MEKASTER TELEMATICS LTD v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, PRADESHIYA INDUSTRIAL AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF U. P. LTD.
2009-09-17
AMITAVA LALA, RAJES KUMAR
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—Since both the aforesaid writ petitions are connected and have been heard analogously, the same are being decided by this common judgment and order having binding effect upon both the writ petitions. 2. So far as the first writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2995 of 2005) is concerned, the petitioner herein, namely, M/s Mekaster Telematics Ltd. (hereinafter in short called as the ‘company’) has filed this writ petition for the purpose of quashing all the steps taken by the respective respondents in pursuance of the notice dated 15th April, 2004, by which the Managing Director and concerned Regional Director of the Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. (hereinafter in short called as ‘PICUP’), being respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein, have already auctioned the immovable property situated at C-294, Sector 10, NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh being factory premises of the company. A further prayer has been made for quashing of any transfer of such property in favour of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 or any other person deriving title through them. In addition thereto, it is further prayed that the respondent No. 4 be directed to return the possession to the company and for quashing of the recovery proceedings against the company or its guarantor or Director under the Uttar Pradesh Public Monies (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Act, 1972’). 2-A. According to the company, it is an industrial company. For some reason or the other, the company faced financial difficulties and become sick within the meaning of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘SICA’). As a result whereof, the company was registered with the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter in short called as the ‘BIFR’) under Section 15 of the SICA on 14th November, 2003. On 27th March, 2004 an auction was held by the respondent No. 3 (Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dadri) for a consideration of Rs. 42 lacs. On 15th April, 2004 a letter was addressed to the company by the respondent No. 3 informing that the property was auctioned and they have received the aforesaid sum as maximum amount. On 19th April, 2004 the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, being representatives of PICUP informed the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad to keep the recovery against the company in abeyance until permission is obtained from BIFR.
On 19th April, 2004 the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, being representatives of PICUP informed the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad to keep the recovery against the company in abeyance until permission is obtained from BIFR. On 26th April, 2004 the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application before the BIFR with a request to allow the respondents to proceed with the recovery. The company informed the respondent No. 3 on 27th April, 2004 not to take any coercive action against the company since the matter is pending before the BIFR. PICUP has contended before this Court that they have received the entire sum due and payable by the company to the PICUP on account of loan but before that the possession had been handed over to the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, being purchasers of the property in the auction purchase. Against this background, this writ petition was filed. 3. In the second writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20396 of 2006), the contention of the petitioner herein is that auction sale of the land and building occupied by the company cannot be made by the PICUP. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that in the year 1999 such petitioner granted a loan of Rs. 75,00,000/- to the company in consideration of mortgage of aforesaid land and building by deposit of title deed. The memorandum of equitable mortgage was also executed. However, the loan remains unpaid. Charge of such petitioner over the said property was registered by the certificate dated 7th October, 1999 with the Registrar of the Companies. The loan agreement between the company and the PICUP was executed on the hypothecation agreements dated 30th September, 1995 and 22nd May, 1998 with regard to plant and machinery only but not with regard to land and building. Therefore, charge of the PICUP and repayment, if any, only related to movable properties and thus, the immovable properties of the borrower company could not have been sold as the same was mortgaged with the petitioner and the charge of the property was registered. However, the sale has been done in violation of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Sale of the property was done for a paltry sum. In any event, the sale of the property is void as the PICUP has only right with regard to plant and machinery. 4.
However, the sale has been done in violation of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Sale of the property was done for a paltry sum. In any event, the sale of the property is void as the PICUP has only right with regard to plant and machinery. 4. The respondent No. 5, auction purchaser, has taken the plea that auction sale has been confirmed in his favour and he has paid the price and is in possession of the property in dispute. A detailed order was passed by a Division Bench of this Court on 8th May, 2008 after hearing the parties by postponing the hearing and awaiting the result of the reference made by the Supreme Court on account of conflicting decisions on the point of interpretation of Section 22 of the SICA. This order has not been challenged by either of the parties. The matter has, thus, become final to the effect that till such time as the matter is not resolved or decided by the Supreme Court, the case would not be heard. This is a binding order between the parties and it is well settled by the Supreme Court that res judicata applies at subsequent stages of the proceeding. Thus, the matter cannot be heard unless the order dated 8th May, 2008 is recalled, reviewed or modified. There is no application for recalling or review of that order. Both the Hon’ble Judges, who passed the order, are available, hence, for recall or review the matter is to be placed before that very Bench under the Rules of the Court. So far as the procedure is concerned, it has been said that there is a complete procedure provided under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘UPZA & LR Act’) and the Rules framed thereunder, namely, Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘UPZA & LR Rules’) to file the objections against the auction sale before the Commissioner of the Division, wherein the property is situated. Thereafter, aggrieved party has been given right to file revision. It has also been contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to such proceedings. There is no averment in the writ petition why the normal statutory remedy will not be followed by the company.
Thereafter, aggrieved party has been given right to file revision. It has also been contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to such proceedings. There is no averment in the writ petition why the normal statutory remedy will not be followed by the company. The company has suppressed such fact that there is an alternative statutory remedy. No explanation has been given by the company to come to this Court belatedly. There is no whisper in the writ petition as to what was he doing after the confirmation of sale. Approach to this Court has been made after a period of eight months after the confirmation of sale. The company has also not challenged the sale of plant and machinery for sum of Rs. 1.57 lacs, which has taken place on 28th March, 2003 i.e. about two years earlier to the filing of the writ petition. There is no factory or company, which could be rehabilitated and, therefore, SICA is not applicable. BIFR has ultimately rejected the application for registration under Section 22 of SICA. The company has filed an appeal wherein the arguments have been heard and the judgment is reserved. The company has not brought any stay order before this Court nor is there any stay order, to the best of knowledge of the respondent No. 5. He further contended that it has also been held by the Supreme Court in JT 1995 (5) SC 474, U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow v. State of U.P. and others that when the matter in issue is pending before the higher Court, the High Court should not decide the question and the best course is to relegate the parties to a normal remedy which is provided under the statutes. Even after the finalization of this proceeding under the statute, there is a regular remedy for filing the suit, where all the questions disputed or otherwise can be gone into and an effective decision can be obtained. Hence, the writ petition/s is/are liable to be dismissed. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the company cited various decisions to establish his case.
Even after the finalization of this proceeding under the statute, there is a regular remedy for filing the suit, where all the questions disputed or otherwise can be gone into and an effective decision can be obtained. Hence, the writ petition/s is/are liable to be dismissed. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the company cited various decisions to establish his case. Firstly, he relied upon 2004 (7) SCC 166 , S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, to establish that alternative remedy is no bar to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Act, 1951’) must be exercised bonafide and fairly. He has relied upon another judgment reported in 2004 (7) SCC 151 , Gajraj Jain v. State of Bihar and others, to establish that at the time of sale under Section 29 of the Act, 1951 the best possible price must be realized. A financial corporation must not act unreasonably. Reasonableness is to be tested against the dominant consideration to secure the best price. He further cited a judgment reported in 1993 (2) SCC 144 , Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and another, to say that if the State Financial Corporation is permitted to resort to the provision of Section 29 of the Act, 1951 while proceedings under Sections 15 to 19 of the SICA are pending, it will render the entire process nugatory. Therefore, consent of BIFR is necessary before any sale. By applying the test of JT 2004 (8) SC 340, Allahabad Bank etc. etc. v. Bengal Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and others etc., he contended that one cannot be deprived of both in money and property. Following the ratio of 2008 (1) SCC 533 , Zenith Steel Tubes & Industries Ltd. and another v. SICOM Limited, learned Counsel appearing for the company contended that the object of the SICA is primarily to assist sick industries, which are failed to meet their financial obligations. By showing AIR 2003 SC 2103 , M/s. Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and others, he submits that the mode of recovery by proceedings under the Act, 1972 is not permissible.
By showing AIR 2003 SC 2103 , M/s. Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and others, he submits that the mode of recovery by proceedings under the Act, 1972 is not permissible. The Act, 1972 deals with separate modes of recovery and such proceedings are not relatable to proceedings under the Financial Act. AIR 1997 SC 2027 , Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and others v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals and others speaks about suspension of legal proceedings and applies only to such dues reckoned or included in sanctioned scheme for rehabilitation. By showing II (1999) BC 370 (DB), Modistone Ltd. v. State of Kerala, it has been submitted before us that the legislative intention is to see that no proceedings against the assets are to be taken before any decision is given by the BIFR. In case the company’s assets are sold or the company wound up, it may indeed become difficult later to restore the status quo ante. Relying upon 2004 (6) SCC 758 , Pawan Kumar Jain v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and others, he further added that under the Act, 1972 action against the guarantor cannot be taken until the property of the principal debtor is first sold of. In AIR 2000 SC 2553 , M/s. Patheja Bros. Forgings and Stamping and another v. I.C.I.C.I. Ltd. and others, a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court held that in case of sick company suit against the guarantor is not maintainable or cannot be proceeded with without sanction of the Board or Appellate Authority under the SICA. 6. Against this background, we are of the view that it is an impractical approach to say that the Court of law will wait indefinitely for the purpose of settlement of issue unless the same point is under active consideration of the Supreme Court. In this regard, this Court has already considered the issue in the judgments reported in 2008 (7) ADJ 546 (DB), M/s Mak Plastics (P) Ltd. and others v. U.P. Financial Corporation and others; and 2009 (7) ADJ 276 (DB), New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Gogi and others. Therefore, at the stage of final hearing we do not feel uncomfortable in hearing the issue. 7.
Ltd. v. Smt. Gogi and others. Therefore, at the stage of final hearing we do not feel uncomfortable in hearing the issue. 7. According to us, whether repayment of loan amount by the petitioner company to the PICUP, automatically creates right in favour of the petitioner company to get back the property from purchaser under the auction sale and/or, whether PICUP had right only in respect of the plant and machinery but not in respect of land and building, therefore, the transfer of landed property is bad and/or, whether before completion of BIFR proceedings or without permission of such forum, the sale has rightly taken place and/or, whether the guarantor has co-extensive right of repayment of loan amount and/or, whether there is any question of payability of interest, all such questions seem to be diversified academic questions before the writ Court at present. Moot point for consideration is whether the respondent No. 5 being a private party can be able to retain possession of the property in question in spite of repayment of loan amount by the petitioner company to PICUP and the respondent No. 5 will relinquish possessory right in favour of the petitioners company of the first writ petition due to such payment of loan amount or in favour of the petitioner of the second writ petition, as he claimed that the land and building are not under the mortgage of PICUP, is required to be considered by an appropriate forum having right to determine possessory right, title, interest inter se private parties. We cannot advise the writ petitioner/s either to go before the BIFR or its Appellate Authority or before any forum under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act or in the Civil Court with regular or summary suit. It is entirely open for the petitioner to invoke appropriate jurisdiction in such a complex situation. This Court only holds that there is alternative forum for adjudication of such type of disputes. Having so, we dismiss both the writ petitions without entering into the merit. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 8. No order is passed as to cost. 9. However, passing of this order will in no way affect the right of either of the petitioners to invoke the appropriate forum for adjudication to get appropriate relief on merit as expeditiously as possible. Hon’ble Rajes Kumar, J.—I agree. ————