JUDGMENT : GM, J. This Writ Petition is filed challenging the proceedings in G.O.Ms.No.139, Home (Courts-C), Department dated 18.09.2008 communicated by the 1st respondent in proceedings Endt. Roc. No.555/2006 Vigilance Cell dated 26.09.2008 and to declare the said proceedings as arbitrary and illegal; and consequently to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits including full back wages. The case of the petitioner is that he was selected for the post of District Munsif (Junior Civil Judge) in the year 1988. Later, he was promoted as Senior Civil Judge in the year 2004. In the year 2005, the petitioner was transferred and posted as Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala, Guntur District. While he was working as Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala, a complaint petition was sent by Sri J.A.Venkateswara Rao, President and other members of the Bar Association, Gurazala, to the High Court and considering the nature of the allegations, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, besides placing him under suspension in public interest. Thereafter, considering the allegations and the written explanation of the petitioner, articles of charges dated 25.07.2006 were framed against the petitioner, communicated to him for his written statement and considering the written statement submitted by the petitioner, a regular departmental enquiry was ordered against the petitioner by appointing Sri T. Sunil Chowdhary, formerly I Additional District Judge, Guntur as Enquiry Officer and Smt. Ch. Shantha Kumari, formerly I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Guntur as Presenting Officer in the enquiry. Shantha Kumari, formerly I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Guntur as Presenting Officer in the enquiry. The articles of charges read as under: " Articles of Charge No.1: That you, Sri K.Balarama Raju, while working as Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala, though you were on commuted medical leave from 8-11-2005 to 15-11-2005 appeared in the court premises on 15-11-2005 picked up quarrel with one Sri Sudireddy Saidiaih, who attended the court of II Additional District Munsiff, Gurazala, on that day, in connection with C.C.No.155/05 at about 10-45 AM abused him in filthy language and later caught hold of his shirt before the public, litigants and members of the Bar and instigated the police to register STC 129/2005 a false case against him for no fault of his and you have done the same with vengeance, high handedness by misusing your position as a Judicial Officer which act of your, if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services ( Conduct ) Rules, 1964. Articles of Charge No.2: That you, Sri K. Balarama Raju, while working as Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala falsely implicated one S. Saidaiah, TDP leader and got filed a petty case against him as 113/05 by the Gurazala P.S. u/s 290 IPC registered as STC 129/2005 and when the concerned ASI Sri Ch. Sambasiva Rao prepared the charge sheet showing three witnesses including himself as 3rd witness, you corrected the charge sheet and added your name in your own hand writing as 2nd witness in the charge sheet and altered the other witnesses numbers as 3 and 4 from 2 and 3 and thus you showed vengeance against Sri S. Saidaiah and wantonly implicated him in a false case which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services ( Conduct) Rules, 1964. Articles of Charge No.3. Articles of Charge No.3. That you, Sri K Balarama Raju, while working as Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala abused and bet Sri B. Sambasiva Rao @ Siva, Attender working in the Bar Association, Gurazala, once, and he escaped from you and ran into the Bar Association Hall, where several members of the Bar were present in the Association that thus you behaved in a rude manner and lowered the reputation of a Judicial Officer in the eyes of public, litigants and the Membes of the Bar of Gurazala which act of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct, judicial dishonesty within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct ) Rules, 1964. Articles of Charge No.4. That you, Sri K. Balarama Raju, while working as Senior Civil Judge, Gurazala; a) Are in the habit of abusing public, litigants, advocates and their clerks for no fault of theirs in an unparliamentary and defamatory language. b) Are in the habit of abusing the advocates in filthy language during legal literacy camps naming them as brokers, touts etc., c) Once by sitting in a local Police Station you summoned the constable of Police Station had a telephonic talk with the S.I. of Police, who was on band obust duty at that time in Tirunalla, got fetched a full bottle of 'Royal Stag Whisky' consumed the same by sitting on the road side openly before the public. d) Used to force the police personnel of your jurisdiction to host parties to you and used to direct them to fetch house hold articles for your domestic use; e) Are in the habit of breaking glass tumblers, vehemently while sitting on the Bench and during the court proceedings. That thus you behaved in an erratic manner which acts of yours if proved or established would amount to grave misconduct, unbecoming of a Judicial Officer within the meaning of Rule 3 of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. " On behalf of the Disciplinary Authority, P.Ws. 1 to 38 were examined and Exs.P. 1 to P.5 were marked. The charged officer examined RWs. 1 to 4 and marked Exs. D.1 to D.8. Considering the evidence, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of charges 1 to 3 and 4 (a) and (e) and charges 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) were held to be not proved. 1 to 38 were examined and Exs.P. 1 to P.5 were marked. The charged officer examined RWs. 1 to 4 and marked Exs. D.1 to D.8. Considering the evidence, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of charges 1 to 3 and 4 (a) and (e) and charges 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) were held to be not proved. The petitioner submitted his explanation dated 08.08.2007 to the Report of the Enquiry Officer. Upon consideration of the explanation and the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner was imposed with the penalty of compulsory retirement from service. Accepting the said recommendation of the High Court, G.O.Ms.No.139 dated 18.09.2008 was issued by the 2nd respondent. Hence, this Writ Petition. Sri Challa Sitaramaiah, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner, while attacking the impugned orders, has vehemently contended that the basic facts were denied and do not exist, as the alleged victims themselves categorically denied the incidents. Learned senior counsel also attacked the findings of the Enquiry Officer and would submit that judicial review is available to the High Court if a decision is arrived at on no evidence and in the instant case the evidence which was relied on by the Enquiry Officer is thoroughly unrealiable, and the impugned orders are, therefore, perverse. Elaborating his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel contends that the findings of the Enquiry Officer insofar as charges 1, 2 and 3 are concerned, are perverse, irrational and opposed to legal principles. It is submitted that the petitioner was an honest judicial officer has discharged his duties without any remarks for the last several years and that the charges 1 and 3 were denied by the very persons who were said to have been involved and against whom the violations were alleged to have occurred, that insofar as charge no.2 is concerned the accused in C.C.No.113 of 2005 admitted the offence and paid the fine on 14.03.2006 the petitioner also made endorsement on the charge sheet, therefore the finding that the petitioner added his name as a witness even without verifying the signature is perverse. With regard to charge no.4 (a), it is contended that no specific words of abuse were mentioned either in the complaint or the articles of charges and the same are vague. With regard to charge no.4 (a), it is contended that no specific words of abuse were mentioned either in the complaint or the articles of charges and the same are vague. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that no litigant person from among the public, or any advocate clerk was examined to speak about the abusing and ill-treatment allegedly meted out by the petitioner, whereas some advocates denied the allegation that the petitioner abused any one. The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the Enquiry Officer ignored the sequences of events, the contempt notice issued by the petitioner to the advocates for their misbehavior and the insult hurled at the petitioner and that the complaint Ex. P-1 by a section of advocates would clearly show that the proposed complaint was a counter blast to the action taken by the petitioner against the Bar members, and that the basis of the charges would disclose the malicious nature of the complainants and the finding on charge 4(e) is perverse and not based on facts at all. Learned Senior Counsel also attacked the impugned orders relying on Rule 20(18) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal ) Rules, 1991, ( for brevity "the Rules"), and submitted that the said Rule mandates that the Enquiry Officer should question the Charged Officer on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence and seek his explanation when the charged officer does not examine himself. Rule 21 of the Rules, it is contended, mandates the Disciplinary Authority to give its own findings on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry and then it should come to a conclusion that a major penalty should be imposed on the basis of its findings. If it disagrees with the Enquiry Officer's findings, notice should be given to the Government Servant. If it does not disagree no further explanation need be called for from the Government servant. It is further contended that the Disciplinary Authority did not give any findings on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer and in any event the penalty imposed is most disproportionate to the gravity of charges and hence the Writ Petition is liable to be allowed. It is further contended that the Disciplinary Authority did not give any findings on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer and in any event the penalty imposed is most disproportionate to the gravity of charges and hence the Writ Petition is liable to be allowed. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel relied on the decisions reported in Sirros V. Moore And Others ((1) 1974) 3 All England Law Reports 776 ), Kuldeep Singh V. Commissioner Of Police ( (2) AIR 1999 (SC) 677 ), Cholan Roadways Ltd V. Thirugnanasambandam ( (3) 2005 (3) Supreme Court Cases 241 ), Registrar, High Court Of Madras V. R. Rajiah ( (4) 1988 ( 3) SCC 211 ), R. C. Sood V. High Court Of Rajasthan ( ( 5 ) 1994 (Supp) 3 SCC 711 ), State Of Assam V. Mohan Chandra ((6) AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2535), R.C. Sood V. High Court Of Judicature At Rajasthan ( (7) 1998 (5) Supreme Court Cases 493 ), J. Ravi Kumar V. Chief General Manager, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited ( (8) 2006 (5) ALT 309 ). On the other hand, Sri G. Vidyasagar, learned Standing Counsel for R.1, contended that strict rules of evidence would not apply to departmental proceedings and that on the basis of the evidence available on record, the Enquiry Officer held that the charges were proved. Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on the basis of the complaint made by the President and other members of the Bar Association, numbering 35 out of 70 members of the Bar, and that the findings on the allegations which culminated in the punishment of compulsory retirement from service, are perfectly legal and valid and no interference with the impugned orders is warranted. It was also contended that the charges and the findings thereon indicated unexpected behavior from a responsible judicial officer and that the punishment imposed is commensurate with the charges alleged and established against the petitioner, and no interference is warranted by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 2226 of the Constitution of India. It was also contended that the charges and the findings thereon indicated unexpected behavior from a responsible judicial officer and that the punishment imposed is commensurate with the charges alleged and established against the petitioner, and no interference is warranted by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 2226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contentions, he relied on the decisions reported in UNION OF INDIA v. K.G. SONI ((9) 2006 (6) Supreme Court Cases 794 ), State Of Punjab V. Ram Singh ( (10) AIR 1992 Supreme Court 2188 ), Apparel Export Promoiton Council V. A. K. Chopra ( (11) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 625 ). In K.G. SONI's case ( 9 supra ), for the misconduct of not disclosing in the attestation form about the first marriage and later performing a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent therein. The Enquiry Officer recorded findings in favour of the respondent and the Disciplinary Authority differed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and came to the conclusion that the respondent was guilty of misconduct and imposed the punishment of removal from service. On appeal, the Appellate Authority converted the punishment to that of compulsory retirement. The matter went upto the High Court and the High Court remitted the matter back to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration with regard to the quantum of punishment. In those circumstances, the Apex Court held that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral stands. Judicial review is limited to the efficiency in the decision making process and not the decision. In RAM SINGH's case (10 supra), the respondent therein was a constable gunman and after having heavy drink, he was seen roaming in the market with his service revolver, while on duty. When he was sent to the doctor for medical examination he abused the medical officer on duty, which showed his depravity or delinquency due to his drinking habit. Considering those circumstances, the Apex Court held that the conduct of the constable would constitute gravest misconduct warranting dismissal from service. When he was sent to the doctor for medical examination he abused the medical officer on duty, which showed his depravity or delinquency due to his drinking habit. Considering those circumstances, the Apex Court held that the conduct of the constable would constitute gravest misconduct warranting dismissal from service. In A.K. Chopra's case (11 supra ), the delinquent-a Superior Officer was found by departmental authorities to be guilty of molesting and of having tried to physically assault a subordinate female employee. The punishment of dismissal was awarded by the Disciplinary as well as the Appellate Authorities. The High Court found no fault with the finding as to the unbecoming conduct of the delinquent or with the conduct of enquiry, yet interfered with the punishment. The Apex Court considering this situation, held as follows : "THE High Court appears to have over-looked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Haltom in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, observed: "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. " ( emphasize supplied ) The main ground of attack of the learned Senior Counsel is that in instant case the punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed on the petitioner without there being any evidence on record. In this regard it is expedient to refer to the rulings of the Apex Court. In KULDEEP SINGH's case ( 2 supra ), the charge against the appellant therein (a Police Constable) consisted of two components, namely, a factory owner had paid certain amount to the appellant therein for being paid to three labourers- complainants and the appellant therein did not pay the entire amount to the labourers but kept some amount with himself. The factory owner appearing as a witness for the Department denied having made any payment to the appellant on that day. The labourers-complainants to whom the payment is said to have been made were not produced at the domestic enquiry. The factory owner appearing as a witness for the Department denied having made any payment to the appellant on that day. The labourers-complainants to whom the payment is said to have been made were not produced at the domestic enquiry. No evidence was adduced in support of the charge framed against the delinquent officer and no attempt was made by the Enquiry Officer to produce any of the complainants at the departmental enquiry. Considering this situation, it was held by the Apex Courtas follows: "( 7 ) IN Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar, AIR 1978 SC 1277 : (1978) 3 SCC 366 : (1978) 3 SCR 708 , it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic Tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which, and, that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer would be perverse. (8) THE findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterized as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, (1964) 2 Lab LJ 150 : AIR 1963 SC 1723 : 1964 (3) SCR 25 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India v. Prakash Chand Jain, (1969) 2 Lab LJ 377 (SC) : AIR 1969 SC 983 and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel, 1976 Lab IC 4 (SC) : AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280 : (1976) 1 SCC 518 . This decision was followed in Central Bank of India v. Prakash Chand Jain, (1969) 2 Lab LJ 377 (SC) : AIR 1969 SC 983 and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel, 1976 Lab IC 4 (SC) : AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280 : (1976) 1 SCC 518 . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour), AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR 866 : (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. (9) Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. . . . . (41) SMT. Meena Mishra, appearing as a witness for the Department, denied having made any payment to the appellant on that day. The labourers to whom the payment is said to have been made have not been produced at the domestic enquiry. Their so-called previous statement could not have been brought on record under Rule 16 (3). As such, there was absolutely no evidence in support of the charge framed against the appellant and the entire findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are vitiated by reason of the fact that they are not supported by any evidence on record and are wholly perverse. (42) THE Enquiry Officer did not sit with an open mind to hold an impartial domestic enquiry which is an essential component of the principles of natural justice as also that of "reasonable Opportunity", contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The "bias" in favour of the Department had so badly affected the Enquiry Officer's whole faculty of reasoning that even non- production of the complainants was ascribed to the appellant which squarely was the fault of the Department. The "bias" in favour of the Department had so badly affected the Enquiry Officer's whole faculty of reasoning that even non- production of the complainants was ascribed to the appellant which squarely was the fault of the Department. Once the Department knew that the labourers were employed somewhere in Devli Khanpur their presence could have been procured and they could have been produced before the Enquiry Officer to prove the charge framed against the appellant. He has acted so arbitrarily in the matter and has found the appellant guilty in such a coarse manner that it becomes apparent that he was merely carrying out the command from some superior officer who perhaps directed "fix him up". In CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD's case ( 3 supra ), it was held by the Apex Court as follows : “This decision also has no application to the facts of the present case. In the instant case the Presiding Officer, Industrial tribunal as also the learned single judge and the Division Bench of the High Court misdirected themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves correct questions. It is now well-settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case, further more, the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did not apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant factor and furthermore took into consideration an irrelevant fact not germane for determining the issue, namely, the passengers of the bus were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which is "preponderance of probability" and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out. (35) Errors of fact can also be a subject-matter of judicial review. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which is "preponderance of probability" and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out. (35) Errors of fact can also be a subject-matter of judicial review. Reference in this connection may also be made to an interesting article by Paul P. Craig Q. C. titled 'judicial Review, appeal and Factual Error' published in 2004 public Law Page 788." In R. RAJAIAH's case ( 4 supra ), the High Court of Tamilnadu while deciding to compulsorily retire the official, did not communicate the recommendation to the State Governor for passing formal orders of compulsory retirement. Instead the High Court passed the orders of compulsory retirement itself, under FR 6(d). As there was no formal order by the Governor under FR 6(d), the same was quashed by the Apex Court. It is apt to extract the relevant portion of the order, which reads as under : “When the High Court takes the view that an order of compulsory retirement should be made against a member of the subordinate judicial service, the adequacy or sufficiency of such materials cannot be questioned, unless the materials are absolutely irrelevant for the purpose of compulsory retirement. But in coming to such conclusion, it must be based on materials. If there be no material to justify the conclusion, it will be an arbitrary exercise of power by the High Court. Article 235 does not contemplate the exercise by the High Court of the power of control over subordinate courts arbitrarily, but on the basis of some materials. As thee was absence of any material to justify the impugned orders of compulsory retirement in this case, those must be held to be illegal and invalid. .... The decision to compulsorily retire the respondent-District Munsif was vitiated as the High Court had relied upon some adverse incidents against him that took place in 1954 after his appointment as Sub-Magistrate, although he was subsequently appointed to the post of District Munsiff in 1976. .... The decision to compulsorily retire the respondent-District Munsif was vitiated as the High Court had relied upon some adverse incidents against him that took place in 1954 after his appointment as Sub-Magistrate, although he was subsequently appointed to the post of District Munsiff in 1976. It is curious that the past events that happened in 1954 were not considered to be of any significance in appointing the respondent to the post of District Munsiff, but for the purpose of compulsory retirement those events were considered to be of importance." In R. C. SOOD's case (5 supra ), it was held by the Apex Court : “Entrustment of the 'control' of the subordinate Judiciary to the High Court by enactment of the relevant provisions in the Constitution of India, particularly Article 235 therein is for the purpose of ensuring their independence and protection from executive interference. At a time when fairness and non- arbitrariness are the essential requirements of every administrative State Action, it is more so for any administrative act of the Judges. It is necessary that members of the subordinate judiciary get no occasion to think otherwise. " In MOHAN CHANDRA's case ( 6 supra ), on a charge of illegal collection of money from the villagers while distributing compensation amount due to them, an enquiry was initiated against the respondent therein. There was no charge against the respondent therein that he had not paid the full amounts to those entitled to compensation or that he had authorized anyone to collect any fee. Considering this situation, the Apex Court held that in a departmental enquiry, a charge cannot be sustained on mere conjectures in the absence of evidence. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: “As we said earlier, there was no charge against the respondent that he had no paid the full amounts to those entitled to compensation or that he had authorized anyone to collect any fee. This enquiry into extraneous allegations with which the respondent was not charged must have certainly prejudiced the Enquiry Officer against the respondent. This enquiry into extraneous allegations with which the respondent was not charged must have certainly prejudiced the Enquiry Officer against the respondent. Even if we were to ignore this aspect, there is no evidence to connect the respondent with the allegation that he had authorized the collection of 'Garibhara' much less can it be said, as averred it he charge that he realized from those persons whom compensation was being paid, certain percentage of compensation money due to them for payment of hire charges of the vehicle in which he had visited the office of Mauzadar from Dhekiajuli." In R.C. SOOD's case (7 supra ), complaints against a judicial officer were made and some of the complaints were by discredited persons against whom the Judicial Officer had acted on the administrative side. The allegations in the complaints were also vague and general. The Rajastan High Court on the administrative side initiated proceedings against the judicial officer. On review of the records, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there was complete lack of bona fides on the part of the High Court when it decided to institute disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner therein. It was further held by the Apex Court held that complaints did not merit serious consideration and therefore initiation of disciplinary proceedings was not proper. In J. RAVI KUMAR's case ( 8 supra), a learned single Judge ofthis Court also held that that the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer if they are based on no evidence and are perverse. Insofar as charges 4(a) and (e) are concerned, the learned Senior Counsel contended that the said charges are vague and that no specific words of abuse were mentioned and therefore the findings on charges on 4(a) and 4(e) are perverse. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decisions reported in Ram Kishan V. Union Of India ( (12 ) 1995 (6) Supreme Court Cases 157 ), Transport Comissioner, Madras V. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy ( (13 ) 1995 (1 ) Supreme Court Cases 332 ), Avinash Chandra Sanjar V. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Jhansi, ( (14 ) 1961 (1) LLJ 7) In Ram Kishan' S Case (12 Supra), a constable was charged of abusing his superior and of another misconduct. The Enquiry Officer found that the charge of abusing the superior was partly proved and the other charge was not proved. The Disciplinary Authority, disagreeing with the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer, issued a show cause notice as to why both the charges should not be taken to have been proved. The constable submitted his explanation and thereafter the orders of dismissal from service were passed and that before the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal the constable's plea was not entertained and ultimately the matter went to Supreme Court. Considering this situation, it was held by the Apex Court that after obtaining the delinquent's explanation, the Disciplinary Authority accepted only the charge of abusing the superior as partly proved, the omission to state the reasons in the show-cause notice for disagreeing with the Enquiry Officer, held did not vitiate the show cause notice. It is also apt to quote relevant portion of the judgment which reads as under: “....When abusive language is used by anybody against a superior, it must be understood in the environment in which that person is situated and the circumstances surrounding the event that led to the use of abusing language. No strait-jacket formula could be evolved in adjudging whether the abusive language in the given circumstances would warrant dismissal from service. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. What was the nature of the abusive language used by the appellant was not stated. Therefore, the imposition of punishment of dismissal from service was harsh and disproportionate to the gravity of charge imputated to the delinquent constable and imposition of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect would be an appropriate punishment. In A. Radha Krishna Moorthy's case ( 13 supra ), it was held by the Apex Court as follows : " ......The truth and correctness of the charges was not a matter for the Tribunal to go more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary authority. Even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after the imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to go into truth of the allegations/charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence. i.e. where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has power of judicial review. i.e. where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has power of judicial review. It only examines the procedural correctness of the decision making process. For this reason the order of the Tribunal insofar as it goes into or discusses the truth and correctness of the charges, is unsustainable in law. " In Avinash Chandra Sanjar's case (14 supra ), a railway servant was charged for misconduct of being uncivil to the public, in using disgraceful language towards a particular gentleman. The charge sheet did not give any particulars as to the actual language used and complained of. A copy of the complaint was not made available to the railway servant nor the complainant examined in the departmental enquiry in spite of the request made by the railway servant. The evidence on record also did not disclose the particulars of the language alleged to have been used by the accused nor the identity of the person alleged to have used the disgraceful language. Considering this situation, while setting aside the order of removal, inter alia, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows : “... where a railway servant is accused of incivility to public in using disgraceful language, the actual words attributed to him must be included in the charge to enable the inquiry officer to decide whether in the particular circumstances, the use of the words amounted to incivility. The mere addition ofthe adjective 'disgraceful' to the noun 'language' could not make the charge clear and specific. The evidence on record at the departmental enquiry did not disclose the particulars of the disgraceful language alleged to have been used by the railway servant or the identity of the person said to have used the same. The copy of the complaint made by the member of the public was not made available to the railway servant and the complainant was not examined in spite of the request made by the accused. The inquiry officer used the complaint in coming to the conclusion against the accused. In the circumstances the enquiry proceedings against the petitioner must be quashed and consequently the order of removal based on such proceedings must also be set aside. The inquiry officer used the complaint in coming to the conclusion against the accused. In the circumstances the enquiry proceedings against the petitioner must be quashed and consequently the order of removal based on such proceedings must also be set aside. It is true that it is not within the power of the Enquiry Officer to compel the complainant to give evidence before him. Even if the complainant had refused to attend when called upon to do so, the proper course for the Enquiry Officer would have been to discard any statement made by the complainant against the petitioner behind his back. In State Of Tamil Nadu V. M. A. Waheed Khan ( (15) 1998 (8) SCC 723 ), respondent therein-a police officer was alleged to have kept two women at a police station at night in violation of S.160(1) of Cr.P.C. and departmental instructions and also indulged in an outrageous behaviour. During the pendency of the disciplinary enquiry, respondent therein was convicted at the trial but was acquitted by the appellate Court on the ground that the two women did not support the prosecution case. As a result of the disciplinary proceedings the respondent therein was, however, dismissed from service and the same was challenged before the Tamilnadu Administrative Tribunal. The respondent's dismissal from service was set aside by the Tribunal on two grounds that the respondent therein had been acquitted on similar facts and that the findings of the disciplinary enquiry were based on the statement recorded during preliminary enquiry which the two women had contradicted at the regular enquiry. However, on facts, it was found regarding presence of two women at the police station at night during the trial. The Tribunal on evidence came to the conclusion that if the witness had contradicted themselves during the regular enquiry, their previous statement could be used only for discrediting them but not for the purpose of appreciation of evidence against the respondent and set aside the dismissal order. The Supreme Court considering this situation while setting aside the order of the Tribunal held as follows: " We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We are of the view that the tribunal fell into patent error. The criminal charge and the charge in the departmental enquiry were entirely different. The Supreme Court considering this situation while setting aside the order of the Tribunal held as follows: " We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We are of the view that the tribunal fell into patent error. The criminal charge and the charge in the departmental enquiry were entirely different. The appellate court in the criminal case came to the conclusion that since the two ladies had not supported the prosecution case, the charges against the appellant were not proved. In the judgment, the criminal courts have, however, accepted that one of the ladies, namely Rani, visited the police station at midnight allegedly to find out as to what had happened to the other lady (Rani's sister-in-law), who was already in the police station. When the two ladies were admittedly at the police station at night, no fault can be found with the charges, as framed in the departmental enquiry. The Tribunal further fell into patent error in holding that it was a case of "no evidence". It is a settled proposition of law that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiries. Before the Enquiry Officer, the statements of both the ladies were recorded. He appreciated the evidence in the light of their earlier statements made in the preliminary enquiry. In this view of the matter, it is not correct to say that there was no evidence before the Enquiry officer. (5) We are, therefore, of the view that the tribunal was not justified in setting aside the order of dismissal in the disciplinary proceedings. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the tribunal and restore the order of dismissal passed against the respondent. No costs." In Narinder Mohan Arya V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd (( 16) 2006 (4) Supreme Court Cases 713 ), it was inter alia held by the Apex Court that the High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction ought to have examined as to whether the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer had nexus with the charge and could or could not lead to the guilt of the employee. Now, the point that arises for consideration is as to whether the order of punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the petitioner requires any interference by this Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? Now, the point that arises for consideration is as to whether the order of punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the petitioner requires any interference by this Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? It is noteworthy to state here that normally the High Court under Art. 226 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of an Appellate Authority. Judicial review is limited to the validity of the decision making process and not the decision. However, this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. As held by the Apex Court in the decisions referred supra, the power of judicial review takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well, and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein only if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or that the findings were perverse, and that the charges cannot be sustained on mere conjectures in the absence of evidence. From a perusal of the material on record it is seen that pursuant to the complaint sent by the president and other Members of the Bar Association, Gurazala, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 21.04.2006, thereafter, articles of charges vide order dated 25.07.2006 were framed against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his written statement dated 19.08.2006. The High Court, on the administrative side, after considering the written statement of the petitioner ordered a regular departmental enquiry by appointing Sri T. Sunil Chowdary, I Additional District Judge, Guntur as Enquiry Officer and Smt. Ch. Santa Kumari, I Additional Senior Civil Judge, as the Presenting Officer to conduct the enquiry, vide its proceedings dated 11.10.2006. The Enquiry Officer conducted an enquiry into the charges and submitted his report dated 29.06.2007 holding that articles of charges Nos. 1, 2 3 and 4(a) and (e) are proved; however, charge nos.4(b), (c) and (d) were held to be not proved. The Enquiry Officer conducted an enquiry into the charges and submitted his report dated 29.06.2007 holding that articles of charges Nos. 1, 2 3 and 4(a) and (e) are proved; however, charge nos.4(b), (c) and (d) were held to be not proved. Considering the Enquiry Report, the Administrative Committee (Disciplinary Matters) of the High Court, in its meeting held on 12.07.2007, resolved to furnish a copy of the Enquiry Officer's Report to the charged officer and to call for his comments on the findings recorded against him in the said Enquiry Report and also seek an explanation as to why one of the major penalties as specified in Rule 9 of the Rules should not be imposed upon him. On the receipt of the written representation of the charged officer, the matter was placed before the Administrative Committee (Disciplinary matters) in its meeting held on 17.09.2007. The Committee constituted on 17.09.2007, referred the matter to a Sub-Committee, and on receipt of the report of the Sub-Committee, the matter was placed before the Administrative Committee (Disciplinary matters) in its meeting held on 24.01.2008. The committee, after accepting the report of the Sub-Committee, resolved to impose the punishment of dismissal from service upon the petitioner. The Report of the Administrative Committee (Disciplinary matters) dated 24.01.2008 was placed before the Full Court in its meeting held on 04.02.2008. The Full Court resolved to approve the minutes dated 24.01.2008 of the Administrative Committee (Disciplinary Matters) with modification of the proposed punishment to that of compulsory retirement. The same was forwarded to the Government and thereafter G.O.Ms.No.130 dated 18.09.2008 was issued. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the Enquiry Officer ignored the sequences of events, the notices issued by the petitioner to the advocates for their misbehavior and the insults hurled at the petitioner, and that the complaint Ex. P-1 by a section of the advocates would clearly show that it was a counter blast. He drew our attention to the evidence of the witnesses and submitted that though judicial review is confined to the decision making process, in the instance case the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority are based on no evidence and are perverse. In this regard it is to be considered as to whether the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer in regard to the charges are based on no evidence. In this regard it is to be considered as to whether the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer in regard to the charges are based on no evidence. P.W.1 is an advocate aged 24 years and he was the President of Gurazala Bar Association. P.W.1 speaks about the Saidaiah incident but does not state in his chief-examination that he personally witnessed the events. He speaks about personally seeing the Charged Officer at Rentachintala Tirunalla in a restaurant consuming liquor with a Police Officer. He further stated in his evidence that the Charged Officer, at the Legal Literacy Camp at Charlagudipadu, called Advocates brokers. He, however, admitted in his cross-examination that there were groups amongst the Advocates. In his cross-examination, P.W.1 further stated that he witnessed the 'Siva' incident. He also admitted that he did not attend the Legal Literacy Camps. P.W.2 is an Advocate aged 44 years and he was the Vice President of Gurazala Bar Association. He stated that the Charged Officer, during the court proceedings, uttered the words ' Siggu Malina Janam' (Shameless people). In his cross-examination, P.W.2 denied that there were two groups in the Bar Association. Though P.W. 2 specifically stated that the petitioner uttered damaging words, no such charge was framed and no material was placed in that regard. Therefore on the charges in question his evidence is no evidence. P.W.3, an Advocate aged about 45 years, is the Secretary of the Gurazala Bar Association and stated that on 07.01.2006 he along with other Judicial Officers were holding a Lok Adalat when the Charged Officer asked them to go away. P.W.4 is an Advocate and was the Joint Secretary of the Gurazala Bar Association. He stated that the charged officer advised the litigants to meet the advocates at their residence and that the charged officer threw a tumbler on the ground during call work. P.W.5 is the Treasurer of Gurazala Bar Association and stated that the charged officer was impatient on the Bench and used to express anger on Advocates, clerks and litigants. He stated that he came to know about the Saidaiah incident and 'Tirunalla' incident. P.W.6, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer caught hold of Saidaiah by his shirt and abused him in filthy language and took him to the Senior Civil Judge Court hall and abused him for 1/2 an hour. He stated that he came to know about the Saidaiah incident and 'Tirunalla' incident. P.W.6, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer caught hold of Saidaiah by his shirt and abused him in filthy language and took him to the Senior Civil Judge Court hall and abused him for 1/2 an hour. He, however, admitted in his cross-examination that there were some disputes among the Advocates. P.W.7 who was the advocate of Saidaiah, stated that the charged officer threw a glass tumbler on the ground. He, however, further deposed that he came to know about the incident. P.W.8, an advocate, stated that the charged officer used to be serious on the Bench and that one Saidaiah peeped into the Court and then the Charged Officer questioned him and restrained him in the Court for five minutes. P.W.9, an advocate aged 42 years, stated that the charged officer is a person of hot temperament and used to express anger from the Bench. P.W.10, an advocate, stated that the charged officer beat Siva and that on one occasion, he chased him up to the Bar Association Hall and that the charged officer brought one man, by name, Saidareddy to the court hall. P.W.11, an advocate, stated that the charged officer is impatient. P.W.12, who is also an advocate, deposed that the charged officer terrorized the court proceedings. P.W.13, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer created terror in the minds of the Advocates and litigant public and he did not maintain decorum and decency of the court. P.W.14, an advocate, stated that the charged officer beat Siva on one occasion and beat Saidaiah, and that the charged officer is impatient on the Bench. P.W.19, an advocate aged about 70 years, deposed that he knew some of the contents of Ex.P.1 personally and that the charged officer used to make comments from the Bench and that the former President, Soubhagya Raju, asked the charged officer not to make comments. P.W.26, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer used to question the Junior Advocates if they did not wear the prescribed dress. P.W.27 deposed that the charged officer used to comment on the advocates if there was any noise. P.W.28, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer used to come to the Bench in an irritable and unpleasant mood and used to blame his predecessors. P.W.27 deposed that the charged officer used to comment on the advocates if there was any noise. P.W.28, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer used to come to the Bench in an irritable and unpleasant mood and used to blame his predecessors. P.W.32, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer used to assault the litigants and send them out of court and that he beat Siva and Saidaiah. P.W.34, an advocate, deposed that the charged officer used to be irritable on the Bench. P.W.35, an advocate aged about 70 years, stated that the charged officer used to be impatient on the Bench. P.Ws. 1 to 35 are signatories to Ex.P.1. This being the evidence of signatories to Ex.P.1, curiously the victim of the alleged assault by the petitioner, P.W.36-Siva, deposed that the charged officer did not beat him and did not chase him in the presence of the several advocates. P.W.37-Saidaiah, the other victim of the petitioner's alleged assault, categorically deposed that the charged officer did not catch hold of his shirt and berate him in the court hall. He denied that he was deposing falsely at the instance of the Police. P.W.38 who is the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police stated that he had instructed the Court Constable to include the name of the charged officer as L.W.2. Insofar as evidence on the side of the petitioner is concerned, R.W.1 is the Court Superintendent of the Court and deposed regarding Ex.D.5 received by the District Court on 24.10.2005 and also Exs.D.6 and D.7 being received by the District Court. R.W.2 is the Senior Assistant in the Senior Civil Judge's Court and deposed regarding the charged officer sending his attender to the Bar Room to reduce the T.V. Volume. R.W.3 is the Junior Civil Judge who attended Legal Literacy Camps along with the Charged Officer and categorically deposed that the Charged Officer did not abuse any advocates in any camp. R.W.4 is an advocate aged about 75 years who had worked as President of the Gurazala Bar Association for 12 times and stated that most of the signatories of Ex.P.1 have no work in the Senior Civil Judge's Court, Gurazala and they are all close associates and friends. R.W.4 is an advocate aged about 75 years who had worked as President of the Gurazala Bar Association for 12 times and stated that most of the signatories of Ex.P.1 have no work in the Senior Civil Judge's Court, Gurazala and they are all close associates and friends. He stated that he refused to sign Ex.P.1 and that the T.V. in the bar room was viewed with high volume by the advocates, and that the charged officer used to send his attender to lower the same. He further stated about P.W.31 misbehaving with the charged officer saying 'arigipoina grampohne record laga silence silence ani vaguthavu', and P.W.31 informed R.W.4 that the District Judge directed him not to use T.V. in the Bar Room. Insofar as the 1st charge is concerned, it is stated that the petitioner beat one Saidulu (P.W.37) and foisted a false case against him. Evidently this Saidulu who was examined as P.W.37 has stated on oath before the Enquiry Officer that he did not give any complaint or statement against the petitioner and no such incident as alleged by a group of advocates had happened. It is significant to note that the Enquiry Officer had permitted the Presenting Officer to declare the witness hostile and mentioned that the witness resiled from earlier statement. However, no such earlier statements, if any, were brought on record. Moreover Saidulu (P.W.37) clearly deposed that since he was at fault, he admitted his guilt before the Magistrate's Court and had paid the fine amount. Thus, it is clear that the Enquiry Officer held that the charge was proved merely on assumptions, more so when the crucial witness himself had denied the incident which formed the foundation for the charge. Insofar as charge no.2 is concerned, it is stated that the petitioner had falsely implicated one Saidaiah, and filed a petty case against him and that the petitioner had inserted his own name as one of the listed witnesses. There was no evidence what so ever to sustain this charge. P.W.1 admitted during the course of his cross-examination that he has no personal knowledge whether the petitioner inserted his name in the charge sheet. In this context it is to be noticed that P.W.38, Ch. There was no evidence what so ever to sustain this charge. P.W.1 admitted during the course of his cross-examination that he has no personal knowledge whether the petitioner inserted his name in the charge sheet. In this context it is to be noticed that P.W.38, Ch. Sambasiva, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, has stated that he was contacted over the phone by his court constable, Chinnayya, who informed him that the court might return the charge sheet for not including the name of the charged officer (petitioner) as one of the witnesses. P.W.38 advised him to include the name of the petitioner. He further stated that he cannot identify the particular handwriting in which the petitioner's name is included. That being so, the learned Enquiry Officer is not correct in concluding that this charge is proved. The proper course would have been for the Enquiry Officer to summon Chinnayya or compare the subject handwritten insertion with that of the handwriting of the petitioner available on record. Be that as it may, the fact remains that in the absence of any evidence in this regard, the finding of the Enquiry Officer insofar as charge no.2 is unsustainable. With regard to charge no.3, Siva, the Attender who was examined as P.W.36, clearly stated before the Enquiry Officer that he did not tell anything against the petitioner and did not give any complaint or statement. Curiously, the Enquiry Officer declared this witness also as hostile and mentioned that the witness resiled from his earlier version. However, no such earlier version was placed on record or was supplied to the petitioner. Declaring this witness hostile in the absence of any earlier statement/complaint is a grave error committed by the Enquiry Officer. When this crucial witness did not say anything in support of the charge, the finding of the Enquiry Officer in this regard, relying on the depositions of interested witness, is unsustainable. So far as charge no.4 (a) is concerned, it sails with charge no.4(b). Charge no.4(b) stood not proved. As stated above, the Enquiry Officer eschewed the earlier correspondence by the petitioner to the District Judge, bringing certain serious invidious vituperations and scathing remarks hurled at the bench and also the evidence of Smt. K. Neelima , II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Gurazala. Charge no.4(b) stood not proved. As stated above, the Enquiry Officer eschewed the earlier correspondence by the petitioner to the District Judge, bringing certain serious invidious vituperations and scathing remarks hurled at the bench and also the evidence of Smt. K. Neelima , II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Gurazala. Moreover, the charge is vague and lacks particulars as to what was the abusive language used by the petitioner against any particular advocate. None of the witnesses stated that the petitioner has used certain abusive language against him. Nothing is mentioned in the charge about the abusive language attributed by any member of the Bar. Unless the specific language allegedly used by the petitioner was put in the charge, it is not open to the Enquiry Officer to decide the charge as the same causes serious prejudice to his right of a proper opportunity to defend himself. With regard to Charge no.4(e), this charge is equally vague inasmuch as it did not contain any particulars. R.W.4-who is one of the senior most advocates of the Bar stated that P.Ws. 1 to 35 were all close associates and friends and he refused to sign on Ex.P.1. He deposed that there is a division in the advocates and he spoke of P.W.31 misbehaving with the charged officer, stating 'arigipoina gramophone record laga silence silence ani vaguthavu'. ( you keep on chattering 'silence, silence' like a stuck Gramophone ). It is apt to extract the letter addressed by the petitioner to the District Judge, Guntur (Ex.D.5), which reads as under: "22-10-2005 Honoured Sir, I humbly submit that about a couple of weeks ago, while proceedings were going on in open court, I heard boisterous and tumultuous sounds form the bar room and when I sent word through my attender, he came and reported to me that some advocates are watching Television in high tune. Several times, I requested the members to cooperate with the court and not to cause much inconvenience. They have already converted the bar room into a bedlam, palaise, loonybin and pandemonium. Around 4 p.m. or so, the President of the Bar, Mr. P.J. Sowbhagyaraju, emerged harum-scarum and sneerfully remarked " arigipoina gramaphonula vaguthavu' at the Bench. It appears, there are two groups in the bar. Each one is vying with other. With the unwonted remarks, I remained doleful and was in a state of heebie jeebies. Around 4 p.m. or so, the President of the Bar, Mr. P.J. Sowbhagyaraju, emerged harum-scarum and sneerfully remarked " arigipoina gramaphonula vaguthavu' at the Bench. It appears, there are two groups in the bar. Each one is vying with other. With the unwonted remarks, I remained doleful and was in a state of heebie jeebies. I am pondering over how to control the boisterous noises from the bar room which is adjacent to the court hall." This letter being long before the storms that lay ahead, clearly indicates that the petitioner made specific allegations against the former President of the Bar, P.W.31. It also indicates the reason as to why the members of the Bar became inimical to the petitioner. It is relevant to note that this letter addressed by the petitioner was much earlier in point of time to all the allegations which were made by the Bar against the petitioner. This being the case, the testimony of the advocates cannot be taken to be trustworthy in the light of Ex.D.5. It emerges from the record that there were two groups in the Bar. P.W.36, Bar Room Clerk - Siva, deposed that the charged officer did not beat him and did not chase him in the presence of the advocates. The evidence of P.W.36-Siva, attender, cannot be discarded as he is the main witness being the victim of the alleged incident. There is no reason as to why he should be scared of the petitioner when he has the support of the advocate community as is evident from the depositions of P.Ws.1 to 35. So also P.W.37, Saidaiah, deposed that the charged officer did not catch hold of his shirt and take him to the court hall. P.W.38-Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police deposed that he instructed the Court Constable-Chinnayya, to include the name of the charged officer as L.W.2. There is no reason asto why Siva and Saidaiah, the alleged victims, should be scared of the petitioner, more so when they have been allegedly harassed and victimized by the petitioner. Relevant to note, Saidaiah is said to be a politician affiliated to a recognized political party and there is no reason forthcoming as to why he should feel intimidated by the petitioner, to the extent of lying for him at the expense of his own reputation. Curiously the evidence of P.Ws. Relevant to note, Saidaiah is said to be a politician affiliated to a recognized political party and there is no reason forthcoming as to why he should feel intimidated by the petitioner, to the extent of lying for him at the expense of his own reputation. Curiously the evidence of P.Ws. 36,37 and 38 was totally discarded by the Enquiry Officer. On a careful perusal of the entire material available on record, we are of the considered view that the learned Enquiry Officer sought to justify his findings on some extraneous material which did not form part of the record or charge and sought to substantiate his findings on a circumlocutory and periphrastic approach to the facts. Added to that, the Enquiry Officer totally ignored the correspondence between the petitioner and the District Judge starting from 22.10.2005 (Ex.D.5) which was long prior to Ex.P.1 complaint and also his letters dated 04.04.2006 and 05.04.2006, basing on which the District Judge gave liberty to the petitioner by memo dated 13.04.2006 to initiate action against the erring advocates. In his letter dated 05.04.2006 addressed to the District Judge, the petitioner clearly stated that some members of the bar, including Law officers, are encouraging the members to rebel against the Bench. On the directions of the District Judge only, the petitioner served a contempt notice upon the President of the Bar-P.W.1, and another notice to Sri A.V.Subba Reddy P.W.2 on 17.04.2006. A clear mention was made in these two notices about the letter addressed by the petitioner to the District Judge on 04.04.2006 and 05.04.2006. The show cause notices dated 17.04.2006 are the outcome of the earlier complaints made by the petitioner to the District Judge on 04.04.2006 and 05.04.2006. The Enquiry Officer failed to take into consideration all these aspects in the proper perspective. This Court in the normal circumstances would not have interfered with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry, even if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied, howsoever compendious it may be. The findings would be of two kinds, basic and ultimate. The ultimate findings could be reached only on the basic facts. If the basic fact does not exist or is not accepted, there cannot be an ultimate finding. The findings would be of two kinds, basic and ultimate. The ultimate findings could be reached only on the basic facts. If the basic fact does not exist or is not accepted, there cannot be an ultimate finding. In the instant case, the basic facts were denied and did not exist as those against whom the offence was said to have been committed, denied that the offence has ever been committed against them. Insofar as charges 1 and 3 are concerned, as discussed supra, the same were denied by the very persons who were said to have been involved and against whom the alleged violations had occurred. Insofar as charge no.2 is concerned the accused in CC No.113 of 2005 admitted the offence and paid the fine and that the petitioner made an endorsement on the charge sheet. The finding of the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner added his name as a witness is also not correct. With regard to charge no.4(a), no specific words of abuse were mentioned either in the complaint or in the Articles of Charges. Nobody was examined to demonstrate that he was personally abused or ill-treated. So also the finding on charge no.4(e) which is not proved on facts at all. On what date the incident is alleged to have happened was not at all indicated. The witnesses also speak only about a single incident wherein the petitioner allegedly broke a tumbler. This can hardly be a foundation to conclude that he was in the habit of breaking tumblers. It is also noteworthy that the Enquiry Officer ignored the sequence of events, viz., the notice issued by the petitioner to the advocates for their misbehaviour and the insults hurled at the petitioner, Ex.D.5 and the complaint Ex.P.1 by the Bar Association, which would clearly show that it is a counter blast to the action initiated by the petitioner. The advocates/complainants were biased and partisan witnesses and their evidence cannot be believed in view of Ex. D.5. It is relevant to note that the enquiry officer adopted pick and choose method in appraising the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 35. The enquiry officer choose to believe certain statements and disbelieve others. There is no rational basis for this approach on the part of the enquiry officer and this supports our conclusions that the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. 1 to 35. The enquiry officer choose to believe certain statements and disbelieve others. There is no rational basis for this approach on the part of the enquiry officer and this supports our conclusions that the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. It appears that the petitioner was inclined to be a strict disciplinarian and a serious judicial officer and used to insist on silence not only in the court but out side the court hall premises also. Such atmosphere would be difficult to procure in the trial Courts, where the litigants and advocates, being large in number, would contribute greatly to the noise pollution. Therefore, this attitude on the part of the petitioner seems to have been disliked by the advocates and compelled them to file the complaint leading to the subject disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. As there is absence of valid material to justify the impugned orders of compulsory retirement, the same must be held to be illegal and invalid. We find force in the contention of Sri Challa Sitharamaiah that the findings of the Enquiry Officer on charges 1,2 3, 4(a) and (e) are perverse and consequently, the imposition of the punishment of compulsory retirement from service is unsustainable. That apart, on perusal of the record, it is seen that the petitioner's honesty and integrity as a judicial officer has never been doubted. Since the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer are not only perverse but based on no evidence, we are of the considered view that judicial review is permissible in the instant case, as the whole enquiry is vitiated, and such enquiry is the basis on which the impugned punishment was imposed upon the petitioner. Apart from the factual aspect detailed above, it is relevant to note that there appears to be a violation of the statutory procedure also, as contended by the learned Senior Counsel. Apart from the factual aspect detailed above, it is relevant to note that there appears to be a violation of the statutory procedure also, as contended by the learned Senior Counsel. Rule 20(18) of The Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal ) Rules, 1991 reads as under : " (18) The inquiring authority may, after the Government Servant closes his case, and shall, if the Government Servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for purpose of enabling the Government Servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him" Rule 21(4) of the Rules reads as under " (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in [clauses )vi) to )x) ] of Rule 9 should be imposed on the Government Servant, it shall make an order after furnishing a copy of the report of the inquiring authority to the Government Servant and after taking into consideration any representation made by him thereto within a reasonable time ordinarily not exceeding one month. It shall not be necessary to give the Government Servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed: Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken on consideration before making an order imposing any such penalty on the Government servant." Rule 20(18) of the CCCA Rules mandates the Enquiry Officer to question the Charged Officer after he closes his case, on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence and seek his explanation when the charged officer does not examine himself. The Enquiry Officer, however, did not follow this procedure. As per Rule 20(18) the petitioner ought to have been examined after his evidence is closed, whereas in the present case the petitioner closed his evidence on 28.04.2007, but his examination by the Enquiry Officer took place on 12.04.2007, which is in violation of the procedure prescribed under rule 20(18). The Enquiry Officer, however, did not follow this procedure. As per Rule 20(18) the petitioner ought to have been examined after his evidence is closed, whereas in the present case the petitioner closed his evidence on 28.04.2007, but his examination by the Enquiry Officer took place on 12.04.2007, which is in violation of the procedure prescribed under rule 20(18). That apart, Rule 21 of the CCCA Rules specifies that the Disciplinary Authority should give its own findings on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry and then should come to a conclusion that a major penalty should be imposed on the basis of its findings. If it disagrees with the Enquiry Officer's findings, notice should be given to the Government Servant. If it does not disagree, no further explanation need be called from the Government Servant. Since the Disciplinary Authority did not give any findings on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer, the impugned order is liable to be struck down on this count also. For the foregoing discussion, the impugned proceedings cannot be sustained, be they viewed on facts, law or procedural technicalities, and the same are set aside. The petitioner is entitled for reinstatement into service with all consequential reliefs as per law. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.