JUDGMENT: Rakesh Tiwari, A. K. Roopanwal, J. We have heard Dr. G. S. D. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Karuna Nand Vajpayee, learned AGA for the State and perused the record. 2. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the validity and the correctness of the judgment and order dated 14.10.1997 passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jhansi, in S. T. No. 295 of 1996, u/s 302 I.P.C., Police Station Mahila Thana Nawabad, District Jhansi, whereby the appellant was convicted u/s 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5000/- and in the event of failure to deposit the fine further rigorous imprisonment for two years. 3. The facts of the case in brief are that the deceased Sheela had herself lodged a first information report, exhibit Ka-2, on 10.5.1996 at 10.55 A.M. that her husband (the appellant) asked money for liquor, which she refused. Her husband on this poured kerosene oil and set her on fire. On the basis of this first information report the case was registered at G.D. No. 12. 4. It appears from the record that the first informant (deceased) was admitted in the hospital by Constable Raj Kumari C.P. 639 and the following injuries had been recorded in the hospital by the Emergency Medical Officer, Jhansi: "Superficial to deep burn injuries on the head singeing of hair over neck and chin, both upper limbs, abdomen front and back, chest back and both lower limbs except Petticoat area. Red line and demarcation present, blisters at many places. G.C. Poor, Pulse rapid, Tuready 130/ mt volume low. Pt is in shock. Smell of kerosene oil present. Percentage of burn 65-70% Duration Fresh. Nature K.U.O. Admitted. Caused by Thermal burn." 5. Constable Mahila, (herein referred to as C.M.) 39 Smt. Kishori Devi, who was on duty and scribed the chick FIR and G.D. also stated that oral dying declaration was also made by the deceased Smt. Sheela before her death. 6. The deceased died in the hospital on 25.5.1996. She had also given her dying declaration on 12.5.1996 before the Magistrate. In that too she had stated that she was burnt by the appellant by pouring kerosene oil and by setting her on fire. 7. The investigation of the case was taken up by S.I. Rita Shukla, the then Station Officer, Police Station Mahila Thana Nawabad, District Jhansi. She had also given her dying declaration on 12.5.1996 before the Magistrate. In that too she had stated that she was burnt by the appellant by pouring kerosene oil and by setting her on fire. 7. The investigation of the case was taken up by S.I. Rita Shukla, the then Station Officer, Police Station Mahila Thana Nawabad, District Jhansi. She had stated that the deceased Smt. Sheela, wife of the appellant had come to the police station on 10.5.1996 at about 10.55 A.M. alongwith a written report in a badly burnt condition. On the basis of the written report the case was registered and the deceased was taken to the hospital for treatment where she died on 25.5.1996. In her evidence S.I. Rita Shukla stated that she recorded the statements of Smt. Sheela (deceased) on 11.5.1996 and of Km. Arti. She had prepared the site plan of the place of occurrence, exhibit Ka-6. Thereafter statement of Ramesh Chandra, who was brother-in-law of the deceased, was recorded. Statements of Mool Chand and Km. Gunja were also recorded by her on 19.5.1996. The inquest report alongwith connected papers were prepared by the I.O. and she arrested the accused- appellant on 26.5.1996. She obtained a copy of the post-mortem report, recorded statements of CP 587 Arvind Kumar, HC 1059 A.K. Yadav and after going through the dying declaration of the deceased submitted the charge sheet. 8. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions where the appellant was charged u/s 302 I.P.C. on 15.10.1996 by the then Sessions Judge, Jhansi, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 9. The trial court after analysing the evidence produced by the prosecution as well as the defence found the case of the prosecution proved u/s 302 I.P.C. against the accused- appellant and convicted and sentenced him in the aforesaid manner. 10. At the very outset we propose to record the statement of Mr. Mishra that he does not dispute the factum of the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by the Magistrate but disputes its truthfulness. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the dying declaration was not liable to be believed by the trial court as the Magistrate, who recorded the same did not obtain any separate certificate from the doctor that the maker of the dying declaration was in fit condition to make the declaration. 12. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the dying declaration was not liable to be believed by the trial court as the Magistrate, who recorded the same did not obtain any separate certificate from the doctor that the maker of the dying declaration was in fit condition to make the declaration. 12. The above argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is devoid of merits. There is no requirement under section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act that a separate certificate about the mental health of the maker of the dying declaration is required in order to prove the dying declaration. In fact the certificate of the doctor regarding the fitness of mind of the victim and the fact that she was concious through out to give statement is available in the dying declaration dated 12.5.96 itself. The certificate is as under:- lVhZQkbM nSV Jherh 'khyk nsoh iRuh Jh dYyk bt dkfUl;l lh es fxo fn LVsVesUV A g0 vLi"V 12- 5 -96 8- 05 ih0 ,e0 ewR;qiwoZ c;ku Jherh 'khyk iRuh dYyk mQZ ewypUnz vk;q 40 o"kZ fuoklh xuir dk cxhpk] vkf'kd pkSjkgk rglhy ds ihNs Fkkuk uokckn >kalh us vius iw.kZ gks'kksgok'k esa l'kiFk c;ku fn;k fd mldk ifr fu0 va0& 'khyk g0 vLi"V ¼/kesZUnz flag½ vij rglhynkj eftLVsªV >kalh 12- 5- 96 8-15 ih0,e0 lVhZQkbM nSV Jherh 'khyk jhsesUM dkUll fM;qfjax n LVsVesaUVA bDt d&1 g0 vLi"V 12@5@96 ,V 8- 15 ih- ,e- Mk0 Vh- ih-ikyhoky bZ- ,e- vks 13. Perusal of the above dying declaration, exhibit-1, shows that the doctor before permitting the Magistrate for recording of the dying declaration certified the state of mind and its fitness. After recording the statement (dying declaration) of Smt. Sheela again certified that Smt. Sheela had remained concious during the statement. Therefore it can be safely said that whatever was narrated by the lady in her dying declaration was mentioned in it as there is nothing on the record to show that anyone had tutored her so as to make her statement false and unbelievable. 14. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there are some variances in the two dying declarations i.e. the first dying declaration in the form of the FIR and the other i.e. the one quoted above. 14. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there are some variances in the two dying declarations i.e. the first dying declaration in the form of the FIR and the other i.e. the one quoted above. According to him, in the FIR it was not written that the appellant had forcibly snatched all the ornaments of the deceased on 10.5.1996 while this fact is mentioned in the aforesaid dying declaration. 15. The question as to whether there was any substantial variation in the dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution and were thus trustworthy so as to fasten guilt upon the appellant for the murder of his wife is now to be considered by us. 16. The first dying declaration was the written report of the deceased Smt. Sheela, which she had submitted on 10.5.1996 before the police of Police Station Mahila Thana Nawabad, Jhansi. This dying declaration was proved by C.M. 39 Kishori Devi PW6, who had scribed the FIR word for word as was dictated by the deceased. She was cross-examined on this dying declaration but nothing could be elicited by which it could be said that this dying declaration in the form of FIR was never made by the deceased or it was a tutored one. The said dying declaration was made by Smt. Sheela (since deceased) within one and half hours of the occurrence. She herself had walked to the police Station Mahila Thana Nawabad, Jhansi, in burnt condition to lodge the same. This dying declaration clearly stated that the accused- appellant was the person, who had committed the occurrence and set her on fire. We feel that this dying declaration is a reliable one and can be made the basis for holding the accused- appellant guilty for the murder of his wife, the first informant (deceased). 17. The second dying declaration was given by the deceased Sheela before the Magistrate in the hospital on 12.5.1996 at about 8.05 P.M., which is exhibit-1. In this dying declaration she had clearly stated that the accused- appellant was the person, who had set her on fire at 9.00 A.M. at 10.5.1996. 18. If something is missing in the previous dying declaration i.e. the FIR by that it cannot be said that the other dying declaration i.e. the present one is untruthful. In this dying declaration she had clearly stated that the accused- appellant was the person, who had set her on fire at 9.00 A.M. at 10.5.1996. 18. If something is missing in the previous dying declaration i.e. the FIR by that it cannot be said that the other dying declaration i.e. the present one is untruthful. It is quite possible that the deceased might have forgotten to narrate the above fact in the FIR, which otherwise is a brief narration of facts, due to shock of burn injuries. Moreover, it is not expected that each and every minute detail shall be mentioned in the FIR. Thus, the above variance in the two dying declarations is not capable to make out a case in favour of the appellant. 19. In view of the above, we feel that no substantive variance in the two dying declarations above is made out which may have the effect of wiping of the prosecution by creating a reasonable doubt about the occurrence, hence this argument is of no help to the appellant. 20. It is then urged that PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 have been declared hostile by the prosecution, hence the evidence of the witnesses, who were declared hostile by the prosecution, ought to have been taken into account inspite of the dying declaration of the deceased, but the trial court, wrongly did not give any benefit of their statements to the accused- appellant. 21. To test the argument of learned counsel for the appellant we propose to refer to the substantial evidence produced by the prosecution as well as the defence. 22. The prosecution produced eight witnesses in support of its case. 23. PW-1 Km. Arti, aged about 14 years, daughter of the appellant, in her evidence stated that her mother sustained burn injuries while she was cooking food. PW-2 Km. Gujna is child witness of 9 years of age. She was tested by the court and was found that she is capable of giving evidence. She stated that Kalla is her mathernal uncle and her "Mami" died of burn in the hospital. She was speaking when she died. PW-3 Ramesh Chandra was also produced by the prosecution. He stated in the evidence that Sheela was conscious ; that she was not a contentious woman; that the accused is of good character and had never beaten his wife before him. 24. She was speaking when she died. PW-3 Ramesh Chandra was also produced by the prosecution. He stated in the evidence that Sheela was conscious ; that she was not a contentious woman; that the accused is of good character and had never beaten his wife before him. 24. All these three witnesses were declared hostile by the prosecution. 25. The daughters PW1 and PW2 of the deceased were minor and were living with the appellant- their father, who was languishing in jail. It appears from their statements that the financial status of their father is very poor and there is no one else in the family to look after them. Therefore, being the daughters of the appellant the natural inclination in the circumstances could be to save their father, who may provide for them as their mother had already died. Therefore, we do not see any reason to believe their testimony for interfereing with the findings recorded by the trial court regarding the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2. 26. So far as PW-3 Ramesh Chandra is concerned, he is not an eyewitness of the incident and his testimony would not carry weight against the dying declaration of the deceased. 27. PW-4 Dr. Raghunath Dhatte, was Emergency Medical Officer in the District Hospital, Jhansi, on duty. He in his statement had deposed that the deceased Smt. Sheela had been brought by Constable Raj Kumari. She had sustained burn injuries. Her condition was also described by him in the statement. He also stated that he had prepared the report regarding burn injuries of the deceased and proved the same. 28. PW-5 Dharmendra Singh, retired Tehsildar, Jhansi, in his evidence stated that he was posted at the relevant time on 12.5.1996 as an Additional Tehsildar, Jhansi, and had taken the dying declaration of the deceased Smt. Sheela. He proved the dying declaration. 29. PW-6 Smt. Kishori Devi, lady constable, in her evidence stated that at the relevant time she was posted at Police Station Mahila Thana, Nawabad, District Jhansi. She proved the written report submitted by the deceased Smt. Sheela. 30. PW-7 Dr. Harish Yadav, who had conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased Smt. Sheela, gave vivid details of the injuries on the body of the deceased. She proved the written report submitted by the deceased Smt. Sheela. 30. PW-7 Dr. Harish Yadav, who had conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased Smt. Sheela, gave vivid details of the injuries on the body of the deceased. He stated that the rigor mortis had passed off, her stomach was distended, eyes bulged out, eyebrows and part of scalp hair were singed and the following ante-mortem injuries were found the body of the deceased: "1st and 2nd degree surgical burn present all over body except (a) Lt. Side of abdomen and thigh; (b) left forearm portion only, (C) Left hand dorsal aspect, (d) Forehead skin peeled off at places of burn area. Floor of burn area congested and some dressing point adhere at some places of burnt area. Line of redness present in between burnt area and healthy skin." 31. The doctor PW-7 had proved the post-mortem report exhibit Ka-4. He opined that the death had occurred due to shock and haemorrhage resulted due to ante-mortem burn injuries. 32. PW-8 Rita Shukla was the I.O. and whatever action had been taken by her have already been mentioned above. 33. All the above persons i.e. PW4 to PW8 are formal witnesses. The appellant could not make any dent in their testimony to shake the very fabric of their evidence, hence the court believes their statement. 34. The statement of the accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded in which he completely denied the prosecution story and examined two witnesses in support of his case namely Matadin as DW-1 and himself as DW-2. 35. As regards the defence witness DW-1 is concerned, he is also not an eyewitness and being previous husband of the deceased had animus to depose against her, who had left him. Thus, the trial court was perfectly justified in not placing reliance upon this witness. 36. DW-2, the appellant, is the interested witness, who would not give any evidence against him. Thus, the trial court was perfectly justified in not placing reliance upon this witness also. 37. Thus, the trial court was perfectly justified in not placing reliance upon this witness. 36. DW-2, the appellant, is the interested witness, who would not give any evidence against him. Thus, the trial court was perfectly justified in not placing reliance upon this witness also. 37. The learned AGA submits that it has been held by the Apex Court time and again that FIR or written report or statement given by the deceased before her death can be considered as a dying declaration, provided that court is satisfied that the dying declaration is of a nature which inspires full confidence i.e. it should neither be tutored nor prompted or be a product of imagination and is voluntarily. 38. In this regard reference may be made to para 15 of the decision of Apex Court rendered in (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)1028, State of H.P. Vs. Rakesh Kumar wherein it has been laid down that there is no reason why the said statement cannot be taken into consideration as a relevant fact. There is also no reason as to why the deceased would falsely implicate the accused to save the real assailant. In Mannu Raja Vs. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 376 it has been held that there is neither rule nor prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. I am also supported by two other decisions of the Apex Court rendered in State of U.P. Vs. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 127 and Ramawati Devi Vs. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 169. 39. The court has, therefore, to scrutinise the dying declarations carefully and must ensure that dying declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination as has been held in the case of K. Ramchandra Reddy Vs. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 168: 1976 SCC (Cri) 473. 40. The aforesaid cases have been considered by the Apex Court and have been cited with approval in Vari Quppal Srinivas Vs. State of A.P., (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 136. 41. Thus, there remains the only evidence of dying declaration against the accused- appellant. The trial court accepted the dying declaration given by the deceased to the Magistrate as believable one and this was the sole basis for holding the accused- appellant guilty. 42. State of A.P., (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 136. 41. Thus, there remains the only evidence of dying declaration against the accused- appellant. The trial court accepted the dying declaration given by the deceased to the Magistrate as believable one and this was the sole basis for holding the accused- appellant guilty. 42. The court is to satisfy itself regarding the state of mental fitness, truthfulness and worthiness of the statement relied upon as dying declaration which can be made a basis for conviction without any further corroboration. Law is well settled that an uncorroborated dying declaration can also form a basis for conviction as corroboration is only a rule of prudence, as has been held in catena of cases wherein the principles governing the dying declaration have been summed up. This is so because the only requirement before a statement is to be considered as dying declaration as that it must confirm of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. They are satisfied regarding the mental status, fitness and the truthfulness of the dying declaration. 43. From the material on the record it is also apparent that the deceased was in a fit mental state to make the statement/ dying declaration. Thus, we see no reason at all to the suspicion of this dying declaration as the deceased had on previous occasion also narrated substantially the same circumstances in her statement. Considering the facts and the circumstances in totality, we do feel that the trial court was perfectly justified in placing reliance on the dying declaration made by the lady about her death and the opinion of the trial court does not require any interference by this Court. 44. The learned counsel for the appellant did not argue any other point. 45. For all the reasons stated above, we do not find any merits in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 46. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is already in jail, therefore, there is no need for him to surrender. 47. A copy of this order is certified to the C.J.M. concerned for necessary action.