Judgment : Oral Judgment: (S.B. Mhase, J.) 1. Heard both sides. The order dated March 26, 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Contempt Petition No. 96 of 2007 in Arbitration Petition No. 349 of 2007 is under challenge. 2. By this order two Directors of the appellant have been discharged on a ground that they were not the Directors of the Company at the relevant time when alleged contempt was committed. However, as against the original respondent no.4 the contempt proceeding continues, and the original respondent no.1 - Appellant was directed to disclose the names of the officers who were concerned with or responsible for the sale of the subject goods and materials on 15th October 2007 etc. It is further ordered that the Court may consider of additionally proceeding against the other named officers of the respondent no.1 Company with contempt action, if it is so warranted. 3. It appears that there was injunction order which was valid till 10-11-2007. According to the respondent - applicant, the said order was in continuation and therefore the disposal of the goods on 15-10-2001 was contrary to the injunction order and therefore the original respondent no.1 to 4 have committed the contempt of Court. 4. Accordingto the appellant the said order has come to an end on 11-10-2007 and therefore for disposal of the goods thereafter, they are not in contempt. However, we need not enter into this controversy at this stage as to whether the appellant has committed the contempt; because the main matter is pending before the learned Single Judge. However, the appellants are aggrieved by the directions to disclose the names of the concerned Officers responsible for the sale of the subject goods and materials on 15-10-2007 and therefore they have preferred this appeal. 5. Mr. S.U. Kamdar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that this appeal is not tenable in view of the provisions of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. He submitted that the appeal will lie under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 only if the conviction order has been passed by the learned Single Judge. According to him, other orders or decisions taken by the Contempt Court are not appellable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 6. Mr. He submitted that the appeal will lie under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 only if the conviction order has been passed by the learned Single Judge. According to him, other orders or decisions taken by the Contempt Court are not appellable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 6. Mr. Aspi Chinoy, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that any order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for its contempt is appelable under section 19 of the Act. He submitted that the interpretation that only the orders of conviction are appealable is not just and proper. He submitted that if such an interpretation is made, it violates the language of the legislation appearing in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 7. Mr. S. U. Kamdar, learned counsel for the respondent, in order to buttress his submission has relied upon judgment reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399 in the matter of Midnapor Peoples’ Co-op. Bank Ltd & Others v/s. Chunilal Nanda & Others. He has relied on paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment in support of his contention. He has also relied upon the judgment of this Court (Coram: J.N. Patel & A.A. Sayed, JJ) delivered in the matter of Bharat S. Shah & Others v/s. Rajkumar Jugalkishore Saraf, reported in ( 2008(1) Mh.L.J. 465 ). In this judgment the bench of this Court has relied upon the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Midnapore Peoples Co-op. Bank Ltd (supra) and following the said ratio decided the matter. 8. It is pertinent to note that in paragraph 25 of its judgment, Division Bench of this Court has quoted paragraph No. 11 of the judgment in the matter of Midnapore (supra). Therefore there is no new ratio laid down by this Court in Bharat’s (supra) matter, but the said Bench has followed the Supreme Court judgment in Midnapore (supra). 9. On reading both these judgments it appears that the appeal would not lie. The emphasis is placed by the learned counsel Mr. Therefore there is no new ratio laid down by this Court in Bharat’s (supra) matter, but the said Bench has followed the Supreme Court judgment in Midnapore (supra). 9. On reading both these judgments it appears that the appeal would not lie. The emphasis is placed by the learned counsel Mr. Kamdar on the following quotation from the said judgment, namely, "Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution." He has also relied upon the following ratio, namely, "An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt." He, therefore, submitted that present appeal is not maintainable. 10. Mr. Aspi Chinoy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in support of his submission relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2007) 1 SCC 373 in the matter of Municipal Corp., Jabalpur v/s Om Prakash Dubey. It will be relevant here to quote paragraph no. 4 of the said judgment, which read thus: "4. The respondent herein was one of the six petitioners in Writ petition No. 4739 of 1998, which was also disposed of together with other writ applications pending before the High Court. A contempt petition came to be filed by the respondent herein alone, although, as noticed hereinbefore, the scheme involved a large number of workmen who were parties before the High Court. The said contempt petition was filed, inter alia, on the premise that the Corporation had been making discrimination amongst the employees in the matter of regularization of their services. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 18-8-2005, having regard to the submissions made before it on behalf of the parties, the High Court directed: "Considering the contention of the non-applicant and after hearing the applicant, it will be appropriate if the respondent is permitted to prepare a fresh gradation list as per date of engagement of all the daily-rated employees. The gradation list shall also reflect educational qualifications of all respective employees. The gradation list shall also reflect educational qualifications of all respective employees. The aforesaid gradation list will be prepared by the respondent within a period of 45 days from today and shall be published on a notice board of the Municipal Corporation inviting objection, if any, from the employees. A period of 15 days shall be given to the employees to submit their objection. If any objection is filed by any of the employees in respect of the gradation list, it shall be considered and decided by the respondent within a period of two weeks thereafter. Then a final gradation list shall be published on the notice board of the Corporation. Thereafter, the respondent shall take the exercise for regularization of the employees as directed by this Court in Ramadhar case. Aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of three months. From the perusal of the order of the Commissioner dated 10-8-2005, it appears that some of the officers of the Municipal Corporation joined hands with the employees and manipulated the gradation list and/or issued regularization orders which are contrary to the directions issued by this Court in Ramadhar case. All the employees concerned who are responsible for the aforesaid mischief deserve an appropriate action by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation. In these circumstances, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation is directed to take departmental action against all the erring officers who have played mischief or played some mala fide rate (sic) in issuing the orders of regularization which are contrary to the directions issued by this Court in Ramadhar case or have manipulated the things for the purpose of issuing regularization orders of the employees who were not eligible for the regularization. Aforesaid action shall be taken by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation within a period of three months from today. In case some action is to be taken by the State, an appropriate step shall be taken by him in this regard drawing attention of the State within a period of 30 days from today. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation shall be responsible for the compliance with this order. A compliance report of this order be sent to the Registry of this Court within a period as fixed by this Court hereinabove. Report filed in a sealed cover is returned to Shri. Sharad Verma, learned counsel." The Municipal Corporation is, thus, before us." 11. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation shall be responsible for the compliance with this order. A compliance report of this order be sent to the Registry of this Court within a period as fixed by this Court hereinabove. Report filed in a sealed cover is returned to Shri. Sharad Verma, learned counsel." The Municipal Corporation is, thus, before us." 11. While considering the remedy as against this order, the Supreme Court has considered the interpretation of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in paragraph nos. 21 and 23 of the said judgment, which read thus: "21. We are in this case not called upon to consider the implication of the awards, which might have been passed in favour of the workmen. The Division Bench, by reason of the impugned judgment had issued directions in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, without arriving at a finding as to how the Corporation has violated its order. It issued directions which are contrary to or inconsistent with the directions issued by a learned Single Judge by an order dated 27-2-2003. 23. Recently in R. V. Serumaga, it was opined: "Section 13 of the 1960 Act provides as follows: ‘(1) subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie under this section from any order or decision of a Court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of Court (including criminal contempt); and in relation to any such order or decision the provisions of this section shall have effect in substitution or any other enactment relating to appeals in civil or criminal proceedings. .(2) An appeal under this section shall lie in any case at the instance of the defendant and, in the case of an application for committal or attachment, at the instance of the applicant; and the appeal shall lie...... (bb) from an order or decision of the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal.... .(3) The Court to which an appeal is brought under this section may reverse or vary the order or decision of the Court below; and make such other order as may be just.....’ We have considered two interpretations of section 13(1). The narrow interpretation is to the effect that it is not triggered until the contemnor has been convicted of, and sentenced for, the contempt. The narrow interpretation is to the effect that it is not triggered until the contemnor has been convicted of, and sentenced for, the contempt. The broad interpretation is that the language ‘any order or decision..... in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt’ is sufficiently wide to relate also to orders or decisions made in the course of proceedings which may result in a conviction of and sentence for contempt. But we have come to the conclusion that the broad interpretation is the correct one. The statutory language permits it. It provides a remedy in a case of unjustifiably prolonged custody, and it does so without impinging on cases where the allegation is of an offence other than contempt of Court. Moreover, there are exceptional features which surround summary proceedings for contempt which, as the authorities make clear, demand an enlarged process of judicial scrutiny." 12. Thus, on reading these paragraphs from the Supreme Court judgment we find that out of the two interpretations, namely, out of narrow and broader interpretations, the Supreme Court has accepted the broader interpretation. The broader interpretation is that the language "any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt" is sufficiently wide to relate also to the orders or decisions made by the High Court in the course of proceedings which may result in the conviction or sentence for contempt. On reading the language of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, we also find that the appeal has been provided in Section 19 as against any order or decision of the High Court while the said High Court is exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Thereby the requirement is that whenever the High Court is in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt; has dealt with the matter and passed any order that order will be appealable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 13. Therefore it naturally flows from the language of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act that it need not be an order of conviction, but any order including the order of conviction can be challenged under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only requirement is that the order must have been passed by the High Court in its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The only requirement is that the order must have been passed by the High Court in its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The words "in its jurisdiction to punish" cannot be interpretated to mean that there should be necessarily punishment and thereby an appeal will lie. We find that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Midnapore (supra) has not been considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Jabalpur (supra). Therefore we are left at a controversy, namely, out of the two judgments which differ so far as the ratio are concerned, which of those judgments should be followed by this Court. It is well settled law that the judgment which is acceptable to us out of the two Supreme Court judgments can be followed by us, and the same is the ratio of the this High Court’s Full Bench Judgment in the matter of Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v/s. Union of India & others, reported in 1994 Mh. L.J. 1669. In this context paragraph no. 14 of the said judgment is relevant, which reads thus: "14. It has been pointed out by one of us, while speaking for a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bholanath v/s. Madanmohan, (AIR-1988 Calcutta 1 at p.5-7), on the question as to the course to be followed by the High Court when confronted with contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanating from Benches of co-equal strength, as hereunder:- "..... When contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanate from Benches of equal strength, the course to be adopted by the High Court is, firstly, to try to reconcile and to explain those contrary decisions by assuming, as far as possible, that they apply to different sets of circumstances. This in fact is a course which was recommended by our ancient Jurists - "Srutirdwaidhe Smritirdwidhe Sthalaveda Prakalapate" - in case there are two contrary precepts of the Sruties or the Smrities, different cases are to be assumed for their application. This in fact is a course which was recommended by our ancient Jurists - "Srutirdwaidhe Smritirdwidhe Sthalaveda Prakalapate" - in case there are two contrary precepts of the Sruties or the Smrities, different cases are to be assumed for their application. As Jurist Jaimini said, contradictions or inconsistencies are not to be readily assumed as they vary often be not real but only apparent resulting from the application of the very same principle to different sets of facts -- "Prayoge Hi Virodha Syat." But when such contrary decisions of co-ordinate benches cannot be reconciled or explained in the manner as aforesaid, the question would arise as to which one the High Court is obliged to follow." "One view is that in such a case the High Court has no option in the matter and it is not for the High Court to decide which one it would follow but it must follow the later one. According to this view, as in the case of two contrary orders issued by the same authority, the later would supersede the former and would bind the subordinate and as in the case of two contrary legislations by the same legislature, the later would be the governing one, so also in the case of two contrary decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by Benches of equal strength, the later would rule and shall be deemed to have overruled the former. P.B. Mukharji, J. (as His Lordship, then was) in his separate, though concurring, judgment in the Special Bench decision of this Court in Pramatha Nath v/s. Chief Justice, (AIR-1961 Calcutta 545 at p.551, para 26), took a similar view. S. P. Mitra, J. (as His Lordship, then was) also took such a view in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Sovachand Mulchand v/s. Collector, Central Excise, (AIR-1968 Cal. 174 at p.186, para. 56). To the same effect is a decision of the Mysore High Court in New Krishna Bhavan v/s. Commercial - Tax Officer, AIR- 1961 Mys. 3 at p.7 and the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vasant v/s. Dikkaya, 1980 Mh.L.J. 229 = (AIR-1980 Bom. 341 at p.345). A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in UP State Road Transport Corporation v/s. Trade Transport Tribunal, AIR -1977 All I p.5 has also ruled to that effect. 3 at p.7 and the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Vasant v/s. Dikkaya, 1980 Mh.L.J. 229 = (AIR-1980 Bom. 341 at p.345). A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in UP State Road Transport Corporation v/s. Trade Transport Tribunal, AIR -1977 All I p.5 has also ruled to that effect. The view appears to be that in case of conflicting decisions, by Benches of matching authority, the law is the latest pronouncement made by the latest Bench and the old law shall change yielding place to new." "The other view is that in such case the High Court is not necessarily bound to follow the one which is later in point of time, but may follow the one which, in its view is better in point of law. Sandhawalia, C.J. in the Full Bench decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Indo-Swiss Time Ltd v/s. Uma Rao, (AIR-1981 Punj. & Har. 213 at pp. 219-220) took this view with the concurrence of the other two learned Judges, though as to the actual decision, the other learned Judges deferred from the learned Chief Justice. In the Karnataka Full Bench decision in Govinda Naik v/s. West Patent Press Co., (AIR-1980 Kant. 92), the minority consisting of two of learned Judges speaking through Jagannath Shetty, J. also took the same view (supra, at p.95) and in fact the same has been referred to with approval by Sandhawalia, C.J. in the Full Bench decision in Indo-Swiss Time Ltd. (supra)." "This later view appears to us to be in perfect consonance with what our ancient Jurists Narada declared – Dharmshastra Virodhe Tu Yuktiyukta Vidhe Smrita – that is, when the Dharmshatras or Law Codes of equal authority conflict with one another, the one appearing to be reasonable, or more reasonable is to be preferred and followed. A modern jurist Seervai, has also advocated a similar view in his Constitutional Law of India, which has also been quoted with approval by Sandhawalia, C.J. in Indo-Swiss Time (supra, at p. 220) and the learned Jurist has observed that "judgments of the Supreme Court which cannot stand together, present a serious problem to the High Courts and subordinate Courts" and that "in such circumstances the correct thing is to follow that judgment which appears to the Court to state the law accurately or more accurately than the other conflicting judgment." 14. Relying upon this judgment we find that the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in (2007) 1 SCC 373 ) in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Jabalpur v/s. Om Prakash Dubey is acceptable to this Bench. Therefore, we hold that this appeal is maintainable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Thus, preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent is hereby rejected. .15. Next, coming to the main controversy, namely, the direction given by the learned Single Judge to the appellant to disclose the names of the officers who have disposed of the machinery on or about 15th October 2007, within a period of two weeks from the date of order, so that the learned Single Judge can consider as to whether to proceed against those officers for contempt of court. It is to be noted that those officers of the appellant who have allegedly disposed of the machinery contrary to the stay orders of this Court, were located in Australia. As they were the officers of the appellant, their names, particulars are only known to the appellant. Thus, while the machinery in dispute which was the subject matter of the contract between the appellant and the respondent, was stationed in Australia, the appellant being a party to the said proceeding was allegedly prohibited from disposing of the said machinery. The learned Single Judge of this Court has ultimately found that the contempt action will proceed as against the original respondent nos. 1 and 4. Thus the original respondent nos. 2 & 3 being the directors of the appellant- company were discharged by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge of this Court has ultimately found that the contempt action will proceed as against the original respondent nos. 1 and 4. Thus the original respondent nos. 2 & 3 being the directors of the appellant- company were discharged by the learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge has also noted that if the machinery has been disposed of or sold by .the officers of the appellant in Australia, then appellant will be liable for the contempt for the acts done by its officers in Australia, as the prohibitory orders passed by this court were binding as against the appellant - company, similarly those orders were equally binding on the officers of the appellant- company. Therefore the act of contempt which the Single Judge has to consider is a composite act of the officers of the appellant and that of the appellant. However, the names of those officers who have disposed of the machinery contrary to the alleged directions of this Court and have allegedly committed the contempt are not known either to the Court and/or to the respondent who has filed the contempt petition. However, the duty of the respondent -complainant is to point out the contempt to the Court and thereafter it is for the Court to take a cognizance and deal with the contemnor. Once the contempt has been pointed out by the complainant -respondent, it is for the Court to find out who are the contemnors and to punish them for the contempt. No doubt, if the complainant - respondent possesses the information in respect of the names of the contemnor and other particulars which is required to punish, he can provide and supply it to the Court. But in the peculiar facts of this case that the names of the officers of the appellant who were located in Australia and their internal record as a result of which they have disposed the machinery in question contrary to the alleged directions of this Court is a material not accessible to the respondent complainant. The said information is exclusive in the custody and possession of the appellant. The said information is exclusive in the custody and possession of the appellant. No doubt, the appellant- company can be punished for the contempt of court, but if the officers are not dealt with then in that circumstances the real contemnors may go free and thereby in the matters of the company the officers will commit the contempt, the company will suffer the punishment for the contempt, but the real contemnors will be free from the action of the contempt of Court. The companies are ultimately governed by the persons and therefore the persons who committed the contempt must be dealt with by the Court while dealing with the contempt action, and therefore in the present case it was necessary for the learned Single Judge to know the names of the real contemnors, namely, the names of the officers of the appellant who are located in Australia. 16. The question, therefore, is how to get information as to the names of the officers of the appellant. One of the course which the learned Single Judge has found appropriate is to give directions to the appellant to disclose the names of its officers, and accordingly the learned Single Judge has issued the directions. However, the appellant has taken exception to such direction by filing this appeal. .17. Mr. Aspi Chinoy, the learned senior counsel who appears for the appellant has submitted before this Court that the action for contempt of Court is a quasi-criminal in nature and as such the standard of proof required is of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. That means, he submitted that it is a quasi criminal trial requiring a criminal standard of proof, and therefore the appellant who is alleged to be a contemnor, if punished will be guilty of an offence of contempt of Court therefore, appellant cannot be asked to disclose the names of the officers who may have equally alleged to have committed a contempt. He submitted that the direction issued by this Court violates Article 20(3) of the Constitution, and therefore such directions .cannot be issued and he ultimately prayed for quashing of the said directions and appeal be allowed. 18. Mr. He submitted that the direction issued by this Court violates Article 20(3) of the Constitution, and therefore such directions .cannot be issued and he ultimately prayed for quashing of the said directions and appeal be allowed. 18. Mr. S.U. Kamdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the contention of the appellant that the directions to disclose the names of the officers is contrary to the rule of self-incrimination is fallacious and misconceived. He submitted that under Article 215 of the Constitution this Court has ample power to give such directions as has been given by the learned Single Judge. He relied upon Rule 1049 of the High Court, Original Side Rules, which interlia prescribe that the High Court while determining the contempt petition can decide its own procedure and follow the procedure as deemed fit and proper. He submitted that the High Court has ample power to direct investigation since the contempt has been committed in foreign country. By way of example he referred to the case of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and another v/s. State of Gujarat & Others, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 374 ) and submitted that Apex Court has followed its own procedure to deal with the said case. .19. Mr. Aspi Chinoy, learned senior counsel has relied upon Mrityunjoy Das & Another v/s Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & others reported in (2001) 3SCC 739) wherein in paragraph 14 the Apex Court has observed that "be it noted that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt." Thus, what we find is that that the Apex Court has held that contempt proceeding is a quasi criminal and standard of proof is of the criminal proceeding, that the breach has to be established beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the appellant stands at par or in a row of alleged contemnors and the directions given to the appellant to disclose the names of the officers of the appellant-company against whom the alleged contempt action may be initiated, may lead to self-incrimination of appellant. As the appellant is a company, thereby for the acts which have been committed by its officers, the company will be held liable for the contempt. As the appellant is a company, thereby for the acts which have been committed by its officers, the company will be held liable for the contempt. Therefore the appellant and its officers, are the persons who have allegedly committed the offence of contempt of court. Therefore, the question is whether one of the alleged contemnors can be directed to disclose the names of the other alleged contemnors. Because as a result of the disclosure of those names, and if those officers are found to be contemnor, the appellant will also be declared as contemnor. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the act of disclosure of the names of officers of the appellant-company is not a simplicitor an act of disclosure of the names of the contemnors with which the appellant had no concern, but as a result of the said disclosure the appellant gets involved in contempt of court. Not only that but appellant produces the evidence as against the company that is against appellant. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is asked to give the evidence against appellant against appellant’s will by giving such directions. We find substance in the contention. Therefore, what we find that even though we have ample powers to find out a proper procedure for punishing the persons for committing the contempt of Court, yet the procedure which we invent shall not be contrary to Article .20(3) of the Constitution. However, in the present matter, what we find is that the directions given by the learned Single Judge to respondent no.3 to disclose the names of its officers is a direction which ultimately resulted into producing and procuring the evidence as against the appellant also and thereby it violates Article 20(3) of the Constitution, and therefore the said direction is not sustainable in law. Therefore we are inclined to quash the said directions. 20. However, the question before this Court is that is this Court helpless under these circumstances? Because whenever this Court finds and/or it has been brought to the notice of this Court that someone has committed contempt of Court, in order to maintain the discipline, dignity and to deter the contemnor from indulging into the acts of contempt, this Court is expected to take appropriate steps to book the contemnors and punish for the contempt of Court. How to do this when the names of the contemnors are not known and especially under the circumstances the directions cannot be given to the party on record to disclose the names of the contemnors. What is interesting to be noted is that in the matter of Zahira (supra) when the Apex Court has noted that the various statements have been made by Zahira and it was rather difficult to hold whether she is responsible for the contempt or not, the Court directed investigation of the facts through the Registrar of the Court and after getting a report, further actions were taken as against the contemnor. However, in that case the contemnor was known but what was the material as against the contemnor was necessary to be ascertained and the Apex Court ascertained it by appointing the officer of the Court to investigate into the facts and get the factual report. This is how the Apex Court has followed its own procedure to deal with the contempt action. In the present matter the appellant is a multinational company and its officers may be either in this country or out of this country. If the officers of appellant are in this country the required information, namely, the names of the officers of appellant and record pertaining to the sale or disposal of machinery would have been investigated either giving directions to police officers. But such course cannot be adopted in this case because the officers allegedly committing contempt and record is located outside the country. Now as a result of the globalization of the business and market, multinational companies are coming to this country along with their officers, they carry on business and/or undertake certain contracts here. When litigation starts in this country and thereby they are under the orders of this Court. But if the officers of said company who are outside the country commit breach of the orders of this court, unless their names have been found or brought before this Court, it will not be possible for this court to deal with the officers of these multinational companies who have flouted the orders passed by this Court. But if the officers of said company who are outside the country commit breach of the orders of this court, unless their names have been found or brought before this Court, it will not be possible for this court to deal with the officers of these multinational companies who have flouted the orders passed by this Court. Therefore, this Court cannot be a silent spectator to the fact that the information regarding the names of the alleged contemnor - officers is exclusively with the multinational company and as the company is also one of the contemnors along with them, cannot be forced to disclose the names of its officers. Therefore, even though we find that directly the directions cannot be given to the company probably in view of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, yet it cannot be said that this Court is helpless. On the contrary in view of the inherent powers to punish for the contempt, this Court can provide for its own procedure and machinery to find out the names of the contemnors and to deal with them. In Zahira’s case (supra) the Apex Court found the appointment of the Registrar to investigate into the facts under what circumstances Zahira made various statements and after getting report Supreme Court proceeded to deal with contempt. In the similar matter what we have noticed is that the contempt of court is a quasi criminal proceeding and ultimately it resulted into punishment for the offence of contempt of court. Here, the alleged contemnor - appellant, is a corporate body and is before this Court, however the officers of this company are outside India, namely, they are in Australia, and their names are not known to the Court. This is a case wherein the information in respect of the offence of contempt of court is outside India and the said information is required for punishing the contemnors. What we find is that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 166A deals with a situation in respect of crimes or offences where the evidence is available outside India. We quote the said section: "166-A. Letter of request to competent authority for investigation in a country or place outside India. What we find is that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 166A deals with a situation in respect of crimes or offences where the evidence is available outside India. We quote the said section: "166-A. Letter of request to competent authority for investigation in a country or place outside India. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, if , in the course of an investigation into an offence, an application is made by the investigating officer or any officer superior in rank to the investigating officer that evidence may be available in a country or place outside India, any Criminal Court may issue a letter of request to a Court or an authority or place competent to deal with such request to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case and to record his statement made in the course of such examination and also to require such person or any other person to produce any document or thing which may be in his possession pertaining to the case and to forward all the evidence so taken or collected or the authenticated copies thereof or the thing so collected to the Court issuing such letter." 21. Thus, what we find is that the information in respect of the names of the persons who alleged to have committed the contempt of court, the manner in which the machinery was disposed of and the record prepared by those officers for disposing of those machineries can be investigated by invoking the powers as provided in section 166-A of the Cr.P.C. or on the line of the procedure provided in this section. We therefore find it appropriate to direct the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai to issue a letter of request to a Court or an authority in Australia where the office of appellant was located and where the sale transaction of disputed machinery has taken place on 15/10/2007, who is competent to deal with the request to examine orally any person employed by the appellant company, who is supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the present case and to record their statements made in the course of the case. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai shall also issue a letter of request to the said Court or Authority requesting to investigate and find out as to who are the officers of the appellant -company who are responsible for the disposal of the machinery on 15th October 2007. 22. The Prothonotary & Sr. Master of this Court is directed to forward the copies of the contempt petition, original arbitration petition from which the contempt proceeding arose and this order to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai so that he can forward the necessary copies of the proceedings to the Court or Authority in Australia to investigate into this aspect of the matter. After a receipt of information from the Court or Authority in Australia as directed above, the same shall be transmitted to the learned Single Judge of this Court so that he can take further steps in the matter. 23. Appeal is partly allowed and disposed of in the above terms.