Judgment :- Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the award of the second respondent Labour Court, dated 11. 2004, made in I.D. No. 395 of 1996. 3. It has been stated that the first respondent was an employee, as a temporary peon, in the Records Section, between 29. 1993 and 19.2 1994 and in the B.A. Section between 9. 1995 and 2. 1996, on daily wages. The employment of the first respondent by the petitioner University is purely temporary and it is made at the time of the admission of the students, conducting of examinations and at the time of the issuing of the certificates etc., to cope up with the increased workload. The availability of the extra work is only seasonal and there would be no need to employ temporary hands during the normal times. Since there was no necessity for employing the petitioner, his service had not been continued. In such circumstances, the petitioner had raised an industrial dispute before the second respondent Labour Court, in I.D. No. 395 of 1996. On an erroneous view on the facts and the law, the second respondent Labour Court had passed an award, dated 11. 2004, reinstating the first respondent in service with backwages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. In such circumstances, the petitioner University had preferred the present writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe petitioner University had contended that the question of retrenchment would not arise in the case of the first respondent, in view of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inasmuch as his employment had not been renewed after it came to an end, on 2. 1996. Consequently, the provisions of 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would not be attracted. The first respondent was never paid the monthly salary of Rs. 1,020/-, as he was only paid daily wages for the work done by him when he was employed under the petitioner University. The period of his service, as mentioned by him in the petition, has also been disputed. The first respondent had not worked for a continuous period of 240 days, as claimed by him. 1,020/-, as he was only paid daily wages for the work done by him when he was employed under the petitioner University. The period of his service, as mentioned by him in the petition, has also been disputed. The first respondent had not worked for a continuous period of 240 days, as claimed by him. In fact, he has been employed in different Sections of the petitioner University till 2. 1996 and thereafter, his service was not renewed, since the employment of the first respondent was purely on a temporary basis. The second respondent Labour Court had erred in reinstating him in service, with continuity of service, backwages and all other attendant benefits, since the first respondent was neither appointed through the employment exchange nor was he employed in a permanent post. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent had contended that the first respondent had been in continuous employment under the petitioner University and there was no plea raised on behalf of the petitioner University before the second respondent Labour Court that the employment of the first respondent was contrary to the service Rules of the petitioner University. It is not correct to state that the definition of workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, excludes those who have not come through the employment exchange. Since the petitioner University has contravened the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by its unfair labour practice, it cannot claim that the first respondent has been irregularly employed. The rules and regulations of the petitioner University had not been placed before the second respondent Labour Court during the enquiry of the Industrial dispute. No opportunity had been granted to the first respondent, when the matter was being heard by the second respondent Labour Court, to meet the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner University before this Court, at this stage. The decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would not be applicable to the present case. Even if the workman had not been employed for a continuous period of 240 days, the break in service could not be attributed to him. 6. The decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would not be applicable to the present case. Even if the workman had not been employed for a continuous period of 240 days, the break in service could not be attributed to him. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner University had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in M.P. Housing Board and Another v. Manoj Shrivastava JT (2006) 3 SC 73 wherein it was held that a person with a view to obtain the status ofa permanent employee must be appointed in terms of the statutory rules. It is not the case of the respondent that he was appointed against a vacant post, which was duly sanctioned by the statutory authority, or that his appointment was made by following the statutory law operating in the field. It is now well-settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularised in service. 7. In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi (3) AIR 2006 SC 1806 : (2006) 4 SCC (2006) 2 MLJ 326 : 2006-II-LLJ-722, the Supreme Court had held as follows: Paragraphs 12 and 45 read as follows: "12. In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, in posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the required procedure to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by the Constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State Government cannot but be recognised and there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a Court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have fhe right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a Court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have fhe right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognised and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for the Courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme. 45. While. directing that appointments, temporary or casual be regularised or made, permanent, the Courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware ofthe nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain – not at arms length — since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts what-ever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissi-ble. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bar-gaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and "if imposed, would only mean- that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when se-curing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and "if imposed, would only mean- that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when se-curing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the- employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post. it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not (sic) one that would en-able the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touch-stone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution." 8. In W.A. Nos. 266 and 267 of 2007, dated 8. 2007, State of Tamil Nadu rep, by its Secretary Personnel & Administrative Reforms Department v. K. Dhanasekaran and Others, the Division Bench of this Court had held that the question of regularisation, absorption or permanency of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees, appointed or recruited de hors the rules applicable for such appointment or recruitment, even if continued for a long time, cannot be done, unless there is a scheme for such regularisation, abortion or granting of permanency of employment. .9. .9. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent had relied on the decision of this Court in Madhya Pradesh Bank Karmachari Sangh (MP.) v. Syndicate Bank and Another 1997-III-LLJ (Suppl)-536 (M.P.): (1996) 2 LLN 747, wherein it had been held that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are to be construed, benevolently, in favour of the workman. They are not to be interpreted in the manner which may stifle the main provision. If the workman is allowed to continue in service by making periodic appointments, from time to time, then it can be said, that the case would not fall under Section 2(oo)(bb). If the workman continues in service, the non-renewal of the contract can be deemed as malade and it may amount to a fraud on the statute. There would be a wrong presumption of non-applicability of Section 2(oo) (bb) where the work is of a continuous nature and there is nothing on record to show that the work for which a workman has been appointed had come to an end. 10. In such circumstances, the award of the second respondent Labour Court, dated 11. 2004, made in I.D. No. 395 of 1996, reinstating the first respondent in the service of the petitioner University, with backwages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits, is valid, as it is in accordance with law and therefore, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner University is liable to be dismissed, as devoid of merits. .11. At the stage of the hearing of the writ petition, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner University had placed before this Court a communication, from the Registrar-in-charge of the petitioner university, dated 1.12 2008, in F.I.(B)/ESTT/2008/ 3855/, which is as follows: ."With reference to your letter cited, I am, by direction, to inform that the Temporary vacancies are available on daily wages basis only and Madras University cannot give guarantee for employment throughout, the year. Subject to the order ofthe Honourable High Court, Madras University can consider and give temporary appointment on daily wages without back wages." 12. In view of the said communication, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent had submitted that appropriate orders may be passed by this Court to employ the first respondent in the petitioner university. Subject to the order ofthe Honourable High Court, Madras University can consider and give temporary appointment on daily wages without back wages." 12. In view of the said communication, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent had submitted that appropriate orders may be passed by this Court to employ the first respondent in the petitioner university. It was also prayed that this Court may be pleased to pass an order restraining the petitioner University from recovering an amount ofRs. 50,000/-, withdrawn by the first respondent workman out of the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- deposited by the petitioner University before the second respondent Labour Court, pursuant to the interim order, dated 24. 2004, passed by this Court, in W.P.M.P. No. 13585 of 2004, in W.P. No. 11538 of 2004. 13. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner University, as well as the first respondent workman, the award of the second respondent Labour Court, dated 11. 2004, made in I. D. No. 395 of 1996, is set aside and the petitioner University is directed to provide employment to the first respondent, as stated in the communication of the petitioner University, dated 12. 2008, in F.1.(B)/ESTT/2008/3855/. The petitioner University is not entitled to recover the amount withdrawn by the first respondent, pursuant to the order passed by this Court, on 24. 2004, in W.P.M.P. No. 13585 of 2004, in W.P. No. 11538 of 2004. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.