62. A combined reading of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 156 shows that Sub-section (1) of Section 156 vests, in the Officer-in-charge of every police station, the power to investigate any 'cognizable case' without the order of a Magistrate, who has the jurisdiction over the territorial limits of the police station concerned to inquire into and try a case under Chapter XIII. I may hasten to add that Chapter XIII relates to jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in enquiries and trials. 63. Thus, a reading of Section 156(1) shows that this sub-section speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of an Officer-in-Charge of a police station to investigate an offence, which is cognizable and which has been committed within the local area of the police station concerned. It has to be borne in mind, in this regard, that a police officer does not have jurisdiction to investigate even a cognizable offence if the offence has been committed outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate, who has the power to enquire into or try a case, which arises within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the police station concerned. However, Sub-section (3) of that section authorities the Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of an offence under Section 190, to order an 'investigation' as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 156. 64. Thus, while Sub-section (1) of Section 156 empowers a police officer to investigate a cognizable case, without any order having been passed, in this regard, from the Magistrate concerned, Sub-section (3) of Section 156 empowers such a Magistrate to order investigation, which the police officer is, in the light of the provisions of Section 156, otherwise also, empowered to investigate. In other words, a Magistrate's power to order investigation, under Section 156(3), does not affect the power, which a police officer, otherwise, has to investigate a cognizable case provided that the case relates to an area, which falls within the local limits of his jurisdiction. 65. In other words, a Magistrate's power to order investigation, under Section 156(3), does not affect the power, which a police officer, otherwise, has to investigate a cognizable case provided that the case relates to an area, which falls within the local limits of his jurisdiction. 65. What surface from the above discussion is that while Section 155 bars a Police Officer from investigating a 'non-cognizable case' without having received, in this regard, an order from the Magistrate, who has the power to try such a case or commit the case of trial, Section 156(1)permits a Police Officer to investigate a 'cognizable case' irrespective of the fact as to whether the Magistrate concerned has directed investigation into the case or not. 66. What is now, of immense importance to note is that, apart from the 'investigation', which a Magistrate has, by virtue of the provisions of Section 156(3), the power to direct, the Magistrate has also the power, under Section 202 of the Code, which falls under Chapter XV, to direct an investigation. Chapter XV, it needs to be noted, prescribes the procedure as to how a Magistrate shall proceed when a 'complaint', within the meaning of Section 2(d), is made by a person and when the Magistrate decides to proceed with such a 'complaint' as a 'complaint case'. 67. The question, therefore, which engages one's attention, is as to whether an investigation, which a Magistrate directs, under Section 156(3), is similar to the investigation, which a Magistrate may direct under Section 202. To correctly appreciate this question, a careful and analytical reading of the scheme of Sections 202, 203 and 204 is imperative. 68. The scheme of the provisions, contained in Sections 200, 201, 203 and 204, is this : If a Magistrate decides to take 'cognizance' of the offence, which a complaint may disclose, he shall examine the complainant and the witness, if any, present. Such examination may, however, be dispensed with, when the complaint is made by a public servant, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, or when a Court has made the complaint. A cautious reading of the provisions of Section 202 shows that a Magistrate may, on receipt of a complaint, postpone issue of process against an accused and either 'enquire' into the case himself or direct an 'investigation' to be made. A cautious reading of the provisions of Section 202 shows that a Magistrate may, on receipt of a complaint, postpone issue of process against an accused and either 'enquire' into the case himself or direct an 'investigation' to be made. The 'enquiry', which may be so held, or the direction for 'investigation', which may be so given, is really for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate decide as to whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint. Under the amended provisions of the Code, it has, now, been made mandatory for the Magistrate not to issue any process against an accused on the basis of a complaint if the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction unless the Magistrate holds an 'inquiry' or directs an 'investigation' for the purpose of deciding as to whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. 69. Thus, where a complaint discloses commission of an offence by a person, who may be residing outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, where the offence is alleged to have been committed, the holding of 'inquiry', as contemplated under Section 202(1), or the direction to conduct the 'investigation', as envisaged by Section 202(1), is mandatory before the process is issued against such an accused. To hold or not to hold an 'inquiry' or to direct or not to direct an 'investigation' in a case, where the accused is residing within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is, however, discretionary. 70. What follows from the above discussion is that a Magistrate need not postpone issue of process and hold any enquiry or direct any investigation if he is satisfied that the complaint and the statements, recorded under Section 200 of the Code, make out a prima facie case for issue of process and that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he can issue process, in terms of Section 204 of the Code, against the accused. When, after examining, in terms of Section 200, the complainant and the witnesses, if present, the Magistrates finds that there exists some materials against the accused, but the same are insufficient for issuance of process, the appropriate statutory mechanism is engrafted under Section 202, which empowers the Magistrate to either direct investigation or inquire into the case himself so as to enable him decide if the process deserves to be issued against the accused. This 'inquiry' or 'investigation' is really for the purpose of determining as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding. If the Magistrate chooses to hold the 'inquiry', the 'inquiry' may result into either issuance of process against the accused under Section204 or dismissal thereof under Section 203, for, Section 203 makes it clear that if, upon considering the statements on oath, if any, of the complainant and his witness and the result of the 'inquiry' or 'investigation', if any, under Section 202, the Magistrate is of the opinion that sufficient grounds do not exist for proceeding further, it is obligatory on him to dismiss the 'complaint', though, while dismissing the 'complaint', the Magistrate is duty bound to record reasons for so doing. Similarly, 'investigation', ordered by the Magistrate under Section 202, would result into submission of a report by the police and if the report, so submitted, does not disclose not sufficient grounds for proceeding, the Magistrate has the discretion to dismiss the 'complaint' under Section 203; but when such a report, submitted by the police, discloses commission of an offence, the Magistrate is duty bound to direct issuance of process against the person(s), who may appear to have committed of-fence(s), which such a report may disclose. 71. Coupled with the above, what can also rot be ignored is that when the accused is a person, who resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned, the Magistrate cannot issue process against the accused inasmuch as he has to either hold an inquiry himself as contemplated under Section 202(1) or has to direct an investigation as contemplated under Section 202(1). The words "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding", which appear in Section 202(1), controls the power of the Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 202 inasmuch as the Magistrate can direct an investigation, under Section 202, only for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This power, conferred upon a Magistrate, is quite distinct from, and independent of, the Magistrate's power to direct an investigation under Section 156(3), which we have already discussed above. 72. Laying down the distinction between the investigations, which a Magistrate can direct, under Section 156 vis-à-vis the investigation, which a Magistrate can direct, under Section 202, the Apex Court, in Mohd. Yusuf v. Afaq Jahan and Anr. reported in (2006) 1 SCC 627 , held as under: 6. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of police officers to investigate cognizable offences. Investigation envisaged in Section 202contained in Chapter XV is different from the investigation contemplated under Section 156 of the Code. 7. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to "information to the police and their powers to investigate", whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps, which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156; falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to "direct an investigation by a police officer". But the investigation, envisaged in Section202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the Code. 8. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substantive of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section173 of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substantive of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code.But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. 9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code makes the position clear that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1) i.e. "or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding." 10. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him. 11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as. indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3)of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. 12. The above position was highlighted in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. (Emphasis is added) 73. From the observations made, in Mohd. Yusuf (supra), it becomes transparent that there is a marked difference between the powers, which a Magistrate has as regards directing an 'investigation' under Section 156(3) and the investigation, which -the Magistrate can direct under Section 202. While the direction, under Section 202, is limited and can be exercised only for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the 'complaint', which the Magistrate ma have received, the power to direct investigation, under Section 156(3), is exercised, as noted in paragraph 4 of Mohd. While the direction, under Section 202, is limited and can be exercised only for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the 'complaint', which the Magistrate ma have received, the power to direct investigation, under Section 156(3), is exercised, as noted in paragraph 4 of Mohd. Yusuf's case (supra), before 'cognizance' is taken and exercise of this power to direct 'investigation' does not suffer from any limitation inasmuch as a direction issued, in exercise of powers, under Section 156(3), would permit the police to 'investigate' a case as thoroughly, which the police officer is, otherwise also, empowered to 'investigate' under Section156(1) and, upon completion of 'investigation', which a police officer conducts either in exercise of his power under Section 156(1) or on a direction given by a Magistrate, under Section 156(3), the police officer shall submit a report as contemplated by Section 173 of the Code and when, the Magistrate decides, on the basis of the report, so submitted to him, to issue process against the offender, in exercise of his power, as pointed out above, the Magistrate is said to have taken 'cognizance'. 74. The incidental question Nos. (c) and (d) shall stand answered accordingly. 75. Let me, now, turn to yet another incidental question, namely, (e) What 'pre-cognizance' stage signifies and how does it differ from 'post-cognizance' stage? 76. It is necessary to point out that Section 156(3) appears in Chapter XII under the heading, "Information to the police and their powers to investigate"; whereas Section 202 is enacted tin Chapter XV, which bears the heading "complaints to Magistrate". Section 202 deals with a stage, when a Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of offence is on the basis of 'complaint', takes 'cognizance' of the offence, which a 'complaint' may disclose, but postpones issuance of process against the accused and decides to hold 'enquiry' into the 'complaint' himself or direct an 'investigation' to be made by the police for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient grounds for proceedings. Section 202 does not envisage those cases, wherein the Magistrate sends the 'complaint', without taking 'cognizance' at all, to the police for 'investigation'. Such a power of sending a 'complaint' for 'investigation' to the police is really in exercise of Magistrate's power under Section 156(3). 77. Section 202 does not envisage those cases, wherein the Magistrate sends the 'complaint', without taking 'cognizance' at all, to the police for 'investigation'. Such a power of sending a 'complaint' for 'investigation' to the police is really in exercise of Magistrate's power under Section 156(3). 77. The power given to a Magistrate to order 'investigation' by police, under Section 156(3), is quite different from the power given by Section 202(1) to the Magistrate to direct 'investigation'. These two power are resorted to is distinctly different spheres at two distinct and different stages. While Section 156(3) deals with Magistrate's power at "pre-cognizance" stage of the offence, Section 202deals with such Magistrate's power at 'post-cognizance' stage. If a Magistrate, instead of sending a 'complaint' to the police for 'investigation' in exercise of powers under Section 156(3), opts to take 'cognizance' and proceeds with the 'complaint' as a 'complaint case' by examining the complainant, the Magistrate cannot switch back to the 'pre-cognizance' stage and avail of his powers under Section 156(3). While the direction to 'investigate', given under Section 156(3), embraces the entire process of 'investigation' into a 'complaint' culminating into submission of 'police report 'Section173(2)(i), Section 202 comes into play at a stage, when some materials have already been collected by the Magistrate by examining the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, but the same is deemed insufficient by him to take next step in the prescribed procedure, namely, issuance of process against the accused. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered, under Section 202, to direct 'investigation' for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In short, the direction to investigation given under Section 202 is at 'post cognizance' stage. See Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1672 , and Khireswar Bora v. State of Assam reported in2005 (Supp) GLT 618, See also Mohd. Yusuf v. Afaq Jahan and Anr. reported in (2006) 1 SCC 627 . 78. The incidental question No. (e) shall stand answered accordingly. VENUE OF TRIAL of a person, who commits an offence, in its entirety, outside India, but is liable to be tried in India. 79. Yusuf v. Afaq Jahan and Anr. reported in (2006) 1 SCC 627 . 78. The incidental question No. (e) shall stand answered accordingly. VENUE OF TRIAL of a person, who commits an offence, in its entirety, outside India, but is liable to be tried in India. 79. Let me, now, turn to question No. (iii), namely, as to where would be the venue of trial of a person, who commits an offence, in its entirety, outside India but is liable to be tried, by virtue of Sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal Code, in India. 80. The question posed above, make me traverse back to the expression, "he may dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found", which appears in Section 188. 81. For the purpose of better appreciation of the issue involved, let me, bearing in mind the provisions of Section 188, quote, hereinbelow, Sections 177, 178, 179, 180 and 181 of the Code too. 177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.-Every offence shall, ordinarily, be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of inquiry or trial.-(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas as offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 179. Offence triable, where act is done or consequence ensues.-When an act is an offence by reason of anything, which has been done, and of a consequence, which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 180. 179. Offence triable, where act is done or consequence ensues.-When an act is an offence by reason of anything, which has been done, and of a consequence, which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 180. Place of trial where act is an offence by reason of relation to other offence.-When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act, which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, the first mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done. 181. Place of trial in case of certain offences.-(1) Any offence of being a thug, or murder committed by a thug, of dacoity, of dacoity with murder, of belonging to a gang of dacoits, or of escaping from custody, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the accused persons is found. (2) Any offence of kidnapping or abduction of a person may be inquired into or tired by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the person was kidnappped or abducted or was conveyed or concealed or detained. (3) Any offence of theft, extortion or robbery may be inquired into or tired by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property which is the subject of the offence was possessed by any person committing it or by any person who received or retained such property knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen property. (4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject to the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person. (5) Any offence which includes the possession of stolen property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property was possessed by any person who received or retained it knowing or having reason to believe is to be stolen property. 82. (5) Any offence which includes the possession of stolen property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property was possessed by any person who received or retained it knowing or having reason to believe is to be stolen property. 82. A bare reading of Section 177 shows that every offence shall be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. This section postulates that, ordinarily, an offence shall be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed. The word, 'ordinarily', which appears in Section 177, has to be understood to mean 'except' as otherwise provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Narumal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1329 . The Legislature can, thus, be seen to have been conscious of the fact that a departure from the general principle, prescribing place of trial, as envisaged by Section 117, needs to be made. It is in the light of this power of the Legislature that Sections 178, 179, 180, 181 and 188 need to be considered. 83. Bearing in mind the fact that, ordinarily, the place of offence shall be the place of enquiry or trial, when on turns of Section 178, what becomes noticeable is that Section 178 deals with a case, where an offence consists of acts having been done or omitted to be done at several places. Thus, when it is not clear and certain as to in which of several local areas, an offence has been committed or when an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area or when an offence is a continuing one and continues to be, committed in more than one local area or when the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, such an offence may by enquired into or tried by a Court, which has jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 84. 84. In short, Section 178 makes it possible for an offender to be tried by a Court, where an offence may not have been committed in its entirety, namely, when an offence consists of several acts done and it is uncertain as to where the offence was actually committed or where the offence is committed partly in one lack area and partly in another local area or when an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more than one local area or where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas. In all such cases, the Court, where any of the acts has been done, will have the jurisdiction to enquire into the case or try the offender. 85. I may also pause here to point out that Section 179 makes it clear that when an act is an offence by reason of anything, which has been done, and of a consequence, which has ensued, the offence may be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such a thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. In other words, both the places, namely, where the act was done and the place, where the consequence ensued, will be the place of enquiry of the case as well as trial. 86. Section 180 deals with the place of trial, where an act becomes an offence by reason of its relation to another offence and lays down that the first-mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done. 87. In all the cases, enumerated above, the jurisdiction is based on the place, where the offence has been committed either in its entirety or in part. A departure can, however, be noticed under Section181(1) inasmuch as Section 181(1) makes, apart from the place, where the offence was committed, the place, where the accused is found, as the place of inquiry or trial. A departure can, however, be noticed under Section181(1) inasmuch as Section 181(1) makes, apart from the place, where the offence was committed, the place, where the accused is found, as the place of inquiry or trial. Section 181, thus, makes provisions for inquiry or trial in respect of those offences, where an accused may be on move, or where the property, involved in an offence, may have been moved from one place to another and makes it clear that such an offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered by the person deceived or was received by the accused person. Section 182 deals with the situation, where an offence is committed by means of letters or telecommunication messages. Section 182 also makes it possible to try a person, under Sections494 and 495 of the IPC, at the place, where the offence was committed, or the offender last resided with his or her spouse by the first marriage, or the wife, by first marriage, has taken up permanent residence after commission of the offence. Section 183 deals with the offences committed during journey or voyage. Section 186 deals with a situation, where two or more Courts take cognizance of the same offence and a question arises as to which of them ought to have enquired into or tried the offence. Such cases, according to Section 186, have to be decided by the High Court, if the Courts, in question, are subordinate to High Court. Section 187 deals with the situation, where a person, within the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate, has committed an offence outside the jurisdiction of the local Magistrate. In such a case, the Magistrate can compel such a person to appear before him and, then, send him to the Magistrate, who has the jurisdiction to enquire into or try such offence. 88. In such a case, the Magistrate can compel such a person to appear before him and, then, send him to the Magistrate, who has the jurisdiction to enquire into or try such offence. 88. Explaining the ambit of the expression, 'as if it had been committed, at any place, within India, at which he may be found', which occurs in Section 188, the Apex Court, in Om Hemrajani v. State of U.P. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 617 , has held that by use of the expression 'as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found', a legal fiction has been created, whereby an offence committed, outside India, by a citizen of India, would be deemed to be an of fence, committed within the territory of India, at the place, at which the offender may be found, and the place, where the offender is found, shall, by the legal fiction, be treated to be the place of commission of the offence. Section 188 proceeds on the basis that a fugitive from justice may be found anywhere in India. The finding of the accused has to be by the Court, where the accused appears. The victim of an offence, which was committed outside India, is not expected to find out the offender in India. The Legislature has, therefore, not considered it necessary that the victim, in such a case, must, first, ascertain as to where the accused is, or may be, found and, then, approach the Court. It is the convenience of such a victim, which Section 188 takes into a account. See Om Hemrajani v. State of U.P. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 617 . 89. Some of the judicial pronouncements, which have helped in shaping the law making it possible to try an offender in India, for an offence committed outside India, may be taken note of. 90. See Om Hemrajani v. State of U.P. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 617 . 89. Some of the judicial pronouncements, which have helped in shaping the law making it possible to try an offender in India, for an offence committed outside India, may be taken note of. 90. In R. v. Benito Lopez reported in (1843-60) All ER REP 1029 : 169 ER 1105, the House of Lords, while dealing with the jurisdiction of English Court's in respect of an offence committed on the high seas by foreigners on board English ships, held that if any person, being a British subject, charged with having committed any crime or offence on board any British ship on the high seas, in any foreign port or harbour, or if any person, not being a British subject, charged with having committed any crime or offence on board any British ship on the high seas, is found within the jurisdiction of any Court of justice in Her Magesty's dominion, which would have cognizance of such crime or offence if committed within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction, such Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try the case as if such crime or offence had been committed within such limits. 91. In Benito Lopez, (supra), it was also held that the word, 'found' is used in most extensive sense and was intended to include all cases by giving jurisdiction to try an offender, at any place, where the prisoner might happen to be at the time of trial. Turning down the contention that if the prisoner was brought within the jurisdiction of the Court against his will, he cannot be said to have been found, Lord Campbell, Chief Justice, held that a man is found within the meaning of the Act, in question, at any place, where he is actually present. 92. In Empress v. Maganlal reported in ILR (1882) Bom 622, it was held that the word 'found' is aimed at conferring jurisdiction on the Court of a place, where the accused is actually found i.e., the Court, where the accused is produced and not where he had been discovered. In other words, the word 'found' would imply the Court, where the accused is actually produced or appears. 93. In other words, the word 'found' would imply the Court, where the accused is actually produced or appears. 93. In Employer v. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar reported in ILR (1911) Bom 225 : 12 Crl J. 356, the contention of the defence was that the accused, who stood charged before a Magistrate, in India, for an offence committed, under the Indian Penal Code, had actually been brought there illegally from a foreign country and, hence, the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to try the offender in such a case. This contention was turned down. The Court, in Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (supra), held, "if he were brought here for trial, it would not be a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court that he had escaped from justice, and that by some illegal means he had been brought back." 94. What Justice Vivian Bose observed, in Sahebrao Bajirao v. Suryabhan Ziblaji, AIR 1948 Nag 251, is acknowledged to have helped immensely in shaping the interpretation of the word, 'found' which appears in Section 188 of the Code. The question, raised in Sahebrao Bajirao (supra), was to who is responsible to do the finding, Bose, J., held that the word 'found', in Section 188, means found by the Court at the time, when the matter comes up for trial, that is to say, any Court, which is, otherwise, competent to try the offence, can assume jurisdiction the moment the accused appears or is produced before him. How the accused comes to appear or how he was produced before the Court is immaterial inasmuch as it is of no significance as to whether the accused comes to the Court voluntarily or in answer to summons or under legal arrest. It is enough that the Court finds the accused person, when the Court comes to take up the case. 95. A victim, according to what the Apex Court has laid down, in Om Hemrajani (supra), may come to India and approach any Court, convenient to him, and file complaint in respect of an offence, committed outside India, by an Indian citizen. It is not necessary for the victim to state, in the complaint, the place, where the accused may be found. It is enough if the complaint says that such an accused may be found in India. It is not necessary for the victim to state, in the complaint, the place, where the accused may be found. It is enough if the complaint says that such an accused may be found in India. The Court, where the accused appears voluntarily pursuant to the issuance of process, or is brought before the Court, though involuntarily, in execution of warrants, would be, within the meaning of Section 188, the competent Court for trial of such an accused inasmuch as it is this Court, which would be, within the meaning of Section 188, said to have found the accused before him, when the accused appears there. Section 188, in fact, deems that the offence, which has been committed outside India by an Indian citizen, has been committed within the jurisdiction of that Court in India, where the accused may be found. Irrespective of the fact as to whether the appearance of the accused, in a Court, is voluntary or in execution of warrants, it is that Court, in India, where the accused has appeared, which would be treated, by legal fiction, as the place, where the accused shall be treated to have been found on account of the fact that the accused has appeared in the Court. The relevant observations, made in this regard, in Om Hemrajani (supra), read as under: 9. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the expression abovenoted in Section188 is to be construed. The same expression was also there in the old Code. From the scheme of Chapter XIII of the Code, it is clear that neither the place of business nor place of residence of the petitioner and for that mater of even the complainant is of any relevance. The relevant factor is the place of commission of offence. By legal fiction, Section 188 which deals with offence committed outside India, makes the place at which the offender may be found, to be a place of commission of offence. Section 188 proceeds on the basis that a fugitive from justice may be found anywhere in India. The finding of the accused has to be by the Court where the accused appears. From the plain and clear language of the section, it is relevant that the finding of the accused cannot be by the complainant or the police. Section 188 proceeds on the basis that a fugitive from justice may be found anywhere in India. The finding of the accused has to be by the Court where the accused appears. From the plain and clear language of the section, it is relevant that the finding of the accused cannot be by the complainant or the police. Further, it is not expected that a victim of an offence which was committed outside India should come to India and first try to ascertain where the accused is or may be and then approach that Court. The convenience of such a victim is of importance. That has been kept in view by Section 188 of the Code. A victim may come to India and approach any Court convenient to him and file complaint in respect of offence committed abroad by an Indian. The convenience of a person who is hiding after committing offence abroad and is a fugitive from justice is not relevant. It is in this context, the expression in question has to be interpreted. Section 188 has been the subject-matter of interpretation for about 150 years. x x x x x x 15. In our opinion, the law has been correctly enunciated in the aforesaid case. The scheme underlying Section 188 is to dispel any objection or plea of want of jurisdiction at the behest of a fugitive who has committed an offence in any other country. If such a person is found anywhere in India, the offence can be inquired into and tried by any Court that may be approached by the victim. The victim who has suffered at the hands of the accused on a foreign land can complain about the offence to a Court, otherwise competent, which he may find convenient. The convenience is of the victim and not that of the accused. It is not the requirement of Section 188 that the victim shall state in the complaint as to which place the accused may be found. It is enough to allege that the accused may be found in India. The Court where the complaint may be filed and the accused either appears voluntarily pursuant to issue of process or is brought before it involuntarily in execution of warrants, would be the competent Court within the meaning of Section 188 of the Code as that Court would find the accused before him when he appears. The Court where the complaint may be filed and the accused either appears voluntarily pursuant to issue of process or is brought before it involuntarily in execution of warrants, would be the competent Court within the meaning of Section 188 of the Code as that Court would find the accused before him when he appears. The finding has to be by the Court. It has neither to be by the complainant nor by the police. The section deems the offence to be committed within the jurisdiction of the Court where the accused may be found. 96. From the above observations, made in Om Hemrajani (supra), it becomes clear that the venue of trial of an Indian citizen, who commits an offence outside the territory of India, or the venue of trial of a person, who may not be Indian citizen, but who commits an offence at any place, on any ship or aircraft, which is registered in India, would be that place, in India, where he may be found. In each a case, an offender would be deemed to have been found in the Court, where the offender either voluntarily appears or, on being arrested, is brought for trial or otherwise. 97. The question No. (iii) stands answered accordingly. 98. Bearing in mind the position of law that (i) a police officer has the power, under Section 156(1), to 'investigate' a 'cognizable offence' without any specific order passed, in this regard, by the Magistrate, who has the jurisdiction to enquire into or try a person, who may have committed an offence within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the police station concerned, the fact that (ii) even the Magistrate concerned can direct such an 'investigation' in exercise of his powers under Section 156(3) before, of course, he takes cognizance and also the fact that (iii) an 'investigation', conducted by a police officer under Section 156(1), or an investigation, directed by a Magistrate under Section 156(3), are distinct from, and independent of, the investigation, which may be conducted pursuant to a direction given by a Magistrate under Section 202(1), let me, now, determine if Section 188 of the Code bars an investigation by police, in India, in respect of an offence, which is committed outside India, unless previous sanction has, in this regard, been obtained from the Central Government. 99. 99. The question, posed above, can be answered more effectively if this question is considered with incidental question Nos. (f) and (g). 100. Let me, therefore, deal with the two incidental questions namely, question Nos. (f) and (g), which read as under: (f) If, in a given case, taking of 'cognizance' of an offence by Magistrate is barred, will such bar also apply to the Magistrate's power to hold enquiry under Section 202 of the Code? (g) Whether a bar in taking 'cognizance' of a 'cognizable offence' by a Magistrate, under Section 190 of the Code, will also bar the Magistrate for directing 'investigation' by invoking his jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and will such bar, in taking 'cognizance' of a 'cognizable offence' by a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code, operate against even the police prohibiting them from conducting an 'investigation' into a 'cognizable offence', which a police officer is, otherwise, competent to conduct, by virtue of his powers under Section 156(1) of the Code? 101. However, while considering the questions posed above, it is of paramount importance to note that the substantive provisions, with regard to trial of a person, who commits an offence outside the territory of India exist in Sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal Code, but the procedural provisions have been incorporated in Section 188 of the Code. 102. I have already pointed out above at the preceding paragraphs that Sub-section (1) of Section156 speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of the Officer-in-Charge of a police station to investigate an offence, which is 'cognizable' and which has been committed within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, who has the power to inquire into or try such a 'cognizable case' in the local area of the police station concerned. As a corollary, it follows that a police officer does not have the jurisdiction to investigate even a 'cognizable offence' if the offence has been committed outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate, who has the power to enquire into or try a case, which arises within the limits of the local area of the police station concerned. I have also pointed out that Sub-section (3) of Section 156 authorises a Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of an offence under Section 190, to order an 'investigation' as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 156. I have also pointed out that Sub-section (3) of Section 156 authorises a Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of an offence under Section 190, to order an 'investigation' as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 156. It clear follows that Section 156(3) authorizes a Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of an offence under Section 190, to order an 'investigation', which a police officer is, otherwise also, competent, by virtue of Section 156(1), to 'investigate'. 103. A doubt has been expressed if Section 156 speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of a Magistrate or of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to inquire into or try a case. In order to correctly appreciate this controversy, it is necessary to point out that when an inquiry, under the scheme of the Code, is barred without previous sanction having been granted by a competent authority, it does not necessarily, in the absence of any express or implied provision, bar the police from conducting investigation into such an offence, which a Magistrate is barred from taking cognizance of. This inference can be well illustrated by a reference to Section 197 of the Code. It may, in this regard, be noted that Section 197 of the Code bars a Court from taking cognizance of an offence, when there is no previous sanction granted by the competent authority if the person, sought to be proceeded against, is of a specified class or category, as mentioned in Section 197, and if such a person is alleged to have committed an offence, while acting, or purporting to act, in the discharge of his official duty. 104. Thus, when a Magistrate is debarred, by Section 197, from taking cognizance of an offence allegedly committed by a public servant, while acting or purporting to act, in the discharge of his official duty, can a Magistrate, in such a case, hold inquiry under Section 202 of the Code? In this regard, it needs to be noted that the stage of an inquiry, under Section 202, as already discussed above, cannot be reached unless 'cognizance' has been taken and, unless, having taken the 'cognizance', the Magistrate examines the complainant and his witnesses, if any, present. Thus, the 'enquiry', envisaged by Section 200, is held at the 'post-cognizance' stage and not 'pre-cognizance' stage. 105. Thus, the 'enquiry', envisaged by Section 200, is held at the 'post-cognizance' stage and not 'pre-cognizance' stage. 105. Hence, when a complaint lodges a complaint before a Magistrate against a public servant (who falls in the category of those public servants, who are protected under Section 197), alleging that the public servant has committed an offence and the Magistrate finds that the public servant concerned is accused to have committed the offence, while acting or purporting to act, in the discharge of his official duty, and that no sanction of the Government concerned has been obtained, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of such an offence. If the Magistrate does not take cognizance, or cannot take cognizance, of the offence, because of the bar placed on his power to take cognizance, he cannot examine the complainant, for, examination of a complainant, under Section 200, is not possible without taking cognizance of the offence(s), which the complaint discloses. The stage of enquiry, envisaged under Section 202, is reached after the complainant and his witness(s), if any, present, are examined and the substance of their examination is reduced into writing. Consequently, when 'cognizance' is not taken, examination of the complainant, under Section 200, is not possible and when examination, under Section 200, is not permissible, holding of 'enquiry', under Section202,will also not be permissible and, if holding of 'enquiry', under Section 202, is not permissible, then, no 'investigation' can be directed by such a Magistrate, in exercise of his powers under Section202, for the purpose of enabling him to decide as to whether he should or should not proceed further with the complaint. 106. In effect, thus, when taking of cognizance, in a given case, is barred, neither enquiry, under Section 202, is possible nor is it possible for the Magistrate to direct 'investigation' by invoking his jurisdiction under Section 202. 107. The question, which, now, arises, is this; When a Magistrate cannot, in a given case, take cognizance of an offence because of the embargo placed on his power under Section 197 of the Code, can he direct 'investigation', in respect of such an offence, by taking resort to his powers under Section 156(3)? It is of immense importance to note, in this regard, that the direction for 'investigation', under Section 156(3), is given before cognizance is taken. It is of immense importance to note, in this regard, that the direction for 'investigation', under Section 156(3), is given before cognizance is taken. Obviously, therefore, even when, in a given case, a Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance of an offence, without previous sanction having been granted by a competent authority, there is no bar for the Magistrate to direct, by invoking his jurisdiction under Section 156(3), an 'investigation' by police into such an offence, particularly, when the offence is cognizable. Necessarily, therefore, it must be held that in respect of an offence, which is cognizable, but which a Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance of, unless there is appropriate sanction from competent authority, the police can, indeed/investigate, in terms of Section 156(1), such a case and if, on the basis of such investigation, the police finds materials to sustain the accusation, it may submit its report, under Section 173(2) of the Code, to the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot, however, take cognizance of the offence, which such a police report may disclose, unless previous sanction, as may be required by a statute, has been obtained. The police has to, therefore, obtain before submitting, under Section 173(2), 'police report' requisite sanction from the competent authority. Similarly, if a complainant wants a Magistrate to take cognizance of such an offence, which requires previous sanction, it is the duty of the complainant to obtain requisite sanction so as to enable the Magistrate take cognizance of the offence and to hold, if required, enquiry, under Section 202, in order to enable the Magistrate make up his mind if there are sufficient grounds for proceeding further or for issuing process to the accused. 108. What surfaces from the above discussion is that the bar, which a statue imposes on the Magistrate's power to take cognizance of an offence, does not automatically extend and/or apply to the power, which the Magistrate has, under Section 156(3), as regards directing 'investigation' nor does the embargo, placed on the Magistrate's power to take cognizance, debar a police officer from conducting 'investigation' by virtue of the powers vested in him under Section 156(1). 109. The question Nos. (f) and (g) shall stand answered accordingly. 110. 109. The question Nos. (f) and (g) shall stand answered accordingly. 110. In the backdrop of the position of law, as indicated above, it is abundantly clear that notwithstanding the fact that even when a Magistrate is debarred for taking cognizance of an offence without previous sanction having been granted, in this regard, however, the Magistrate can, in a given case, direct 'investigation' into such an offence, at the 'pre-cognizance' stage, by invoking his powers under Section 156(3) and that even a police officer can, in such a case, conduct 'investigation', in exercise of his powers under Section 156(1), if the offence is one, which is cognizable. 111. Let me, now, turn to the remaining three questions, namely: (iv) Whether the police, in India, can investigate into a cognizable offence, which was committed, in its entirety, outside India, without having received previous sanction, in this regard, from the Central Government? (v) Whether such sanction for investigation by the police will be necessary even when a cognizable offence was committed partly in India and partly outside India? (vi) Whether the limitations, which the proviso to Section 188 of the Code imposes on a Court, debarring it from enquiring into or trying, without previous sanction of the Central Government, a person, in India, for an offence committed by him outside India, would also apply to an investigation, which a police officer is, otherwise, entitled, on the basis of a First Information Report, to conduct into a 'cognizable offence' as defined under the Code? 112. Viewed from the angle of how the incidental question Nos. (f) and (g) stand answered above, it becomes clear that the mere fact that the proviso to Section 188 prohibits a Magistrate from holding any enquiry or trial in respect of an offence, which has been committed outside India, without previous sanction of the Central Government, such a bar, imposed on the Magistrate's power, will not, in the absence of anything, express or implied, take away the power of the police, under Section156(1), to investigate a case, which is cognizable and committed outside India, nor will it debar a Magistrate from directing 'investigation' into such a case by invoking his jurisdiction under Section156(3). 113. 113. Coupled with the above, it is also of immense importance to note that a careful survey of the various provisions, contained in the Code, makes it clear that whenever the legislature intended to include, within a given provision, various aspects of a case, namely, investigation, enquiry, and trial, it has expressed its intentions unequivocally and in clear terms. A reference may, in this regard, be made to the provisions contained in Section 4 as well as Section 91 of the Code. Section 4 reads as under: 4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.-(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 18609) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. 114. A patient reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Code shows that the Legislature, while laying down as to how the offences under the Indian Penal Code and also under other law, shall be dealt with, used the words, 'investigation', 'inquiry' and 'trial'. This shows that when the Legislature felt it necessary that the provisions of the Code shall apply to all aspects of the trial of an offence, be it under the Indian Penal Code or other laws, it comprehensively used all the requisite expressions, such as, 'investigation', 'inquiry' and 'trial'. 115. Another instance, when the legislature has comprehensively dealt with all aspects of a criminal case, is Section 91 of the Code, which relates to issuance of summons to produce documents or other things. The legislature, while conferring, on the Court, the power to issue summons to produce documents, has not only used all the three words, namely, 'investigation', 'inquiry' 'into' and 'trial', but also 'other proceedings' under the Code. For the purpose of correct appreciation, Sub-section (1) of Section 91 is quoted hereinbelow: 91. The legislature, while conferring, on the Court, the power to issue summons to produce documents, has not only used all the three words, namely, 'investigation', 'inquiry' 'into' and 'trial', but also 'other proceedings' under the Code. For the purpose of correct appreciation, Sub-section (1) of Section 91 is quoted hereinbelow: 91. Summons to produce document or other thing.-(1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order. 116. Thus, a dispassionate analysis of the provisions, contained in Sections 4 and 91, leaves no room for doubt that whenever the legislature intended to use the three words, i.e., 'investigation', 'inquiry' 'into' and 'trial', the legislature has clearly and unambiguously used the said three words. Had, therefore, the legislature intended to place embargo on the powers of the police to 'investigate' a 'cognizable offence', which has been committed outside the territory of India, nothing could have stopped the legislature from making its intentions clear by using the word 'investigate' or 'investigation' in the proviso to Section 188. 117. I have already pointed out above that the heading of Chapter XII of the Code, which covers Sections 154 to 176, reads, "Information to the Police and their Powers to Investigate"; whereas the heading of Chapter XIII, which covers Sections 177 to 189, reads, "Jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in Inquiries and Trials". Thus, while Chapter XII deals with the information to the police and their power to 'investigate', Chapter XIII deals with the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts to hold 'inquiries' and 'trials'. Hence, it becomes abundantly clear that the provisions, contained in Chapter XII, and those, contained in Chapter XIII, serve two distinct and different purposes, for, the powers contained in Chapter XII cannot be exported to Chapter XIII, nor can the limitations, contained in Chapter XIII, be imported into the provisions of Chapter XII. 118. Mr. Hence, it becomes abundantly clear that the provisions, contained in Chapter XII, and those, contained in Chapter XIII, serve two distinct and different purposes, for, the powers contained in Chapter XII cannot be exported to Chapter XIII, nor can the limitations, contained in Chapter XIII, be imported into the provisions of Chapter XII. 118. Mr. Baruah, learned Counsel for the opposite party, is correct, when he submits that the legislature, in order to give clear and unambiguous meaning to Section 188, have clearly left out 'investigation', under Chapter XII, from the scope of the proviso to Section 188, and, in consequence thereof, the necessity of obtaining previous sanction of the Central Government, in the case of 'investigation', under Section 156 must be held to have been dispensed with if and when a victim informs the Officer-in-Charge of a police station, in India, about a 'cognizable offence' having been committed by a Indian citizen outside the territory of India. The legislature, having not specifically included the word, 'investigation', in the proviso to Section 188, have made it clear that in respect of, at least, 'cognizable offences', committed outside India by an Indian citizen, the proviso to Section188 shall not be applicable as far as 'investigation', under Section 156, is concerned. 119. As already indicated above, whenever the legislature deemed it fit, it included, as indicated above, by Sections 4 and 91, all the three words, namely, 'investigation', 'inquiry' and 'trial'. Consequently, the non-inclusion of the word 'investigation', in the proviso to Section 188, makes it abundantly clear that in respect of an offence, which is being 'investigated' under Chapter XII of the Code, the proviso to Section 188 would have no application. The principle is well settled that a Court cannot read anything to be statutory provision, which is plain and unambiguous, and that the language, employed in a statute, is determinative of the legislative intent. The primary rule is that the intention of the legislature must be inferred from the words used by the legislature itself. The observations of the Constitution Bench, in Padma Sudara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533 , are of great relevance, in this context, and are, therefore, quoted hereinbelow: 12. The rival pleas regarding rewriting of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. The observations of the Constitution Bench, in Padma Sudara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533 , are of great relevance, in this context, and are, therefore, quoted hereinbelow: 12. The rival pleas regarding rewriting of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well-settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statues should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid", Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage. The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama. 13. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr., it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only Clause (i) and/or Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction- one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statue as a whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artimiou v. Procopiou (at All ER p. 544-I), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result", we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC, where at AC p. 577 he also observed : All ER p. 664-I "This is not a new problem, though, our standard of drafting is such that is rarely emerges. 120. Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC, where at AC p. 577 he also observed : All ER p. 664-I "This is not a new problem, though, our standard of drafting is such that is rarely emerges. 120. It is also worth noticing that the proviso to Section 188 uses the words 'notwithstanding anything in any of the prescribing Sections of this Chapter' meaning thereby that the said proviso shall not be applicable to any other provisions contained in the rest of the Chapters of the Code. It further goes to show that the proviso is not applicable to the provisions contained in Chapter XII or any other Chapters of the Code save and except Chapter XIII, which only relates to jurisdiction of Criminal Courts in 'inquiries' and 'trials'. It is also important to note that Section 188 does not start with the non-obstante clause and it is only the proviso, which starts with a non-obstante clause, and this non-obstante clause limits itself to the provisions embodied in Chapter XIII only and not more. 121. A microscopic reading of the provisions contained in Section 188 shows that the legislature, in the body of Section 188, used the words 'he may be dealt with in respect of such offence'. The expression, 'dealt with' clearly shows that the legislature permits a person, who is accused of having committed offence as contemplated under Section 188, to be dealt with in such a manner as may be permissible in law. Hence, the expression 'dealt with' would include not only 'inquiry' and 'trial', but also 'investigation'. In fact, this proposition has not been disputed. However, while enacting the proviso to Section 188, the legislature has used the expression 'inquiry' or 'trial'. Had the legislature intended 'investigation' to be included within the proviso, nothing could have stopped the legislature from mentioning the word 'investigation' too in the said proviso. To put it a little differently, when the legislature allows an accused to be 'dealt with' in the manner as may be permissible in law and stops, at the same time, Courts from holding any 'inquiry or trial' except with the provisions sanction of the Central Government, the legislature must be inferred by implication, to have left 'investigation' outside the ambit of the proviso to Section 188. 122. 122. I may, at this stage, pause here and refer to the case of Delhi Administration v. Ram Singh, AIR 1962 SC 63 , wherein the language, used in Section 3 of the enactment, in question, read, 'there shall be, for each area to be specified by the State Government, a special police officer appointed by or on behalf of that Government for dealing with offences under the Act in that area.' It was suggested before the Supreme Court that the expression 'dealing with the offences' would mean something, which will not include 'investigation' 'inquiry or trial'. Turning down this contention, the Supreme Court observed, in Ram Singh (supra), that the expression 'dealt with' is all comprehensive and that 'investigation', 'inquiry' or 'trial' were some aspects of 'dealing with the offences'. Thus, the decision, in Ram Singh (supra), clearly shows that when the legislature used the word 'deal with' in respect of an offence, it, ordinarily, and in the absence of anything showing to the contrary, would include not only 'investigation', 'inquiry' or 'trial', but even other steps, which may be taken by an investigating agency, such as, 'arrest'. 123. It is impossible to infer that in Section 188, the legislature used the word 'dealt with' by restricting its meeting to something other than 'investigation', inquiry' or 'trial'. Thus, the expression, 'dealt with', occurring in Section 188, cannot, but be held to include 'investigation' too, besides 'injury' or 'trial'. In respect of offences committed outside India previous sanction of the Central Government is, therefore, not required so far as the 'investigation' under Section 188 is concerned. 124. In fact, in Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India reported in AIR (1993) 3 SCC 609 , K. Ramaswamy, J., observed that, even under the proviso to Section 188, sanction is not a condition precedent to take cognizance of the offences and, if need be, sanction can be obtained before trial begins. A Division Bench, in Muhammed v. State of Kerala reported in 1994 (1) KLT 464 , speaking through M. Jagannadha Rao (Chief Justice), concluded, in no uncertain words, that for the purpose of investigation into an offence committed abroad, sanction of the Central Government is not necessary. A Division Bench, in Muhammed v. State of Kerala reported in 1994 (1) KLT 464 , speaking through M. Jagannadha Rao (Chief Justice), concluded, in no uncertain words, that for the purpose of investigation into an offence committed abroad, sanction of the Central Government is not necessary. In fact, the Division Bench, in Muhammed (supra), expressed its agreement with the decision reached by KT Thomas, J, in Remia v. Sub-Inspector of Police, Tanur reported in 1993 Cri LJ 1098 (Ker), wherein the Court had held that Kerala police can conduct 'investigation' into offences committed abroad and no sanction of Central Government is necessary for the said purpose. 125. Mr. Phukan places reliance on Samarudeen v. Assistant Director Enforcement, Trivandrum and Ors. reported in 1995 Cri LJ 2825 (Ker), wherein a learned single Judge of Kerala High Court has expressed his disagreement not only with the decision in Remia, (supra), but also with that of its Division Bench, in Mohammed's case (supra). In fact, the learned single Judge, in Samarudeen, (supra), observed thus: 14. With utmost respect of the Judges of the Division Bench the conclusion arrived at is based upon a cursory examination of only a few provisions of the Cr PC, and overlooking the provisions of Cr PC in Chapter 12 and the definition of 'local jurisdiction' in Section 2(j) and 'investigation' in Section 2(h) Cr PC. It should also be remembered that the Criminal Procedure Code contains several sections which provide for the Court 'dealing with' people for various types of actions. It does not mean that the pre-enquiry stage necessarily means investigation. The Court failed to see that section does not have overriding effect over the provision of Chapter 12. In spite of the Court's attention being specifically drawn to the fact that Section 188 is not cover investigation envisaged in Section 2(h) Court did not into Chapter 12 which alone...with investigation. With utmost respect to the learned Judges the interpretation of law that the main part Section 188 does not require sanction of the Central Government and only for the purpose of inquiry and trial mentioned in the proviso, the previous sanction of the Central Government is required is an enormous view, ignoring several vital provision of the Cr PC. 126. With utmost respect to the learned Judges the interpretation of law that the main part Section 188 does not require sanction of the Central Government and only for the purpose of inquiry and trial mentioned in the proviso, the previous sanction of the Central Government is required is an enormous view, ignoring several vital provision of the Cr PC. 126. With utmost respect and humility, I must point out that the decision, in Samarudeen (supra), not only run contrary to the decision in Muhemmed's case (supra), which had approved the decision in Remia's case (supra), but also run contrary to the concept of judicial discipline. The least that the learned single Judge could have done was to refer the matter to a Bench of appropriate strength for determination of the controversy instead of brushing aside its own Division Bench decision, in Muhammed's case (supra), by branding the decision as erroneous and in ignorance of the vital provisions of the Code. 127. Coupled with the above, the learned single Judge, in Samarudeen (supra), has not taken into account the fact that the 'investigation', which the Code envisages are of two kinds, namely, 'investigation' at the pre-cognizance stage' and 'investigation' at the 'post-cognizance stage'. While 'investigation', at the post-cognizance stage, can be held to be barred without previous sanction of the Central Government under the proviso to Section 188, 'investigation', at the pre-cognizance stage', is not possible to be treated as barred under the proviso to Section 188. 128. Mr. Phukan also places reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court rendered on 26.4.2007, in CRP No. 28/2003 Smt. Bitihika Dasgupta v. The State of West Bengal and Anr. The decision in Smt. Bithika Dasgupta (supra), as correctly contended by Mr. Baruah, does not lay down any law, inasmuch as the learned Court held that the law as regards Section 188, was yet to be settled. The learned Court did not settle the law, and, without setting the law, examined the facts of the case and came to the conclusion that Section 188 could operate as bar to the 'investigation' of the case, which had been launched against the petitioner, Smt. Bithika Dasgupta. The learned Court did not settle the law, and, without setting the law, examined the facts of the case and came to the conclusion that Section 188 could operate as bar to the 'investigation' of the case, which had been launched against the petitioner, Smt. Bithika Dasgupta. With great respect, I must point out that without settling, as a proposition of law as to whether 'investigation' is barred under the proviso to Section 188, it is not possible to hold, in any case, that previous sanction is or is not required for the purpose of conducting 'investigation' under Section 156. The relevant observations, made in the decision, in Smt. Bithika Dasgupta, (supra), read as under: The principle of law on Section 188 of the Code as it appears from the aforesaid reported decisions reveal clearly that judicial opinion has not yet been settled. In some of the decisions the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts have observed that without prior sanction of the Central Government the investigation and trial cannot proceed but, on the other hand the other decisions indicate that sanction under Section 188 of the Code is not necessary. When the principle of law is not yet well settled in this respect, I think it fruitful to enter into factual matrix disclosed to the FIR and the materials collected during investigation in the meantime, which would indicate whether Section 188 of the Code would operate as a bar in this case for proceeding with the investigation against the petitioner. 129. I may, now, turn to the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (1996) 9 SCC 735 , wherein the Supreme Court has observed that in order to enable the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short, 'the CBF), which is constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1973, to investigate an offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, previous sanction from the Central Government is necessary. How this observation has come to be made, what is the effect of this observation and whether this observation applies to investigation by police under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of offences under the Indian Penal Code are the questions, which, now, need to be addressed. 130. The facts of the case, in Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 130. The facts of the case, in Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (1996) 9 SCC 735 , thus: (a) The Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, made an application under Section 155(2), Cr PC, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offenses), Jaipur, Rajasthan, for grant of permission to investigate a case under Section 25 of read with Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (in short, 'the FERA') against the respondent, who was an Indian national and a resident in India. It was alleged that the violation of FERA had been committed in a foreign country i.e. U.K. The Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed the said application on the ground, inter alia, that no notification could be produced before him, which had empowered the CBI under Sections 4 and 5 of FERA to cause investigation in respect of the offences under FERA. The order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was affirmed by the High Court. (b) In the appeal filed on behalf of the CBI, the question before the Supreme Court was whether or not a member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, (in short, 'DSPE'), which is also a special police force constituted by the Central Government, under Section 3 and Section 5 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (in short, 'DSPE Act') can, investigate offences, under FERA, in a given State, other than the Union Territory, without the consent of such State Government; more so, when the offence is alleged to have been committed outside Indian Territory. (c) Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed, inter alia, thus : A combined reading of Sections 3,4 and 5 of the FERA shows that the officers of the Enforcement Directorate are the ones, who, as mentioned in Sections3 and 4 of the FERA, have been, primarily, empowered to exercise the powers conferred on such officers of the Enforcement Directorate and since it may, in some cases, become necessary to confer powers, and impose duties, under FERA, no persons, outside the Enforcement Directorate, the legislator has, under Section 5 of FERA, provided that the Central Government may authorize any offer of Customs or Central Excise, or any police officer or any officer of Central Government or State Government, to exercise the powers and discharge the duties, which an officer of the Directorate of Enforcement can, under FERA, exercise and discharge. On the other hand, the members of Delhi Special Police Establishment (in short, 'DSPE') are the members of the police force, constituted, under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (in short, 'DSPE Act'), by the Central Government. Under the scheme of the DSPE Act, a member of the DSPE can exercise power of investigation in respect of only such offence(s) as may be mentioned in Section 3 of the DSPE Act. This apart, such power of investigation can be exercised only within the limits of Union Territory. In respect of offences, which may be committed, and required to be investigated, outside Union Territory, a member of the DSPE would require a notification, under Section 5 of the DSPE Act, to be issued by the Central Government, empowering or authorizing him to make investigation in respect of even those offences, which a member of the DSPE, under Section 3 of the DSPE Act, is competent to investigate. In other words, a member of the DSPE can exercise power, beyond Union Territory, only when there is a notification issued, under Section 5 of the DSPE Act, by the Central Government. Such a notification, permitting a member of the DSPE to investigate a case outside the Union Territory, i.e., within the limits of another State, cannot be issued except with the consent of the State Government concerned. In other words, without the consent of the State Government concerned, a member of the DSPE cannot investigate a case in such a State even if the offence is one, which has been specified in Section 3and in respect whereof, a member of the DSPE is, otherwise, competent to conduct investigation. Though, by a general notification, the members of the DSPE may be authorized to exercise the powers of investigation, in respect of certain offences, in areas outside the Union Territory, the fact remains that it is only the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, who are closed with the power to enforce the provisions of FERA. By virtue of Section 5, the Central Government is competent to authorize even a police officer to investigate into an offence under the FERA. 131. By virtue of Section 5, the Central Government is competent to authorize even a police officer to investigate into an offence under the FERA. 131. However, since there was no notification, issued under the FERA, authorizing the members of the DSPE to discharge the duties and functions of an officer of Enforcement Directorate, constituted under the FERA, the Supreme Court concluded, in Central Bureau of Investigation, (supra), that the notifications, issued under Sections 3 and 5 of the DSPE Act, would not clothe a member of the DSPE with the power to conduct investigation into offences under the FERA. 132. The Apex Court also held, in Central Bureau of Investigation, (supra), that FERA is a special legislation, a self-contained Code making comprehensive and elaborate provisions as regard investigation, enquiry and trial of offences committed under the FERA and Section 5 of the Code of the Criminal Proceeding is not applicable in respect of such offences. 133. Taking into consideration the fact that the FIR, in the case of the Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), related to offences under the FERA, which were committed outside the territory of India, and also considering the fact that a member of the DSPE cannot investigate even the listed offences, under Section 3 of the DSPE Act, unless authorized by the Central Government, with the consent of the State Government concerned, as discussed hereinabove, the Supreme Court concluded that the question of investigation by the members of the DSPE, under Section 5, does not arise at all. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that an investigation by a member of the DSPE is possible only if an authority is issued, in this regard, under the FERA. The Supreme Court further pointed out that even under Section 188, Cr PC, investigation of an offenee, committed outside India, may be made only with the permission of the Central Government. These observations are to be read in the context of the powers and functions of the members of the DSPE. A member of the DSPE cannot investigate any offence committed outside the Union Territory unless authorized by the Central Government; hence, for the members of the DSPE, sanction to conduct investigation, in respect of an offence committed outside Indian territory, is necessary. The decision, in Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), cannot be extended to a member of the police force of her than the DSPE. The decision, in Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), cannot be extended to a member of the police force of her than the DSPE. This apart, Section 56(6) of the FERA makes it more than abundantly clear that the proviso to Section188 Cr PC will not apply to any offence punishable under Section 56. In other words, for offences, which are punishable under Section 56 of the FERA, no sanction for holding enquiry or trial, in terms of the provisions of Section 188, is necessary. This, in turn, shows that the proviso to Section 188does not come into play as far as offences, under the FERA, are concerned. Hence, the observations, made in Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), with regard the provisions of Section 188, may be read only in respect of the members of the DSPE and not the members of the ordinary police force. 134. As a member of DSPE cannot conduct investigation outside Union territory without authority granted under Section 5 of the DSPE Act, it is clearly follows that the member of DSPE may not, in a given case, be entitled to conduct investigation in respect of offence, which is committed outside India if the First Information Report is lodged, in a given case, outside the union territory. Hence, in such cases, apart from the authority, which the Central Government has to grant under Section 5 of the DSPE Act, a member of DSPE would require sanction, under Section 188, for investigating an offence committed outside India. 135. There is yet another aspect of the law relating to Section 188. In respect of an offence, committed by an Indian citizen, outside the Indian Territory, procuring presence of the accused, in India, for the purpose of his trial, may become necessary and, in such a case, the accused may have to be brought to India from another country. In such circumstances, the question of extradition of such an accused person may also arise. Hence, the Central Government has been given, under Section 188, a say, before it helps in obtaining the presence of an accused, if the accused, whose presence is demanded by a Court, is found to be outside India. In such circumstances, the question of extradition of such an accused person may also arise. Hence, the Central Government has been given, under Section 188, a say, before it helps in obtaining the presence of an accused, if the accused, whose presence is demanded by a Court, is found to be outside India. In order to obviate any complication in such a case, it was, perhaps, deemed necessary that the Central Government have a say before a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, records statement of the complainant and his witnesses and/or hold enquiry under Section 202 and/or issue process against the accused for the purpose of his trial. It is for this reason that a Magistrate is not allowed to hold enquiry, and when he is not allowed to hold enquiry, the question of issuing process does not arise, particularly, when the trial of such an accused is also, without sanction from the Central Government, prohibited under the proviso to Section 188. If a trial has to be held on the basis of a 'police report' submitted under Section173(2), it too would, in the face of the proviso to Section 188, require sanction from the Central Government. Hence, the police shall have to obtain sanction before it submits report, under Section173(2), requesting a Court to take cognizance of the offence, as may be disclosed by such a report. 136. What finally emerges from the above discussion is, in brief, thus: (i) Sanction under the proviso to Section 188 of the Code and sanction, as referred to in Chapter XIV (Sections 195 to 199) of the Code, operate in two different areas and serve two different objectives. (ii) A careful reading of the opening words of Section 190, which relates to taking of 'cognizance' of offences, shows that Section 190 opens with the words, and reads, "Subject to the provisions of, this Chapter", any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence. The taking of cognizance by the Magistrate is, however, dependant on the conditions, mentioned in Sections 195 to 199, which pertain to prosecution sanction and that is why, the heading of Chapter XIV reads thus : "CONDITIONS REQUISITE FOR INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS". The taking of cognizance by the Magistrate is, however, dependant on the conditions, mentioned in Sections 195 to 199, which pertain to prosecution sanction and that is why, the heading of Chapter XIV reads thus : "CONDITIONS REQUISITE FOR INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS". If the conditions, mentioned in Sections 195 to 199, are not fulfilled (wherever these provisions are applicable), then, the Magistrate cannot take 'cognizance'. When taking of 'cognizance' is barred, further proceeding would obviously be barred and, hence, no trial can be held. Under the proviso to Section 188, the Magistrate cannot 'enquire into', far less try, a case without previous sanction having been granted, in this regard, by the Central Government. Thus, even if, in a given case, an accused is to be tried for an offence committed outside India, a Magistrate may very well order 'investigation', for, in such a case, the Magistrate has neither taken 'cognizance' nor will he be holding 'enquiry' or holding 'trial' of the accused. Consequently, the proviso to Section 188 would not come into play. In short, when a Magistrate orders 'investigation' into an offence committed outside India, proviso to Section 188 of the Code is not violated. 137. The question Nos. (iv), (v) and (vi) shall stand answered accordingly. Whether the First Information Report, in respect of All Women Police Station Case No. 21/2008, can be quashed? 138. Let me, now, determine if the FIR, lodged in the present case, can be quashed. 139. So far as All Women PS Case No. 21/2008, is concerned, the case of informant, who lodged the FIR, is, in brief, thus: The informant, who presently resides at Guwahati, was married to accused Gautam Sharma, on 28.1.2007, at Guwahati. The accused works in Manila, Philippines. The accused as well as his parents are Indian citizens are reside permanently at Guwahati. After their marriage, the informant and her husband stayed at Guwahati and, after about 12 days of their marriage, they went to Manila. On reaching Manila, the informant's husband started telling the informant that she was extremely fat and that he (accused) was actually looking for a wife, who would have been modern and slim. Initially, the information took such words of the accused as mere joke; but, gradually/she realized that the accused was serious. On reaching Manila, the informant's husband started telling the informant that she was extremely fat and that he (accused) was actually looking for a wife, who would have been modern and slim. Initially, the information took such words of the accused as mere joke; but, gradually/she realized that the accused was serious. Though the informant's height is 5 feet 7 inches and she weighted 66 kgs, at the time of marriage, the accused started abusing the informant and also started finding fault on' each and every part of the informant's physique; for example, the accused started telling the informant that her forehead was short, her legs were long, etc. The accused also started embarrassing the informant in presence of his friends and their wives. Left with no choice, the informant continued to bear such humiliation as ill- treatment. Sometime, thereafter, the accused started telling that all his money is being spent in feeding the informant. The accused, then, started refusing to give adequate food to the informant. In the process, the informant lost about 14 kgs since her marriage. The accused also started abusing the members of the informant' family and asked her not too keep any contact with the members of her family. As the informant could not stop himself from contacting her parents, brothers and sisters, who are very dear to her, the accused started assaulting the informant so much so that he had kicked on her stomach, face, back, pulled her hair, dragged her out of the room and slapped her on her face. The accused also asked the informant not to report the happenings, at Manila, to anyone. On 31.10.2007, the accused tortured the informant so much that she started vomiting, but the accused refused to let her see a doctor. Again, on 16.12.2007, the informant was beaten up by the accused and, on that day, while the informant was sleeping, the accused pulled her hair, dragged her out of her home and did not allow her to sleep at night. Consequently, the informant remained standing outside their apartment for whole night. On 28.12.2007, the informant and the accused came to Guwahati from Manila and, on reaching Guwahati, the informant told the parents of the accused about the torture, which was being subjected to. Consequently, the informant remained standing outside their apartment for whole night. On 28.12.2007, the informant and the accused came to Guwahati from Manila and, on reaching Guwahati, the informant told the parents of the accused about the torture, which was being subjected to. The parents of the accused told the informant that they had explained everything to the informant's husband and that the informant's husband would not torture her, in future, provided that the informant refrains from talking to the members of her parental family. On 8.2.2008, there was a religious ceremony of the informant's brother, commonly known a 'upanayan'. The parents of the accused allowed the informant to attend the said ceremony on condition that it would be her last visit to her parents' house and she would not keep contact with them any more. The informant was made to attend the said ceremony as a guest and not as a member of the family of her parents. In fact, the informant was not even allowed to stay for the complete ceremony. This apart, some persenal gifts, given by the parents of the informant, were thrown away by the parents of the accused on the ground that these gifts would bring bad omen to the family of the informant. After returning to Guwahati from Jorhat, the parents of the accused, on 15.2.2008, took the informant to Manila. The parents of the accused left for India on 3.3.2008. During the period, when the parents of the accused stayed with her at Manila, the accused did not physically torture the informant, but continued to abuse the informant on petty matters and the parents of the accused silently watched everything. After the parents of the accused left, the accused, again, started physically torturing the informant and stopped her contact with her family. On 9.3.2008, the accused, after getting drunk, started physically abusing the informant, threw her out of the room, kicked and slapped her. On the following day, i.e., on 10.3.2008, in the morning, the accused, seeing the informant sleeping on the floor, again, beat her for no rhyme or reason. Whenever the informant protested, she was told by the accused that she was the property of the accused and he would deal with her as he likes. On the following day, i.e., on 10.3.2008, in the morning, the accused, seeing the informant sleeping on the floor, again, beat her for no rhyme or reason. Whenever the informant protested, she was told by the accused that she was the property of the accused and he would deal with her as he likes. Though the informant asked the accused to allow her to go to India, the accused refused to hand over the passport or ticket to the informant. On 27.3.2008, the accused, again, for a petty reason, beat up the complainant. The informant, having realized that her marriage had reached a stage of no return, contacted her parents, asked them to send ticket so that she could come back to India. The informant, somehow, could get hold of her passport and, on 5.4.2008, she returned to India from Manila. 140. When the FIR is read carefully and dispassionately, it cannot be said that the allegations, made in the FIR, taken at their face value, in their entirety, do not make out a case of commission of any offence. Far from this, the contents of the FIR clearly reveals commission of an offence under Section 494-A, IPC inasmuch as the FIR clearly reveals that the informant had been subjected to cruelty of such a degree that it would have driven, any woman, placed as the informant was, to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. The allegations, so made in the FIR, may or may not be true. The question that the allegations made in the FIR are or are not true can be arrived at only by investigation or if it becomes necessary, at the trial. It would, thus, be wholly illegal and highly improper, on the part of this Court, to comment on the veracity and correctness of the allegations made in the FIR. However, when the allegations made in the FIR are taken in their entirety, there remains no room for doubt that the FIR does disclose a prima facie can against the accused-petitioner, the case being that the petitioner had subjected the informant to 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498-A, IPC. However, when the allegations made in the FIR are taken in their entirety, there remains no room for doubt that the FIR does disclose a prima facie can against the accused-petitioner, the case being that the petitioner had subjected the informant to 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498-A, IPC. She was subjected to 'cruelty' not only abroad, but also at places, such as, Jorhat and Guwahati, in Assam, inasmuch as the informant had been allegedly told by her parents-in-law that the informant's husband had agreed not to torture the informant provided that the informant refrained herself from talking to the members of her parental family. The obvious effect of this restriction, which had been allegedly put on the informant, was that the informant could not, according to the FIR, participate in her brother's 'upanayan' ceremony, on 8.2.2008, in the manner as a sister would have done at that she had to visit and attend the ceremony just like any other guest so much so that the informant was not allowed to even stay throughout the ceremony. All these allegations, which were made in the FIR, constitute, whether true or false, instances of mental 'cruelty' and were, therefore, amenable to the jurisdiction of the police both at Jorhat as well as at Guwahati. 141. The reference made by Mr. Baruah to the case of A.V. Mohan Rao and Anr. v. M. Kishan Rao and Anr. reported in (2002) 6 SCC 174 , is not completely misplaced, though the case of A.V. Mohan Rao, (supra) relates to a complaint and not to the FIR inasmuch as the relevant observations made at para 23 of this decision read as under: 23. Reading of the complaint petition and the materials produced by the complainant with it in the light of provisions in the aforementioned sections, it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint taken in entirety do not make out, even prima facie, any of the offences alleged in the complaint petition. We refrain from discussing the merits of the case further since any observation in that regard may affect one party or the other. The allegations made are serious in nature and relate to the Power Company registered under the Act having its head office in this country. We refrain from discussing the merits of the case further since any observation in that regard may affect one party or the other. The allegations made are serious in nature and relate to the Power Company registered under the Act having its head office in this country. Whether the appellants were or were not citizens of India at the time of commission of the offences alleged and whether offences alleged were or were not committed in this country, are questions to be considered on the basis of the evidence to be placed before the Court at the trial of the case. The questions raised are of involved nature, determination of which requires enquiry into facts. Such questions cannot be considered at the preliminary stage for the purpose of quashing the complaint and the proceeding initiated on its basis. It is relevant to note here that from Sections 4 and 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is clear that even if the offence is committed by a citizen of India outside the country the same is subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in India. See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Ram Narain, Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay and Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India. 142. In the light of the discussions held above, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the FIR, in question, does disclose a prima facie case against the accused-petitioner under Section 498-A, IPC and the offence, so alleged, having allegedly been committed partly in India and partly outside India, is amenable to investigation and trial, in India, without the requirement of having obtained previous sanction from the Central Government. This apart, and as already indicated above, when an offence has been committed partly in India and partly outside India, Section 188 does not get attracted. Above all, the embargo, placed on the power of a Court, to inquire into and try an offence, which has been committed outside India, is not applicable to the present case at all inasmuch as the proviso applies to inquiry and trial and not to investigation under Section 156, Cr PC. Whether CR Case No. 2834-C/2008 can be quashed? 143. So far as CR Case No. 2834-C/2008 is concerned, the complainant's case, in brief, is thus : The complainant was married to accused Gautam Sharma, on 28.1.2007, who is a citizen of India. Whether CR Case No. 2834-C/2008 can be quashed? 143. So far as CR Case No. 2834-C/2008 is concerned, the complainant's case, in brief, is thus : The complainant was married to accused Gautam Sharma, on 28.1.2007, who is a citizen of India. The accused as well as his parents are Indian citizen and reside permanently at Guwahati. At the time of her marriage, the parents of the complainant had given her stridhan and all the stridhan were handed over to the accused No. 1 to accused No. 2. After their marriage, they stayed in Guwahati at the permanent residence of the accused. After her marriage, the complainant stayed with her husband, namely, accused Gautam Sharma, and her matrimonial house, at Guwahati, where the parents of the accused also reside. At the time of her marriage, the parents of the accused had given her stridhan as per the list enclosed with the complaint and the same were handed over by accused No. 1, namely, Gautam Sharma, to his mother, namely, Rita Sharma, who is accused No. 2. At the time when the complainant and her husband were leaving Guwahati for Manila, Philippines, because accused No. 1 has been working at Manila. The accused No. 1 has subjected the complainant to such cruelty that she, being unable to bear, came back to India by, somehow, managing to obtain a ticket in this regard from her parents. As regards the cruelty to which the complainant had been subjected to, she has already lodged an FIR. Though the complainant asked her husband to allow her to go to India, he refused to hand over the passport or ticket to the complainant. On return to India, the complainant, on 10.5.2008, went to the residence of the accused No. 1 to take back all the stridhan, but the accused No. 1 refused to return the same and threatened to dispose of the said stridhan. Thus, the accused, according to the complaint, having acquired dominion over the stridhan of the complainant refused to return the same at Guwahati when the complainant demanded that her stridhan be returned to her. This refusal amounted to an offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406, IPC. 144. Thus, the accused, according to the complaint, having acquired dominion over the stridhan of the complainant refused to return the same at Guwahati when the complainant demanded that her stridhan be returned to her. This refusal amounted to an offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406, IPC. 144. In view of the fact that in the present case, allegations of commission of offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust have been made, it needs to be borne in mind that Sub-section (4) of Section 181 provides that an offence of criminal misappropriation, or of criminal breach of trust, may be inquired into or tried by a Court, within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence, was received or retained, or was required to be returned, or accounted for, by the accused person. 145. Thus, under Section 181(4), when a complaint alleges that an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust has been committed, the offence can be enquired into or tried by a Court, within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, or any part of the property, which is the subject of offence, was received or retained, or was required to be returned, or accounted for, by the accused person. 146. In para 3 of the complaint, in question, it has been clearly stated that all the stridhan, mentioned in the list, appended to the complaint, were handed over by the accused No. 1 to the accused No. 2 at the time of leaving Guwahati for Manila, Philippines. Again, at paragraph 14, it has been specifically mentioned that on 10.5.2008, the complainant had gone to the residence of the accused No. 2 (i.e., the petitioner No. 2 herein) and asked her to return all her stridhan, but the accused No. 2 refused to return the same and threatened to dispose of the stridhan. The said allegations, made in the complaint, clearly disclose that the properties, which form the subject-matter of the offence, were, according to the complainant, received and retained at Guwahati and were also required to be returned, or accounted for, at Guwahati. 147. The said allegations, made in the complaint, clearly disclose that the properties, which form the subject-matter of the offence, were, according to the complainant, received and retained at Guwahati and were also required to be returned, or accounted for, at Guwahati. 147. Thus, the entrustment of the properties having taken place at Guwahati and/or dominion over the stridhan having been acquired at Guwahati and refused to be returned, and accounted for, at Guwahati, it cannot but be viewed that the offence of criminal breach of trust was allegedly committed, in the light of the statements made in the complaint, at Guwahati. The question as to whether the accusations, made in the complaint, are true or not, is a question, which can be determined only at the trial and not in the present proceedings for quashing. Section 188, in the present case, has, therefore, no application and in consequence thereof, the proviso to Section 188also would have no application. To put a little differently, a bare reading of the complaint, in question, which has given rise to Complaint Case No. 2834-C/2008, clearly indicates that the property, which is the subject of offence, was allegedly received or retained at, and was to be accounted for, by the accused-persons, within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Chief Juridical Magistrate, Kamrup, and, hence, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, will, in such circumstances, have the jurisdiction. 148. For what have been discussed and pointed out above, it becomes clear that so far as the proceedings of the complaint case, in question, are concerned, the same cannot, at this stage, be interfered with in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code. Whether the complaint lodged before the Assam State Commission for Women can be interfered with? 149. As regards the third challenge, i.e., the challenged posed to the proceedings before the Assam State Commission for Women, is concerned, suffice it to point out that the proceedings, before the Assam State Commission for Women, are not controlled in any manner by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This Court would, therefore, in exercise of its powers under Section 482, Cr PC, not interfere with the proceedings before the said Commission. 150. This Court would, therefore, in exercise of its powers under Section 482, Cr PC, not interfere with the proceedings before the said Commission. 150. It may also be pointed out that the present petition is based on the jurisdictional issues and, at the time of hearing of this petition, nothing specifically has been submitted as regards the veracity or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR and the complaint. This apart, and as already indicated above, in a quashing proceeding under Section 482 , Cr PC, it is not open to the High Court to determine the truth, veracity, correctness or otherwise of the accusations made in an FIR or a complaint. 151. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this criminal petition fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. Petition dismissed JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By making this application under Section 482 of the Code, the petitioners, who are accused in two cases, namely (1) All Women Police Station Case No. 21/2008 under Section 498-A, IPC and (ii) Complaint Case No. 2834-C/2008 under Section 406, IPC, which is presently pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guwahati, have sought for quashing of the FIR, which has given rise to the said 'police case' the said 'complaint case', the proceedings thereof and also the complaint, which has been registered as ASCW No. 67/2008 by the Assam State Commission For Women. 2. I have heard Mr. NC Phookan, learned Counsel, for the petitioners, and Mr. D. Baruah, learned Counsel, for the opposite party. 3. Some of the important questions, which this criminal petition, made under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, 'the Code'), has raised, are: (i) It is possible for a Court, in India, to try a person for acts or omissions, which constitute an offence under the Indian Penal Code, if such acts or omissions were done, in their entirety, outside the territory of India? If so, under what circumstances, such a trial is possible? (ii) If the acts of omissions, constituting the offence, were done partly in India and partly outside the territory of India, will the Court, in India, have, in such a case, jurisdiction to try the offender and, if so, under what circumstances? (iii) Where shall be the venue of trial of a person, who has committed an offence outside India? (ii) If the acts of omissions, constituting the offence, were done partly in India and partly outside the territory of India, will the Court, in India, have, in such a case, jurisdiction to try the offender and, if so, under what circumstances? (iii) Where shall be the venue of trial of a person, who has committed an offence outside India? (iv) Whether the police, in India, can investigate into a cognizable offence, which was committed, in its entirety, outside India, without having received previous sanction, in this regard, from the Central Government? (v) Whether such sanction for investigation by the police will be necessary even when a cognizable offence was committed partly in India and partly outside India? (vi) Whether the limitations, which the proviso to Section 188 of the Code imposes on a Court, debarring it from enquiring into or trying, without previous sanction of the Central Government, a person, in India, for an offence committed by him outside India, would also apply to an investigation, which a police officer is, otherwise, entitled, on the basis of a First Information Report, to conduct into a 'cognizable offence' as defined under the Code? 4. The other incidental questions, which this criminal petition has raised, are: (a) What is the scope of the High Court's power, under Section 482 of the Code, in respect of quashing of a 'complaint' or 'First Information Report? (b) What is 'cognizance'? (c) How does an 'investigation', under Section 156 of the Code, differ, under the Scheme of the Code, from an 'inquiry' under Section 202 of the Code? (d) Is there any difference between an 'investigation', directed by a Magistrate under Section 156(3), and an 'investigation', which a Magistrate may direct under Section 202 of the Code; and if so, how does the 'investigation', under Section 156, differ from an 'investigation' under Section202? (e) What 'pre-cognizance' stage signifies and how does it differ from 'post cognizance' stage? (f) If, in a given case, taking of 'cognizance' of an offence by Magistrate is bared, will such bar also apply to the Magistrate's power to hold enquiry under Section 202 of the Code? (e) What 'pre-cognizance' stage signifies and how does it differ from 'post cognizance' stage? (f) If, in a given case, taking of 'cognizance' of an offence by Magistrate is bared, will such bar also apply to the Magistrate's power to hold enquiry under Section 202 of the Code? (g) Whether the bar in taking 'cognizance' of a 'cognizable offence' by a Magistrate, under Section 190 of the Code, without 'sanction' having been obtained, in this regard, from a competent authority will also bar the Magistrate from directing 'investigation' by invoking his jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and will such bar, in taking 'cognizance' of a 'cognizable offence' by a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code, operate against even the police prohibiting them from conducting an 'investigation' into a 'cognizable offence', which a police officer is, otherwise, competent to conduct, by virtue of his powers under Section 156(1) of the Code? 5. Without entering into the discussion of the merit of this Criminal Petition, it is, in the face of the peculiarity of the facts and circumstances of the present case, appropriate, in my view, to settle some of the questions of law, which this criminal petition has raised. 6. Before, however, dealing with the main issues, which have arisen in this criminal petition, let me deal with the incidental question, namely, as to what is the scope of the High Court's power, under Section 482 of the Code, in respect of quashing of a 'complaint' or 'First Information Report'? Scope of the High Court's power, under Section 482 of the Code, in respect of quashing of a 'Complaint' or 'First Information Report'. 7. The law with regard to the quashing of criminal complaint or FIR is no longer res integra. A catena of judicial decisions has settled the position of law on this aspect of the matter. I may refer to the case of R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , wherein the question, which arose for consideration was whether a first information report can be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. I may refer to the case of R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , wherein the question, which arose for consideration was whether a first information report can be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held, on the facts before it, that no case for quashing of the proceeding was made out; Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the Court, however, observed that though, ordinarily, criminal proceedings, instituted against an accused, must be tried under the provisions of the Code, there are some categories of cases, where the inherent jurisdiction of the Court can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. One such category, according to the Court, consist of cases, where all allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises and it is a mater merely of looking at the FIR or the complaint in order to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, said the Court, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused. From the case of R.P. Kapoor, (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that when a mere look into the contents of a complaint or FIR shows that the contents thereof, even if taken at their face value and accepted to be true in their entirety, do not disclose commission of offence, the complaint or the FIR, as the case maybe, shall be quashed. 8. As a corollary to what has been discussed above, it is also clear that if the contents of a complaint or an FIR constitute offence, such a complaint or FIR cannot be quashed except where the complaint or the FIR is, otherwise also, not sustainable in law. 9. Laying down the scope of interference by the High Court in matters of quashing of FIR or complaint, the Apex Court, in the leading case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajanlal and Ors.reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, observed as follows: 102. 9. Laying down the scope of interference by the High Court in matters of quashing of FIR or complaint, the Apex Court, in the leading case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajanlal and Ors.reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, observed as follows: 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section482 of the Code, which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration, wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to law down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines of rigid formula and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases, wherein such power should be exercised: (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegation in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance of the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal private grudge. (Emphasis is added) 10. In the case of Bhajanlal, (supra), the Apex Court gave a note of caution on the powers of quashing of criminal proceeding in the following words: 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extra ordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. (Emphasis is added) 11. (Emphasis is added) 11. It is clear from a close reading of the principles laid down in the case of R.P. Kapoor, (supra) and Bhajanlal, (supra) that broadly speaking, quashing of a complaint or a First Information Report is possible (a) when the allegations made in the complaint or the First Information Report, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely as true, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (b) when the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or compliant and evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and/or make out a case against the accused; and (c) when the al-legations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that on the basis of such absurd and inherently improbable allegations, no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 12. It follows, as a corollary, that in a quashing proceeding, it is not, within the ambit of the powers of the High Court, under Section 482 of the Code, to determine the truth, veracity, correctness or otherwise of the accusations made in the FIR or a complaint. In the case at hand too, therefore, this Court has to proceed on the assumption that the allegations made in the complaint are true and, then, determine whether the contents of the complaint, if assumed to be true, disclose commission of any offence under the Indian Penal Code. See Sadip Kar and Ors. v. Pampy Kar reported in (2009) 1 GLR 329. This apart, if there is any legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the, Code, or the enactment, whereunder the criminal proceeding is instituted, institution of such a criminal proceeding or the continuation thereof can be quashed by invoking High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. 13. v. Pampy Kar reported in (2009) 1 GLR 329. This apart, if there is any legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the, Code, or the enactment, whereunder the criminal proceeding is instituted, institution of such a criminal proceeding or the continuation thereof can be quashed by invoking High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. 13. It further logically follows that if, in the present case, the police, as contended, on behalf of the petitioners, are barred, under the provisions of the Code, from conducting 'investigation' into 'cognizable offence(s)', which the petitioners are alleged to have committed, or if there is any legal bar in the Magistrate's holding of 'enquiry', under Section 202 of the Code, as regards the offence(s), which the petitioners have allegedly committed, such 'investigation' or 'enquiry' or the 'processes', which have been issued against the petitioners on the basis of such 'investigation' or 'enquiry', can, indeed, be quashed by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code. 14. The incidental question No. (a) shall stand answered accordingly. Question No. (i). When is it possible for a Court, in India, to try a person for acts or omissions, which constitute an offence under the Indian Penal Code, if such acts or omissions were done, in their entirety, outside the territory of India? (ii) if the acts or omissions, constituting the offence. were done partly in India and partly outside the territory of India, will the Court, in India, have, in such a case, jurisdiction to try the offender and, if so, under what circumstances? 15. As these two questions are closely inter-linked, I take up both these questions for discussion and decision together. 16. In order to appreciate the questions posed above, it is necessary to bear in mind the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal Code. These two sections are, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: Section 3.-Any person liable, by any Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India, shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond India in the same manner as if such act had been committed within India. These two sections are, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: Section 3.-Any person liable, by any Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India, shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond India in the same manner as if such act had been committed within India. Section 4.-The provisions of this Code apply also to any offence committed by- (1) any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India; (2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be. Explanation.-In this section the word "offence" includes every act committed outside India, which, if committed in India, would be punishable under this Code. 17. A careful reading of Section 3, IPC clearly shows that a person, who is liable to be tried by any Indian law, for an offence, committed beyond India, shall be dealt with in the same manner as if the act has been committed within India. Thus, Section 3 creates a legal fiction, whereby it is possible to punish a person for an act of omission or commission if such an act was done or omitted to be done beyond the territory of India provided that such an act or omission constitutes an offence, which is triable by any Indian Law. 18. Turning to Section 4, IPC, it needs to be noted that the provisions of the Indian Penal Code apply to any offence, which has been committed by (i) any citizen of India in any place beyond the territory of India or (ii) by any person on any ship or aircraft, registered in India, wherever it may be. 19. The Explanation to Section 4 further clarifies that the word 'offence', which appears in Section 4, IPC, includes every act or omission or commission committed outside India, which, if committed in India, would be punishable under the Indian Penal Code meaning thereby that an act of omission or commission, which is an offence under the Indian Penal Code, would be deemed to be an offence committed, in India, even if such an act of omission or commission was done outside the territory of India provided that the person, doing such an act of omission or commission, is a citizen of India. However, even when such a person is not an Indian citizen, he would be still triable, in India, if he had done such act of omission or commission, on any ship or aircraft, which is registered in India, irrespective of the place, where such ship or aircraft was. 20. Thus, when a citizen of India kills a person, beyond the territory of India, say, in England, and such killing falls within the definition of culpable homicide amounting to murder, as given in Section300, IPC, then, such an Indian citizen shall, irrespective of the fact as to whether the person killed is or is not an Indian citizen, be deemed to have committed, by a legal fiction, an offence of murder within the Indian soil and shall be punishable by Section 302, IPC in India. This apart, irrespective of the fact as to whether the killer, in such a case, is or is not an Indian citizen and irrespective of the fact as to whether the person killed is or is not an Indian Citizen, such a person would still be liable to be tried, in India, as if he has committed the offence, in India, provided that the offence was committed in any ship or aircraft registered in India. It is immaterial, in this regard, that the ship was at the high seas, when the murder took place, or the aircraft was airborne, when the murder was committed. 21. The provisions, contained in Sections 3 and 4, which deal with extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Indian Courts are, primarily, based on international principles governing exercise of criminal jurisdiction. It may be noted that in early 17th Century, criminal jurisdiction came to be exercised on the bass of the 'principle of territoriality'. The 'principle of territoriality' made a person liable to be tried, in a given State, if the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the State concerned. The reason is that the State, within whose territory an offence is committed, was considered more suited to deal with the offence. Thus, 'principle of territoriality' was based on the locus delicti. The 'principle of territoriality' made a person liable to be tried, in a given State, if the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the State concerned. The reason is that the State, within whose territory an offence is committed, was considered more suited to deal with the offence. Thus, 'principle of territoriality' was based on the locus delicti. The proponents of this principle even today claim that the State, where a crime is committed, can be said to have strongest interest in punishing the offender and that such a State can easily apprehend the accused, the local forum of the State would be the most convenient place for trial, because the witnesses and even the juries, where jury system prevails, would be available, and that an accused cannot be punished unless the country, where the offence is committed, treats the act as an offence. 22. However, the territorial principle has not been an absolute principle in international law. With the scientific advancements, which the world had witnessed, and technical developments, which the world had experienced, the capacity to cause harm to one State by another State grew. In the 19th Century and even in the present day, need has been felt to dilute the 'principle of territoriality' and find exceptions to this principle. The exceptions to the 'principle of territoriality' have been made by statutes as well as by judicial pronouncements. 23. A patient reading of the provisions, embodied in Sections 3 and 4, IPC, reflect two things, namely, (i) accountability of an Indian citizen to the Indian Courts irrespective of the fact as to whether they committed, outside the territory of India or within the territory of India, the acts or omissions, which constitute an offence under the Indian law and (ii) subordination of non-Indian citizen to the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts in respect of the acts or omissions, constituting an offence, which were committed on a ship or aircraft, registered in India, irrespective of the fact as to whether the ship was at the high seas, at the time of commission of the offence, or the aircraft was airborne and outside the territory of India, when the offence was committed. 24. The provisions making an Indian citizen accountable to Indian law is based on the principle of nationality or citizenship, which is actually derived from the concept of sovereignty. 24. The provisions making an Indian citizen accountable to Indian law is based on the principle of nationality or citizenship, which is actually derived from the concept of sovereignty. A State has the duty to protect its nationals abroad and it is for this reason that a wrong against a citizen is a wrong against his State. It is an accepted principle of criminal jurisprudence that the protection, which a citizen caries with him, wherever he goes, also imposes upon him a corresponding duty to conform to the standards of conduct demanded of him by his State. Hence, any act or omission of a citizen committed abroad, which violates standards of conduct demanded of him by his State, would be regarded as a wrong against his State even though the act or omission was done beyond his State's territory. 25. It is, therefore, said that the penal provisions of Indian law are applicable to its nationals everywhere, no matter how minor the offence may be. In contrast, as English citizen can be brought to book, in England, in respect of acts done outside England, only in certain classes of cases covered by specific statutes. Interestingly, Germany exercises criminal jurisdiction not only on a person, who was a German national at the time, when he committed the offence abroad, but also when such a person becomes a German national subsequent to the act or omission, done abroad, constituting an offence under the German law. 26. The penal provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the IPC also embody protective or security principle. The protective principle is based on the nature of interest of the country injured rather than of the country, where the offence has taken place. Irrespective of the fact as to whether an offence has been committed abroad by a citizen or an alien, when the offence affects, or is likely to affect, the security or integrity of another State, the State, which is affected, must be able to take punitive action against the offender regardless of the 'principle of territoriality', which is commonly known as locus delecti. This principle of extra-territorial jurisdiction can be traced to the right of self-defence in the United Nations Charter. 27. This principle of extra-territorial jurisdiction can be traced to the right of self-defence in the United Nations Charter. 27. Thus, it is with the object of punishing an Indian citizen, who commits an offence outside the territory of India, and also with the object of punishing a person, who may not be an Indian citizen, but who commits an offence, within the meaning of Indian laws, at any place, in a ship or aircraft, registered in India, that the provisions, as contained in Sections 3 and 4, IPC, have been made. 28. What surfaces from the above discussion is that if, at the time of commission of an offence, the person continued to be a citizen of India, then, he would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts, in India, even if he commits the offence outside India. These provisions are based on the principle that qua citizens, the jurisdiction of the Courts, in India, is not lost by reason of the venue of the offence. If, however, at the time of commission of an offence outside India, the accused person is not a citizen of India, then, the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the IPC would have no application whatsoever meaning thereby that a foreigner is not liable to be tried, in India, for an offence committed outside India unless, of course, the offence is committed on a ship or aircraft registered in India. 29. In the backdrop of the position of law as discussed above, it may, now, be noted that it has been contended, on behalf of the accused-petitioners, in the present case, by Mr. N.C. Phookan, learned Counsel, that taking of cognizance of the complaint, which has given rise to Complaint Case No. 2834- C/2008, and issue of processes, in the said case, against the accused-petitioners, are wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as Section 188 of the Code bars an Indian Court from holding an 'inquiry' or 'trial' if the alleged 'offence' was committed outside India and no previous sanction of the Central Government has been obtained in respect of holding of such 'inquiry' or 'trial'. 30. While agreeing with the submission made by Mr. Phookan that a Court, in India, cannot hold inquiry or trial in respect of an offence, which is committed outside India, if no previous sanction, in this regard, has been obtained from the Central Government, Mr. 30. While agreeing with the submission made by Mr. Phookan that a Court, in India, cannot hold inquiry or trial in respect of an offence, which is committed outside India, if no previous sanction, in this regard, has been obtained from the Central Government, Mr. Baruah, learned Counsel for the complainant-opposite party, has submitted that the previous sanction of the Central Government, as stipulated by Section 188, would be required only in respect of such offences, which are committed entirely and exclusively outside the territory of India, and, hence, contends Mr. Baruah, the bar of jurisdiction, which Section 188 imposes, will not be applicable to a case, where the offence consists of several acts and if some of the acts, in a given case, have been done in India and some of the acts have been done outside India. 31. Bearing in mind the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties concerned, let me, now, turn to Section 188, which reads as under: 188. Offence committed outside India.- When an offence is committed outside India- (a) by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or (b) by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found: Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 32. On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 188, what becomes evident is that while Sections3 and 4 of the IPC, which I have already dealt with, make substantive provisions for trial of a person, who may or may not be a citizen of India, Section 188 deals with the procedure for trial of such a person. 32. On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 188, what becomes evident is that while Sections3 and 4 of the IPC, which I have already dealt with, make substantive provisions for trial of a person, who may or may not be a citizen of India, Section 188 deals with the procedure for trial of such a person. No wonder, therefore, that Section 188 makes it transparent that when an Indian citizen commits an offence outside India, irrespective of the fact as to whether such offence has been committed on the high seas or elsewhere or when a person, not being an Indian citizen, commits an offence on any ship or aircraft, registered in India, even when the ship was on the high seas or aircraft was airborne, he may be dealt with in respect of such an offence as if it has been committed at any place, within India, at which he may be found. I will discuss the meaning of the expression, "he may be dealt within respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found", which appears in Section 188, a little later; suffice it, however, here to point out that the proviso to Section 188 makes it clear that 'inquiry' or 'trial' against a person, who commits an offence outside India, cannot be held in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 33. The question, now, is as to whether Section 188 bars trial of a person in respect of only such offence, which has been committed, in its entirety, outside India or Section 188 bars trial of a person even in respect of such an offence, which in part, may have been committed within the territory of India. While considering this question, it needs to be borne in mind that an offence is said to have been committed, when all the ingredients of the offence are satisfied. Since Section 188 has used the word 'offence', it cannot be understood, and interpreted to mean, part of the offence. Necessarily, therefore, Section 188 would come into play only when all the ingredients of an offence are satisfied outside India and not before. Since Section 188 has used the word 'offence', it cannot be understood, and interpreted to mean, part of the offence. Necessarily, therefore, Section 188 would come into play only when all the ingredients of an offence are satisfied outside India and not before. Logically extended, this will mean that all the ingredients of an offence must have been satisfied and completed outside India so as to attract the proviso to Section 188; otherwise, the bar, imposed by the proviso to Section 188, would have no application. In other words, if any part of an offence has been committed in India, the offender will be triable, in India, without the restrictions, with Section 188 impose on 'enquiry' or 'trial' of a person, who commits an offence, in its entirety, outside India. 34. The above position of law may be examined from yet another angle. When I read Section 188, what attracts the attention, immediately, is that Section 188 starts with the words, "When an offence is committed outside India". These words obviously indicate that Section 188 speaks of, and relates to, an offence, which, in its entirety, has been committed outside India. In fact, there is nothing in the language, employed in Section 188, which indicates that even when an offence consists of several parts or consists of several acts and when, in such a case, some of the acts have been committed in India, the limitation, imposed by Section 188 of obtaining previous sanction of the Central Government for the purpose of holding inquiry or trial, would still be applicable. As a corollary, one can safely infer that this section, i.e., Section 188, would not be attracted if an offence is partly committed within India and partly outside India. This becomes clear, as rightly submitted by Mr. Baruah, from the observations made, at paragraph 33 of the decision, in Ajay Agarwala v. Union of India reported in (1993) 3 SCC 609 , which read as under: 33. Nor is there any merit in the submission that even part of the offence would attract Section 188 as the section operates when offence is committed outside India. An offence is committed when all the ingredients are satisfied. The section having used the word offence it cannot be understood as part of the offence. Nor is there any merit in the submission that even part of the offence would attract Section 188 as the section operates when offence is committed outside India. An offence is committed when all the ingredients are satisfied. The section having used the word offence it cannot be understood as part of the offence. Section 179 Cr PC empowers a Court to try an offence either at a place where the offence is committed or the consequences ensue. On the allegations in the complaint the act or omissions were committed in India. In any case the consequence of conspiracy, cheating and forgery having taken place at Chandigarh the offence was not committed outside the country therefore the provisions of Section 188, Cr PC were not attracted. (Emphasis added) 35. From the above observations, made in Ajay Agarwal, (supra), it becomes clear, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, that unless all the ingredients of an offence are satisfied, the offence cannot be said to have been committed; and, hence, when Section 188 speaks of an offence committed outside India, it connotes that all the ingredients of the offence, which is alleged to have been committed by a person, have been satisfied outside India and it is then only that the provisions of Section 188 would be attracted. Consequently, if the offence consists of several acts and if some of these acts have been done in India and some outside India, the limitations, imposed by Section 188, would not apply. 36. What emerges from the above discussion is that a Magistrate is debarred, under Section 188 of the Code, from holding an inquiry or trial in respect of an offence, which has been committed, in its entirety, outside the territory of India unless the previous sanction has been obtained or received, in this regard, from the Central Government. 37. In Vishnu Dutt Sharma and Ors. v. State reported in 1994 (31) DRJ 160 , the Delhi High Court, having held that a bare reading of Section 188 shows that if an offence is committed outside India by a citizen of India, previous sanction of the Central Government is necessary before the offence can be inquired into or tired in India, has, however, recognized the fact that when an offence is committed partly in India and partly outside India, the limitation, imposed by Section 188, does not apply. 38. 38. For the purpose of sustaining his submissions that in the present case, the Court ought not have taken 'cognizance' of the complaint', in question, and issued processes against the accused-petitioners, Mr. Phookan has placed reliance on Fatima Bibi Ahmed Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in (2008) 6 SCC 789 . While considering the case of Fatima Bibi Ahmed Patel (supra), it needs to be pointed out that in the said case, the accused was not a citizen of India; rather, she was a citizen of Mauritius. This apart, the offence was committed in Kuwait. As the accused was not an Indian citizen (because she was a citizen of Mauritius) and the offence was committed outside India (because the offence was allegedly committed in Kuwait), the Apex Court held that Section 4, IPC and Section 188 of the Code have no application, though the accused used to visit India on the basis of visa issued by the Government of India. 39. Thus, when an offence is committed, in its entirety, outside India by a person, who is not a citizen of India, particularly, when such an offence is not committed on a ship or aircraft, registered in India, neither the substantive provisions, which Sections 3 and 4, IPC embody, nor the limitations, which Section 188 of the Code imposes, would be attracted. In other words, when a person, who is not an Indian citizen, commits, within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code, an offence outside the territory of India, such a person cannot be tried in India; but if such a person commits such an offence at a ship or aircraft, registered in India, such a person, though not an Indian citizen, would be liable to be tried, by virtue of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the IPC, in India and the provisions of Section 188 of the Code would also be attracted in such a case. 40. Conversely, even when an Indian citizen commits, within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code, an offence, in its entirety, outside India, he cannot escape from being tried in India and he would remain liable to be tried by the Courts, in India, for such an offence, though the limitations, which Section 188 of the Code imposes, would be attracted. 41. The question No. (i) stands answered accordingly. 42. 41. The question No. (i) stands answered accordingly. 42. What further logically follows from the above conclusion is that when an offence consists of several acts and some of these acts have been done in India, the limitation, imposed by the proviso to Section 188, would not be attracted and the Court, in India, would be free to hold inquiry or trial in respect of an offence, which has been committed partly in India and partly outside India. 43. The question No. (ii) shall accordingly stand answered. 44. Bearing in mind the position of law that Section 188 of the Code debars a Magistrate from holding an 'enquiry' in respect of an of fence, which has been committed, in its entirety, outside India without sanction having been granted, in this regard, by the Central Government, it clearly follows, and it is, in fact, not even disputed, that neither a Magistrate can hold an 'enquiry' under Section 202of the Code in respect of an offence, which has not been committed within the territorial limits of his jurisdiction, nor can he even direct, in exercise of this powers under Section 202, an 'investigation' by police, in such a case, for the purpose of deciding as to whether or not he should proceed with the complaint unless previous sanction, in this regard, has been given by the Central Government. 45. The question, therefore, is as to whether the limitation imposed, under Section 188, on the power of the Magistrate to hold an 'enquiry' under Section 202 or on his power to direct an 'investigation', in exercise of the powers under Section 202, would extend to the Magistrate's power, under Section 156(3), to direct 'investigation' by the police and would the limitation, as indicated hereinbefore, even debar a police officer from exercising powers, which he, otherwise, has, under Section 156(1), to 'investigate' a 'cognizable offence', if such an offence is reported to his police station. 46. Before, however, I discuss the above aspects of law, let me deal with the remaining incidental questions framed in this case. These questions are: (b) What is 'cognizance'? (c) How does an 'investigation', under Section 156 of the Code, differ, under the scheme of the Code, from an 'inquiry' under Section 202 of the Code? 46. Before, however, I discuss the above aspects of law, let me deal with the remaining incidental questions framed in this case. These questions are: (b) What is 'cognizance'? (c) How does an 'investigation', under Section 156 of the Code, differ, under the scheme of the Code, from an 'inquiry' under Section 202 of the Code? (d) Is there any difference between an 'investigation', directed by a Magistrate under Section 156(3) and an 'investigation', which a Magistrate may direct under Section 202 of the Code; and if so, how does the 'investigation', under Section 156, differ from an 'investigation' under Section202? (e) What 'pre-cognizance' stage signifies and how does it differ from 'post cognizance stage'? 47. As all these four questions are inextricably connected with each other, it is necessary that all these questions are discussed and dealt with together. (b) What is 'cognizance'? 48. The word 'cognizance' has not been defined under the Code. The word 'cognizance' really indicates the stage, when a Magistrate or a Judge, first, takes judicial notice to offence(s) and not of person(s) accused of such offence(s). It is Section 190 of the Code, which deals with taking of cognizance of offences by a Magistrate. It may be noted that Sub-section (1) of Section 190embodies three different modes of taking 'cognizance' inasmuch as it enacts that any Magistrate of the First Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class, specially empowered, in this behalf, under Sub-section (2) of Section 190, may take 'cognizance' of any offence; (a) upon receiving a 'complaint' of facts, which constitute such offence, or (b) upon a 'police report' of such facts, or (c) upon 'information' received from any person, other than a police officer, or upon his 'own knowledge', that such offence has been committed. 49. Whether a Magistrate has or has not, on the basis of a 'complaint', taken 'cognizance' of an offence may, in a given case, be reflected by the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, which the Magistrate may have taken. 49. Whether a Magistrate has or has not, on the basis of a 'complaint', taken 'cognizance' of an offence may, in a given case, be reflected by the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, which the Magistrate may have taken. When the Magistrate, in order to ascertain if, on the basis of a 'complaint', he shall issue process to the person(s), who may have been alleged to have committed an offence, proceeds to examine the complainant under Section 200, he can be said to have taken 'cognizance', for, he cannot proceed to examine the complainant without taking 'cognizance' of the offence(s), which the 'complaint' may disclose to have been committed. When, however, the Magistrate takes, on the basis of a 'complaint', an action other than one, which is indicated hereinbefore, such as, when he directs 'investigation' by the police, he cannot be held to have taken 'cognizance', for, such exercise of power of directing 'investigation' is pursuant to the provisions of Section 156(3). 50. Broadly speaking, thus, when, on receiving a 'complaint', the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections, contained in Chapter XV of the Code, he is said to have taken 'cognizance' of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). When, however, the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XV of the Code, but for taking action of some other kind, such as, ordering 'investigation' under Section 156(3) or directing issuance of search warrant, etc., he cannot be said to have taken 'cognizance', See R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (1951) SCR 312, and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors. reported in AIR 1976 SC 1672 . 51. Taking of 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'complaint', is different from that of taking of 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'police report'. When a Magistrate, on receipt of a 'complaint', decides to examine the veracity or sufficiency of the accusations, made in the 'complaint', in order to determine if process needs to be issued to the offender and, for this purpose, examines the complainant, 'cognizance' can be said to have been taken. When a Magistrate, on receipt of a 'complaint', decides to examine the veracity or sufficiency of the accusations, made in the 'complaint', in order to determine if process needs to be issued to the offender and, for this purpose, examines the complainant, 'cognizance' can be said to have been taken. When a Magistrate applies his mind to a 'police report', submitted under Section 173(2)(i), to determine if process needs to be issued against the person, who is accused to have committed an offence 'cognizance' is taken. 52. Thus, 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'police report', implies making of mind of the Magistrate if process needs to be issued to the accused; whereas 'cognizance', in a case of 'complaint', means the Magistrate's application of mind for the purpose of deciding as to whether the 'complaint' needs to be preceded as a 'complaint case'. 53. The foundation for taking 'cognizance' need not necessarily be a 'complaint' or 'police report', for, 'cognizance' is possible to be taken even on the basis of 'information' received by a Magistrate or on his 'own knowledge'. When a 'complaint', within the meaning of Section 2(d), is made to a Magistrate, whether in the form of a 'petition' or otherwise, such a 'complaint' must be registered as a 'complaint' and, therefore, only, the Magistrate may pass, if he deems necessary, order(s) directing the police to register the 'complaint' as FIR and investigate the case. When an 'information' is given to a Magistrate, it would nevertheless be, in the light of the provisions of Section 190(c), legally permissible for the Magistrate to take 'cognizance' of the of-fence(s), which such 'information' may reveal to have been committed. Similarly, 'cognizance' of an offence can be taken by a Magistrate, in the face of the provisions of Section 190(c), on the basis of his knowledge too that an offence has been committed. However, when 'cognizance' is taken by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 190(c), limitations imposed by Section 191 (with which we are not presumably concerned) would be applicable. However, when 'cognizance' is taken by a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 190(c), limitations imposed by Section 191 (with which we are not presumably concerned) would be applicable. It may be pointed out that the passing of the order directing registration of a 'complaint' as an FIR or investigation of a case is not a mechanical exercise of power and it cannot be left to the office of a Magistrate to decide as to whether a 'complaint' would or would not be sent to the police for registering the same as a case and for investigating the same, for, if the Magistrate does not apply his mind before direction to register a 'complaint' as an FIR is passed, he may, unknowingly and unconsciously, even direct registration of a case against his ownself without even knowing that the accusations are made against him. Such unconscious exercise of power cannot but be deprecated. 54. The incidental question No. (b) stands answered accordingly. 55. Let me, now, deal with the following two incidental questions inasmuch as both these questions are largely inseparable: (c) How does an 'investigation', under Section 156 of the Code, differ, under the scheme of the Code, from an 'inquiry' under Section 202 of the Code? (d) Is there any difference between an 'investigation', directed by a Magistrate under Section 156(3) and an 'investigation', which a Magistrate may direct under Section 202 of the Code; and if so, how does the 'investigation', under Section 156, differ from an 'investigation' under Section202? 56. Before entering into the discussion of the questions posed above, it is also necessary to ascertain as to what an 'investigation' is and how does an 'investigation' differ form 'inquiry'. 57. Section 2(h) of the Code defines the term 'investigation' to include all the proceedings, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate), who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf. 58. An 'inquiry', on the other hand, means, according to Section 2(g) of the Code, every inquiry, other than a trial conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Magistrate or a Court. 59. 58. An 'inquiry', on the other hand, means, according to Section 2(g) of the Code, every inquiry, other than a trial conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Magistrate or a Court. 59. In H.N. Rashbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 , the Apex Court concluded that investigation constitutes (i) proceeding to the spot, (ii) ascertainment of the facts and the circumstances of the case, (iii) discovery and arrest of the suspected offenders, collection of evidence relating to commission of the offence, which may consist of (a) examination of various persons and the reduction of the statement into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of a place or seizure of the things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial and (iv) formation of the opinion as to whether by the materials collected there is a case to place the accused before the Magistrate. 60. Bearing in mind the definition of the term 'investigation', contained in Section 2(h), and also the various steps, which, in the light of the decision, in H.N. Rishbud (supra), an 'investigation' includes, I may, now, point out the scheme of Chapter XII vis-a-vis Chapter XIII of the Code. While considering Chapter XII, it needs to be borne in mind that Chapter XII deals with 'information' to the police and their powers to investigate. What is necessary to note is that the foundation of this Chapter lies in Section 154, which deals with information relating to commission of 'cognizable offence' if given orally or in writing to the Officer-in-charge of a Police station. Sub-section (1) of Section 154provides that every 'information' relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an Officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced, into writing, by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant and that every such 'information', whether given in writing or reduced to writing, shall be signed by the person giving it. As against Section 154, which deals with information relating to 'cognizable offence', Section 155 relates to giving of information as regards 'non- cognizable' offence to the Officer-in-Charge of a police station and the manner of investigation thereof in the sense that Section 155(2) prohibits the police from investigating a non-cognizable case without on order of the Magistrate, who has the power to try such a case or commit the case for trial. 61. As Section 156 is of great relevance, Section 156 is quoted below: 156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable cases.-(1) Any officer-in-charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case, which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an 'investigation' as above-mentioned.