JUDGMENT Hon’ble Arun Tandon, J.—This is plaintiff’s second appeal. Plaintiff filed Original Suit No. 225 of 1971 on 27.6.1971 through his guardian namely maternal uncle for cancellation of the sale-deed dated 23.11.1975 said to have been executed by his father Hanuman Prasad whereby the share of minor Dhiraj in the joint Hindu Family was transferred to one Sri Pal. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff attained majority and has perused the suit himself. In the plaint allegations it is stated that the sale was contrary to the interest of minor and, therefore, liable to be set aside. The defendants Sri Pal filed a written statement and the case set up by the plaintiff was contested. However, subsequently an amendment application was filed wherein it was suggested that Hanuman Prasad was the rightful owner of the property and the sale-deed executed in the name of Dhiraj was Benami. The Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and order dated 22.7.1976. 2. Not being satisfied by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court the defendants filed appeal before the District Judge, Banda. The appeal has been allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court has been set aside. Hence this second appeal. 3. While admitting the appeal on 29.3.1978 the Hon’ble High Court framed the following substantial question of law : “The substantial question of law which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether in view of the assertion made in the sale-deed that it was being executed on behalf of the minor, it was open to the defendants, who claimed to derive title through the said sale-deed to have taken in plea that the property did not belong to the minor.” 4. I have heard Shri V.K.S. Chaudhary, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri G.C. Tiwari, Advocate. Nobody is present on behalf of the defendant respondents even in the revised reading of the cause list. 5. The First Appellate Court has recorded that the property in fact belongs to the Hanuman Prasad and the sale-deed executed by him as a guardian of his minor son was in fact Benami. 6. Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the order passed is based on complete non-consideration of the fact that no person can be permitted to lead evidence contrary to the document whereby the property was transferred. 7. 6. Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the order passed is based on complete non-consideration of the fact that no person can be permitted to lead evidence contrary to the document whereby the property was transferred. 7. It is not in dispute that the sale-deed was in respect of immovable property and, therefore, compulsorily registrable. The Privy Council in the case of Martin Cashin v. Peter J. Cashin, AIR 1938 Privy Council 103, has held as follows : “Their Lordships wish to add that in a case where the person executing the deed is neither blind nor illiterate, where no fraudulent misrepresentation is made to him, where he has ample opportunity of reading the deed and such knowledge of its purport that the plea of non est factum is not open to him, it is quite immaterial whether he reads the deed or not. He is bound by the deed because it operates as a conclusive bar against him-not because he has read it or understands it, but because he has chosen to execute it.” 8. It is not open to a person to lead evidence contrary to facts recorded in the registered sale-deed. Reference may be had to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of K. Munneyya & Co. v. Varadrajulu, AIR 1964 AP 17 , wherein it has been held as follows : “A person is bound by his admission in the document he has executed. The normal presumption is that his recitals in the document are true. If he seeks to displace this presumption the onus is heavy on him to show that the document signed by him was tainted with illegibility or that an untrue statement was obtained with set purpose. It is not alleged that his signature is a product of fraud of misrepresentation.” 9. From the registered sale-deed dated 23.11.1965 which is on record it is clear that Hanuman Prasad in his capacity as natural guardian of Dhiraj has executed the sale-deed in favour of Sri Pal, the defendant. The recitals in the sale-deed are unequivocal as it is specifically mentioned that the property belongs to minor Dhiraj. From the registered sale-deed dated 23.11.1965 which is on record it is clear that Hanuman Prasad in his capacity as natural guardian of Dhiraj has executed the sale-deed in favour of Sri Pal, the defendant. The recitals in the sale-deed are unequivocal as it is specifically mentioned that the property belongs to minor Dhiraj. In view of the aforesaid recital contained in the sale-deed referred to above, it is not permissible either to Sri Pal to allege that the property in question in fact belongs to Hanuman Prasad or that the sale-deed in the name of his son was Benami. This Court may refer to Section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act which clearly prohibit any evidence being led contrary to the recitals contained in a document which records the contract between the parties. Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows : 91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions herein before contained. Exception. 1.................. Exception. 2.................. Explanation. 1............... Explanation. 2............... Explanation. 3............... 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representative in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms : Provision (1). ........... Provision (2). ........... Provision (3). ........... Provision (4). ........... Provision (5). ........... Provision (6). ........... 10. ........... Provision (2). ........... Provision (3). ........... Provision (4). ........... Provision (5). ........... Provision (6). ........... 10. This Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 prohibits sale of the property of the minor without leave of the Court and Section 8 (3) makes such transfers voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. Section 8(6) of the Act 1956 defines the Court for the purpose of Section 8. The provisions read as follows : “8(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court : (a) mortgage or charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor; or (b) ............................ (3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. (6) In this section, “Court” means the City Civil Court or a District Court or a Court empowered under Section 4-A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such Court, means the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate.” 11. From the facts on record it is admitted that transfer of the property of Dhiraj (minor) and sale-deed dated 23.11.1975 was made without the consent of the ‘Court’ concerned. The substantial question of law as framed is answered in favour of the appellant. 12. In view of the aforesaid the judgment of the First Appellate Court cannot be legally sustained. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court is set aside. The decree granted by Munsif is restored. ————