JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—The short question raised in this petition is, as to whether the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was right in cancelling the license to run a fair price shop issued in favour of the petitioner, as affirmed by the Commissioner in appeal under the provisions of the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 2004 read with the Government Order dated 28.10.2002. 2. The petitioner was granted a license to run a fair price shop under the Government Order dated 28.10.2002, which was then prevalent, in the year 2003. This was done according to the petitioner under a valid resolution of the Gram Sabha to run the shop at Village Houspura within Gram Panchayat Sainjni. Charges of maldistribution were brought against him coupled with the charge of having concealed the fact that his father, Mohd. Sayeed, was already a license holder of a fair price shop at village Sainjni which disqualifies the petitioner for a license under Clause 10(e) of the Government Order dated 28.10.2002. 3. An enquiry was conducted with opportunity to the petitioner who, apart from defending the charges on the ground of improper procedure adopted during enquiry, went on to urge that since he was living separately from his father, he did not inhere any such disqualification as alleged aforesaid. It was also contended by the petitioner in his reply that the documents which he wanted to support his stand with, were lost on his way to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s Office. Relying on the extract of the family register of Village Juldhakiya, Gram Sabha Sainjni, Nyaya Panchayat Dilari, Tehsil Thakurdwara, District Moradabad, it was pleaded that the petitioner’s family has been shown separately from that of his father and as such it is urged that the conclusions drawn by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as affirmed by the Commissioner are erroneous. In short, since the petitioner is separated from his father, therefore he does not belong to the same family as per the Government Order dated 28.10.2002 and therefore he does not suffer from any such disqualification. The prayer is to accordingly quash the impugned orders as they proceed on erroneous assumption of law and fact. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri C.P. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the State who has cited the decision in the case of Baldev Sahai Bangia v. R.C. Bharin, 1982(2) SCC 210 to support his submissions. 5. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri C.P. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the State who has cited the decision in the case of Baldev Sahai Bangia v. R.C. Bharin, 1982(2) SCC 210 to support his submissions. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the submissions that were advanced before the authorities below and has invited the attention of the Court to the extract of the family register appended to this writ petition to support the stand of segregation of the family status of the petitioner. He contends that once the petitioner is recorded as the head of a separate family and the petitioner claims to be living under a separate roof in a distinct household, the authorities have committed an error in construing the provisions adversely against the petitioner. 6. In response, learned Standing Counsel contends that the definition of separation of family and its interpretation under personal law or under special statutes would not govern the definition of family as occurring in the Government Order dated 28.10.2002. He urges that the word family has not been specifically defined but in view of the purpose of the order governing grant of license of running a fair price shop, the widest possible meaning should be construed, and for that he relies on paras 12 to 17 and para 24 of the decision in the case of Baldev Bangia (supra). 7. Having considered the rival submissions it is not disputed by the petitioner that his father, Mohd. Sayeed, was already possessed of a license to run a fair price shop at Village Sainjni since 1993. Both of them, according to the admitted family register extract, are residents of Village Juldhakiya within the same Gram Panchayat and Nyaya Panchayat. During inspection both shops were allegedly found running from the same premises at Juldhakiya. The petitioner has been granted license at Village Houspura within the same vicinity of Gram Panchayat Sainjni. The Government Order dated 28.10.1982 in Clause 10(e) prohibits the grant of license to a person of the same family. It does not confine it to the same village or the same Gaon Sabha or Gram Panchayat. The emphasis is on the word ‘family’ which has not been given any definition in the Government Order. 8. To my mind, giving it any restricted meaning, would defeat the very purpose of the said provision. It does not confine it to the same village or the same Gaon Sabha or Gram Panchayat. The emphasis is on the word ‘family’ which has not been given any definition in the Government Order. 8. To my mind, giving it any restricted meaning, would defeat the very purpose of the said provision. Grant of license is for a public distribution system through a ‘fair price shop’. This cannot be permitted to function so as to create a monopoly in favour of the members of one family. This appears to be a more reasonable interpretation as it serves the purpose and also eliminates any possibility of nepotism and favoritism. If the rule making authority has left some gap, it is the duty of the Court to cull out the intent through purposive interpretation. One can easily apply Heydon’s rule to construe that the prohibition contained in Clause 10(e) aforesaid is a reasonable restriction so as to exclude any other grant of license to a member of the same family. To give a narrow or constricted meaning to my mind would be to do violation to the rule itself. In my considered opinion the widest possible meaning should be given as understood ordinarily in such matters. However in the present case since the relationship of father and son is admitted, it would not be necessary to venture to give any exhaustive definition for deciding the issue involved herein. 9. The petitioner claims separation on the strength of the family register. No other evidence has been led to establish separation like the existence of a separate house or evidence to believe the separation of Kitchen. However such issues are not that relevant as the relationship of the petitioner with his father is a blood relation. This does not snap even if the petitioner claims himself to be sheltered beneath a separate roof. For this the definition of the word family, as generally understood, can be looked into as referred to in the decision of Baldev Sahai’s case (supra) paras 12 to 17 and para 24 quoted below : 12. This does not snap even if the petitioner claims himself to be sheltered beneath a separate roof. For this the definition of the word family, as generally understood, can be looked into as referred to in the decision of Baldev Sahai’s case (supra) paras 12 to 17 and para 24 quoted below : 12. We have heard counsel for the parties and given our anxious consideration to all aspects of the matter and we feel that the High Court has taken a palpably wrong view of the law in regard to the interpretation of the term ‘member of the family’ as used in clause (d) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. In coming to its decision, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the dominant purpose and the main object of the Act which affords several intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to show that the non-applicants were undoubtedly members of the family residing in the house and the migration of the main tenant to Canada would make no difference. The word ‘family’ has been defined in various legal dictionaries and several authorities of various Courts and no Court has ever held that mother or a brother or a sister who is living with the older member of the family would not constitute a family of the said member. Surely, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that when the tenant was living with his own mother in the house and after he migrated to Canada, he had severed all his connections with his mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family. Such an interpretation is against our national heritage and, as we shall show, could never have been contemplated by the Act which has manifested its intention by virtue of a later amendment. 13. Coming now to the definitions, we find that in Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, Volume 16) at pages 303-11 the word ‘family’ has been defined thus : The father, the member, and the children ordinarily constitute a ‘family’. The word ‘family’ embraces more than a husband and wife and includes children. A ‘family’ constitutes all who live in one house under one head. Father and mother of two illegitimate children, and children themselves, all living together under one roof, constitute a ‘family’. The word ‘family’ embraces more than a husband and wife and includes children. A ‘family’ constitutes all who live in one house under one head. Father and mother of two illegitimate children, and children themselves, all living together under one roof, constitute a ‘family’. The word ‘family’ in statute authorizing use of income for support of ward and ‘family’ is not restricted to those individuals to whom ward owes a legal duty of support, but is an expression of great flexibility and is liberally construed, and includes brothers and sisters in poor financial circumstances for whom the insane ward, if competent, would make provision. The general or ordinarily accepted meaning of the word ‘family’ as used in Compensation Act, means a group, comprising immediate kindred, consisting of the parents and their children, whether actually living together or not. 14. Similarly, in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the word ‘family’ is defined thus: Household including not only the servants but also the head of the household and all persons in it related to him by blood or marriage …... a group of persons of common ancestry. 15. In Chamber Twentieth Century Dictionary (New Edition 1972, the word ‘family’ has been defined thus: The household, or all those who live in one house (as parents, children, servants): parents and their children. 16. In Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sixth Edition), the same definition appears to have been given of the word ‘family’ which may be extracted thus : Members of a household, parents, children, servants, etc.; set of parents and children, or of relations, living together or not; person’s children. All descendants of common ancestor, … 17. A conspectus of the connotation of the term ‘family’ which emerges from a reference to the aforesaid dictionaries clearly shows that the word ‘family’ has to be given not a restricted but a wider meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but all members or descendants from the common ancestors who are actually living with the same head. More particularly, in our country, blood relations do not evaporate merely because a member of the family-the father, the brother or the son – leaves his household and goes out for some time. More particularly, in our country, blood relations do not evaporate merely because a member of the family-the father, the brother or the son – leaves his household and goes out for some time. Furthermore, in our opinion, the legislature has advisedly used the term that any member of the family residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the action would be treated as a tenant. The stress is not so much on the actual presence of the tenant as on the fact that the members of the family actually live and reside in the tenanted premises. In fact, it seems to us that clause (d) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act is a Special concession given to the landlord to obtain possession only where the tenanted premises have been completely vacated by the tenant if he ceased to exercise any control over the property either through himself or through his bloodrelations. 24. Even as far back as 1930, Wright, J. in Price v. Gould (a King’s Bench decision) had clearly held that the word ‘family’ included brothers and sisters and in this connection observed as follows : I find as a fact that the brothers and sisters were residing with the deceased at the time of her death...... It has been laid down that the primary meaning of the word ‘family’ is children, but that primary meaning is clearly susceptible of wider interpretation, because the cases decide that the exact scope of the word must depend on the context and the other provisions of the Will or deed in view of the surrounding circumstances. *** *** *** Thus, in Snow v. Teed it was held that “the word ‘family’ could be extended beyond not merely children but even beyond the statutory next of kin”.” 10. A common understanding, which also appears to be reasonable from the common man’s understanding point of view, of the word family in the present context would include a blood relation without any distinction on separation. The clause referred to hereinabove does not draw any dissimilarity between a separated or unseparated family member. The family register exists for a different purpose, namely to identify the people living in a village or a locality. The clause referred to hereinabove does not draw any dissimilarity between a separated or unseparated family member. The family register exists for a different purpose, namely to identify the people living in a village or a locality. The mere mention of the petitioner as a different family head in the family register does not snap his ties with his father and to that extent he has been rightly considered to belong to his father’s family. 11. Having found so, the petitioner therefore suffers from a disqualification under the Government Order dated 28.10.2002 and he could not have been granted a license. This being the position, it is not necessary to enter into the merits of the other charges against the petitioner, and his explanation in that respect. 12. Learned counsel contends that the license of the petitioner’s father too has been cancelled. The same is not a subject matter of this petition and if that is so, the petitioner’s father can always raise this issue which can be decided without being prejudiced with the grant or otherwise of a license to the petitioner. 13. The petition is accordingly dismissed subject to the observations made herein above. ————