Ranjan Gogoi, J.;- This appeal is directed against the judg­ment and order dated 21.8.2000 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, North Lakhimpur, in Sessions Case No.48(NL)/1997. By the aforesaid order the respondents/accused have been acquitted of the offences under Sections 147/148/1497 447/302, I.P.C. 2. The relevant facts may be noticed at this stage. A first information report was lodged be­fore the in-charge, Panigaon Police Outpost by one Dineswar Doley, Beel Supervisor, al­leging that certain persons belonging to Rajabura Gaon forcibly took away fishing nets erected in the Beel by villagers belonging to Ghuligaon village and furthermore that two fishermen engaged by the Ghuligaon villagers were abducted. On the basis of the aforesaid F.I.R. North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.91111990 under Sections 143/379/365/435, IPC was registered. It appears that after the said incident some of the Ghuligaon villagers armed with deadly weapons came to Rajabura village and re­covered the fishermen who were taken away by the Rajabura villagers. Thereafter, an F.I.R. dated 11.11.90 was lodged by one Debakanta Pegu (PW 2), of Rajabura village alleging that the six accused named therein belonging to Ghuligaon village (respondents in this appeal) had attacked and caused inju­ries to several persons of Rajabura village with sharp weapons. The incident mentioned in the F.I.R. is alleged to have taken place at about 10.00 A.M. of 11.11.90. On the basis of the aforesaid ejahar filed, North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.913/1990 under Sections 147/1487 149/447/326 (later on converted to Section 302), IPC was registered. It appears that on the same day i.e. 11.11.90 another F.I.R. was lodged by one Nila Kanta Pegu on behalf of Ghuligaon vil­lagers alleging that when they had protested against the acts of the Rajabura villagers in destroying the fishing nets and taking away two fishermen the Rajabura villagers had at­tacked persons from the Ghuligaon village causing injury to them. On the basis of the aforesaid F.I.R. North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.914/1990 under Sections 147/447/326/379, IPC was registered. Investigation in respect of the three cases registered, as noticed above, were under­taken by the investigating agency on comple­tion of which charge-sheet was submitted against the named accused belonging to Ghuligaon village in North Lakhimpur P.S. Case Na913/90. Similarly, charge-sheet was submitted in North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.914/90 against the villagers of Rajabura village. North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.9111190 ended in Final Report. 3. Similarly, charge-sheet was submitted in North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.914/90 against the villagers of Rajabura village. North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.9111190 ended in Final Report. 3. Some of the offences alleged in North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.913/90 corre­sponding to G.R. Case No. 1543/90, being triable by the Court of Sessions the said case was committed to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur for trial. Sessions Case No.48(NL)/97 was thereafter regis­tered in the Court of Sessions at North Lakhimpur. North Lakhimpur P.S. Case No.914/90 (corresponding to GR. Case No. 1544/90) was tried in the Court of the learned Magistrate, First Class at North Lakhimpur. The aforesaid case ended in the acquittal of the accused therein on the basis of a judgment and order dated 22.12.97. The aforesaid judgment has attained finality in law as no appeal has been filed against the order of acquittal. 4. Insofar as Sessions Case No.48(NL)/97 is concerned, charge was framed against the accused persons under Sections 149/3 02/326, IPC to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In the course of the trial 11 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. The defence ex­amined 4 witnesses in support of its case. The statement of the accused persons were also recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C. There­after, at the conclusion of the trial the learned Sessions Judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 21.8.2000 had acquitted all the accused/respondents. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed by the State. 5. Before proceeding to consider the mer­its of the appeal in the light of the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the par­ties we may briefly touch upon the power of the Court while considering appeals against orders of acquittal. The power of appellate court while considering orders of acquittal though same as in the case of appeals against orders of convictions, it is a fairly well recog­nized principle that orders of acquittal ought not to be disturbed merely because the ap­pellate court is inclined to take a different view of the matter. Interference of the appellate Court will be justified primarily in a situation where the acquittal is founded on wholly un­acceptable grounds and the findings recorded in support are diametrically opposed to the weight of the evidence on record. Interference of the appellate Court will be justified primarily in a situation where the acquittal is founded on wholly un­acceptable grounds and the findings recorded in support are diametrically opposed to the weight of the evidence on record. In other words, if the view taken by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused is a pos­sible view merely because the appellate court disagrees with the view taken the same may not be a sufficient ground for interference. 6. In the present case a scrutiny of the evi­dence adduced by the prosecution as well as the evidence of the defence witnesses clearly demonstrates that after the incident commit­ted by the Rajabura villagers at about 8.00 A.M. of 11.11.90, the Ghuligaon villagers armed with deadly weapons had gone to Rajabura village at about 10. A.M. and the first act committed by the said villagers is to recover the two abducted fishermen. The evi­dence on record further discloses that there­after there was a free fight between the two groups in the course of which injuries had been caused to the villagers of both the villages and death of one Barikha Pegu of Rajabura vil­lage had occurred in the hospital as a result of the injuries sustained. Specifically the evi­dence on record discloses that the following persons belonging to Rajabura village had sustained injuries, namely, Mohan Pegu (PW 7), Bipul Pegu (PW 6), Phukan Pegu, Rais­ing Pegu (PW 5), Uma Kanta Pegu, Laimon Pegu(PW 4), Gangaram Pegu (PW 8) and Barikha Pegu who died later. The evidence on record also discloses that at least 5 per­sons belonging to Ghuligaon village had suf­fered injuries i.e. Paramananda Doley, Umakanta Pegu, Indreswar Doley, Gobind Pegu and Karneswar Doley. Of the afore­said injured persons Indreswar Doley is one of the accused amongst the accused/respon­dents in the present case. 7. The first question that needs to be ad­dressed by the Court is the liability of the accused/respondents, if any, under the provi­sions of Section 149, I.P.C. which deals with common object of an unlawful assembly. In the event the materials on record in the present case are capable of giving rise to a satisfac­tion in the Court that the villagers of Ghuligaon village had a common object to commit any particular offence, naturally, all persons who were members of the unlawful assembly will be liable for such offence(s) as may have been committed. In the event the materials on record in the present case are capable of giving rise to a satisfac­tion in the Court that the villagers of Ghuligaon village had a common object to commit any particular offence, naturally, all persons who were members of the unlawful assembly will be liable for such offence(s) as may have been committed. In the present case, the evidence on record clearly show that after the news had spread in Ghuligaon that the Rajabura villagers had caused damage to the fishing equipments installed by the Ghuligaon villag­ers in the beel and two of their fishermen had been abducted the Ghuligaon villagers armed with deadly weapons had come to the Rajabura village. The evidence on record fur­ther discloses that the Ghuligaon villagers had first rescued the two kidnapped fishermen and thereafter there was a free fight between the two groups of villagers. The above being the core of the evidence, in our considered view, it cannot be held that the villagers of Ghuligaon had a common object within the meaning of Section 149,I.P.C. to cause any injury or the consequential death of Barikha Pegu that had been occasioned in the course of the incident in question. Rather, it appears to us that the common object was to rescue the two fishermen who have been abducted by the Rajabura villagers. 8. If the Court has reached the aforesaid conclusion the next issue that has to be determined is whether the evidence on record is capable of sustaining a view that the ac­cused/respondents or any of them are liable for any of the individual injuries caused to the Rajabura villagers including the injuries caused to Barikha Pegu leading to the death of afore­said person. 9. In this regard, the Court has noticed that the injuries found on the deceased Barikha Pegu in the course of his post mortem exami­nation were sharp cut grievous injuries in the parietal region measuring 6" X 2" X 2". The prosecution witnesses have testified that one Dimbe Doley had hit deceased Barikha Pegu on the head with a sharp cutting weapon. None of the accused/respondents are known by the name of Dimbe Doley. There is noth­ing in the evidence on record to suggest that any of the accused had a second name i.e. Dimbe Doley. The prosecution witnesses have testified that one Dimbe Doley had hit deceased Barikha Pegu on the head with a sharp cutting weapon. None of the accused/respondents are known by the name of Dimbe Doley. There is noth­ing in the evidence on record to suggest that any of the accused had a second name i.e. Dimbe Doley. In such circumstances, on the materials available to the Court, it is difficult to hold that any of the accused can be made liable for the offence under Section 302, IPC insofar as the deceased Barikha Pegu is con-4 cerned. 10. An argument has been offered by the learned Public Prosecutor that in the statement of the accused/respondent No.1 re­corded under Section 313, Cr.P.C. he had described himself as Dimbeswar Doley and perhaps he was also known to the villagers as Dimba Doley. The argument advanced proceeds on an assumption and we find no material on record to take any such view. That the accused-Respondent Dimbeswar is not the same person as Dimba Doley referred to in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses is also evident from the fact that in the state­ment recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C. Dimbeswar Doley has described himself as the son of late Sorju Doley. In the F.I.R. one of the named accused Dimba Doley has been described as the son of one Chambe Doley, a fact that has been revealed upon perusal of % the FIR in original. In the aforesaid circum­stances, it will be difficult for us to accept the contention made by the learned P.P. that the said accused person should be understood to be Dimbeswar Doley and the reference to Dimbe Doley in the evidence of the prosecu­tion witnesses is necessarily in respect of Dimbeswar Doley. 11. The further evidence of the prosecution indicates that PW 7, Mohan Pegu and PW 6, Bipul Pegu both of whom had suf­fered sharp cut injuries were assaulted by accused Agunti Pegu (respondent No.3) and accused Bhudung Pegu (respondent No.4). The evidence of PWs 7 and 6. respectively, specifically mentions about the commission of injuries by the aforesaid two accused with sharp weapons which evidence finds corroboration from other prosecution witnesses be­longing to Rajabura village. The said evidence of the prosecution witnesses, therefore, if is to be accepted, can indicate some liability on the part of the two accused respondents named above. respectively, specifically mentions about the commission of injuries by the aforesaid two accused with sharp weapons which evidence finds corroboration from other prosecution witnesses be­longing to Rajabura village. The said evidence of the prosecution witnesses, therefore, if is to be accepted, can indicate some liability on the part of the two accused respondents named above. The learned Public Prosecu­tor has contended that there is nothing on record to disbelieve PWs 6 and 7 who have clearly deposed with regard to the injuries inflicted on them by the two accused. Accord­ing to the learned Public Prosecutor such evi­dence has also been duly supported by the other prosecution witnesses. 12. Sri T J. Mahanta, learned counsel for the accused/respondents, however, has sub­mitted that from the cross-examination of PWs 6 and 7 and the other prosecution witnesses as well as from the evidence of P W 10, the Investigating Officer of the case, it clearly tran­spires that none of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses had implicated the accused respon­dent Nos.3 and 4 in their statements recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161, Cr.P.C. Referring to the evidence of the Investigating Officer, Sri Mahanta has sub­mitted that a reading of the evidence of the said witnesses clearly demonsl rates that be­fore the Investigating Officer none of the pros­ecution witnesses had narrated any incident of assault resulting in any injuries on PWs 6 and 7 though the said witnesses have been very categorical in this regard in their depositions made in Court. It is, therefore, the con­tention of the learned counsel for the accused/respondents that the evidence of PWs 6 and 7 and the corroborative evidence of the other prosecution witnesses should be disbelieved by the Court on the ground that the same are exaggerations and improvements. 13. The manner in which a witness is to be discredited with reference to his previous statement in writing is laid down in Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Under the said pro­vision of the Evidence Act while a witness may be cross-examined with reference to his pre­vious statement recorded in writing without such writing being shown to him if, however, if it is intended to contradict such witness with reference to his previous statement in writing the same must be placed before the witness before it is proved. Under the said pro­vision of the Evidence Act while a witness may be cross-examined with reference to his pre­vious statement recorded in writing without such writing being shown to him if, however, if it is intended to contradict such witness with reference to his previous statement in writing the same must be placed before the witness before it is proved. The learned Public Pros­ecutor has urged that the prosecution wit­nesses, will stand discredited only if they had been confronted with their previous state­ments made before the police and the relevant part thereof had been proved and exhibited which was not done in the present case. 14. Though the learned Public Prosecutor may be right in his contentions, the practice prevailing in the subordinate courts in the State of Assam of not adhering to the aforesaid re­quirement was noticed by a Division Bench of this Court in The State Vs. Md. Misir Ali & Ors., reported in AIR 1963 Assam 15L That the aforesaid position continued to pre­vail is evident from another Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ganakanta Das & Ors. Vs. State of Assam, reported in 1990 Crl.L.J. 219. In the said later case the Divi­sion Bench took the view that if such a situa­tion had occurred it would be the duty of the Court to scrutinize the case diary to find out the contradiction instead of refusing to consider the same on the ground that the relevant part of the previous statement of a witness is not marked as an Exhibit in the case. We have no reasons to believe that the situation has been fully corrected as on date though all ef­forts are being made in this regard. 15. The above question, notwithstanding the elaborate recitals, however need not de­tain us. In the present case, according to the learned counsel for the defence, the prosecu­tion witnesses had omitted to state before the Investigating Officer what was stated by them in Court. Omissions, strictly speaking, can-not be proved as contradictions as an omis­sion does not contain a diction. However glar­ing omissions in the evidence of the prosecu­tion witnesses can be relied upon as a rel­evant circumstance. The following observa­tion of this Court in The State Vs. Md. Misir Ali (supra) would eloquently sum up the is­sue. Omissions, strictly speaking, can-not be proved as contradictions as an omis­sion does not contain a diction. However glar­ing omissions in the evidence of the prosecu­tion witnesses can be relied upon as a rel­evant circumstance. The following observa­tion of this Court in The State Vs. Md. Misir Ali (supra) would eloquently sum up the is­sue. "(16) We should not, however, be under­stood as stating that in no case could a serious and glaring omission from a police statement be relied on. It may not be relied on as a contra-diction as such, but it may be relied on as a relevant circumstance. To give an example, if a witness stated on oath before the Court trying a murder charge, that A, B and C attacked and caused the death of the deceased, and before the police he only stated that A and B did the murderous assault, that circumstance may be brought out not as a contradiction under Sec­tion 145 of the Evidence Act but as something having an effect somewhat similar to a contra­diction, in that a different case, as it were, is put forward by the witness for the prosecution, dis­closing perhaps an attempt to improve or de­velop the prosecution case, which thus may have the effect of casting a doubt on the pros­ecution case as put forward before the Court, and also on the veracity of the witness, at least to the extent of his implicating CV 16. In the present case, omissions on a very crucial area of the prosecution case i.e. commission of assault by the accused is dis­cernible in the evidence of almost all the prosecution witnesses. None of them had implicated the accused before the Investi­gating Officer; yet all of them had deposed in Court about the clear involvement of the accused in the crime alleged. No cogent ex­planation for the above situation is available on record. In such circumstances, serious doubt necessarily arises with regard to the involvement of the accused. Such a view hav­ing taken by the learned trial court this Court must understand the same to be a possible view in which event interference must be avoided. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion this Court is of the opinion that it will be proper to refuse interference with the impugned judg­ment of acquittal as prayed for by the State. The appeal, consequently, is dismissed.