JUDGMENT Honble Amitava Lala, J.—By means of this writ petition, the writ petitioner wanted to get the notional super-time pay scale from due date and fixation of pension accordingly. 2. The petitioner was a judicial officer and took voluntary retirement from the service w.e.f. 17th February, 1995 and filed this writ petition on 24th May, 1995. The adverse entry in question was recorded in the service record of the petitioner on the basis of report of Administrative Judge, which was communicated to the petitioner vide Court’s communication dated 2nd November, 1993, the relevant portion of which is as follows : “....the officer did not enjoy a good reputation during his tenure at Ballia. Over all one may assess him as a below average District Judge.” 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that according to rule, before an adverse remark is communicated to the concerned judicial officer, it must be placed before Hon. the Chief Justice and by necessary implication, the rule requires concurrence of Chief Justice for taking action on the adverse remarks against the concerned judicial officer. In support of his contention, he relied upon a judgment reported in AIR 1988 SC 1403 , D.K. Agarwal v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, where the Supreme Court has interfered with the order of refusal of super-time pay scale and held that the grant of super-time pay scale is exclusively within the administrative jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court generally does not interfere with the same but if the High Court acts in violation of any rule framed by it or of the principles of natural justice or comes to any finding not supported by any reliable material, Supreme Court has to examine the matter for ends of justice. In P.K. Shastri v. State of M.P. and others, (1999) 7 SCC 329 , it has been held that a decision to give adverse annual confidential report must be taken objectively after careful consideration of all the materials which are before the authority. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and others, (2001) 2 SCC 305 , apex Court held that the entry in the confidential rolls should not be a reflection of personal whims, fancies or prejudices, likes or dislikes of a superior. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and others, (2001) 2 SCC 305 , apex Court held that the entry in the confidential rolls should not be a reflection of personal whims, fancies or prejudices, likes or dislikes of a superior. The entry must reflect the result of an objective assessment coupled with an effort at guiding the judicial officers to secure an improvement in his performance where need be; to admonish him with the object of removing for future, the shortcoming found; and expressing an appreciation with an idea of toning up and maintaining the imitable qualities by affectionately patting on the back of meritorious and deserving. In M.A. Rajasekhar v. State of Karnataka and another, (1996) 10 SCC 369 , it has been held that it is now well settled that the object of making adverse remarks is to assess the competence of an officer on merits and performance of an officer concerned so as to grade him in various categories as outstanding, very good, good, satisfactory and average, etc. The competent authority and the reviewing authority have to act fairly or objectively in assessing the character, integrity and performance of the incumbent. 4. The High Court filed an affidavit through its officer on special duty litigation, from which it appears that the petitioner was given adverse remarks for the years 1982-83, 1990-91 and 1992-93. During the year 1992-93 the High Court had observed that the petitioner did not enjoy a good reputation during his tenure at Ballia. Over all, one may assess him as below average District Judge. This remark would reveal that the officer was not rated to be a very good officer. The petitioner had worked as District Judge Sonbhadra, Azamgarh, Siddharth Nagar, Sultanpur, Ballia and Pithoragarh. The petitioner was transferred from Pithoragarh to Hamirpur as District Judge vide Court’s Notification dated 19th August, 1993 but on the request made by the petitioner himself, the transfer order was cancelled vide Court’s Notification dated 30th August, 1993. The petitioner was awarded adverse remarks by the High Court for the years 1990-91 and 1992-93 which were communicated to him vide Court’s letters dated 3rd January, 1993 and 2nd November, 1993 respectively. The petitioner made representations dated 7th January, 1994 and 23rd January, 1994 against the aforesaid remarks given by the Court. The petitioner was awarded adverse remarks by the High Court for the years 1990-91 and 1992-93 which were communicated to him vide Court’s letters dated 3rd January, 1993 and 2nd November, 1993 respectively. The petitioner made representations dated 7th January, 1994 and 23rd January, 1994 against the aforesaid remarks given by the Court. Upon careful consideration of the representations adverse remarks for the year 1990-91 had been expunged by the High Court but the representation dated 23rd January, 1994 regarding expunction of the adverse remarks for the year 1992-93 had been declined. The petitioner was accordingly informed on 19th December, 1994. The matter for considering the grant of super-time pay scale to the officers working in the selection grade in U.P. Higher Judicial Service including the petitioner was taken up by the selection committee on 20th July, 1994, which gave the following observations : “On over all assessment of service records and the personal file, we find that this officer is not fit for Super Time Scale.” The report of the committee was placed before the Judges meeting held on 23rd July, 1994 and it was resolved that the matter of the petitioner be remitted to the selection committee for reconsideration. This was again considered by the committee on 14th November, 1994 and was found against the petitioner, which was placed before the Judges meeting on 18th December, 1994, but it did not approve the name of petitioner for super-time pay scale on the basis of the observations of the selection committee. Petitioner submitted a memorial dated 1st December, 1994 for expunging the adverse remarks and the same had been declined by the High Court. The petitioner was informed on 19th December, 1994. 5. Therefore, it cannot be said that the High Court has not considered the issue and whimsically or capriciously or in arbitrary manner, the remark of administrative Judge was affirmed. The petitioner was informed on 19th December, 1994. 5. Therefore, it cannot be said that the High Court has not considered the issue and whimsically or capriciously or in arbitrary manner, the remark of administrative Judge was affirmed. The Annexure 1 to the writ petition is the communication but what are the materials to come to such conclusion may not be the part of such communication of the High Court but when the matter was repeatedly placed before the High Court in its administrative side and subsequently a committee was constituted to consider the question of super-time pay scale, which refused the same repeatedly, we cannot hold and say that the principle of natural justice has been violated and the High Court has acted in arbitrary manner. When plurality is exposed and the records and materials are lying with the High Court and considered, not by one Judge but by the Judges and committees of the High Court by way of Administrative Committee or so, it cannot be presumed that the refusal of super-time pay scale is without any material whatsoever. 6. In the matter of compulsory retirement we have come across several judgments of Supreme Court. In the case of S. Ramchandra Raju v. State of Orissa, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 424, the Supreme Court observed that administration to be efficient must not be manned by drones, do-nothings, incompetents and unworthies. They may not be delinquent who must be punished but may be a burden on the Administration if they by insensitive, insouciant, unintelligent or dubious conduct, impede the flow or promote stagnation. In a country where speed, sensitivity, probity, and non-irritative public relations and enthusiastic creativity are urgently needed, paper-logged processes and callous cadres are the besetting sin of the Administration. It is in public interest to retire a never-do-well. 7. The members of judicial services stand on pedestal different from other civil services. To demonstrate this, the Apex Court in All India Judges’ Associations v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 288 , observed that the judicial service is not service in the sense of ‘employment’. The Judges are not employees. As members of the judiciary, they exercise the sovereign judicial power of the State. To demonstrate this, the Apex Court in All India Judges’ Associations v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 288 , observed that the judicial service is not service in the sense of ‘employment’. The Judges are not employees. As members of the judiciary, they exercise the sovereign judicial power of the State. Since the judicial officers perform a function that is utterly divine and the officers of the subordinate judiciary have the responsibility of building up of the case appropriately to answer the cause of justice, therefore, the judicial service cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons who have lost their utility or are of doubtful integrity. 8. Therefore, when the judiciary is to act in a proper manner and if anything contrary to the same is reflected, the same has to be checked out. This is not the case of such nature. Here the petitioner did not get the super-time pay scale and one cannot get super-time pay scale as a matter of course. It is purely based on service record. Super-time pay scale is as good as certificate. The petitioner faced the adverse remarks not only one time but several times. However, it cannot be accepted that at all points of time, the adverse remarks are to be expunged. In the instant case, further interesting part is that before the voluntary retirement on 17th February, 1995, the petitioner invoked writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the said writ petition seems to be withdrawn on 20th January, 1995. According to Mr. K.N.Tripathi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, it was advised to be withdrawn with a liberty to file afresh before the High Court. We do not find any such recording but between the withdrawal of such writ petition from the Supreme Court on 20th May, 1995 and filing of the writ petition before this Court on 24th May, 1995, a very important event took place i.e. voluntary retirement of the petitioner on 17th February, 1995. We do not find any such recording but between the withdrawal of such writ petition from the Supreme Court on 20th May, 1995 and filing of the writ petition before this Court on 24th May, 1995, a very important event took place i.e. voluntary retirement of the petitioner on 17th February, 1995. Had it been the case that the liberty was granted to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition from the Supreme Court and to file the writ petition before the High Court, there would not have arisen any occasion for any voluntary retirement as on 17th February, 1995 and thereafter making the writ petition before this Court for consideration of cause on 24th May, 1995. It appears that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. It can be safely said that he has exhausted his remedy before the Supreme Court and when found that there is no case, withdrew it. Even he took voluntary retirement and thereafter made a chance application to obtain an order to get notional super-time pay scale to refix the pension. Such type of litigation cannot be encouraged at all. The writ petition deserves to be dismissed and is therefore, dismissed. However, since we find that at one point of time the petitioner had worked in the subordinate judiciary under the High Court, no cost is imposed but he is cautioned hereunder. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————