ORDER This Revision petition is directed against the order dated 25-09-2008 in E.P.No.50 of 1996 in O.S.No.33 of 1985 on the file of the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Hindupur. 2. The respondents 1 to 5 herein are the plaintiffs who filed the suit seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale allegedly executed by the 151 defendant L. Venkata Krishna Reddy. The 2nd defendant - L. Ramanagopal Reddy - is the son of the defendant NO.1. Though appearance was entered on behalf of the defendants, since their counsel reported no instructions they were set ex parte and the suit was decreed with costs by judgment and decree dated 11-08-1992 directing the 151 defendant to execute a registered sale deed as per the terms of agreement of sale dated 19-04-1980 in respect of the suit schedule building in favour of the plaintiffs by 21-09-1992 and in case the 151 defendant fails to comply with the above clause granting liberty to the plaintiffs to get the sale deed registered through the Court on behalf of the 151 defendant on depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/of Rs.2,50,000/- and necessary registration charges in the Court. 3. Pursuant thereto, the plaintiffs 2 to 4 (respondents 2 to 5 herein) along with respondents 6 to 24 who are the legal representatives of the deceasd-151 plaintiff filed E.P.No. 50 of 1996 under Order XXI, Rule 32 CPC with a prayer to direct the Judgment Debtors to execute a sale deed as per the terms of the agreement of sale dated 19-04-1980 with respect to suit schedule property after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- being deposited in the court. A further direction was sought for delivery of the possession of the suit schedule property to the decree holders. 4. It is to be noted that by that time the 151 defendant - L. Venkata Krishna Reddy died and representing his estate-petitioners 2 to 7 herein were added as respondents 1 to 6 to E.P.No.50 of 1996. They filed a counter in the E.P. contending that since the decree-holders failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within a reasonable time from the date of decree, they were not entitled to the relief. They filed a counter in the E.P. contending that since the decree-holders failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within a reasonable time from the date of decree, they were not entitled to the relief. While claiming that the value of the property was more than Rs.40 lakhs, it was also contended that the decree-holders had no money or ready cash to perform their part of contract as was evident from the fact that the balance sale consideration was deposited only on 22-4-1995 (sic. 1996), long after filing the E.P. 5. After hearing both the parties, the Court below by order dated 19-01-2007 allowed E.P.No.50 of 1996. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioners herein filed Civil Revision Petition No. 607 of 2007. The said revision petition was allowed by this Court by order dated 01-11-2007 and the matter was remitted to the trial court for consideration afresh. Thereafter, oral and documentary evidence was produced by both the parties and on appreciation of the same the Court below by order dated 25-09-2008 allowed E.P.No.50 of 1996. The said order dated 25-09-2008 is under challenge in this Civil Revision Petition. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material on record. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners while pointing out that the balance sale consideration was deposited by the decree holders after a long delay of about three (3) years from the date of decree, vehemently contended that the Court below ought to have dismissed the execution petition on that ground alone. It is also contended that in view of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Court below ought to have held that the contract was deemed to have been rescinded on the ground of unreasonable delay in complying with the direction to deposit the amount as per the decree. The learned counsel further contended that the conclusion of the court below that it cannot go beyond the decree is contrary to the well settled principle that in a suit for specific performance the contract subsists even after the decree and that the decree is in the nature of a preliminary decree. The learned counsel further contended that the conclusion of the court below that it cannot go beyond the decree is contrary to the well settled principle that in a suit for specific performance the contract subsists even after the decree and that the decree is in the nature of a preliminary decree. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the decisions in Hunger ford Investment Trust Limited v. Haridas Mundhra and others ( AIR 1972 SC 1826 = (1972) 3 SCC 684 and C. Venkata Rao v. B.B.G. Sharma 1987 (2) ALT 229 . 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that since no time was prescribed in the decree for depositing the balance sale consideration, the question of either rescission of contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or extension of time for making the payment does not arise and the Execution Petition was rightly allowed by the Court below. 9. Before going into the rival contentions raised by the parties, it is necessary to notice the decree dated 11-08-1992 in O.S.No.33 of 1985 which runs as under: ". .. ... ... this Court doth order and decree: That the 151 defendant be and hereby directed to execute a Registered Sale Deed as per the terms of the agreement of sale dated 19-4-1980 in respect of the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs by 21-01-1992 (sic 21-09-1992); That in case of default by the 151 defendant to comply the above clause the plaintiffs are at liberty to get the sale deed registered through Court on behalf of the 1st defendant on depositing balance of sale consideration for amount of Rs.2,50,000/- and necessary registration fee charges in the court; and That the defendant do pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs.5,728/- towards costs of this suit and do bear their own costs of Rs.2/-." 10. On a perusal of the decree it is clear that except a direction to the 1st defendant to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs by 21-09-1992, there was no specific direction that the balance sale consideration should be paid by the plaintiffs before execution of such sale deed. On a perusal of the decree it is clear that except a direction to the 1st defendant to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs by 21-09-1992, there was no specific direction that the balance sale consideration should be paid by the plaintiffs before execution of such sale deed. However in the second part of the decree while granting liberty to the plaintiffs to get the sale deed registered through the Court in case of default by the 1st defendant to execute a Registered Sale Deed by 21-09-1992, it was mentioned that the same would be on depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- and necessary registration charges in the court. 11. Having regard to the recitals in the second part of the decree, the learned Counsel for the Revision petitioners contended that the plaintiffs were bound to pay the balance sale consideration on or before 21-09-1992 and since they failed to do so they were not entitled to seek execution of the decree. 12. The very same contention was raised before this Court by the Revision petitioners/defendants in the earlier round of litigation in C.R.P.No.607 of 2007. This Court while negativing the said contention held at page-4 of the order dated 1-11-2007 in C.R.P.No.609 of 2007 as under: If the date is fixed for deposit of the balance sale consideration as is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, the question of permitting the decree holders again to deposit the balance sale consideration and necessary registration charges for getting the sale deed registered through Court would not arise. Therefore, the time granted to the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed by 21-9-1992 obviously cannot be the upper limit for depositing the amount necessitating the decree holders to seek extension of time for depositing the balance sale consideration. The default clause contained in the latter part of the decree clearly shows that the decree holders can deposit the balance sale consideration before the executing Court and can request the Court to direct the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed by the Court itself in the event of non-compliance of the direction of the Court by the judgment debtors" 13. Having taken note of the fact that though the decree was passed on 12-8-1992 directing execution of the sale deed by 21-9-1992, the balance sale consideration was deposited by the decree-holders on 24-2-1995, this Court further observed as under: "It is no doubt true that there has been long delay in depositing the amount, which was made admittedly on 24-02-1995, although the decree was passed on 12-8-1992. From this circumstance is it legitimate to conclude that the decree holders are not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. But before raising such question, the judgment debtor shall explain as to why he has not complied with the decree direction. Having not obeyed the direction of the Court, it is not legitimately open to the judgment debtors to contend that there is enormous delay on the part of the decree holders in depositing the amount. The contumacious conduct on the part of the judgment debtors in executing the sale deed in utter disregard to the direction of the Court cannot also be lost sight of." 14. It is also relevant to note the following observations made by this Court at page-20 of the said Order: "There has been no explanation whatsoever forthcoming in this case from the decree holder as to why he did not deposit the balance sale consideration. The Court has to see reasonableness of the request for extension of time or as to whether it is a fairly a case for recession of the contract. Inasmuch as the contract between the parties is not abrogated and exists notwithstanding the decree passed by the court the executing court still has to consider as to whether decree holder is entitled to the equitable relief of the equity lies in rescinding the contract with reference to matrix of the case and respective contentions. There seems to have been no endeavour on the part of the executing court to consider these aspects. A clear and unequivocal finding is needed to be reached by the court. Therefore the matter requires to be remitted to the executing court for fresh consideration. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the court below for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made inter alia in the order. Therefore, there shall be no separate order as to costs." 15. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the court below for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made inter alia in the order. Therefore, there shall be no separate order as to costs." 15. On a careful reading of the order dated 01-11-2007 passed by this Court in C.R.P.No.507 of 2007, it is clear that the scope of remand was limited only t6 find out whether it is reasonable to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration by the decree-holders and whether they are entitled to the equitable relief or whether the equity lies in rescinding the contract. 15. It is also clear from the portions of the order extracted above, particularly the paragraph at page-4 of the order, that a finding was recorded by this Court that the time granted to the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed by 21-9-1992 cannot be taken as the upper limit for depositing (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in subsection (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely:- (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor; (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee as the case may be. (5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court. 22. On a plain reading of Section 28, it is clear that the only ground on which the Court can make an order rescinding the contract is that the purchaser has committed default in paying the purchase money within the time allowed under the decree or such further period as the Court may allow. 22. On a plain reading of Section 28, it is clear that the only ground on which the Court can make an order rescinding the contract is that the purchaser has committed default in paying the purchase money within the time allowed under the decree or such further period as the Court may allow. It is also clear that Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not expressly enable the decree-holder to seek extension of time but the power to extend the time can be exercised by the Court in an application by the judgment-debtor to rescind the contract. 23. Having considered the scope and object of Section 28 in detail, in Hungerford Investment Trust Limited's case (supra) the Supreme Court held that the Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed, and that the contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of the decree. 24. The said principle has been reiterated in Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal (1982) 1 SCC 525 , Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara (1994) 2 SCC 642 = 1994 (1) ALT 21 (DN SC), Sardar Mohar Singh v. Mangilal (1997) 9 SCC 217 = 1997 (2) ALT 23 (D.N.) and Kumar Dhirendra Mullick v. Tivoli Park Apartments (P) Ltd. 2005 (2) SCJ 205 = (2005) 9 SCC 262 . 25. Coming to the facts of the present case, admittedly the decree did not fix any date for deposit of the balance sale consideration by the plaintiffs. Though there was a direction to the 1st defendant to execute the Registered Sale Deed by 21-09-1992, this Court in C.R.P.No.607 of 2007 had already held that 21-09-1992 cannot be taken as the upper limit for depositing the balance sale consideration by the plaintiffs and the said finding has become final. 26. In the absence of any time limit, the question is whether the plaintiffs can be permitted to pay the balance sale consideration at any time as per their whims and fancies and whether it is not open to the defendants to invoke Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract. 27. 26. In the absence of any time limit, the question is whether the plaintiffs can be permitted to pay the balance sale consideration at any time as per their whims and fancies and whether it is not open to the defendants to invoke Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract. 27. An identical question was answered by the Supreme Court in Hungerford Investment Trust Limited's case (supra) as under: "The fact that the decree did not fix a time for completing the contract did not prevent either party from demanding performance from other party within a reasonable time and thus make time essential, as the parties had that liberty before the decree was passed and the decree did not abrogate that liberty in any way, and if the party from whom performance was demanded evinced by his conduct that he was unwilling to perform his part, then it was open to the party claiming performance to rescind the contract and obtain an order from the court adjudging rescission of the contract and the decree thereon." 28. In K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan (1997) 3 SCC 1 = 1997 (2) ALT 4 (D.N.) the Supreme Court further held that the length of reasonable time is a question of fact in each case and has to be decided by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property. In other words, for rescinding a contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and nullifying the decree for specific performance, a clear case of default has to be established against the decree-holder to perform his part of contract. 29. In the instant case, the plaintiffs/decree-holders filed the execution petition on 20-06-1994 without depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- in the Court. They did not even tender the payment of he balance sale consideration before filing the execution petition. The material on record shows that the decree-holders deposited the balance sale consideration in the Court only on 24-02-1995 and thereafter the execution petition was numbered as E.P.No.50 of 1996. It is also not in dispute that the decree-holders did not file any application for extension of time. 30. The material on record shows that the decree-holders deposited the balance sale consideration in the Court only on 24-02-1995 and thereafter the execution petition was numbered as E.P.No.50 of 1996. It is also not in dispute that the decree-holders did not file any application for extension of time. 30. In the circumstances, the learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the unreasonable delay on the part of the decree-holders to deposit the balance sale consideration made it clear that they were unwilling to perform their part of the contract and therefore it is a fit case for rescission of contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. While relying upon the decision of this Court in Pagadala Pedda Yadaiah v. K. Annapurnamma 2001 (5) ALT 417 , the learned counsel further contended that the Court below in the absence of an application by the decree-holders for extension of time ought not to have allowed the decree-holders to deposit the amounts in the Court particularly without notice to the judgment-debtors. 31. In Pagadala Pedda Yadaiah's case (supra) the defendants were directed in the decree for specific performance dated 6-3-1998 to execute the Regular Sale Deed on receipt of balance sale consideration and deliver possession to the plaintiffs within three months. However the plaintiff did not deposit the amount, but filed the execution petition on 16-12-1999. The executing Court having numbered the E.P. on 19-1-2000, directed the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration on or before 8-3-2000. The plaintiff failed to do so and filed an application seeking set off the costs awarded in the suit against the balance sale consideration payable by him under the decree. The said application was allowed on 3-4-2000 without notice to the defendants. The defendants filed C.R.P.No. 1498 of 2000 against the order dated 19-1-2000 and C.R.P. No. 1500 of 2000 against the order dated 3-4-2000. This Court allowed both the Civil Revision Petitions holding that in the absence of any application filed for enlargement of the time for deposit of the balance sale consideration, the executing Court could not have, of its own accord, enlarged the time for payment of the balance sale consideration by its order dated 19-1-2000. 32. In the above case, admittedly the decree itself required the payment of balance sale consideration within a specified time. 32. In the above case, admittedly the decree itself required the payment of balance sale consideration within a specified time. The said-frame was not adhered to by the plaintiffs nor they made an application for extension of time while filing the Execution Petition. In the said set of facts, this Court held that grant of time by the executing Court to deposit the balance sale consideration in the absence of any application by the plaintiffs was illegal. 33. However, in the case on hand, the decree did not specify any time for payment of balance sale consideration by the plaintiffs and the facts are entirely different. Hence Pagadala Pedda Yadaiah's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable and has no application to the present case. 34. As a matter of fact, Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, does not enable the decree-holder to seek extension of time but it is the discretion to be exercised by the Court in an application by the judgment-debtor to rescind the contract having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore merely on the ground that the decree-holders failed to seek extension of time, the Revision petitioners/judgment-debtors are not entitled to rescission of contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. 35. The next question that requires consideration is whether the delay in depositing the sale consideration by the decree-holders can be held to be reasonable and whether the decree-holders are entitled to get the decree for specific performance executed. 36. The Supreme Court in Sardar Mohar Singh's case (supra) held as under: "The Court has the discretion to extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as mentioned in the decree for specific performance. Although the respondent has not given satisfactory explanation of every day's delay but it is not unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, an application for condonation of delay. It is one for extension of time. Under these circumstances, the executing court as well as the High Court had exercised discretion and extended the time to comply with the conditional decree." 37. It is one for extension of time. Under these circumstances, the executing court as well as the High Court had exercised discretion and extended the time to comply with the conditional decree." 37. In V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan AIR 1999 SC 918 = 1999 (4) ALT 8.1 (DNSC), it was further explained as under: "Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 3 years period is prescribed for filing the suit for specific performance of contract of sale from the date of the agreement or when the cause of action arises. Merely because a suit is filed within the prescribed period of limitation does not absolve the vendee-plaintiff from showing as to whether he was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement and if there was nonperformance was that on account of any obstacle put by the vendor or otherwise. Provisions to grant specific performance of an agreement are quire stringent. Equitable considerations come into play. Court has to see all the attendant circumstances including if the vendee has conducted himself in a reasonable manner under the contract of sale." 38. In the light of the legal position explained above, it was held by the Supreme Court in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm's case (supra) that allowing extension of time for making payment of balance of sale consideration after five years of passing of decree and three years of its confirmation by the Appellate Court would be going beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing of the suit for specific performance of the agreement though the said provision may not be strictly applicable. Accordingly, it was held that the equity demands that discretion be not exercised in favour of the decree-holders and no extension of time be granted to them to comply with the decree. 39. In the instant case, the plaintiff NoA/4th decree-holder deposed as P.W.1 in E.P.No. 50 of 1996 and stated that since the defendants filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree in O.S.No.33 of 1985 they were under an impression that the ex parte decree was likely to be set aside and since there was no direction in the decree to pay the sale consideration within a specific period and as per the advice of their counsel the balance sale consideration was not deposited in the Court immediately after the decree dated 11-08-1992. It was also stated that they were always ready and willing to deposit the balance sale consideration in the court and that they had ready money with them. To substantiate his plea, the extracts of the Bank accounts of the plaintiffs were marked on their behalf as Exs.A-1 to A-5 to show that sufficient funds were available for depositing the balance sale consideration. 40. On behalf of the judgment-debtors, the 7th petitioner herein was examined as R. W.1. He stated that the decree-holders intentionally evaded to deposit the balance sale consideration and that they were not ready and willing to perform their part of contract within the stipulated time granted in the decree. It was also stated that the market value of the property was more than Rs.50 lakhs and to substantiate the same Ex.B-1 Valuation Certificate, dated 11-9-2008, issued by the Sub-Registrar, Hindupur, was marked. 41. On appreciation of the said evidence, the Court below recorded a finding that the delay in depositing the amount of balance sale consideration was reasonable and no case was made out for rescission of the contract. 42. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the evidence produced by the parties, I do not find any justifiable reason to hold that the above finding recorded by the Court below suffered from any error of fact or law. At the outset, it is to be noted that immediately after the ex parte decree dated 11-8-1992 the 15t defendant filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C. to set aside the ex parte decree. However, he failed to process the same and even before the application was numbered, he died on 11-2-1993. Long thereafter, the legal representatives were brought on record and the application was numbered as I.A.No.188 of 1996. However, ultimately, the said application was dismissed as not pressed in the year 2006. It is also relevant to note that the judgment-debtors never filed an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for rescission of the contract either before filing of the execution petition by the decree-holders or thereafter on the ground that the decree-holders failed to make payment of the balance sale consideration. They did not even make any demand calling upon the decree-holders to pay the balance sale consideration. They did not even make any demand calling upon the decree-holders to pay the balance sale consideration. Even in the counter filed by them in the execution petition, the judgment-debtors never pleaded for rescission of the contract. 43. The law is well-settled that even where time is not the essence of the contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time. The same principle of contract would apply even after a decree is passed for specific performance. Therefore, even if the decree did not prescribe any time limit for payment of balance sale consideration, it is open to the judgment-debtors, who were directed to execute the Registered Sale Deed to demand payment of the balance sale consideration by the decree-holders and in case of their failure to comply with the demand, the judgment-debtors are entitled to seek rescission of the contract. 44. In the instant case, the judgment debtors never made any demand for payment of balance sale consideration. The said fact itself shows that they were unwilling to perform their part of contract. Moreover, the judgment-debtors never sought for rescission of contract and they did not take a plea for rescission of the contract even in their counter in the execution petition. Admittedly I.A.No.188 of 1996 filed by the judgment debtors for setting aside the ex parte decree was pending till 2006 and in the meanwhile the decree-holders having filed the execution petition on 20-05-1994 deposited the balance sale consideration in the Court on 24-02-1995. In the totality of the above facts and circumstances, there is absolutely no reason to hold that the delay of about 2% years on the part of the decree-holders in depositing the balance sale consideration after passing the decree is unreasonable. Not only the delay was properly explained by the decree-holders but the conduct of the judgment-debtors also made it clear that they never intended to rescind the contract. Hence, the Court below had rightly concluded that the decree-holders were entitled to the equitable relief and that no case was made out to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 45. The said conclusion arrived at by the Court below on proper appreciation of the material available on record cannot be held to be erroneous or illegal on any ground whatsoever. 45. The said conclusion arrived at by the Court below on proper appreciation of the material available on record cannot be held to be erroneous or illegal on any ground whatsoever. Hence, the order under Revision which does not suffer from any material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction vested under law warrants no interference by this Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. 46. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.