JUDGMENT Rajes Kumar, J.—These are 14 appeals filed by the insurance company against the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Vth Additional District Judge, Barabanki passed on 22.2.2001 in Claim Petition Nos. 163 of 1996, order dated 26.9.2006 passed by the Special Judge (E.C. Act)/M.A.C.T. Bahraich in M.A.C.T. No. 93/70/2000, order dated 5.4.2006 in Claim Petition No. 154/70/1998, order dated 10.3.2006 in Claim Petition No. 147/70/1998, order dated 10.3.2006 in Claim Petition No. 232/70/1998, order dated 6.4.2006 in Claim Petition No. 151/70/1998, order dated 10.3.2006 in Claim Petition No. 163/70/1998, order dated 4.4.2006 in Claim Petition No. 148/70/1998, order dated 8.5.2006 in Claim Petition No. 153/70/1998, order dated 31.1.2006 in Claim Petition No. 155/70/1998, order dated 10.4.2006 in Claim Petition No. 149/70/1998, order dated 10.3.2006 in Claim Petition No. 150/70/1998, order dated 23.9.2005 in Claim Petition No. 220/70/1998 and order dated 25.9.2006 passed by the Additional District Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Special Judge (E. C. Act), Bahraich in Claim Petition No. 164/70/1998 by which in the accident the buses attached to U.P.S.R.T.C., the insurance company has been held liable to pay the compensation. Since in all the appeals a common question is involved, therefore, all the appeals are being decided by a common order. 2. In all the cases owner of the buses entered into the contract/ agreement with Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Sapru Marg, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the "U.P.S.R.T.C.") to provide their buses for transportation. The owner of the vehicles admittedly got their vehicles insured through the appellant-insurance companies. The U.P.S.R.T.C. has not got such vehicles insured . The question for consideration is that while such buses met with accidents, which, under the terms of the contract, have been provided to U.P.S.R.T.C., whether the insurance company is liable for compensation to the third party to indemnify the liability of the owner of the buses or the U.P.S.R.T.C. 3. Heard Sri R. C. Sharma, Ms. Alka Verma and Sri Shishir Pradhan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, Sri Aqtar Abbas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of U.P.S.R.T.C. and S/Sri Ravindra Pratap Singh and Sarvesh Kumar Saxena, learned counsel appearing on behalf of claimants. 4. Heard Sri R. C. Sharma, Ms. Alka Verma and Sri Shishir Pradhan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, Sri Aqtar Abbas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of U.P.S.R.T.C. and S/Sri Ravindra Pratap Singh and Sarvesh Kumar Saxena, learned counsel appearing on behalf of claimants. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), it is the owner of the vehicle who is liable to pay the compensation to the claimants in case of accident. The owner is defined by Section 2 (30) of the Act. Under the definition of the owner the person under whose possession the vehicle was, is deemed to be the owner. Under the terms of the agreement between the actual owner of the vehicle and the U.P.S.R.T.C., the possession and control of the vehicle have been transferred to U.P.S.R.T.C. during the period of contract which is clear from clause (1) of the agreement. Therefore, the U.P.S.R.T.C. is the owner of the vehicle within the definition of owner under the Act for the period of contract. He submitted that under the insurance policies, the insurance companies undertook to indemnify the liability of the owner who got the vehicle insured. Since the vehicle during the period of contract, was not in possession and control of the actual owner (in short 'insured') but was under the possession and control of U.P.S.R.T.C. The insured who got the vehicles insured were not the owner within the definition of "owner" under the Act and the U.P.S.R.T.C. was the owner within the definition of the Act and liable for compensation. The insurance company has not undertaken, under the insurance policies, to indemnify the U.P.S.R.T.C. in respect of their liability, therefore, the insurance company is not liable for the payment of compensation for the accident committed during the period of agreements between the insured and the U.P.S.R.T.C. 5. In support of the contention they relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Kammarudin and others, 1998 (1) TAC 42. The Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Kammarudin and others, F.A.F.O. No. 389 of 2003, decided on 21.10.2003 the S.L.P. filed against the said order has been dismissed by the Apex Court on 25.7.2005. The Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Kammarudin and others, F.A.F.O. No. 389 of 2003, decided on 21.10.2003 the S.L.P. filed against the said order has been dismissed by the Apex Court on 25.7.2005. The Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of F.A.F.O. No. 63 of 2001, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Smt. Lallan Devi and others and other connected F.A.F.Os. decided on 12.4.2007, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi and others, 2008 (1) TAC 214 : 2008 (1) ACCD 143 : 2008 (1) AWC 587 (SC). 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of U.P.S.R.T.C. submitted that under clause (2) of the agreement the liability under the Act was on the owner of the vehicle and not on U.P.S.R.T.C. He submitted that under Section 146 of the Act no vehicle could be plied without getting the insurance and it also allowed the owner of the vehicle to allow other person to ply such vehicle and such person using the vehicle is not required to take seperate insurance. In support of contention he relied upon the following decisions - Rikhi Ram and another v. Smt. Sukhrania and others, (2003) 3 SCC 97 , Gauri Shanker Paliwal v. J.N. Nigam and others, 2007 (1) ALJ 774 : 2007 (1) ACCD 213 (All) : 2007 (1) AWC 481 and Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company, Rampur v. Smt. Savitri Devi and others, 2008 (1) ALJ 417 : 2008 (1) ACCD 102 (All) : 2008 (1) AWC 188. He submitted that the decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is distinguishable and is not applicable to the present case. He further submitted that the insurance companies were aware that the vehicles were given under the contract to the U.P.S.R.T.C. and knowing this fact the vehicle was insured owning the liability which may arise due to the accident. He submitted that the vehicle was insured and, therefore, any liability arises from the accident by such insured vehicle, the insurance company is liable to pay compensation. The copy of the agreement is on record. It is admitted by both the parties that the terms of agreement in all the cases are common. He submitted that the vehicle was insured and, therefore, any liability arises from the accident by such insured vehicle, the insurance company is liable to pay compensation. The copy of the agreement is on record. It is admitted by both the parties that the terms of agreement in all the cases are common. Extracts of some of the relevant clauses of the agreement read as follows : v. ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê mÊ/UÊ ©U‹éœ ?§/UÊ߸ ªß¸ Á?ŸË’‚ ‚¢ÅÿÊ xw/|xzw ?ÊÚ«U‹ xÆ.x.v~~x vÿÊ?§ ’Ë?Ê ÊÚÁ‹‚Ë ‚¢0 ~x/xv/vÆyy| ?ÒœÃÊ ÿÊ ?Ò?§ÁÀ?§ ’‚ ¡Ê? ß‚ •ŸÈ’㜠??§ •ãÿ ‡ÊÃÊ?Z ??§ •œËŸ ‚?ÿ-‚?ÿ /U ©U‹éœ ?§/UÊ߸ ¡Êÿ?ªË, •ŸÈ’㜠•?Áœ ??¥ ?œÊŸ ?Ê ??§ „U?Ê‹? /U„?UªË ÃÕÊ ’‚ ?§Ê S?ÊÁœ?§Ê/U •ÊÒ/U ÁŸÿãòÊáÊ ?Õ? ?Ê ??§ •œËŸ /U„?UªÊ, Á?§ãÃÈ ’‚ ?§Ê S?ÊÁ?à? ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ?§Ê „UË /U„?UªÊ– w. ?Ê?˜U/U ÿÊŸ •ÁœÁŸÿ?, v~}} ÿÊ •ãÿ •ÁœÁŸÿ?Ê?¥ ??§ •ãê¸Ã ‚÷Ë Á?Áœ?§ ŒÊÁÿà?Ê?¥ ÿÊŸË ?Ê?˜U/U ?Ê„UŸ ?§Ê ¢¡Ë?§/UáÊ, ˜UÒÄ‚ ÷ȪÃÊŸ, vÿÊ?§ ’Ë?Ê ÃÕÊ ?? ‚÷Ë ŒÊÁÿà? ¡Ê? ‚?ÿ-‚?ÿ /U Á?§‚Ë ÷Ë Á?Áœ mÊ/UÊ ?Ê„UŸ S?Ê?Ë /U ÁŸœÊ¸Á/Uà Á?§ÿ? ¡Êÿ?, ??§ ÁŸ?¸„UŸ ??§ Á‹ÿ? ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ?§Ê ©UûÊ/UŒÊÁÿà? „UÊ?ªÊ ÃÕÊ ?Õ? ?Ê ?§Ê ?§Ê?߸ ŒÊÁÿà? Ÿ„UË¥ ?ÊŸÊ ¡Êÿ?ªÊ– y.y. ÿÊòÊË ?§Ê? Á˜U?§˜U Œ?Ÿ?, Á?§/UÊÿÊ ?Ê# ?§/UŸ? ÃÕÊ ß‚ ‚ê’㜠??¥ Á?Á÷㟠??§Ê/U ??§ •Á÷‹?pÊ?¥ ?§Ê? Íáʸ ?§/UŸ? ?§Ê ŒÊÁÿà? ?Õ? ?Ê mÊ/UÊ ÁŸÿÈQ§ Á/UøÊ‹?§ ?§Ê „UÊ?ªÊ– Á/UøÊ‹?§Ê?¥ ?§Ë ÁŸÿÈÁQ§ ?Õ? ?Ê mÊ/UÊ ?§Ë ¡Êÿ?ªË– Á/UøÊ‹?§ ??§ ÁŸŒ?¸‡ÊŸ ??¥ øÊ‹?§ ’‚ ‚¢øÊÁ‹Ã ?§/?UªÊ– øÊ‹?§, ‚¢øÊ‹Ÿ ‚ê’ãœË ?Õ? ?Ê ??§ ‚÷Ë •ÊŒ?‡ÊÊ?¥ ‚? ’Êäÿ „UÊ?ªÊ– ÿÁŒ øÊ‹?§ mÊ/UÊ ‚¢øÊ‹Ÿ ??§ ‚ê’㜠??¥ ?§Ê?߸ òÊÈÁ˜U ÿÊ •?ôÊÊ ?§Ë ¡ÊÃË „ÒU ÃÊ? ?„U ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ?§Ë òÊÈÁ˜U ÿÊ •?ôÊÊ ?ÊŸË ¡Êÿ?ªË ÃÕÊ Ãà‚ê’ãœË ‚÷Ë „UÊÁŸ ?§Ë ?ÁÃÍÌà ?Õ? ?Ê mÊ/UÊ ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ‚? ?§/UŸ? ?§Ê? •Áœ?Χà „UÊ?ªÊ ? ?§Ë ¡Êÿ?ªË– ~.v. •ŸÈ’㜠Ÿ?ËŸË?§/UáÊ Ÿ Á?§ÿ? ¡ÊŸ? ?§Ë ÁSÕÁà ??¥ x ?•¸ ?§Ê „UÊ?ªÊ Á?§ãÃÈ ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ?§Ê? ?àÿ??§ ?•¸ ÿ„U ??ÊáÊ-òÊ Œ?ŸÊ „UÊ?ªÊ Á?§ ©U‚? ?Õ? ?Ê ‚? •ŸÈ’ÁãœÃ ’‚ ?§Ê •ŸÈ’ÁãœÃ •?Áœ ??§ Á‹ÿ? vÿÊ?§ ’Ë?Ê ?§/UÊ Á‹ÿÊ „ÒU ¡Ê? Á?§ ?Òœ „ÒU 8?¢ ’‚ ??§ ˜ÒUÄ‚ •ÊÁŒ ?§Ê •lÊ?Áœ?§ ÷ȪÃÊŸ Á?§ÿÊ ¡Ê øÈ?§Ê „ÒU •ÊÒ/U ’‚ ?§Ë Á»§˜UŸ?‚ ‚ê÷ʪËÿ Á/U?„UŸ •Áœ?§Ê/UË ‚? ?§/UÊ ŒË ªß¸ „ÒU, ÃÕÊ ?Òœ „ÒU– vÆ. øÊ‹?§ ?§Ë Á?§‚Ë òÊÈÁ˜U •‚Ê?œÊŸË, ŒÈÉʸ˜UŸÊ ÿÊ •ãÿ •?Òœ ?§ÊÿÊ?Z ?§Ê Íáʸ ŒÊÁÿà? ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ?§Ê „UÊ?ªÊ ÃÕÊ ß‚ ‚ê’㜠??¥ Á?§‚Ë ÷Ë ?ÁÃ?§/U ÿÊ •ãÿ Œ?ÿ œŸ/UÊÁ‡Ê ??§ ÷ȪÃÊŸ ?§Ê ŒÊÁÿà? ?§/UÊ ŒË ªß¸ „ÒU, ÃÕÊ ?Òœ „ÒU– vÆ. øÊ‹?§ ?§Ë Á?§‚Ë òÊÈÁ˜U •‚Ê?œÊŸË, ŒÈÉʸ˜UŸÊ ÿÊ •ãÿ •?Òœ ?§ÊÿÊ?Z ?§Ê Íáʸ ŒÊÁÿà? ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ?§Ê „UÊ?ªÊ ÃÕÊ ß‚ ‚ê’㜠??¥ Á?§‚Ë ÷Ë ?ÁÃ?§/U ÿÊ •ãÿ Œ?ÿ œŸ/UÊÁ‡Ê ??§ ÷ȪÃÊŸ ?§Ê ŒÊÁÿà? ’‚ S?Ê?Ë ÿÊ •ÁœÁŸÿ?Ê?¥ ??§ •ãê¸Ã ’Ë?Ê ?§êŸË ?§Ê „UÊ?ªÊ Á?§‚Ë ÷Ë •?SÕÊ ??¥ øÊ‹?§ ?§Ë òÊÈÁ˜U, •‚Ê?œÊŸË ŒÈÉʸ˜UŸÊ, •?ÒäÊ ?§ÊÿÊ?Z ?§Ê ŒÊÁÿà? ?Õ? ?Ê ?§Ê Ÿ„UË¥ „UÊ?ªÊ– ÿÁŒ Á?§‚Ë ãÿÊÿÊ‹ÿ •ÊÁŒ ??§ •ÊŒ?‡Ê ??§ •ŸÈÊ‹Ÿ ??¥ ?Õ? ?Ê mÊ/UÊ ?§Ê?߸ ÷ȪÃÊŸ Á?§ÿÊ ªÿÊ „UÊ? ÃÊ? ÁmÃËÿ ?Ê ??§ Œ?ÿ?§Ê?¥ ‚? ÿÊ •ãÿ Á?ÁœÿÊ?¥ mÊ/UÊ ?Õ? ?Ê vÿÊ?‚ÊÁÿ?§ Œ/U /U éÿÊ¡ ‚Á„Uà ?‚Í‹Ë ?§/UŸ? ???§ Á‹ÿ? •Áœ?Χà „UÊ?ªÊ– w|. •ŸÈ’ÁãœÃ Á?ŸË ’‚ ?§Ê /UÁ?˜U ?Õ? ?Ê ??§ ŸÊ? ’Ÿ?ªÊ ÃâÊÊ »§Ë‚ /U vÿÿ ?§Ë ªß¸ œŸ/UÊÁ‡Ê ?§Ê ?„UŸ ?Õ? ?Ê „UË ?§/?UªÊ– 7. Some of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act read as follows : "Section 2 (30) "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement ; Section 140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.—(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifty thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect or the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifty thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect or the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees. (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall be quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) regarding death or bodily injury to any person, for which the owner of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for relief, he is also liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being in force : Section 144. Overriding effect.—The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Section 146. Necessity for insurance against third party risk.—(1) No person shall use, except as a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use, a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter : Provided that in the case of a vehicle carrying, or meant to carry, dangerous or hazardous goods, there shall also be a policy of insurance under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991). Section 147. Section 147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.—(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which— (a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer ; or (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)— (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place ; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place : Provided that a policy shall not be required— (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee— (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of the vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely : (a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred ; (b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand : Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier. (3) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any condition subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matters ; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases. (4) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provisions of this Chapter or the rules made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority in whose records the vehicle to which the cover note relates has been registered or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. Section 149. Section 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.—(1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) or under the provisions of Section 163A is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal ; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely— (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely : (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle— (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle ; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification ; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion ; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. Section 157. Section 157. Transfer of certificate of insurance.—(1) Where a person in whose favour the certificate of insurance has been issued in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter transfers to another person the ownership of the motor vehicle in respect of which such insurance was taken together with the policy of insurance relating thereto, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the date of its transfer. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that such deemed transfer shall include transfer of rights and liabilities of the said certificate of insurance and policy of insurance. (2) The transferee shall apply within fourteen days from the date of transfer in the prescribed form to the insurer for making necessary changes in regard to the fact of transfer in the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate in his favour and the insurer shall make the necessary changes in the certificate and the policy of insurance in regard to the transfer of insurance. Section 163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs of the victim, as the case may be. Explanation. — For the purposes of this sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. Section 168. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. Section 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.—(1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be : Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X." 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we have perused the impugned orders, copy of the agreement between the U.P.S.R.T.C. and the insured and the materials available on record. 9. Section 2 (30) of the Act defines 'owner'. Under Section 140 it is the 'owner' who is liable to pay compensation in case of death or disablement of any person resulted from an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Section 146 says that no person shall use except as a passenger a motor vehicle in a public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or other person as the case may be a policy of the insurance complying with the requirement of this chapter. Section 146 also permits a person to allow the other person to use motor vehicle. The insurance is necessary against third party risk. Under Section 147 of the Act a liability of the insurer is limited as well as unlimited depending upon the nature of the policy. Section 146 also permits a person to allow the other person to use motor vehicle. The insurance is necessary against third party risk. Under Section 147 of the Act a liability of the insurer is limited as well as unlimited depending upon the nature of the policy. Section 149 (1) of the Act contemplates the duty of the insurer to satisfy judgment and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risk. Section 149 (2) provides the condition under which the insurer may not be liable to pay. The 'owner' is defined under Section 2 (30) of the Act. It means a person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered and where such person is a minor the guardian of such minor and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. Therefore, under the agreement of lease the person in possession of the vehicle shall be the 'owner'. 10. Therefore, in order to decide the controversy in the present case it is to be examined that what is the nature of the agreement and who was in possession of the vehicle during the period of the agreement. The relevant clauses of the agreement are referred hereinabove. Clause 1 of the agreement clearly stipulates that during the period of agreement possession and control of the vehicle shall be with the U.P.S.R.T.C. Clause 9.1 provides that the period of agreement was for three years. Therefore, as per the agreement for the period of three years the possession and control of the vehicle was with the U.P.S.R.T.C. Having regard to the terms of the conditions we are of the view that the nature of agreement was the agreement of lease and there was a transfer of a right to use the vehicle by the insured to the U.P.S.R.T.C. and the possession of the vehicles were with the U.P.S.R.T.C. during the period of contract. Therefore, we are of the view that under the definition of 'owner' in Section 2 (30) of the Act, the U.P.S.R.T.C. was the owner of the vehicles and liable for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act to the persons who were injured or caused death in an accident by such vehicles. 11. Therefore, we are of the view that under the definition of 'owner' in Section 2 (30) of the Act, the U.P.S.R.T.C. was the owner of the vehicles and liable for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act to the persons who were injured or caused death in an accident by such vehicles. 11. In the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kailash Nath Kothari and others (supra) the facts of the case was that in an accident held on 17.7.1981 by Bus No. RSB-3945, which was provided by the insurer to the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (called the 'R.S.R.T.C.' for short) under the terms of the agreement, 23 passengers travelling in the Bus died in an accident. The insured (actual owner of the vehicle) has got the vehicle insured with the insurance company The question for consideration was whether the insurance company was liable to pay compensation or the R.S.R.T.C. Under the term of the contract it was found that the vehicle was under the actual possession and control of the R.S.R.T.C. The definition of 'owner' under Section 2 (19) of the old Act and now Section 2 (30) of the new Act and conditions No. 4 to 7 and 15 of the agreement executed between the R.S.R.T.C. and the owner have been considered. On the aforesaid fact, the Apex Court held as follows : "15. Conditions 4 to 7 and 15 of the agreement executed between the R.S.R.T.C. and the owner read : "4. The Corporation shall appoint the conductor for the operation of the bus given on contract by the second party and the conductor of the Corporation shall do the work of issuing tickets to the passengers, to receive the fare, to all the passengers to get in and get out of the bus, to help the passengers to load and unload their goods, to stop the bus at the stops fixed by the Corporation and to operate the bus according to time table. 5. The tickets, way-bills and other stationary shall be supplied by the Corporation to the said conductor of the Corporation to the said conductor of the Corporation. 6. The driver of the bus shall have to follow all such instructions of the conductor, which shall be necessary under the rules for the operation of the bus. 7. 5. The tickets, way-bills and other stationary shall be supplied by the Corporation to the said conductor of the Corporation to the said conductor of the Corporation. 6. The driver of the bus shall have to follow all such instructions of the conductor, which shall be necessary under the rules for the operation of the bus. 7. The driver of the bus shall comply with all the orders of the Corporation or of the officers appointed by the Corporation. 15. Upon the accident of the bus taking place the owner of the bus shall be liable for the loss, damages and for the liabilities relating to the safety of the passengers. The Corporation shall not be liable for any accident. If the Corporation is required to make any payment or incur any expenses through some Court or under some mutual compromise, the Corporation shall be able to recover such amounts from the owner of the bus after deducting the same from the amounts payable to him." 16. The admitted facts unmistakably show that the vehicle in question was in possession and under the actual control of R.S.R.T.C. for the purpose of running on the specified route and was being used for carrying, on hire, passengers by the R.S.R.T.C. The driver, was to carry out instructions, orders and directions of the conductor and other officers of the R.S.R.T.C. for operation of the bus on the route specified by the R.S.R.T.C. 17. The definition of owner under Section 2 (19) of the Act is not exhaustive. It has, therefore, to be construed, in a wider sense, in the facts and circumstances of a given case. The expression owner must include, in a given case, the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions and commands the driver is obliged to operate the bus. To confine the meaning of 'owner' to the registered owner only would in a case where the vehicle is in the actual possession and control of the hirer, not be proper for the purpose of fastening of liability in case of an accident. The liability of the "owner" is vicarious for the tort committed by its employee during the course of his employment and it would be a question of fact in each case as to one whom can vicarious liability be fastened in the case of an accident. The liability of the "owner" is vicarious for the tort committed by its employee during the course of his employment and it would be a question of fact in each case as to one whom can vicarious liability be fastened in the case of an accident. In this case, Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus could not ply the bus on the particular route for which he had no permit and he in fact was not plying the bus on that route. The services of the driver were transferred along with complete 'control' to R.S.R.T.C., under whose direction, instructions and command the driver was to ply or not to ply the ill-fated bus on the fateful day. The passengers were being carried by R.S.R.T.C. on receiving fare from them. Shri Sanjay Kumar was, therefore, not concerned with the passengers travelling in that bus on the particular route on payment of fare to R.S.R.T.C. Driver of the bus, even though an employee of the owner, was at the relevant time performing his duties under the order and command of the conductor of R.S.R.T.C. for operation of the bus. So far as the passengers of the ill-fated bus are concerned, their privity of contract was only with the R.S.R.T.C. to whom they had paid the fare for travelling in that bus and their safety, therefore, became the responsibility of the R.S.R.T.C. while travelling in the bus. They had no privity of contract with Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus at all. Had it been a case only of transfer of services of the driver and not of transfer of control of the driver from the owner to R.S.R.T.C., the matter may have been somewhat different. But on facts in this case and in view of conditions 4 to 7 of the agreement (supra), the R.S.R.T.C. must be held to be vicariously liable for the tort committed by the driver while plying the bus under contract of the R.S.T.R.C. The general proposition of law and the presumption arising therefrom that an employer, that is the person who has the right to hire and fire the employee, is generally responsible vicariously for the tort committed by the concerned employee during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, is a rebuttable presumption. If the original employer is able to establish that when the servant was lent, the effective control over him was also transferred to the hirer, as the case may be, must be held vicariously liable for the tort committed by the concerned employee in the course of his employment while under the command and control of the hirer notwithstanding the fact that the driver would continue to be on the pay roll of the original owner. The proposition based on the general principle as noticed above is adequately rebutted in this case not only on the basis of the evidence led by the parties but also on the basis of conditions 6 and 7 (supra), which go to show that the owner had not merely transferred the services of the driver to the R.S.R.T.C. but actual control and the driver was to act under the instructions, control and command of the conductor and other officers of the R.S.R.T.C. 18. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on condition No. 15 of the agreement (supra) in our view is misconceived. Apart from the fact that this clause in the agreement between the owner and the R.S.R.T.C., to the extent it shifts the liability for the accident, from the R.S.R.T.C. to the owner, may be against the public policy as opined by the High Court, though we are not inclined to test the correctness of that proposition of law because on facts, we find that R.S.R.T.C. cannot escape its liability to pay compensation. The second part of condition No. 15 makes it abundantly clear that the R.S.R.T.C. did not completely shift the liability to the owner of the bus because it provided for reimbursement to it in case it has to pay compensation arising out of an accident. the words : "if the Corporation is required to make any payment or incur any expenses through some Court or under some mutual compromise, the Corporation shall be able to recover such amounts from the owner of the bus after deducting the same from the amounts payable to him." in the later part of condition No. 15 leave no ambiguity in that behalf and clearly go to show the intention of the parties. Thus, R.S.R.T.C. cannot escape its liability under condition No. 15 of the agreement either. Thus, R.S.R.T.C. cannot escape its liability under condition No. 15 of the agreement either. Thus, both on facts and in law the liability to pay compensation for the accident must fall on the R.S.R.T.C." 12. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi and others (supra) the fact of the case was that the offending car was requisitioned during the Assembly election by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rampur, through the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla. The said vehicle was in possession as also under the control of the said officer. On 17.11.1993 while the S.D.M., Rampur, was travelling in the said vehicle an accident occurred, as a result whereof a boy named Satish Kumar sustained injuries. He later on expired. The heirs of Satish Kumar filed the complaint. Such car was insured with the National Insurance Co. Ltd. The insurance was obtained by the actual owner of the vehicle. The question was whether the actual owner of the vehicle was liable to pay compensation and in turn National Insurance Company or the State is liable to pay on behalf of S.D.M., Rampur. The Apex Court has considered the definition of the owner in Section 2 (30) of the Act and the various decisions of the Apex Court including the decision in the case of Kailash Nath Kothari and the decisions of the various High Courts. The Apex Court held as follows : "10. Parliament either under the 1939 Act or the 1988 Act did not take into consideration a situation of this nataure. No doubt, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 continued to be the registered owner of the vehicle despite the fact that the same was requisitioned by the District Magistrate in exercise of its power conferred upon it under the Representation of People Act. A vehicle is requisitioned by a statutory authority, pursuant to the provisions contained in a statute. The owner of the vehicle cannot refuse to abide by the order of requisition of the vehicle by the Deputy Commissioner. While the vehicle remains under requisition, the owner does not exercise any control thereover. The driver may still be the employee of the owner of the vehicle but he has to drive it as per the direction of the officer of the State, who is put in- charge thereof. While the vehicle remains under requisition, the owner does not exercise any control thereover. The driver may still be the employee of the owner of the vehicle but he has to drive it as per the direction of the officer of the State, who is put in- charge thereof. Save and except for legal ownership, for all intent and purport, the registered owner of the vehicle loses entire control thereover. He has no say as to whether the vehicle should be driven at a given point of time or not. He cannot ask the driver not to drive a vehicle on a bad road. He or the driver could not possibly say that the vehicle would not be driven in the night. The purpose of requisition is to use the vehicle. For the period the vehicle remains under the control of the State and/or its officers, the owner is only entitled to payment of compensation therefor in terms of the Act but he cannot not exercise any control thereupon. In a situation of this nature, this Court must proceed on the presumption that the Parliament while enacting the 1988 Act did not envisage such a situation. If in a given situation, the statutory definitions contained in the 1988 Act cannot be given effect to in letter and spirit, the same should be understood from the common sense point of view. 18. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the State shall be liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants and not the registered owner of the vehicle and consequently the appellant herein." 13. In F.A.F.O. No. 389 of 2003, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Kammarudin and others the Tribunal has held U.P.S.R.T.C. liable for the payment of compensation. The U.P.S.R.T.C. filed the aforesaid appeal in this Hon'ble Court. The Division Bench of this Court, following the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.S.R.T.C. v. Kailash Nath Kothari (supra) dismissed the appeal of U.P.S.R.T.C. and upheld the order of the Tribunal. Special leave petition against the aforesaid order has been dismissed by the Apex Court on 25.7.2005. 14. The Division Bench of this Court, following the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.S.R.T.C. v. Kailash Nath Kothari (supra) dismissed the appeal of U.P.S.R.T.C. and upheld the order of the Tribunal. Special leave petition against the aforesaid order has been dismissed by the Apex Court on 25.7.2005. 14. In another case the Division Bench of this Court in F.A.F.O. No. 63 of 2001, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Smt. Lallan Devi and others and other connected appeals, has held as follows : "Although contractual liability is not defined under the Act but to us as the liability arising in the case in hand is because of contract between the Corporation and the owner of the bus as per terms and conditions determined, policy cannot cover the liability arising out of this contract. The contract was between owner and corporation without involving insurance company. We have failed to understand as to how in those circumstances liability arising due to said contract the insurance company can be made liable. Therefore, in our opinion, since the vehicle was running under the contract with the Corporation and as would be evident, under the direct control of the conductor appointed by the Corporation on the specified routes and realizing of fare by the conductor as fixed by the Corporation, if any liability arose during enforcement of the contract, the insurance company cannot be held liable. In such eventuality, since Corporation is in ultimate control of the vehicle, it should own vicarious liability for the fault and negligence of the driver although appointed by the owner but plying the vehicle under the command of the Corporation. For the same reason, not only the insurance company, but the owner who placed his vehicle at the control of Corporation, will also not be liable for compensation because of any act such as negligence etc. committed by the driver acting under the control of the Corporation." 15. The Division Bench further held that the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R.S.R.T.C. v. Kailash Nath Kothari (supra) was not confined to limited liability alone. 16. For the reason stated above, we are of the view that under the terms of the contract the vehicles were under possession and control of U.P.S.R.T.C. during the period of the contract. 16. For the reason stated above, we are of the view that under the terms of the contract the vehicles were under possession and control of U.P.S.R.T.C. during the period of the contract. The permit was in the name of the U.P.S.R.T.C. and the driver was under the control of U.P.S.R.T.C. and had to ply on the instruction of the U.P.S.R.T.C., thus the U.P.S.R.T.C. is liable for compensation arising from the accident by such vehicles. The insurance company was not the party in the agreement between the U.P.S.R.T.C. and the actual owner. The vehicle was got insured by the actual owner and not by the U.P.S.R.T.C. Under the insurance policy the insurance company was liable to indemnify the liability of the insured and not of U.P.S.R.T.C. Therefore, the appellant insurance co. cannot be held liable for the payment of compensation payable to the heirs arising as a result of accident by such vehicles. 17. We do not find any substance in the argument of learned counsel for the U.P.S.R.T.C. Merely because under Clause 2 of the agreement between U.P.S.R.T.C. and the actual owner, the actual owner has been held liable, the insurance company cannot be held liable to pay compensation as the insurance company was not the party of such agreement. Similar clause has also been considered by the Apex Court in the case of R.S.R.T.C. v. Kailash Nath Kothari, referred hereinabove and on the consideration of such term the Apex Court has held R.S.R.T.C. liable for compensation and not the insurance company The decision in the case of Rikhiram and others v. Sukhrania and others relied upon by the learned counsel for the U.P.S.R.T.C. has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Complany Ltd. v. Deepa Devi and others and held not applicable to such situation. It was a case relating to transfer of vehicle by the owner to the third party. In the case of Gauri Shanker Paliwal v. J.N. Nigam and others, (supra) the case was relating to the change of ownership. Relying upon the provision of Sections 94, 95 (1) (b) and 103A, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the insurer cannot be exempted from the payment of compensation. This situation is not available in the present case. Therefore, this case is not applicable. 18. Relying upon the provision of Sections 94, 95 (1) (b) and 103A, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that the insurer cannot be exempted from the payment of compensation. This situation is not available in the present case. Therefore, this case is not applicable. 18. In the case of Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company, Rampur v. Smt. Savitri Devi and others (supra) the vehicle was being driven by the third person with the permission of the registered owner and on these facts it has been held that the insurance company cannot be exempted from payment of compensation. Therefore, this case is also distinguishable. 19. For the reasons stated above all the appeals are allowed. The order of the Tribunals are set aside. We hold that the U.P.S.R.T.C. are liable for payment of compensation and not the appellant insurance company. In case if the amount has already been deposited by the insurance company the same shall be recovered from the U.P.S.R.T.C. The Tribunal is directed to recover the balance amount, not already recovered, from the U.P.S.R.T.C. and release the same forthwith to the claimants as per their respective shares. The statutory amount deposited shall be remitted to the Tribunal. The insurance company may move an application for the refund of the amount. In case if any such application is moved, the same may be disposed of at the earliest. There shall be no order as to costs.