JUDGMENT : Narendra Nath Tiwari, J.: The main point sought to be answered in this appeal is as to whether Dar-raiyati settlement made in the year 1934 without permission of the Deputy Commissioner is violative of Section 46 or any other provisions of Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter to be referred as the “Act”), attracting mischief of Section 71A of the said Act. 2. The appellant claims to have validly possessed land of Revisional Survey Khata No.257, measuring an area of 23.07 acres of village Gotra, P.S. Simdega, District Gumla. The said land of Khata No.257 was recorded as KAIMI in the names of Mana Kharia and Suleman Kharia in the Revisional Survey Record of Rights as tenants in common with note of specific possession of the plots in the remarks column. 3. Mana Kharia was also known as Emmanuel Kharia. He mortgaged the land of his share to Manonit Ekka, mother of the appellant, on 14th March, 1934. 4. Suleman Kharia, another co-tenant, made a Dar-raiyat Settlement in favour of Manonit Ekka in respect of the land, measuring 14.29 acres of Khata No.257 by unregistered deed dated 19th March, 1934. 5. During subsistence of the mortgaged period, Mana Kharia too made Dar-raiyat Settlement in favour of Manonit Ekka in respect of the land, measuring 8.78 acres of Khata No.257 on accepting Salami by unregistered deed dated 8th April, 1936. 6. Since thereafter, the land is being held and possessed as Dar-raiyat by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and subsequently by the appellant continuously on payment of rent. 7. Manonit Ekka died leaving behind two sons, namely, Kushal Maya Ekka and the appellant. They in exercise of their right of ownership and possession sunk a Pucca Well on a portion of Plot No.5022 and reclaimed upland (Tanr land) and converted the same into paddy land. At the relevant time, the cost came between Rs.30,000-40,000/-. They made further improvement in the land and have been coming in continuous cultivating possession of the land. 8. According to the appellant, as a confirmatory step, an indenture of sale was unilaterally executed by Suleman Kharia on 18th July, 1946, though the same remained dormant and inoperative and the land all along is held as Dar-raiyat. 9. They made further improvement in the land and have been coming in continuous cultivating possession of the land. 8. According to the appellant, as a confirmatory step, an indenture of sale was unilaterally executed by Suleman Kharia on 18th July, 1946, though the same remained dormant and inoperative and the land all along is held as Dar-raiyat. 9. After about more than 40 years Cyril Kharia, son of Mana Kharia (Respondent No.4 herein) filed an application under Section 71A of the said Act before the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, praying for restoration of the said land. 10. Section 71A of the said Act has been enacted by Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969 (Bihar Regulation 1 of 1969) in order to make provision for restoration of possession to the members of the Scheduled Tribes over the land unlawfully transferred. 1. The Special Officer registered the aforesaid application as SAR Case No.283 of 1979-80. Notice was issued to the appellant. He had appeared and contested the case. In his reply, it was, inter alia, contended that the application is not maintainable in aw and is liable to be rejected. There has been no violation of Section 46 or any other provision of the said Act. The land was validly acquired by virtue of Dar-raiyati Settlement long back in the year 1936. It was further contended that the application seeking restoration of the land after more than four decades is also barred by limitation. 12. The Special Officer after hearing the parties passed order dated 20th October, 1981 holding that the appellant himself is a member of the Scheduled Tribes. The land was given as Darraiyati settlement on payment of Salami more than 30 years ago. He has acquired valid right title and possession and that the application for restoration under Section 71A of the Act is not maintainable. He, thus, rejected the application. 13. Respondent no.4 preferred appeal against the said order before the Additional Collector, Gumla, being S.A.R. Appeal No.321 R 15 of 1981-82. 14. Learned Additional Collector allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Special Officer, observing that the claim of the appellant being based on unregistered deed is fraudulent and the land has been transferred in contravention of the provisions of the said Act. 15. The appellant, thereafter, preferred statutory revision before the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi. 14. Learned Additional Collector allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Special Officer, observing that the claim of the appellant being based on unregistered deed is fraudulent and the land has been transferred in contravention of the provisions of the said Act. 15. The appellant, thereafter, preferred statutory revision before the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi. The same was registered as Ranchi Revenue Revision No.91 of 1984. The Commissioner by his laconic order dated 19th June, 1984 refused to admit the revision. 16. The appellant, challenging the said order, filed a writ petition, being CWJC No.910 of 1984 (R). By order dated 25th May, 1989, the said writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the order of the Commissioner and directing him to admit the revision application and hear the parties on merit. 17. The Commissioner, thereafter, heard the said revision application and dismissed the same by order dated 7th June, 1997. 18. The appellant assailed the said order in this Court in CWJC No.2586 of 1997(R). By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition, upholding the order of the revisional authority and dismissing the petition. It has been, inter alia, held that the appellate as well as revisional authorities have passed concurrent orders holding that no right was created either by mortgage deed or by Dar-raiyati deed and the ground of limitation was not raised before the concerned authority. The writ petition has, thus, no merit. 19. The appellant, in this appeal, has sought to challenge the impugned order of learned Single Judge mainly on the following grounds: (i)The appellant’s predecessor-in-interest acquired the land by virtue of Dar-raiyati Settlement. By the said settlement a subsidiary right has been created by the raiyat. The Chotanagpur Tenancy Act does not debar creation of Dar-raiyati right by any of its provisions. (ii)Dar-raiyat or under-raiyat is a class of tenant recognized and defined in Section 4 of the Act. (iii)Dar-raiyati tenancy is well recognized age old customary tenancy. Custom of acquisition of occupancy right and/or right equal to raiyati right has been said to be not in inconsistent with any provision of the C.N.T. Act. Such custom is saved by Section 76 of the said Act. (iv) There is no contravention of law in the said transaction and the same does not come within the ambit of Section 71A of the said Act. Such custom is saved by Section 76 of the said Act. (iv) There is no contravention of law in the said transaction and the same does not come within the ambit of Section 71A of the said Act. (v)The appellant and before him his predecessor-in-interest had/have been in continuous cultivating possession of the land for more than four decades; they have acquired right of occupancy even by operation of statutory provision. .(vi)The application for restoration of land preferred after more than four decades is barred by limitation. (vii)The appellate authority and the revisional authority without taking into consideration the said legal provisions and the well recognized customs saved by Section 76 of the said Act have erroneously upset the finding and the order of the Special Officer, Scheduled Areas Regulation. He had rightly held that the application under Section 71A of the said Act is not maintainable. (viii)Learned Single Judge has upheld the said erroneous orders without taking into consideration the points taken in the writ petition. Learned Single Judge has also committed an error of record in observing that the appellant has not raised the point of limitation earlier and the said ground cannot be entertained at that stage. As a matter of fact, the appellant had raised this point at the very outset in his show cause reply before the Special Officer, Scheduled Areas Regulation and the Special Officer had taken note of the same and rejected the application of Respondent no.4, also taking into consideration of the point of limitation. 20. The respondents, on the other hand, contested the appeal and submitted that the initial mortgage as also the claim of under raiyati settlement was fraudulent and contrary to the provision of Section 46 of the said Act and the power under Section 71A has been rightly exercised by the appellate and the revisional authorities. 21. Mr. B. B. Sinha, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of Respondent No.4, submitted that even if it is accepted that the under raiyati tenancy was created in favour of Manonit Ekka, the said right is not heritable by the descendants of Manonit Ekka and possession of the land has been rightly restored in favour of the descendants of the transferor. Learned counsel referred to and relied upon a decision of learned Single Judge of Patna High Court in the case of Haripada Mahato and Anr. Vs. Learned counsel referred to and relied upon a decision of learned Single Judge of Patna High Court in the case of Haripada Mahato and Anr. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [1988 BLT (Rep.) 258]. He further submitted that there is no prescribed period of limitation for exercising power under Section 71A of the said Act by the Deputy Commissioner and power can be exercised at any time without any limitation. The points raised by the appellant were considered by the learned Single Judge and the same were rightly rejected. No interference with the impugned order is warranted. 22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the facts and materials on record. We also examined the relevant legal provisions and the decisions referred to and relied upon in course of hearing of this appeal. 23. Section 71A of the said Act has been introduced by Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969 (Bihar Regulation 1 of 1969). 22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the facts and materials on record. We also examined the relevant legal provisions and the decisions referred to and relied upon in course of hearing of this appeal. 23. Section 71A of the said Act has been introduced by Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969 (Bihar Regulation 1 of 1969). The said section is reproduced herein below: “71-A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred-If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a raiyat or a Mundari Khunt-Kattidar or a Bhuinhari who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 or Section 48 or Section 240 or any other provisions of this Act or by any fraudulent method, including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transfer, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary inquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another Raiyat belonging to Scheduled Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding: Provided that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed: Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into force of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, validate such transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, of the equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor: Provided also that if after an inquiry the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by adverse possession and that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another raiyat, as the case may be, to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be and the amount of any compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable.” 24. From the said provision, it is clear that in order to bring a case within the fold of this provision-(i) there must be transfer of land belonging to a raiyat or Bhuinhar or Mundari Khunt-kattidar, who is a member of Scheduled Tribes; (ii) the transfer is in contravention of Section 46 or any other provision of the said Act or by any fraudulent method. 25. In the instant case, the Kaimi raiyats by virtue of the settlement of the land, made in favour of Manonit Ekka created a subsidiary right under them called under-raiyat. No provision has been brought before us to show that any provision of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act prohibits creation of under-raiyati tenancy. 26. Section 4 of the said Act specifies classes of tenants. In Clause (3) of the Section ‘Under-raiyat’ has been included as one of the classes of tenant. The said section runs thus: “4. Classes of tenants.-There shall be, for the purposes of this Act, the following classes of tenants, namely:- (1) tenure-holders, including under-tenure-holders; (2) raiyat, namely:- (a) occupancy-raiyats, that is to say, raiyats having a right of occupancy in the land held by them, (b) non-occupancy raiyats, that is to say, raiyats not having such a right of occupancy, and (c) raiyats having khunt-katti rights; (3) under-raiyats, that is to say, tenants holding, whether immediately or mediately, under raiyats; and (4) Mundari Khunt-kattidars.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. Again Section 6 of the said Act defines the meaning of ‘raiyat’, which reads as follows:- “6. Meaning of “raiyat”-(1) “Raiyat” means primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold and for the purpose of cultivating it by himself or by members of his family, or by hired servants or with the aid of partners; and includes the successor-in-interest of persons who have acquired such a right, but does not include a Mundari-Khunt-kattidar. (2) A person shall not be deemed to be a raiyat unless he holds land either immediately under a proprietor or immediately under a tenure-holder or immediately under a Mundari-khunt-kattidar. (3) In determining whether a tenant is a tenure-holder or raiyat, the Court shall have regard to,- (a)local custom, and (b)the purpose for which the right of tenancy was originally acquired. “ 28.Sections 4 and 6 read together make it clear that ‘Raiyat’ and ‘Under-raiyat’ are two different classes of tenants in the C.N.T. Act. (3) In determining whether a tenant is a tenure-holder or raiyat, the Court shall have regard to,- (a)local custom, and (b)the purpose for which the right of tenancy was originally acquired. “ 28.Sections 4 and 6 read together make it clear that ‘Raiyat’ and ‘Under-raiyat’ are two different classes of tenants in the C.N.T. Act. A raiyat holds land either immediately under a proprietor or a tenure-holder or Mundari-Khunt-Kattidar, whereas an under-raiyat holds land immediately or mediately under a raiyat. 29.Mana Kharia and Suleman Kharia, who had made settlement in favour of Manonit Ekka, admittedly were raiyats within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act. The settlement in favour of Manonit Ekka by the said raiyats created a tenancy, namely, under-raiyati tenancy, which is a recognized class of tenant under the said Act. 30.Though the provisions of the said Act do not provide the procedure for creation or incident of under-raiyati tenancy, a custom by which an under-raiyat acquires rights similar to those of an occupancy raiyat is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Such custom and usage is saved by Section 76 of the said Act. Section 76 of the said Act reads as follows: “76. Saving of custom-Nothing in this Act shall affect any custom, usage or customary right not inconsistent with, or not expressly or by necessary implication modified or abolished by its provisions. Illustrations .(i) A custom or usage whereby a ‘Raiyat’ obtains a right of occupancy as soon as he is admitted to occupation of the tenancy, whether he is a settled ‘Raiyat’ of the village or not, is not inconsistent with, and is not expressly or by necessary implication modified or abolished by, the provisions of this Act. That custom or usage, accordingly, wherever it exists, will not be affected by this Act. (ii) A custom or usage by which an under ‘Raiyat’ can obtain rights similar to those of an occupancy ‘Raiyat’ is similarly, not in consistent with, and is not expressly or by necessary implication modified or abolished by the provisions of this Act, and will not be affected by this Act. (iii) A custom or usage whereby a ‘Raiyat’ is entitled to make improvements on his tenancy and to receive compensation therefore an ejectment is not inconsistent with, and is not expressly or by necessary implication modified or abolished by the provisions of this Act. (iii) A custom or usage whereby a ‘Raiyat’ is entitled to make improvements on his tenancy and to receive compensation therefore an ejectment is not inconsistent with, and is not expressly or by necessary implication modified or abolished by the provisions of this Act. That custom or usage, accordingly, wherever it exists, will not be affected by this Act. (iv)A custom or usage whereby ‘Korkar’ is held,- .(a)during preparation for cultivation, rent-free, or .(b)after preparation, at a rate of rent less than the rate payable for ordinary ‘Raiyati’ land in the same village tenure or estate, is not inconsistent with, and is not expressly or by necessary implication modified or abolished by the provisions of this Act. That custom or usage, accordingly wherever it exists, will not be affected by this Act.” 31. Illustration (ii) of Section 76 of the Act makes it clear that any such custom by which an under Raiyat can obtain rights similar to those of an occupancy Raiyat is not inconsistent with and not expressly or by necessary implication modified or abolished by the provisions of this Act, and will not be affected by this Act. 32. From the said clear provision in the said Act, creation of an under raiyati tenancy and custom of acquisition of right even similar to those of an occupancy raiyat cannot be said to be in violation or in consistent with any other provisions of the Act. 33. It is a different question that in all cases, an under-raiyat does not acquire occupancy right in the land held by him. Acquisition of such right is subject to custom or usage prevalent in the area. The claim of such custom raises a factual question and the same is required to be pleaded and proved. 34. It is not the case of the respondents that the appellant has not pleaded and proved such custom of acquisition of occupancy right, which as per the provision of Section 23 of the Act is a heritable right like any other immovable properties subject to local custom to the contrary. However, under raiyati, being a recognized class of tenancy under law, cannot be held to be per se illegal or violative of any provision of the Act so as to bring the same within the fold of Section 71A of the Act. 35. However, under raiyati, being a recognized class of tenancy under law, cannot be held to be per se illegal or violative of any provision of the Act so as to bring the same within the fold of Section 71A of the Act. 35. The appellate/revisional authority as well as learned Single Judge have not taken into consideration the said legal aspects and erroneously maintained the claim of the respondents under the provisions of Section 71A of the Act. 36. In view of the said legal provision, we are unable to uphold the view of the learned Single Judge in the case of Haripada Mahato & Anr. (Supra) that the creation of under raiyati settlement is a lease and such lease is restricted only for a period of five years. An under-raiyat is a class of tenant, holding the land under a Raiyat recognized by the custom and the tenancy law. Moreover Section 44 of the Act speaks about the Raiyat’s right to entitle to receive land on a lease but it does not include under-raiyat. Section 46 of the Act also does not speak about any restriction for creating a subsidiary under raiyati tenancy. The fact of the case of Haripada Mahato & Anr. (Supra) is also different and the same has got no application to the facts of the instant case. 37. That apart, in the instant case, under raiyati tenancy was created in the year 1936. Since thereafter the ancestors of the appellant were in continuous cultivating possession. After the death of Manonit Ekka, the appellant and his brother have been coming in continuous possession of the land. There is a claim of improvement of land on investing considerable amount. Even in absence of a custom of acquisition of occupancy right, the appellant having been in continuous cultivating possession for more than 40 years to the knowledge of the recorded tenants/their successor-in-interest acquires title by adverse possession. 38. By Bihar Regulation 1 of 1969, Article 65 of the Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963 has been amended and the period of limitation has been extended to 30 years in respect of the immovable property belonging to the member of Scheduled Tribe. Settlement in this case is of the year 1936 and the claim of restoration has been made in the year 1979-80 i.e. after more than the prescribed period of thirty years. 39. Settlement in this case is of the year 1936 and the claim of restoration has been made in the year 1979-80 i.e. after more than the prescribed period of thirty years. 39. Though the third proviso to Section 71A of the Act confers power on the Deputy Commissioner to restore the land and resettle it to the transferor or his heir or another raiyat even after acquisition of title by adverse possession. Such power has to be exercised for reasons to be recorded as to why it should be restored or resettled after acquisition of title by adverse possession. That too can be ordered subject to further condition of depositing the fair and equitable sum as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner, having regard to the market value of the land or the amount for which the land was transferred, coupled with compensation for improvements effected to the land. From the said proviso to Section 71A of the Act, it is clear that if after an enquiry, the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired title by adverse possession and that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another raiyat, as the case may be, to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be and the amount of any compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable. 40. The said provision, therefore, contemplates that in order to exercise the power of restoration after expiry of more than thirty years, the Deputy Commissioner has to peruse and ponder: whether the land should or should not be restored to the transferor or his heir. The legislature intended that for restoration of land after acquisition of title by adverse possession by the transferee, the test of reasonableness has to be applied keeping also in view the object of social justice underlying in Section 71A of the Act. 41. The legislature intended that for restoration of land after acquisition of title by adverse possession by the transferee, the test of reasonableness has to be applied keeping also in view the object of social justice underlying in Section 71A of the Act. 41. One of the considerations in such cases may be the visible presence of element of evil and dishonest design to wrongfully deprive the ignorant/unprivileged tribal of his raiyati land by some one having better social and economic background which was misused to occupy the land of the tribe without legally unexplainable and reasonable excuse and further that denial of restoration would defeat the object sought to be achieved by enacting the special provision of Section 71A. 42. In the instant case, there is no such visible element of deceit. The original settlee was herself an aboriginal having same social background and the under-raiyati settlement made in her favour is a well recognized kind of tenancy under the said Act. 43. The concerned authorities ignored the same and have also not recorded any specific reason for restoration of land in favour of Respondent no.4 as required by third proviso to Section 71A in spite of acquisition of valuable right, title by the appellant. 44. Even if the Deputy Commissioner found reasons and decided that the land should be restored in spite of lapse of more than four decades, he had to determine fair and equitable amount of compensation as envisaged in the said provision. The order of restoration passed without meeting the said legal requirements is not in conformity with law and is illegal and unsustainable. 45. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the amendment in Article 65 to the schedule of the Limitation Act, the application for restoration filed beyond 30 years is barred by limitation. 15.46. Mr. B. B. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of Respondent no.4, on the other hand, argued that there is no limitation for filing application for restoration under Section 71A of the Act. The opening line of the provision of Section 71A of the Act starts with “If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner”. It does not prescribes any period of limitation for approaching the concerned authority. 47. The opening line of the provision of Section 71A of the Act starts with “If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner”. It does not prescribes any period of limitation for approaching the concerned authority. 47. Whether 30 years limitation is strictly applicable to restrict the revenue authority to entertain application and exercise power under Section 71A is no longer res integra. 48. In the case of Situ Sahu & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. [ (2004)8 SCC 340 ], the Apex Court has held that the use of the words “at any time” in Section 71A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under the Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. 49. In view of the above, it cannot be held that the expiry of period of limitation takes away the power of the concerned officer to restore the land in favour of the transferee under Section 71A. The object not to bar the said power by law of limitation is also clear from the third proviso to Section 71A, as discussed above. The Deputy Commissioner can exercise power of restoration even after acquisition of right by adverse possession by the transferee subject to the conditions appended to the said proviso. 50. In the case of Situ Sahu & Ors. The Deputy Commissioner can exercise power of restoration even after acquisition of right by adverse possession by the transferee subject to the conditions appended to the said proviso. 50. In the case of Situ Sahu & Ors. (Supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that lapse of 40 years is certainly unreasonable time for exercising such power even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. 51. In the instant case, there is lapse of more than 43 years which cannot be said to be reasonable time for exercising power under Section 71A of the Act and that too without recording reasons and fulfilling the conditions imposed by third proviso to Section 71A of the Act. 52. The appellant from the very beginning has been objecting the maintainability of the restoration proceeding on the said grounds. The first revenue court, the Special Officer, considered the same and rejected the application of the Respondent no.4. The appellate as well as the revisional authorities without taking into the said legal aspects erroneously reversed the order of the Special Officer. Learned Single Judge upheld the said erroneous orders, holding the said unfounded and perverse orders as concurrent findings and also rejected the ground of limitation erroneously observing that it was raised for the first time at the writ stage, which apparently appears to be an error of record. 53. For the reasons aforesaid, the order of learned Single Judge cannot sustain. This appeal is, thus, allowed. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge as also the orders of the revisional and appellate authorities are set aside. 54. However, there is no order as to costs.