Judgment : The petitioner herein is working as an employee of the second respondent Department as a Forest Watcher, While he was working with the first respondent, the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Special cell set up a trap and in pursuant to the same, he was arrested and a Criminal case has been registered against the petitioner in Cr.No.12/AC/2005/SL/Su on 112. 2005. The said complaint made from one R. Manickam has been registered on the ground that the petitioner demanded money in not registering the case against him for utilization of forest trees in the construction of a house. The said criminal case filed against the petitioner was closed by the proceedings of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem, dated 110. 2007 by stating that the case is closed as further action dropped. 2. Thereafter, a charge memo was issued by the first respondent in Charge Memo No.17 of 2008, dated 6. 2008 alleging that the certain charges against the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner gave a representation on 8. 2008 stating that there is no reason to frame any charges after dropping of the case by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption. In presenting (sic) the said representation, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition seeking to quash the said Charge Memo issued by the first respondent on the ground that in view of the dropping of Criminal case by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption, the Charge Memo cannot be proceeded with and therefore the same has to be set aside. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the facts involved the criminal case and the Charge Memo are one of the same. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the charge Memo will have to be set aside, since the criminal case has been closed. Therefore, in view of the same the present departmental proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed with. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in W.P.No.2108 of 2004, dated 25. 2009, on support of his contention that when there was exoneration by the Criminal Court has to be admitted that the accused has been acquitted honourably and therefore, it will not be proper to initiate a departmental enquiry. 4. 2009, on support of his contention that when there was exoneration by the Criminal Court has to be admitted that the accused has been acquitted honourably and therefore, it will not be proper to initiate a departmental enquiry. 4. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate submit that the it is a well settled preposition of law that the departmental enquiry and the criminal case can be proceeded separately and individually and the fact that in the criminal case an accused in acquitted cannot be ground for setting aside the departmental proceedings. Accordingly, the learned counsel submits that the rules of the procedure on the law of evidence are totally different in both the cases and therefore, it was prayed that the charge memo will have to be dismissed. 5. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the standard, of proof as required in the departmental proceedings is not the same as required to prove in a criminal case. Even if there is an acquittal in criminal proceedings, the same will not have the departmental proceedings. It is ho doubt true that the judgment verified in a criminal Court is a piece of evidence to be considered by the authorities while decided the departmental proceedings. However, the said finding of the criminal Court cannot be held to be binding on the departmental proceedings. In the present case on hand, there is not even an honourable acquittal in favour of the Writ Petitioner. Moreover, the prosecution has been done by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department. The said decision cannot be binding on the respondent who is proceeding independently. It is also not known under what circumstances, the criminal case was closed. Moreover, the criminal case it is for the prosecution to prove their case, where as in the departmental proceedings the rules of evidence are procedure are totally different and the duty is also on the delinquent officer to substantial his case. 6. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the facts are totally different. In the said case, a judgment on merits was passed by the Criminal Court. The above said judgment the Court was dealing with the case in which the petitioner was given the punishment after a full-fledged enquiry. 6. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the facts are totally different. In the said case, a judgment on merits was passed by the Criminal Court. The above said judgment the Court was dealing with the case in which the petitioner was given the punishment after a full-fledged enquiry. The Hon’ble Court was pleased to consider the above said facts involved, the said case, such as the other persons who were charge sheeted and sent for trial have not been proceeded with an against the petitioner therein and they have also been retained in the job and promoted as well. Further, the petitioner there in was exonerated by the vigilance committee and punishment was based upon a statement of a person who was also charge sheeted by against whom no action is taken. Therefore, taking in to consideration of the above said facts, the learned single Judge has set aside the punishment against the petitioner thereon, on account of violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India. 7. However, the facts of the present case are totally different. In the present case, there is no allegation of violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India. It is well settled principle of law that there is no bar for the departmental proceedings evening a case where the delinquent officer is acquitted by the Criminal Case. In the Judgment report in Corpn. Of the City of Nagpur v. Ramachandra (1981) 2 SCC, 714: 1981-II-LLJ-6, has observed as follows at p.8 of LLJ: “7. The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a mater which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the finding given by the criminal Court. The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a mater which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the finding given by the criminal Court. Normally, where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction (discretion) in any way fettered…” Similarly, in the Judgment G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Others AIR 2006 SC 2129 : (2006) SCC 446: (2006) 3 MLJ 143: 2006-III-LLJ-1075. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows at p.153 of MLJ: “25. … In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to he valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed……” In a recent judgment in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1161 : (2007) 10 SCC 385 : (2007) 4 MLJ 884, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, observed as follows at p.890 of MLJ: “16. The position in law relating to acquittal in a criminal case, its effect on, departmental proceedings and reinstatement in service has been dealt with by this Court in Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana (1997) 4 SCC 385 . It was held in para 5 as follows: 5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal Court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It was held in para 5 as follows: 5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal Court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary government, servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent is only a temporary government servant, the power being available under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in service a government servant accused of defalcation of public money, reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money. 17. The standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge and even if there is an acquittal in the criminal proceedings the same does not bar departmental proceedings. That being so, the order of the State Government deciding not to continue the departmental proceedings is clearly untenable and is quashed. The departmental proceedings shall continue.” In Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. v. N Balakrishnan (2007) 9 SCC 755 : (2007) 6 MLJ 1675. The Hon’able Supreme Court has observed as here under. At p.1862 of MLJ: “22. There are evidently two lines of decisions of this Court operating in the field. The departmental proceedings shall continue.” In Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. v. N Balakrishnan (2007) 9 SCC 755 : (2007) 6 MLJ 1675. The Hon’able Supreme Court has observed as here under. At p.1862 of MLJ: “22. There are evidently two lines of decisions of this Court operating in the field. One being the cases which would come within the purview of Capt M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. AIR 1999-1-LLJ-1094, and G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat. (supra). However, the second line of decisions show that an itself may not be held to be determinative in respect of order of punishment meted out to the delinquent officer, inter alia, when; (i) the order of acquittal has not been passed on the same set of facts or same set of evidence; (ii) the effect of difference in standard of proof in criminal trial and disciplinary proceeding has not been considered or, where the delinquent officer was charged with something more than the subject-matter of the criminal case and/or covered by a decision of the civil Court.” 8. The learned Government Pleader also relied upon the judgment in Ajitkumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. Haldaia and Others AIR 2005 SC 4217 : (2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005-III-LLJ-1129, wherein paragraph 12 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows at p. 1134 of LLJ: “12. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal Court is concerned, the said order does not preclude the corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. Acquittal by a criminal Court would, not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations, in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. The operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of a criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with, the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless tire prosecution is able to prove the guilt (sic) of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt,” he cannot be convicted by a Court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability.” Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the corporation. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal Court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserve to be quashed set aside, cannot be upheld.” 9. A reading of the above judgments would clearly show that there is no bar for the respondents to proceed with the departmental enquiry even though the criminal case initiated against the petitioner has been closed. As observed earlier, it is not established under what circumstances the said case was closed. Even otherwise, the closing of the said case is not a bar to the Departmental proceedings and also not a ground to set aside the charge memo. The question whether the charges are true or not will have to be proved only in the departmental enquiry. 10. Hence, taking into consideration of the above said facts the Court is of the opinion that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the same is dismissed. However, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner about the impact of the closing of the criminal case will have to considered by the disciplinary authorities while deciding the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Hence, with the said observation, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are dismissed.