. Applying the principles stated above to the instant case, it would be found that in the instant case also the appellant had abstained from the witness-box and had not made any statement on oath in support of his pleading set out in the written statement. An adverse inference has, therefore, to be drawn against him. Since it was specifically stated by Respondent 2 in his statement on oath that it was at the instance of the appellant that he had issued the cheque on the account of Respondent 1 in Central Bank of India Ltd., Sambalpur Branch and the appellant, admittedly, had encashed that cheque, an inference has to be drawn against the appellant that what he stated in the written statement was not correct. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of Respondent 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also." .(ii) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1441 (Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another) "15. It was Defendant 1 who contended that the sale deed executed by Defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff was fictitious and the whole transaction was a bogus transaction as only Rs.500 were paid as sale consideration to Defendant 2. He further claimed that payment of Rs.4500 to Defendant 2 at his home before the registration of the deed was wholly incorrect. This plea was not supported by Defendant 1 as he did not enter the witness-box. He did not state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath in the trial court and avoided the witness-box so that he may not be cross-examined. This, by itself, is enough to reject the claim that the transaction of sale between Defendant 2 and the plaintiff was a bogus transaction. 17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh case. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath held that if a party abstains from entering the witness-box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box." 6. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box." 6. The Apex Court in the cited decision would highlight and spotlight in addition to home in on the point that if in a case there are certain facts which are exclusively within the knowledge of the plaintiff and if such a party shuns the witness box, then in that event the Court could draw adverse inference, but this is not a case of that nature as my above discussion supra would demonstrate the same. The lower Court also in its order would refer to the fact that the landlady is a pardhanashin lady and she expressed her desire not to figure as a witness at the instance of the revision petitioner/tenant herein and in such a case, that is also an additional factor which enures to the benefit of the landlady not to appear as a witness in the Court. Simply because the tenant would contend that a huge amount of advance was paid to the erstwhile owner of the property, he is not justified in compelling the present owner of the property, namely the landlady who took the property in public auction sale to appear as a witness. Hence for these reasons, I could see no infirmity in the order passed by the lower Court and accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed confirming the order of the lower court. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is closed.