JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Udyan Nandan, learned Advocate who appeared in support of this petition and Sri Jyotindra Mishra, learned Advocate General, Sri S. G. Hasnain, learned Additional Advocate General, Sri M. C. Chaturvedi, Chief Standing Counsel who appeared for the respondent No. 1 and 4, Sri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Yashwant Verma, learned Advocate who appeared for the respondent No. 3. 2. Writ petition, counter affidavit, rejoinder affidavit and a supplementary affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 dated 27.7.2009 received on 12.8.2009 to which, on asking no response is filed are on record and they are perused. 3. By means of this writ petition prayer is to quash the notifications dated 15.10.2007 (annexure No. 1 to the writ petition ) and notification dated 4.1.2008 (annexure No. 2 to the writ petition) issued under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). There is a further prayer for issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondents from interfering in the possession of the petitioners over plot No. 437 situated at village Korab, Tehsil Mahaban, district Mathura. Land in dispute which is plot No. 437 is only 1.0348 hectares as is clear from khatauni extract. 4. The purpose of acquisition of land in dispute is to construct a express way of which detail has come in subsequent part of judgment. In this petition small area, out of huge area so acquired is only under challenge. 5. Before notice of the arguments from either of sides certain basic facts to understand the issue about which there may not be much dispute can be hurriedly noticed. 6. The State Government while exercising the powers under Clause D of Section 2 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 notified the land of eight villages of Tehsil Sadar, district Gautam Budh Nagar as industrial development area and also constituted an authority under Section 3 of the said Act named as Taj Expressway Industrial Development Authority headed by Principal Secretary, Government of U.P. Industries Development and Industrial Development Commissioner. Thereafter by notification dated 22.8.2001 schedule was amended and Taj Expressway to include land of several villages of district Gautam Budh Nagar, Aligarh, Agra and Mathura etc. was issued. Thereafter by notification dated 22.8.2001 schedule was amended and Taj Expressway to include land of several villages of district Gautam Budh Nagar, Aligarh, Agra and Mathura etc. was issued. After that notification the land of various villages of the districts as noted became part of industrial development area to be called as Taj Expressway. The State Government by an advertisement dated 23.5.2001 invited offers for construction of 160 kms. Taj Expressway. It was published in two daily news papers having wide circulation. The purpose and object of the project as mentioned in the advertisement is to be quoted here : “The absence of a major highway on the eastern side of Yamuna in U.P. is resulting in longer travel time as well as inconvenience to road users. Considering this, U. P. Government is contemplating to provide an access-controlled expressway connecting New Delhi with Mathura and further Agra. The objectives of the proposed Expressway are as follows : (i) Provide a fast moving corridor to minimize the travel time. (ii) To connect the main townships/commercial centres on the eastern side of Yamuna. (iii) To relieve NH-2 which is already congested and runs through the heart of cities like Faridabad, Ballabgarh and Palwal.” 7. This was a project of building six lane motorable road from Greater Noida to Agra which is to run over 160 kms. The highway between Noida Toll Bridge to Greater Noida was already constructed by the State Government which is about 25 kms. The project was offered as a Joint Venture (JV) in which case a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was to be floated and in the alternate the bidder could take the project exclusively. The respondent No. 3 exercised the second option for taking the project exclusively. Pursuant to the initial advertisement bids were received but they were rejected by the State Government and then fresh advertisement was issued on 10.1.2003 upon which three bids were received which were examined by tender evaluation committee and the bid submitted by the respondent No. 3 was found to be lowest i.e. lowest period during which the Expressway would be operated and toll collected and consequently it was recommended for acceptance. A concession agreement was executed between respondent No. 2 and 3 on 7.2.2003. At this stage the entire project came under series of litigation. A petition came before this Court assailing validity of grant of contract. A concession agreement was executed between respondent No. 2 and 3 on 7.2.2003. At this stage the entire project came under series of litigation. A petition came before this Court assailing validity of grant of contract. Then a committee of Retired Judge of this Court was constituted and it is thereafter a writ petition came to be filed by Jay Pee Industries Limited which was allowed and report of Justice Mishra Commission was quashed. Then again an enquiry commission was constituted by the State Government who submitted its report on 12.10.2006 which was considered by the Cabinet and was accepted. It is thereafter again a petition in the nature of public interest litigation came to be filed in this Court and ultimately the writ petition (PIL) 30322 of 2007 was finally decided on 14.3.2008. The writ petition was dismissed and an undertaking of the respondent No. 2 of that writ petition namely J. P. Group of Industries was recorded for completion of the project before the commencement of the Common Wealth Game in 2010. The judgment of this Court in the writ petition referred above in the case of Ashutosh Srivastava is reported in 2008 (3) ADJ 427 . It is thereafter notification dated 15.10.2007 was issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act and notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 4.1.2008 for an area of 23.625 hectares for the purpose of construction of Taj Expressway in village Korab, district Mathura. A deed of lease was also executed between respondent No. 2 and 3. The contents of the lease deed also indicates about concession agreement dated 7.2.2003 which was granted to the respondent No. 3 by which various concessions as mentioned in the lease deed were permitted. Thus to challenge the two notifications as referred above present writ petition is before this Court. 8. Main submission of Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Advocate for the petitioners is that the actual purpose of acquisition is for the benefit of the Company and, therefore, the provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act has been wrongly dispensed with and the provision of Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act has been illegally invoked. 8. Main submission of Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Advocate for the petitioners is that the actual purpose of acquisition is for the benefit of the Company and, therefore, the provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act has been wrongly dispensed with and the provision of Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act has been illegally invoked. As the purpose is the acquisition for company the proceedings should have been drawn only in accordance with the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act read with provisions of Land Acquisition for Companies Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act and Rules). 9. Submission is that if the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act would have been complied with then the respondents were required to travel and complete long procedure which having not been adhered the acquisition has to fall. 10. Submission of Sri Shashi Nandan is that as the entire cost of acquisition is to be borne by the company and company is to pay the entire dues towards acquisition cost and thus a premium amount of Rs. 1,51,42,03,407/- has been deposited by the company with a liberty to the company to utilize/use the part of land for various facilities. Thus for all practical purposes acquisition is for and in the benefit of the company. The name of public purpose as mentioned in the notification is just camouflage and, therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated. Lastly it is submitted that the real test to ascertain the acquisition for the public purpose and the acquisition for the company although that may be for a public purpose is that whether the compensation awarded for such property is to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenue or some fund controlled/managed by a local authority. 11. To elaborate the aforesaid, reliance has been placed on certain clauses of lease deed dated 24.4.2008 (annexure No. 3 to the writ petition). The clauses on which emphasis was given are clauses 4, 9, and 12 (d) which are to be quoted here : “4. During the term of the lease, the Lessee shall pay to the Lessor lease rent of Rs. 100/- (One hundred only) per hectare per year in advance (the “Rent Amount”) commencing from the month of April, 2008. The clauses on which emphasis was given are clauses 4, 9, and 12 (d) which are to be quoted here : “4. During the term of the lease, the Lessee shall pay to the Lessor lease rent of Rs. 100/- (One hundred only) per hectare per year in advance (the “Rent Amount”) commencing from the month of April, 2008. The Lessee has paid to the Lessor for 772.2362 Hectares of Land falling in sixty six villages of Tehsils Mant and Mahavan, Distt. Mathura (U.P.)as per SCHEDULE III which includes 23.6251 Hectares of the Demised Land, a premium amount of Rs. 1,51,42,03,407.00 (Rupees One hundred fifty one crores forty two lacs three thousand four hundred seven only) towards acquisition cost of the Demised Land through Pay Orders detailed below, the receipt whereof the Lessor doth hereby acknowledges. S.No Pay Order Date Amount Rs. Drawn On No. 1. 975149 24-07-07 8,13,02,000.00 Oriental Bank of Commerce, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. 2. 001034 08-03-07 8,47,81,442.00 Axis Bank Ltd., Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. 3. 001041 13-08-07 6,97,20,310.00 Axis Bank Ltd., Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. 4. 272564 20-11-07 1,27,83,99,655.00 Punjab National Bank, Connaught Place, New Delhi. Total 1,51,42,03,407.00 9. The Lessee shall have right to mortgage, pledge or hypothecate the Demised Land and the assets created thereon to the financial institution and other leaders for financial assistance as per provisions of the Concession Agreement. 12.d The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor any dues towards acquisition cost of the Demised Land remaining outstanding and payable as settled by Lessor without in any way affecting Lessee’s legal rights of the Demised Land.” 12. Submission is that lessee has to pay the entire acquisition cost as a premium and lessee has been given the right to mortgage, pledge or hypothecate the demise land and the assets created thereon in his own way. It is clear that lessee has to bear entire acquisition cost and whatever amount will be outstanding and payable as settled is also to be paid subsequently. From these facts the inference has been tried to be drawn that land has been acquired at the cost of the company, in its interest and the mention of lease rent of Rs. 100/- per hectare is totally misconceived and has no meaning. 13. From these facts the inference has been tried to be drawn that land has been acquired at the cost of the company, in its interest and the mention of lease rent of Rs. 100/- per hectare is totally misconceived and has no meaning. 13. Sri Nandan emphasized that declaration that land is needed for public purpose as mentioned in the notification even if accepted to be correct, compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. 14. At this stage the Court is to quote provisions of Section 6 of the Act and its proviso and the second explanation which are relevant for all purposes of the case, which was referred by counsel for the petitioners : “6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.—(1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of this Act, [appropriate Government] is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub-section (2)], that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders [and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5A, sub-section (2)]; ………………………. ………………………. Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.” Explanation 1. . . . . . Explanation 2 Where the compensation is to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues. 15. After referring to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act learned counsel took the Court to the provisions as contained in Chapter VII of the Act. 15. After referring to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act learned counsel took the Court to the provisions as contained in Chapter VII of the Act. Section 39 to 42 of this Chapter deals with the procedure when the acquisition is for the company. Previous consent of the appropriate government in respect to applicability of Section 5-A of the Act, the enquiry and publication of the agreement itself are provided. 16. At this place we are to quote the provisions as contained in Section 43 of the Act, which will be useful later on for our purpose : “43. Sections 39 to 42 not to apply where Government bound by agreement to provide land for Companies.—The provisions of Sections 39 to 42, both inclusive, shall not apply and the corresponding sections of the Land Acquisition Act, 1870 (10 of 1870), shall be deemed never to have applied, to the acquisition of land for any Railway or other Company, for the purposes of which, under any agreement with such Company, the Secretary of State for India in Council, the Secretary of State, The Central Government or any State Government is or was bound to provide land.” 17. After referring to the provisions of the Act reference was also made to the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Rule 4 of the Rules is to be quoted here : “4. Appropriate Government to be satisfied with regard to certain matters before initiating acquisition proceedings.–(1) Whenever a company makes an application to the appropriate Government for acquisition of any land, that Government shall direct the Collector to submit a report to it on the following matters, namely– ……………….” 18. Rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules states that whenever a company makes an application to the appropriate government for acquisition of the land the Government shall direct the Collector to submit report to which on the following matters it is thereafter certain procedure is provided. Submission is that as the mandate of Rule 4 of the Rules has not been followed the acquisition is to fall. Further submission is that Government never asked any report from the Collector and no enquiry proceeded and accordingly no agreement has been entered between the company and the Government at the same time published as required under Part VII of the Act and thus notifications are bad in law. 19. Further submission is that Government never asked any report from the Collector and no enquiry proceeded and accordingly no agreement has been entered between the company and the Government at the same time published as required under Part VII of the Act and thus notifications are bad in law. 19. Besides referring to various provisions of the Act and the Rules referred above, in respect to both submissions that acquisition is not for public purpose and if it is so then how and in what manner notification is to be made and when purpose can be treated to be public purpose and what is the distinctive feature in that respect series of judgments of the Apex Court were placed. (i) Essco Fabs Private Limited and another v. State of Haryana and another, (2009) 2 SCC 377 . (ii) Pratibha Nema and others v. State of M.P. and others, (2003) 10 SCC 626 . (iii) Shyam Bihari and others v. State of M.P. and others, AIR 1965 SC 427 . (iv) Smt. Somawanti and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1963 SC 151 . (v) State of Gujrat and another v. Patel Chaturbhai Narsinbhai and others, AIR 1975 SC 629 . (vi) Abdul Ghaffar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1985 ALR 79. (vii) Narayan Govind Gavate etc. v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1977 SC 183 . (viii) Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. District Collector and others, (2008) 9 SCC 552 . (ix) Amarnath Ashram Trust Society and another v. Governor of U.P. and others, (1998) 1 SCC 591 . 20. In response to the aforesaid Sri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the main argument of the petitioners side that as no amount towards compensation came to be paid from the State side or the fund owned and controlled by the local authority irrespective of the public purpose for which the land is acquired the acquisition is to be treated for company and thus the procedure as prescribed under Chapter VII is to be followed is totally misconceived, rather it is misplaced. Submission is that on the principle there may not be any quarrel but on the facts that having no application and all the test of Section 6 of the Act being there the acquisition for all purposes being under Chapter II has to be approved. 21. Submission is that on the principle there may not be any quarrel but on the facts that having no application and all the test of Section 6 of the Act being there the acquisition for all purposes being under Chapter II has to be approved. 21. Submission is that the acquisition is neither for the company nor for the benefit of the company nor otherwise the compensation awarded for such property is to be paid by the company either wholly or partly and, therefore, the argument of the petitioners side has no legs. 22. Argument is that no application was ever given by the company for acquisition of the land for its own purpose and in fact land has never vested in the company and it is only on the basis of build, operate and transfer the land is to be used with all the rights for all the times of the authority and therefore, the very basis in submission of the petitioners side of applicability of Part VII of the Act and observance of various procedures so provided in Part VII of the Act and the Rules is totally misconceived and has nothing to do with the present case. 23. Submission is that intention behind the acquisition and the benefit if any to the company cannot be a subject matter of objection by the petitioners and in fact bonafides on the part of the State Government in the acquisition proceedings and the concession so given to the respondent No. 3 has already been tested by this Court by dealing the concession agreement. Major work of the Expressway has already been completed and on account of filing of this petition small work remained for which public at large is to suffer and the undertaking given in the earlier writ petition to complete the work/project before Common Wealth Game, 2010 is also under cloud for no fault of the respondents. 24. Submission is that the project already dragged in litigation for several years and it is on a final shape having been given by the judgment of this Court matter proceeded. 25. 24. Submission is that the project already dragged in litigation for several years and it is on a final shape having been given by the judgment of this Court matter proceeded. 25. Submission is that keeping in mind the undertaking given before this Court and otherwise with an intention that public at large is to be benefited, various proposals including proposal dated 19.7.2007 relating to village Korab for acquisition of 23.6251 hectares was forwarded to the office of the Collector, district Mathura. The total land under acquisition for Taj Expressway (now Yamuna Expressway) is the land of 66 villages of district Mathura including the land of the village Korab was notified and the entire land under acquisition is about 772.396 hectares and the number of farmers are about 5630. At all level the proposal was examined and it is on being satisfied that the land is urgently needed for public purpose, after recording the satisfaction, notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 was issued on 15.10.2007 and then it was pasted in the locality on 9.12.2007. It is thereafter notification under Section 6 was issued on 4.1.2008. Notice under Section 9 was issued to the tenure holders and the objections were invited up to 18.2.2008. Notice was duly served upon petitioners also on 14.2.2008 and they filed their objections also which has been annexed as Annexure No. CA-11 and CA-12 filed by the respondent No. 2. In the objection the issue raised was mainly of payment of the compensation and to get some more facilities. On these facts submission is that acquisition being in the interest of the public to benefit the public and is for public purposes no interference is required in the writ petition. 26. In support of the submission that the body through whom the work is to be arranged has paid the amount to the authority as provided in the terms of deed and authority has paid the amount of compensation it will be treated to be payment of compensation wholly or partly out of the public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by the local authority, reliance has been placed on series of the decisions given by the Apex Court which are referred below. 27. Sri Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate in support of submissions placed reliance on following cases. 27. Sri Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate in support of submissions placed reliance on following cases. (i) Ashutosh Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (3) ADJ 427 ; (ii) Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1960 SC 1203 . (iii) Pandit Jhandu Lal and others v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1961 SC 343 . (iv) R.L. Arora v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1962 SC 764 . (v) Amarnath Ashram Trust Society and another v. Governor of U.P. and others, (1998) 1 SCC 591 . (vi) Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. District Collector and others, (2008) 9 SCC 552 . (vii) Pratibha Nema and others v. State of M.P. and others, (2003) 10 SCC 626 . (viii) First Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another, (2002) 4 SCC 160 . (ix) Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, (1975) 4 SCC 285 . (x) Rajasthan Housing Board and others v. Shri Kishan and others, (1993) 2 SCC 84 . 28. Sri Jyotindra Mishra, learned Advocate General to oppose the submission of the petitioners side clearly stated that entire amount was paid by the Company to the authority which is admitted situation and on receipt of the amount/fund that became the fund/public revenue owned and controlled by the authority and, therefore, the compensation to be awarded for such property which is required to be paid wholly or partly out of the public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by the local authority was in fact paid by the public authority and, therefore, sole objection which has been highlighted before this Court during the course of argument has no substance on the fact of the present case. 29. Sri Mishra placed before the Court the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and specially on explanation II of the first proviso of Section 6 of the Act. 30. 29. Sri Mishra placed before the Court the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and specially on explanation II of the first proviso of Section 6 of the Act. 30. In support of the submission, besides all the decisions on which reliance has been placed by Sri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate namely the case of Pandit Jhandu Lal and others (supra); R.L. Arora (supra); Smt. Somawanti (supra); Pratibha Nema (supra), Ashutosh Srivastava (supra); Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra), further reliance has been placed on the decision given in the case of Ramnik Lal N. Bhutta and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1997) 1 SCC 134 . 31. We are to notice the facts of the cases on which decision was given in various cases on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners and respondents. 32. Here are the cases relied from the petitioners side. 33. In the decision given in the case of Essco Fabs (supra) that was a case where the notification under Section 4 and 6 of the Act lapsed and the land stood released and then after 20 years notification was issued for taking of the land for development and utilization for construction of the road and urgency clause was dispensed in an arbitrary manner and it is on the facts of that case Apex Court observed that holding of the enquiry or hearing of the objection under Section 5-A of the Act may be admissible to the public interest and such enquiry cannot be dispensed with. 34. In the decision given in the case of Pratibha Nema (supra) it has been observed that existence or non existence of public purpose is not a primary distinguishable factor between the acquisition under Part II and acquisition under Paert VII. The root point of distinction seems to be that the source of fund to cover the cost of acquisition. It was observed that essential condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that cost of acquisition should be borne wholly or in part/out of the public fund. 35. In the case of Shyam Bihari (supra) the land was needed for the Premier Refrigerator Factory and work connected therewith. It was observed that essential condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that cost of acquisition should be borne wholly or in part/out of the public fund. 35. In the case of Shyam Bihari (supra) the land was needed for the Premier Refrigerator Factory and work connected therewith. Even on the facts of that case it was found that the mere fact that public purpose mentioned was for the Premier Refrigerator Factory and work connected therewith and therefore it cannot mean that the land was needed for a company. The observation in this respect is to be quoted here : “It follows that when the two notifications declared that the land was needed for a public purpose in a case where no part of the compensation was to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority, they were invited in view of the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. All proceedings following on such notifications would be of no effect under the Act.” 36. In the case of Somwanti (supra) after dealing with public purpose declaration under Section 6 (3) was held to be conclusive evidence. The Apex Court analysed the meaning of proviso to Section 6 (1). Phrase wholly or partly public revenue has been scrutinized and it has been said that part does not necessarily mean a substantial part of the estimated compensation. The question whether amount contributed by State satisfies requirement of law depends on the facts of each case. The observation of the Apex Court in this respect is hereby quoted : “Moreover the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 6 is clear on the point that the land is being acquired at public expense, and the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 6 preclude a Court from going behind such a declaration unless it is shown that the Government has in fact decided not to contribute any funds out of the public revenues for that purpose. For, if the Government had in fact taken a decision of that kind then the exercise of the power to make an acquisition would be open to challenge as being cololurable.” 37. The decision given in the case of State of Gujrat (supra) the Apex Court held that if the acquisition of the land is for the company then the procedure so provided is to be followed. 38. The decision given in the case of State of Gujrat (supra) the Apex Court held that if the acquisition of the land is for the company then the procedure so provided is to be followed. 38. Another decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Abdul Ghaffar is also on the same point. 39. Then we are to see the decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra) The Apex Court held that absence of significant contribution by the State whether the colourable exercise of the power is there. A token contribution from the public revenue was held that it cannot ipso facto be treated as colourable exercise of power by the State in acquisition of land. The public purpose has been explained. The observation of the Apex Court in respect to contribution by the State is hereby quoted : “It is now well established that if the cost of acquisition is borne either wholly or partly by the Government, the acquisition can be said to be for a public purpose within the meaning of the LA Act. But if the cost is entirely borne by the company then it is an acquisition for a company under Part VII of the Act. Even a token contribution from public revenue cannot ipso facto be treated as colourable exercise of power by the State in acquisition of land. Acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the same time for a public purpose and the whole or part of compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. The distinction between Part II public purpose acquisition and Part VII acquisition (for company) has got blurred under the impact of judicial interpretation of relevant provisions. The main and perhaps the decisive distinction lies in the fact whether the cost of acquisition comes out of public funds wholly or partly. Here again, even a token or nominal contribution by the Government is held to be sufficient compliance with the second proviso to Section 6 as held in a catena of decisions. The net result is that by contributing even a trifling sum, the character and pattern or acquisition could be changed by the Government. Here again, even a token or nominal contribution by the Government is held to be sufficient compliance with the second proviso to Section 6 as held in a catena of decisions. The net result is that by contributing even a trifling sum, the character and pattern or acquisition could be changed by the Government. In ultimate analysis, what is considered to be an acquisition for facilitating the setting up of an industry in the private sector could get imbued with the character of public purpose acquisition if only the Government comes forward to sanction the payment of a nominal sum towards compensation.” 40. In another decision given in the case of Amarnath Ashram Trust Society (supra) the Apex Court made the same observation as in the earlier cases that merely because notification under Section 4 stated that the land was needed for a public purpose cannot be said that acquisition was for a public purpose and not under Chapter VII for the said society. 41. Following are the decisions on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3. 42. First we are to notice the observation of this Court in the Bench decision, dealing with the same project where the bonafides of the Government and grant to respondent No. 3 has been approved. 43. In the decision given in the case of Ashutosh Srivastava (supra) the Bench of this Court dealing with the present acquisition, while writing a lengthy judgment in public interest litigation petition made following observation : “In such view of the matter we do not find any ground for holding the enquiry bad or illegal nor can the tender process be held to be faulty or terms of the contract held to be against public interest.” “Submission of the petitioner that various concession have been given to favour respondent No. 2 by the agreement dated 7.2.2003 also does not have much force in view of the fact all such concessions had been spelt out in the bid document and, thus, all parties making the offer were well aware of the concessions to be granted for the project by the State Government.” 44. This Court in the judgment of Ashutosh Srivastava referred to decision of the Apex Court in the case of linking Bangalore with Mysore by an express highway State of Kartnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organization, (2006) 4 SCC 683 wherein also the Court did not interfere in the similar road project between Bangalore and Mysore. 45. The Court further relied upon the decision given by the Apex Court in the case of BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 350 where the Apex Court said that the policy decision in respect of economic matters cannot be interfered unless contrary to the Act or Constitution. 46. In the decision given in the case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra) the Apex Court observed that entire compensation was to be paid by APIIC which works as a nodal agency developing the project which would facilitate socio economic progress and thus it was held that simply because there was a private company which do not mean that larger public interest has been sacrificed or disregarded. 47. In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court considered the distinction in respect to the proposition of Part II and Part VII of the Act and various provisions of which reference has been given by the learned counsel for the petitioners has been taken note. The Apex Court in this case referred to various observations made in the case of R.L. Arora (supra); Pandit Jhandu Lal (supra). Observations as made in this respect by the Apex Court are to be quoted here : “101. The Court (In Pandit Jhandulal case) observed that the Act contemplates acquisition for (i) a public purpose, and (ii) for a company; thus, conveying the idea that acquisition for a company, is not for a public purpose. It was also observed that the purposes of public utility, referred to in Sections 40 and 41 of the Act were akin to public purpose. Hence, acquisition for a public purpose as also acquisition for a company are governed by considerations of public utility. But the procedure for the two kinds of acquisitions is different and if it is for a company, then acquisition has to be effected in accordance with the procedure laid down in Part VII. Considering the ambit and scope of Sections 6 and 39 to 41 and referring to Babu Barkya, the Court observed (Pandit Jhandu Lal case, AIR pp. But the procedure for the two kinds of acquisitions is different and if it is for a company, then acquisition has to be effected in accordance with the procedure laid down in Part VII. Considering the ambit and scope of Sections 6 and 39 to 41 and referring to Babu Barkya, the Court observed (Pandit Jhandu Lal case, AIR pp. 346-47, para 8). “There is no doubt that, as pointed out in the recent decision of this Court, the Act contemplates for a public purpose and for a Company, thus conveying the idea that acquisition for a Company is not for a public purpose. It has been held by this Court, in that decision that, the purposes of public utility, referred to in Sections 40-41 of the Act, are akin to public purpose. Hence, acquisition for a public purpose as also acquisitions for a company are governed by considerations of public utility. But the procedure for the two kinds of acquisitions is different, in so far as Part VII has made substantive provisions for acquisitions of land for Companies. Where acquisition is made for a public purpose, the cost of acquisition for payment of compensation has to be paid wholly or partly out of Public Revenues, or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. On the other hand, in the case of an acquisition for a company, the compensation has to be paid by the Company. But, in such a case, there has to be an agreement, under Section 41, for the transfer of the land acquired by the Government to the Company on payment of the cost of acquisition, as also other matters not material to our present purpose. The agreement contemplated by Section 41 is to be entered into between the Company and the appropriate Government only after the latter is satisfied about the purpose of the proposed acquisition, and subject to the condition precedent that the previous consent of the appropriate Government has been given to the acquisition. The ‘previous consent’ itself of the appropriate Government is made to depend upon the satisfaction of that government that the purpose of the acquisition was as laid down in Section 40. It is, thus, clear that the provisions of Sections 39-41 lay down conditions precedent to the application of the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act, if the acquisition is meant for a company.” 102. It is, thus, clear that the provisions of Sections 39-41 lay down conditions precedent to the application of the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act, if the acquisition is meant for a company.” 102. The Court then dealt with the extent and applicability of Section 6 of the Act and stated : “Section 6 is, in terms, made subject to the provisions of Part VII of the Act. The provisions of Part VII, read with Section 6 of the Act, lead to this result that the declaration for the acquisition for a Company shall not be made unless the compensation to be awarded for the property is to be paid by a company. The declaration for the acquisition for a public purpose, similarly, cannot be made unless the compensation, wholly or partly, is to be paid out of public funds. Therefore, in the case of an acquisition for a Company simpliciter, the declaration cannot be made without satisfying the requirements of Part VII. But, that does not necessarily mean that an acquisition of a Company for a public purpose cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part VII, if the cost or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come out of public funds. In other words, the essential condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that the cost of the acquisition should be borne, wholly or in part, out of public funds. Hence, an acquisition for a Company may also be made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. If, on the other hand, the acquisition for a Company is to be made at the cost entirely of the Company itself, such an acquisition comes under the provisions of Part VII. As in the present instance, it appears that part at any rate of the compensation to be awarded for the acquisition is to come eventually from out of public revenues, it must be held that the acquisition is not for a Company simpliciter. It was not, therefore, necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part VII. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the High Court, though not for the same reasons”. 103. It was not, therefore, necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part VII. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the High Court, though not for the same reasons”. 103. Reference was also made to R.L. Arora (I) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1962) Supp (2) SCR 149. In that case, land was sought to be acquired by the Defence Department of the Government of India for the construction of textile machinery parts factory by Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur. Notifications were issued under the Act applying ‘urgency’ clause. Admittedly, no procedure laid down under Part VII of the Act was followed. A writ petition was, therefore, filed praying for quashing of Notifications and land acquisition proceedings. The main ground in support of the petition was that procedure under Part VII (Sections 38 to 42) of the Act had not been complied with. Referring to the relevant provisions of the Act and Babu Barkya and Pandit Jhandulal, Wanchoo, J. (as His Lordship then was) for the majority stated : “Therefore, though the words `public purpose’ in Sections 4 and 6 have the same meaning, they have to be read in the restricted sense in accordance with Section 40 when the acquisition is for a company under Section 6. In one case, the Notification under Section 6 will say that the acquisition is for a public purpose, in the other case the Notification will say that it is for a company. The proviso to Section 6(1) shows that where the acquisition is for a public purpose, the compensation has to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Where however the acquisition is either for a company, the compensation would be paid wholly by the company. Though therefore this distinction is there where the acquisition is either for a public purpose or for a company, there is not a complete dichotomy between acquisitions for the two purposes and it cannot be maintained that where the acquisition is primarily for a company it must always be preceded by action under Part VII and compensation must always be paid wholly by the company. A third class of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the same time for a public purpose and the whole or part of compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. In such a case though the acquisition may look as if it is primarily for a company it will be covered by that part of Section 6 which lays down that acquisition may be made for a public purpose if the whole or part of the compensation is to be paid out of the public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Such was the case in Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab. In that case the acquisition was for the construction of a labour colony under the Government sponsored housing scheme for the industrial workers of the Thapar Industries Co-operative Housing Society Limited and part of the compensation was to be paid out of the public funds. In such a case this Court held that “an acquisition for a company may also be made for a public purpose within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds” and therefore it was not necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part VII. It is only where the acquisition is for a company and its cost is to be met entirely by the company itself that the provisions of Part VII apply. In the present case it is not the case of the respondents that any part of the compensation is to be paid out of what may be called public funds. It is not in dispute that the entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and therefore the provision of Part VII would apply to the present case; and it is in this background that we have to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant”. 106. It is not in dispute that the entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and therefore the provision of Part VII would apply to the present case; and it is in this background that we have to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant”. 106. In R.L. Arora (II) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, this Court held that in view of the amendment made in the Act, even if the acquisition did not satisfy conditions laid down under clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 40 of the Act, it would be valid, if they satisfy conditions in clause (aa) introduced by the amendment Act. It was also held that once the Government decided to acquire land for public purpose, such acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground that procedure laid down in Part VII had not been followed. The Court, keeping in view the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962 (Act 31 of 1962), held that clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of Section 40 as inserted by Act 31 of 1962 did not contravene Article 31 (2) or Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Accordingly the acquisition was held legal and valid.” 48. In another judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Pratibha Nema (supra) on which both sides placed reliance the Apex Corut has dealt all the aspects which are in fact involved in the present matter and the distinction between the acquisition under Part II of the Act and acquisition under Part VII of the Act was considered. 49. The question posed in the case of Pratibha Nema (supra) for consideration is to be quoted here : “(1) Whether M/s. B. Arun Kumar International Ltd. deposited a sum of Rs. 3 crores for payment of compensation to the land holders for acquisition of land for them. (2) Whether in view of the facts stated in I.A. No. 2 of 2001 and the counter affidavit and further affidavits, the acquisition of land was for the Company and not for public purpose. (3) If the findings on Questions 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, whether any subsequent withdrawal of compensation amount by M/s. Arun Kumar International Ltd. would not affect the invalidity of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. (3) If the findings on Questions 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, whether any subsequent withdrawal of compensation amount by M/s. Arun Kumar International Ltd. would not affect the invalidity of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. (4) If the findings on Issues 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, whether the State Government also contributed partly towards compensation to be paid to the landholders and in its absence the acquisition of land for public purpose is invalid.” 50. In para 9 of the aforesaid judgment proviso to Section 6, on which reliance has been placed from the petitioners side during argument, was quoted and that has been specifically dealt with. 51. On a consideration of the matter observation as made by the Apex Court in the matter noted above is to be quoted here : “17. In Jage Ram’s case (supra) the public purpose mentioned in the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 was the setting up a factory for the manufacture of China-ware and Porcelain-ware. The State Government had contributed a sum of Rs. 100 as was done in the case of Somavanti (supra) towards, the cost of the land. The question arose whether it was necessary for the Government to proceed with the acquisition under Part VII of the Act. Holding that acquisition under Part VII need not have been resorted to, this Court proceeded to discuss the question whether the acquisition was intended for a public purpose. K.S. Hegde, J. speaking for the Court observed thus : “There is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry is in public interest. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that the new State of Haryana was lacking in industries and consequently it had become difficult to tackle the problem of unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the industrialization of an area is in public interest. That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose, the declaration of the Government that it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge. Section 6(3) says that the declaration of the Government that the acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless it is shown that there was a colourable exercise of power, it is not open to this Court to go behind that declaration and find out whether in a particular case the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not : See Smt. Somavanti and others v. The State of Punjab and Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. On the facts of this case there can be hardly any doubt that the purpose for which the land was acquired is a public purpose.” 52. Besides the aforesaid observation in the case of Pratibha Nema (supra) further observation as made in para 24 and 25 of the same judgment can be said to be of more importance for our purposes. Para 24 and 25 of the judgment is quoted below : “Para 24…. The payment of any amount at the stage on account of lease premium was rather premature, but, the fact remains that under the terms of MOU, the Companies which were parties to the MOU did express their willingness to deposit the amount of lease premium in advance. Viewed from another angle, no interim compensation was determined by the time the payment was made by the Company and there was no reference in the MOU to the compensation amount at all and if so, there is no reason to presume that the amount was deposited by the Company as advance compensation amount. In this state of affairs, the High Court was well justified in relying on the documents/books maintained in the ordinary course of business and recording a conclusion that the Cheque for Rs. 3 crores was issued by AKI Ltd., towards advance lease premium. In this state of affairs, the High Court was well justified in relying on the documents/books maintained in the ordinary course of business and recording a conclusion that the Cheque for Rs. 3 crores was issued by AKI Ltd., towards advance lease premium. The non-production of covering letter which according to the sixth respondent is not on its record, does not clinch the issue in favour of the appellants. Taking an overall picture, we are unable to hold that the conclusion of the High Court in this regard is perverse or unsustainable. 25. It seems to be fairly clear, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the amount paid by the Company was utilized towards payment of a part of interim compensation amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer on 7.6.1996 and in the absence of this amount, the Nigam was not having sufficient cash balance to make such payment. We may even go to the extent of inferring that in all probability, the Nigam would have advised or persuaded the Company to make advance payment towards lease amount as per the terms of MOU on a rough and ready basis, so that the said amount could be utilized by the Nigam for making payment on account of interim compensation. Therefore, it could have been within the contemplation of both the parties that the amount paid by the Company will go towards the discharge of the obligation of the Nigam to make payment interim compensation. Even then, it does not in any support the appellants’ stand that the compensation amount had not come out of public revenues. Once the amount paid towards advance lease premium, may be on a rough and ready basis, is credited to the account of the Nigam, obviously, it becomes the fund of the Nigam. Such fund, when utilized for the purpose of payment of compensation, wholly or in part, satisfies the requirements of the second proviso to Section 6(1) read with Explanation 2. The genesis of the fund is not the determinative factor, but its ownership in praesenti that matters. Whether acquisition is for private purpose and vitiated by colourable exercise of power” 53. In another judgment given in the case of Aflatoon (supra) the Apex Court made the following observation : “It was contended by Dr. The genesis of the fund is not the determinative factor, but its ownership in praesenti that matters. Whether acquisition is for private purpose and vitiated by colourable exercise of power” 53. In another judgment given in the case of Aflatoon (supra) the Apex Court made the following observation : “It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the acquisition was really for the cooperative housing societies which are companies within the definition of the word company’ in Section 3(e) of the Act, and, therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Act should have been complied with. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were of the view that the acquisition was not for company. We see no reason to differ from their view. The mere fact that after the acquisition the Government proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the property acquired for development to the cooperative housing societies would not make the acquisition one for company’. Nor are we satisfied that there is any merit in the contention that compensation to be paid for the acquisition came from the consideration paid by the cooperative societies. In the light of the averments in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions here, it is difficult to hold that it was cooperatives which provided the fund for the acquisition. Merely because the Government allotted a part of the property to cooperative societies for development, it would not follow that the acquisition was for cooperative societies, and therefore, Part VII of the Act was attracted.” 54. At this stage some more observations as made in the case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra) although referred earlier can be quoted here : “In case of integrated and indivisible project, the project has to be taken as a whole and must be judged whether it is in the larger public interest. It cannot be split into different components and to consider whether each and every component will serve public good. A holistic approach has to be adopted in such matters. If the project taken as a whole is an attempt in the direction of bringing foreign exchange, generating employment opportunities and securing economic benefits to the State and the public at large, it will serve public purpose. A holistic approach has to be adopted in such matters. If the project taken as a whole is an attempt in the direction of bringing foreign exchange, generating employment opportunities and securing economic benefits to the State and the public at large, it will serve public purpose. The joint venture mechanism for implementing the policy, executing the project and achieving lawful public purpose for realizing the goal of larger public good would neither destroy the object nor vitiate the exercise of power of public purpose for development of infrastructure. The concept of joint venture to tap resources of private sector for infrastructural development for fulfillment of public purpose has been recognized in foreign countries as also in India in several decisions of the Supreme Court. And in such integrated infrastructure development projects acquisition of land and giving it to the company are legal and lawful and does not suffer from mala fides.” “111…….It was also contended that the acquisition was for company inasmuch as after acquisition, the Government proposed to hand over the property or a portion thereof to cooperative housing societies and since procedure in Part VII of the Act was not followed, the acquisition was not valid. Even the said contention was negatived by the Court observing that merely because the Government allotted a portion of the property to cooperative societies, Part VII do not get attracted and the acquisition could not be held invalid. [See also Ajay Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India, (1996) 10 SCC 721 ]. “112….. Emphasising the fact that the acquisition was through the Board, this Court ruled that acquisition was for a public purpose. The notification stated about public purpose of establishment of information technological part through the Board. Considering various clauses in the joint venture agreement, the Court held that the cumulative effect of all went to show that acquisition was for the public purpose of setting up technological park by the Government of Karnataka through the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and was, therefore, valid.“ “116. Reliance was also placed on State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organisation. In that case, the Government of Karnataka undertook a mega project for developing its transport and communication system. A memorandum of understanding was entered into between the State Government and a company for implementation of the project and lands were acquired. Reliance was also placed on State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organisation. In that case, the Government of Karnataka undertook a mega project for developing its transport and communication system. A memorandum of understanding was entered into between the State Government and a company for implementation of the project and lands were acquired. A public interest litigation (PIL) was filed in the High Court alleging that the land was not needed for public purpose and yet excess land was acquired and had been given to a company. The action was, therefore, illegal, unlawful and mala fide. Negativing the contention and upholding the action, this Court observed that the project was an integrated infrastructure development project and not merely a highway project. As an integrated project, it required acquisition and transfer of lands even away from the main alignment of the road. Acquisition of land and giving it to the company was, therefore, legal and lawful and did not suffer from mala fides.” 55. Besides aforesaid decisions, observation as made by Apex Court in the case of Ramnik Lal, on which Sri Mishra placed heavy reliance is also to be noticed. 56. In respect of acquisition of land for public purpose on the exercise of the powers by this Court, the Apex Court has made very clear observation in the case of Ramnik Lal (supra) : “The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 “indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the Courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.” 57. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the Courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.” 57. Following the decision of the Apex Court given in the case of Ramnik Lal (supra) recently a Bench of this Court by a detailed judgment dismissed Swatantra Bharat Paper Mills Private Limited and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (9) ADJ 135 (DB). 58. After noticing the facts and arguments and the decisions of the Apex Court as relied by both sides, this Court has to analyse the situation as emerges on the facts of the present case so as to decide the writ petition. 59. At this place we are to again summarize the noticeable facts although basic facts are already noted which may make the Court comfortable in forming the opinion on the dispute. 60. At the very outset this Court is to observe that issue happens to be very small which in fact was argued with so much ability from both sides that it got a colour of very big issue. Some times small fact/aspect is given multi flavour. 61. At the cost of repetition the purpose of the object for which acquisition was made as mentioned in para 1.1 of the initial advertisement can be reproduced hereunder : “The absence of a major highway on the eastern side of Yamuna in U. P. is resulting in longer travel time as well as inconvenience to road users. Considering this, U.P. Government is contemplating to provide an access-controlled expressway connecting New Delhi with Mathura and further Agra. The objectives of the proposed Expressway are as follows : (1) Provide a fast moving corridor to minimize the travel time. (2) To connect the main townships/commercial centres on the eastern side of Yamuna. (3) To relieve NH-2 which is already congested and runs through the heart of cities like Faridabad, Ballabgarh and Palwal.” 62. There is no denial to the fact that land was needed for public need and has been acquired for the public purpose and for the benefit of public at large. Petitioners side also clearly admits this factual aspect. (3) To relieve NH-2 which is already congested and runs through the heart of cities like Faridabad, Ballabgarh and Palwal.” 62. There is no denial to the fact that land was needed for public need and has been acquired for the public purpose and for the benefit of public at large. Petitioners side also clearly admits this factual aspect. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate being very fair in his submissions was not serious with the issue that land is not needed for the public purpose. Sri Nandan further added that even if the land was acquired primarily for the company purpose but the Court can always examine the ultimate extended benefit to the public and if is ultimately found to be for the benefit of public at large then even in those cases also the acquisition can be accepted for the public purpose. 63. In our case, it is an admitted situation that land has been acquired for the public purpose in public interest for all round development. 64. It is another situation that while doing some good to the public or while doing something in the better/best interest of the public at large, an individual might be slightly benefited or is to get some benefit as the case argued here. If it is so whether on that ground irrespective of the bonafides and good faith for which the project/object and acquisition is there, acquisition can fail. 65. Admittedly neither the company has made any application for acquisition of the land as regard under Rule 4 of the Rules for his own purposes nor the land vests in the company and it is on certain terms for which the power is possessed by the authority under the Transfer of Property Act, the company has been given the land which has to come back to the authority at a particular point of time and thus submission that acquisition was for company for the purpose of company, at the cost of the company so as to attract the provisions of Part VII of the Act and as the procedure has not been followed, acquisition has to fall is to be gently ruled out. 66. At this place provisions as contained in Section 43 of the Act, also can be touched. 66. At this place provisions as contained in Section 43 of the Act, also can be touched. This Section which is in Part VII of the Act clearly excludes applicability of Section 39 to 42, based on which non performance of various formalities, has been argued. If under the acquisition, Government is not bound to provide the land to the Company, then also provisions of Part VII may not apply. On the facts of the present case it is clear that the land was never needed by the company. No application was ever made by the Company for acquisition of land. It was never acquired for the company and under the acquisition, Government was never bound to provide land to the Company. 67. When the project was conceived the company was even not in existence for the purpose and the project and its object as has been already noted in the opening part of this judgment on being achieved is to be certainly accepted to be an object meant for the public and in the best interest of all around development i.e. economic, industrial or otherwise. 68. In the present case, admittedly the acquisition is for construction of expressway which is otherwise for the benefit of the public at large. We can take note of the tremendous growth in the population and the roads and other facilities available to the public at large to be seriously lacking. 69. On these facts it is clear that the State Government in order to provide the infrastructural facilities for developing industries throughout the Yamuna Belt has taken up the project which can be said to be of national importance as it is to connect various cities of Uttar Pradesh to the National Capital and the involvement of the respondent No. 3 is for a limited purpose. The respondent No. 3 is basically to execute the project within stipulated time and is to depart within the time so allowed and thus the acquisition in question is to be held purely for the public purpose and not for the benefit of the respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 is basically to execute the project within stipulated time and is to depart within the time so allowed and thus the acquisition in question is to be held purely for the public purpose and not for the benefit of the respondent No. 3. At the time when the project was in the mind of State authority there was no involvement/existence of the respondent No. 3 and thus the submission of the petitioners side about the acquisition being camouflage in the name of public purpose for the purpose of company being totally misconceived and based on no foundation has to be negatived. Thus it is clearly held that acquisition is for the public purpose. 70. The aspect which can be said to be the main issue on which stress was given by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no compensation came to be paid i.e. wholly or partly out of public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. This has been argued to be the main distinctive feature in respect to the acquisition for the public purpose so to be covered under Section 4 and 6 of the Act and in so far the acquisition for a company even for a public purpose as contemplated under Part VII of the Act. 71. From various clauses of lease deed so placed by the petitioners side it is clear that lessee has paid to the lessor for the land so acquired a particular amount towards acquisition cost vide pay orders as detailed in para 4 of the lease deed. As the word premium is mentioned there emphasis was given by the petitioners counsel, on the word premium at the par to the word acquisition cost. Both phrases are mentioned in the same clause and for the purpose of more clearity at this very place clause 12.d can be taken note where it is provided that the lessee shall pay to the lessor any dues towards acquisition of cost of the demised land remaining outstanding and payable as settled by lessor. Both phrases are mentioned in the same clause and for the purpose of more clearity at this very place clause 12.d can be taken note where it is provided that the lessee shall pay to the lessor any dues towards acquisition of cost of the demised land remaining outstanding and payable as settled by lessor. Thus it is clear that entire cost of acquisition or any dues in that respect is to be paid by the respondent No. 3 on a ready basis and on its receipt there being no restriction on the rights of the authority in its payment/disbursement to the land owner that can be safely said to be an amount/fund within the means of the authority in its control and management for the purpose so mentioned in Section 6 of the Act or for any purpose. It has been clearly stated in para 16 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3 that the payment of acquisition cost in the terms of the provisions of concession agreement was the payment made to the authority and that became the own fund and it is from this public revenue that compensation was disbursed to the land holders. If this is accepted then the acquisition falls under Part II and not Part VII so as to attract various procedures so provided to be followed under Part VII of the Act on which the argument of the petitioners side is based. It is not a fact that the respondent No. 3 has made any payment of the compensation to the land holders. They deposited the money and the fund was available with the Collector for payment to be made towards compensation. Admitted fact is that payment of compensation was made by the authority. The fund stood at the sole discretion and control of the authority. Respondent No. 2 is an authority which is a statutory body and thus on the facts of the present case it is held that compensation was paid from the public revenue and thus the acquisition cannot be relatable to Part VII of the Act. The fund stood at the sole discretion and control of the authority. Respondent No. 2 is an authority which is a statutory body and thus on the facts of the present case it is held that compensation was paid from the public revenue and thus the acquisition cannot be relatable to Part VII of the Act. On these facts, this Court is of the considered view that it is not a case where the payment of compensation is neither wholly or partly is out of the public revenue or the fund controlled or managed by the local authority and, therefore, on that ground acquisition proceeding is not to fall. This Court concludes that there is no force in the second submission of the petitioners’ counsel and on that ground the notification is not to be quashed. 72. It is also to be noted that the petitioners in para 7 of the rejoinder affidavit filed to the counter affidavit of the respondent No. 3 clearly admitted that actually disbursement of the amount of compensation was made by the authority to the land owners although that was initially paid by the company to the authority. 73. At this place a data which was given in the supplementary affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3 dated 27.7.2009, copy of which was served on the petitioners side to which no response was filed although that was asked can be noticed. The data given in the supplementary affidavit is to be quoted here : S. No. Details of the project 1. Total area of Expressway 1636 hectares. 2. Number of villages (Greater NOIDA to Agra in Expressway) 133 3. Number of total farmers (Greater NOIDA to Agra in Expressway) 12315 4. Received compensation by number of farmers (Greater NOIDA to Agra in Expressway) 11387 5. Distance of Expressway From Greater NOIDA to Agra in Expressway 165 Kms. 6. Total numerb of farmers of village Karab 142 7. Total number of farmers of village Karab who have received compensation 139 74. From the above it is apparently clear that in respect to such a long expressway a small portion is now dragged at the instance of the petitioners. So far the farmers of village Karab is concerned 142 farmers are said to be affected out of which 139 farmers have taken compensation. From the above it is apparently clear that in respect to such a long expressway a small portion is now dragged at the instance of the petitioners. So far the farmers of village Karab is concerned 142 farmers are said to be affected out of which 139 farmers have taken compensation. Besides the land of village Karab land of several villages of other districts are also involved and from the chart it it is clear that all is clear and huge amount of compensation has already been paid. Physical progress of the project is also in very advance stage having expenditure of several thousands crores which is clear from the facts so stated in the supplementary affidavit, referred above. 75. At this very place we can also refer to the objections filed by the petitioners themselves on receipt of the notice under Section 9 of the Act. The objections of the petitioners has been annexed as annexure No. 12 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1. In para 46 and 47 of the counter affidavit filed by the State reference to the objections filed by the petitioners is there. In para 47 it is clearly mentioned that objection was basically on the issue of enhancement of the compensation and to provide some more facility. A perusal of the annexure No. 12 to the counter affidavit makes it clear that the main objection was in respect to the rate/quantum and to get an employment and certain other benefits. This objection is dated 18.2.2008. In the bottom of the objection (para 9) as usual, right was reserved to challenge acquisition in the Court of law. 76. On a consideration of various factual aspects besides proposition as laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred from either of the sides the final outcome, on the facts of the present case comes as under. 77. Undisputedly large area was acquired for the purpose of Taj Expressway and the entire project without there being any iota of doubt is in the public interest and is to benefit the State at large. It is in the interest of alround development. Almost everybody has taken the compensation. Project is in very very advance stage and huge expenditure is already on. Petitioners themselves in their objection claimed higher rate and employment etc. No prejudice of any kind on the facts can be claimed. It is in the interest of alround development. Almost everybody has taken the compensation. Project is in very very advance stage and huge expenditure is already on. Petitioners themselves in their objection claimed higher rate and employment etc. No prejudice of any kind on the facts can be claimed. The Apex Court has clearly permitted weighing the public interest vis-à-vis individual interest in the case of Ramnik Lal (supra). 78. The project when was conceived, there was no existence of the respondent company and thus the extended benefit to the company as is being complained by the petitioners could not be conceived when the project was in offing. Project was open to all. No application was ever given by the company needing the land as required under Rule 4 of the Company Rules so as to apply various procedure of the Land Acquisition under Companies Rules, 1963. Land is never meant and needed for the company and land is to never vest in the company and thus the applicability of Chapter VII of the Act and observance of procedure so provided is not to be adhered. The project for which the land has been acquired is not for the company and as the cost of the acquisition was not known it was mentioned that premium will be the cost of acquisition and the lease rent has also been fixed. Land if was given to the company on lease then certain amount of premium was certainly required to be charged and the company being under the legal obligation to pay the premium, the mention of the fact about payment of premium to be the acquisition cost can be said to be ready method to calculate the premium. 79. Section 6 of the Act in very clear term states that if land is needed for a company or if that is for public purpose the declaration shall be made to the effect. Here is the case where undisputedly land is not needed for the company and thus very opening sentence of Section 6 of the Act read with the opening sentence of Rule 4 of the Company Rules negatives the submission to follow the special procedure so required to be followed. Here is the case where undisputedly land is not needed for the company and thus very opening sentence of Section 6 of the Act read with the opening sentence of Rule 4 of the Company Rules negatives the submission to follow the special procedure so required to be followed. In view of second explanation to the first proviso of Section 6 of the Act fund being available with the authority at its control and discretion, compensation awarded for such property was to be paid and in fact was paid by the authority then for all practical purposes, on a plain reading of second explanation, referred above, such compensation shall be deemed to be the compensation paid out of the public revenue. 80. If the land is needed for a company then the application will have to be made to the State Government for acquisition of such land as required under Rule 4 of the Rules and then the process will start as provided under the Rules and Chapter VII of the Act and thus the very basic fact for applicability of the aforesaid provisions not being there the submission of applicability of the aforesaid provision/process is apparently misplaced. 81. If the land is required for and by the company for its purpose then that has to vest absolutely in the company. Admittedly the land never vested in the company. The land vests in authority and for specific period, for specific purpose land has been given on lease under a system known as Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) and, therefore, in the light of the provisions as contained in the Land Acquisition Act and the Rules the submission of petitioners side do not hold field. 82. The Explanation 2 to first proviso to Section 6 of the Act just speaks that where the compensation is to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of the Corporation owned or controlled by the State such compensation shall be deemed to be the compensation paid out of public revenue. Case in hand, the amount came to the fund of the authority at its sole discretion and that was paid by the authority towards compensation. 83. Case in hand, the amount came to the fund of the authority at its sole discretion and that was paid by the authority towards compensation. 83. On a joint reading of the first proviso and explanation 2 of Section 6 of the Act in view of specific observation as made in the case of Pratibha Nema (supra), in the case of R.L. Arora (supra) and in the case of Sooraram Reddy (supra), besides other cases and keeping in mind the public interest vis-à-vis the individual interest as held in the case of Ramnik Lal (supra), this Court is not to intervene. 84. In the decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Pratibha Nema (supra) the fact was that under the terms of the MOU the company did express its willingness to deposit the amount or lease premium in advance. No interim compensation was determined by the time the payment was made by the company. The amount paid by the company was utilized towards payment of the interim compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer. In the absence of that amount Nigam was not having sufficient cash balance to make such payment. The Apex Court went to the extent of observing that in all probability the Nigam could have advised or persuaded the company to make advance payment towards lease amount as during the term of the MOU on rough and ready basis so that the said amount could be utilized by the Nigam for making payment on account of interim compensation. 85. It was further observed that it could have been within the contemplation of both parties that the amount paid by the company will go towards discharge of the obligation of the Nigam to make payment of interim compensation and even then it does not support the appellants stand that compensation amount had not come out of the public revenue. 86. After making aforesaid observation, in this continuation the last lines of paragraph 25 of the aforesaid judgment is the complete answer to the petitioners stand of non payment of the amount of compensation by the authority out of its own fund. The conclusion of the Apex Court is that the genesis of the fund is not the determinative factor but its ownership in praesenti that matters. 87. The conclusion of the Apex Court is that the genesis of the fund is not the determinative factor but its ownership in praesenti that matters. 87. The decision given in the case of Pratibha Nema (supra) was in fact also relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners also. 88. There is yet another thought which is to be noted. The project is to be implemented on a Build, Operate and Transfer basis (BOT). Government chooses a developer who is to implement the project and after getting the cost received to hand over the entire project to the Government. Merely Government chooses an agency to execute the project, the nature of acquisition can not be claimed to be not an acquisition for public purpose, rather an acquisition for company so as to attract Part VII of the Act. In choosing the developer, there is neither any arbitrariness nor any malice. In the agreement, the word ‘equivalent to’ about the premium amount can only be said to be a criteria for calculating the premium. Amount of premium so received by the authority was at its full discretion/disposal without any reservation and thus if that was utilised by the authority for payment of compensation then that may not take the acquisition from Part II to Part VII of the Act. If this is accepted then even though the acquisition may be only and only for public purpose, which can be proceeded under Part II of the Act, will stand frustrated on account of observance of various stages which may take a long span of time. This can never be the intention of the legislature. 89. We have already discussed and analyzed various aspects, which were argued by both the sides and now we are to add something more for general consideration and the approach which every body can understand. 90. Besides, whatever has been said above, the issue can be viewed from another angle also. This is the matter of common experience that to achieve a big goal small discomfort and injury has to be sacrificed. A system which came into existence with a small population, say 50 – 100 years back if that is to be renovated and is to be expanded then how and at what place and in what manner that is to be stretched. A system which came into existence with a small population, say 50 – 100 years back if that is to be renovated and is to be expanded then how and at what place and in what manner that is to be stretched. If we are to expand ourselves to meet the challenges of a thick population with an intent to provide meaningful, useful and comfortable facilities then someone has to be affected. We are to see that the injury which is being complained by an individual, besides being within four corners of law is without any malice. If a thing/action is found to be in good faith and in the best interest of the public at large/society for which an elected Government is there then the Courts have been cautioned by the Apex Court to be very slow rather rigid in dislodging the ambitious projects which are for the good of the public as on date and for the future generations. The action of an institution or of the Government might not be felt to be fully befitting as on date but certainly we are to view it with open eyes to analyse and imagine the future of our generation and thus we will have to find out ways and means to console and compensate an individual so as to meet the need of the masses. It is in this back drop and with an idea to meet the pressing needs of the society as on date and in the future and to compete and to be a part of developing and advance system we are to leave the past in past. The Apex Court has clearly permitted the weighing of the public interest vis-à-vis the private interest. The Supreme Court further expressed its hope and trust that these consideration will be borne in mind by the Courts while dealing with the challenges to the acquisition proceedings. 91. If we are to improve and develop various kinds of infrastructure to meet the growing needs, specially of a common man then we are to take the land from its available sources as the extent of the land cannot be matter of generation. The land will have to be located for various purposes, out of the existing/available resources. 91. If we are to improve and develop various kinds of infrastructure to meet the growing needs, specially of a common man then we are to take the land from its available sources as the extent of the land cannot be matter of generation. The land will have to be located for various purposes, out of the existing/available resources. Fund and means for various purposes, for all kind of advancements can be a creation of the minds and a result of supertech mechanism but so far the space on earth is concerned we will have to concentrate ourselves the existing source which can be said to be available as that cannot be stretched by any means and no experiment can help to it. We are to protect and extend our greenery so as to get rid of environmental problems, to take care of the health of the society and at the same time we are to add to all round system failing which we will be lagging behind to be a part of the advance era. We are not to forget our heritage, culture and traditions but at the same time as we are to claim to be a developed, civilized and an advance nation we are to develop, generate more and more infrastructure facilities and new advance technology. For all this we will have to find out the ways and means and thus by placing the matter in hand in the above tests besides taking care of legal formate we are satisfied that respondents are to go ahead to achieve the object of the project as noted above which was meant and is meant for the public. 92. On an analysis of the facts of the present case and the decisions so relied upon by all sides at their fullest length, on a consideration of which extracts of series of decisions has been quoted in this judgment, we are convinced that the cases on which reliance has been placed by the counsel for the respondents side are more and more near to the facts of the present case. Accordingly this Court finds difficulty in agreeing with the submission of the petitioners side. 93. Accordingly this Court finds difficulty in agreeing with the submission of the petitioners side. 93. Applying the principles as elaborated by the Apex Court so far the case in hand, in our considered opinion it cannot be said that proceeding initiated by the State for acquisition of the land are illegal, unlawful, unwarranted, malafide or have been undertaken in colourable exercise of powers. Only in appropriate cases where such power is exercised malafidely or for collateral purpose or the purported action is de hoarse the Act, irrational or otherwise, unreasonable or the so called purpose is no public purpose at all the writ Court can interfere failing which declaration of the Government is not subject to judicial review. 94. We are to mention that besides the aspects which are discussed here, no other point was argued and pressed by counsel for either of sides. 95. For the reasons given above, this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in this petition thus that is to fail. 96. Accordingly writ petition fails and is dismissed. ————