JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Both these matters are connected involving the common questions of facts and law and, therefore, as requested and agreed by learned counsel for the parties have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Writ Petition No. 22087 of 1989 filed by one Mohd. Sarwar (hereinafter referred to as the “first writ petition”) stating that he was initially appointed as class-IV employee in Western Mirzapur Forest Division in September, 1975 on daily wage basis and continued to work as Moharrir/Tracer up to December, 1978. vide order dated 8.1.1979 he was promoted as Seasonal Nikasi Munshi in the pay scale of 185-265. The said order further provides that the services shall come to an end automatically on 30.6.1979. Thereafter vide order dated 1.7.1980 he was again directed to work as Nikasi Munshi in a vacancy occurred due to suspension of one Sri Khiladi Singh. The said order was modified on 24.6.1981 and the engagement of petitioner was made for the period the vacancy continued due to suspension of the above employee but the petitioner’s engagement was made on contract basis. It was also stated therein that the appointment is purely temporary and on suspension coming to end, he would automatically stand terminated. By means of the impugned order dated 7.11.1989 the petitioner was terminated due to suspension of one Sri Mewa Lal having come to an end and he was reinstated. The petitioner challenged the above order of termination contending that he was appointed against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Khiladi Singh and therefore, his termination due to reinstatement of Sri Mewa Lal is illegal since the petitioner was not appointed against a vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Mewa Lal. He further contended that a person junior to him has been retained but he has been discriminated. He further contended that a person junior to him has been retained but he has been discriminated. Lastly, it is said that since he was continuing from 1975 and in the meantime U.P. Regularisation of Ad-hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules, 1979”) were enacted conferring benefit of regularisation to ad hoc appointees who were appointed prior to 1.1.1977 and the said Rules were further amended on 22.3.1984 extending the cut off date to 1.5.1983 and again in 1989 extending the cut off date to 6.10.1986, the petitioner having continuing in service during the aforesaid period is entitled to be regularised. 3. This Court while entertaining the writ petition on 21.11.1989 passed the following interim order: “Issue notice. Learned Standing Counsel may file a counter affidavit within a month. Until further orders, the operation of the order dated 7th November, 1989 shall remain stayed.” 4. The respondents have filed counter affidavit alongwith stay vacation application on 15.1.1990. The case of the respondents is that initially, the petitioner was engaged on daily wage basis on 10.9.1975 for tracing the maps and ceased to work on 25.1.1977, after cessation of work. Thereafter, for sometime he was engaged as Moharrir on daily wage basis. On 8.1.1979 he was engaged as Seasonal Nikasi Munshi and he continued till 30.6.1979. Again he was engaged as Seasonal Nikasi Munshi on 6.11.1979. In the meantime, one Sri Mewa Lal, a permanent employee was suspended and consequently the petitioner was appointed on 6.11.1981 against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Mewa Law, who was reinstated on 7.11.1989 resulting in termination of the petitioner from the post on which Sri Mewa Lal was reinstated but the petitioner was permitted to continue on daily wage basis as Seasonal Nikasi Munshi. It is said that though after the reinstatement of Sri Mewa Lal, the petitioner could have been terminated from service but taking a lenient view, he was allowed to work as Seasonal Nikasi Munshi. The averment that he has continued to work has not been disputed but it is said that since the petitioner was appointed against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Mewa Lal, by order dated 4.11.1991, there was nothing wrong or illegal in the order impugned in the writ petition and the writ petition is thus liable to be dismissed. It is further said that since the appointment of the petitioner as Nikasi Munshi by order dated 7.11.1989 was for a fixed tenure, he is not entitled for regularization at all. 5. The Writ Petition No. 19995 of 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the “second writ petition”) is against a subsequent termination order dated 8.7.1991. 6. The respondents’ case is that the petitioner’s engagement was not on ad hoc basis but on daily wage and contract basis and, therefore, he is not covered by the Rules 1979. In the rejoinder affidavit filed in writ petition No. 22087 of 1989, the petitioner has reiterated that he was appointed on 24.6.1981 against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Khiladi Singh, who has not been reinstated so far and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner having been appointed in the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Mewa Lal, is liable to be displaced after reinstatement of Mewa Lal. In para 13, it has been said that the alleged order dated 4.11.1981 was never communicated to the petitioner at any point of time prior to the counter affidavit being filed by the respondents and the appointment letter of the petitioner, whereby he was appointed in the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Khiladi Singh has neither been recalled nor modified. 7. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 8. First question is about the vacancy in which the petitioner was appointed and the nature of his appointment. From the perusal of order dated 24.6.1981 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition), it is evident that the petitioner was appointed as Nikasi Munshi against a vacancy caused due to suspension of one Sri Khiladi Singh, Nikasi Munshi for the limited period during which the said employee was to remain under suspension and the said appointment was on contract basis in the pay scale 185-265/-. It also shows that the appointment is absolutely temporary and liable to be terminated on reinstatement of the above Nikashi Munshi, but can also be terminated without any prior notice. It also shows that the appointment is absolutely temporary and liable to be terminated on reinstatement of the above Nikashi Munshi, but can also be terminated without any prior notice. The order of appointment dated 24.6.1981 is reproduced as under : ^^dk;kZy; mi vj.;iky] mRrjh fetkZiqj cu izHkkx fetkZiqj cukns’k la[;k 94@mRrjh@16,Q&13 fnukad fetkZiqj 24 twu] 81 fu;qfDr ,oa inLFkkiu bl dk;kZy; dk cukns’k la[;k 8@16 ,Q&13 fnukad 14-7-80 rFkk cukns’k la[;k 1@15 ,Q&13 fnukad 1-7-80 dk la’kks/ku djrs gq;s Jh yk[k ukjk;u rFkk Jh eksgEen ljoj dh fu;qfDr vkns’k tkjh gksus dh frfFk ls dze’k% uUgdw izlkn xqIrk] fu0eq0 ¼fu0½ rFkk Jh [ksykM+h flag fu0 eq’kh ¼fu0½ ds LFkku ij dsoy fuyEcu le; ds fy;s osrueku 185&3&215 iz0v0 4&235 iz0v0 6&265 osrudze esa dUVsDV csfll ij dh tkrh gSA mijksDr nksuksa fudklh eqa’kh dk in LFkkiu tgkWa ij dk;Zjr gS ogkWa ij fd;k tkrk gS ;g fu;qfDr iw.kZr;k vLFkkbZ gS rFkk fudklh eqa’kh ds dzekuqlkj fuyEcu lekIr gksus ij Lor% lsok eqDr gks tk;sxsaA blds iwoZ Hkh fcuk fdlh iwoZ lwpuk ds lsok eqDr fd;s tk ldrs gSaaA g0@vLi"V ,l0,p0,0 fjtoh mi vj.;iky mRrjh fetkZiqj] cu izHkkx] fetkZiqjA** 9. The averments regarding the above appointment have been made by the petitioner in para 5 of the first writ petition and this has not been disputed in para 11 of the counter affidavit where the respondents have said as under : “11. That in reply to the contents of paragraph No. 5 of the writ petition, it is stated that the petitioner was working against the suspended Export Moharrir and afterwards since 1.7.1980 he was working against the suspended employee namely, Khilari Singh.” 10. Regarding the continuance of the petitioner after his appointment pursuant to the appointment letter dated 24.6.1981 is concerned, in para 12 of the counter affidavit, the respondents have said that the petitioner was later on placed in the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Mewa Lal, another Export Moharrir vide order dated 4.11.1981. However it is not shown anywhere as to how and in what manner the said order was communicated to the petitioner. Its communication has categorically been denied by the petitioner in para 13 of the counter affidavit. However it is not shown anywhere as to how and in what manner the said order was communicated to the petitioner. Its communication has categorically been denied by the petitioner in para 13 of the counter affidavit. The respondents have not placed anything on record to show as to when the order dated 24.6.1981 was modified changing the position of the petitioner regarding appointment against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Khiladi Singh, Export Moharrir by making his appointment against the vacancy caused due to suspension of another employee, namely, Sri Mewa Lal, Export Munshi and whether this order was ever communicated to the petitioner. Therefore, the order of termination dated 7.11.1989 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) showing that due to reinstatement of Sri Mewa Lal, the petitioner’s officiating service is liable to be terminated cannot sustain since the petitioner was appointed against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Khiladi Singh, working as Export Muharrir, and not against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Mewa Lal. The respondents have failed to show that the alleged subsequent order dated 4.11.1981 was ever communicated to the petitioner and was given effect. The petitioner, therefore, could not have been terminated due to reinstatement of Sri Mewa Lal since in view of this Court, he was appointed against the vacancy caused due to suspension of one Sri Khiladi Singh. 11. Now coming to the question of relief claimed by the petitioner regarding regularization under 1979 Rules, it is evident from the facts as above that the petitioner was not appointed against a temporary or permanent post, on ad hoc basis, but his appointment was purely on temporary basis for a limited tenure, i.e., till the person, in whose vacancy, he was appointed, is reinstated in service or the petitioner is otherwise terminated. Engagement of the petitioner was like a substitute employee in a temporary vacancy caused due to suspension of an employee and, therefore, in my view, 1979 Rules would not apply to such a case. An ad hoc appointment cannot be equated with a substantive or regular appointment but simultaneously it also cannot be said to be an appointment made on daily wage basis, tenure or substitute appointment. An ad hoc appointment cannot be equated with a substantive or regular appointment but simultaneously it also cannot be said to be an appointment made on daily wage basis, tenure or substitute appointment. Meaning of the words “ad-hoc appointment” was appointment de-hors the rules, namely the appointment is not made in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the rules but normally such an appointment is made in a vacancy against which none has any lien, the post may be temporary or permanent. The appointment is also not made for a limited period but for an indefinite period though liable to be terminated at any point of time. A tenure appointment cannot be said to be an ad hoc appointment. Besides, in any case, the letter of appointment dated 24.6.1981 clearly shows that the nature of the appointment of the petitioner is contractual and, therefore, also it cannot be said to be an ad hoc appointment attracting 1979 Rules. Though in the context of working out an equitable remedy in a manner so as not to disentitle an employee the benefit of his fairly long period of service for the purpose of seniority, the Apex Court considered the meaning of the words “ad hoc”, “stop gap” and “fortuitous” in Rudra Kumar Sain and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 2008 SC 2028 and referring to the dictionary meaning in the absence of any definition of the terms in the rules, observed in para 16, 17 and 18 as under : “16. The three terms ‘ad hoc’, ‘stop gap’ and ‘fortuitous’ are in frequent use in service jurisprudence. In the absence of definition of these terms in the rules in question we have to look to the dictionary meaning of the words and the meaning commonly assigned to them in service matters. The meaning given to the expression “fortuitous” in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary is “accident or fortuitous casualty”. This should obviously connote that if an appointment is made accidentally, because of a particular emergent situation and such appointment obviously would not continue for a fairly long period. But an appointment made either under Rule 16 or 17 of the Recruitment Rules, after due consultation with the High Court and the appointee possesses the prescribed qualification for such appointment provided in Rule 7 and continues as such for a fairly long period, then the same cannot be held to “fortuitous”. But an appointment made either under Rule 16 or 17 of the Recruitment Rules, after due consultation with the High Court and the appointee possesses the prescribed qualification for such appointment provided in Rule 7 and continues as such for a fairly long period, then the same cannot be held to “fortuitous”. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the expression “fortuitous” means “occurring by chance”, “a fortuitous event may be highly unfortunate”. It thus, indicates that it occurs only by chance or accident, which could not have been reasonably foreseen. The expression “ad hoc” in Black’s Law Dictionary, means “something which is formed for a particular purpose”. The expression “stop-gap” as per Oxford Dictionary, means “a temporary way of dealing with a problem or satisfying a need”. 17. In Oxford Dictionary, the word ‘ad hoc’ means for a particular purpose, specially. In the same Dictionary, the word ‘fortuitous’ means happening by accident or chance rather than design. 18. In P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s Law Lexicon (2nd Edition) the word ‘ad hoc’ is described as “for particular purpose, Made, established, acting or concerned with a particular and or purpose’. The meaning of word fortuitous event’ is given as ‘an event which happens by a cause which we cannot resist; one which is unforeseen and caused by superior force, which it is impossible to resist; a term synonymous with Act of God’.” 12. However, in para 19 of the judgment, the Court says that the meaning assigned to these terms while interpreting provisions of a Service Rule would depend on the provisions of that Rule and the context and purpose for which the expression is used, and, said “.....it will be necessary to look into the purpose for which the post was created and the nature of the appointment of the officer as stated in the appointment order. If the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as ‘ad hoc’ or ‘stop-gap’. If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as ‘fortuitous’ in nature. If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as ‘fortuitous’ in nature. If an appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to any reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet this contingency an appointment is made then it can appropriately be called as a ‘stop-gap’ arrangement and appointment in the post as ‘ad hoc’ appointment. It is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula nor give an exhaustive list of circumstances and situation in which such an (ad hoc, fortuitous or stop-gap) appointment can be made......” 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that every kind of temporary appointment which is not substantive and regular will come within the term “ad hoc” but I do not find any reason to accept the same when he also could not substantiate the above submission by placing any authority in favour of the same. When in law, different terminology is used in the context of different aspects unless there is something to show that different terminology, in fact, refers to one and the same contingency, there is no reason to treat all the said terms as referring to one and the same consequence. The nature of appointment like contractual, seasonal, daily wage, fortuitous etc. are well known and refers to different kind and status of appointment and the person concerned. Therefore, unless the rules so provide or by necessary implication refers to such a conclusion, there is no reason to treat all such terms as resulting in the same situation or the same kind of appointment. 14. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that initially some daily wage appointees sought to take advantage of Regularization Rules, 1979, but the rules framing authority later on negatived it by promulgating a separate set of rules in respect to daily wage employees in Group-C and Group-D posts which shows that the daily wage appointments were not intended by the rule framing authority to be treated alike with the ad hoc appointments. The Apex Court’s decision in this regard in favour of daily wage employee in Khagesh Kumar v. Inspector General of Registration, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 182 has been overruled by the Constitution Bench of Apex Court (in Uma Devi) as observed by the Apex Court in General Manager, Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi and others, 2009 (7) SCC 205 . In State of Karnataka and others v. G.V. Chandrashekar, JT 2009 (4) SC 367. Dealing with a contractual appointment, the Court further said “If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wage or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules.” 15. The distinct nature of appointment have also been recognized by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions and one of such is P.K. Sandhu (Mrs.) v. Shiv Raj V. Pati, 1997 (4) SCC 348 where the Apex Court observed that the power to make an appointment includes the power to make an appointment on substantive basis, temporary or officiating basis, ad hoc basis, daily or contractual basis. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees’ Association and others, 2006 (11) SCC 731 , the above view has been reiterated. The reference to different kinds of appointments and the contractual appointment separately from ad hoc appointment shows that the two kinds of appointments are not alike unless otherwise evident from the scheme of rules. 16. Therefore, in my considered view, the petitioner’s claim for regularization under 1979 Rules considering his nature of appointment cannot be accepted. 1979 Rules, according to my view, would not apply to the petitioner. 17. 16. Therefore, in my considered view, the petitioner’s claim for regularization under 1979 Rules considering his nature of appointment cannot be accepted. 1979 Rules, according to my view, would not apply to the petitioner. 17. Now coming to the last aspect of the matter, i.e., validity of the second order of termination dated 8.7.1991, subject matter of the second writ petition, I find that the said termination is simplicitor and shows that the petitioner’s services, which were temporary are being terminated. In this regard it is said in para 11 of the counter affidavit in second writ petition that after expiry of the season, he was terminated. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order has been passed on the presumption that the petitioner was employed as Seasonal Nikasi Munshi, though his appointment on 24.6.1981 in the vacancy caused due to suspension of a permanent employee, namely, Khiladi Singh cannot be said to be a seasonal appointment and, therefore, the very basis on which the impugned order of termination was passed is non est vitiating the order of termination. He further says that it is true that the petitioner’s appointment letter itself says that it is liable to be terminated at any point of time but the respondents have not terminated the petitioner as if he was no longer required, but from the counter affidavit of the respondents, it appears that he was terminated treating him to be a Seasonal Nikasi Munshi though as per his appointment letter dated 24.6.1981 he was appointed on contract and seize to be a seasonal one since it was in a vacancy caused due to suspension of a permanent employee, namely, Khiladi Singh, who was working as Nikasi Munshi. 18. A temporary employee is liable to be terminated at any point of time. In the case in hand, the very basis on which the petitioner was terminated, i.e. as if he was appointed as a Seasonal Nikasi Munshi being contrary to record, this Court would have no hesitation in holding the order of termination dated 8.7.1991 as illegal and arbitrary having been passed on the basis of a fact which was non est and not applicable to the petitioner at all. However, the matter would not end here. However, the matter would not end here. It is evident from the pleadings and in particular para 6 of the second writ petition that Sri Khiladi Singh was reinstated in March 1991. Since the appointment of the petitioner was made in the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Khiladi Singh and it was clearly mentioned in his appointment letter that the appointment would automatically seize on the suspension of Sri Khiladi Singh come to an end, the petitioner’s appointment on the post of Export Moharrir (Nikasi Munshi) against the vacancy caused due to suspension of Sri Khiladi Singh seized on the reinstatement of said gentleman. The cessation of appointment of petitioner after reinstatement of Sri Khiladi Singh did not require any order of termination since it is automatic, by efflux of time, and on occurrence of contingency as provided in the said letter of appointment. The continued engagement of the petitioner thereafter till the impugned order of termination dated 8.7.1991 was passed has been explained by the respondents that they allowed and treated him as a Seasonal Nikasi Munshi and after the end of season since he was no longer required, hence the impugned order was passed. The said termination is obviously, therefore, not in connection with the order of appointment dated 24.6.1981 which itself came to an end in March 1991 after the reinstatement of Sri Khiladi Singh, and, further continuance of the petitioner was treated by the respondents as his continuous engagement on seasonal basis in which capacity, he was earlier working before his appointment vide letter dated 24.6.1981. The said order of termination is simplicitor. It has not been shown by the petitioner that he had any right to continue in service or to hold the post after his appointment pursuant to letter dated 24.6.1981 came to an end due to reinstatement of Sri Khiladi Singh. I, therefore, in the peculiar facts of this case do not find any illegality in the order of termination dated 8.7.1991 impugned in second writ petition. 19. In the result, the first writ petition is partly allowed. The order dated 7.11.1989 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. The petitioner is held entitled to continue in service till Sri Khiladi Singh, suspended Nikasi Munshi was reinstated, i.e., March 1991 with all consequential benefits. 19. In the result, the first writ petition is partly allowed. The order dated 7.11.1989 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. The petitioner is held entitled to continue in service till Sri Khiladi Singh, suspended Nikasi Munshi was reinstated, i.e., March 1991 with all consequential benefits. However, the relief sought by the petitioner regarding regularization, being not covered by Rule 1979 is hereby declined and to this extent the first writ petition fails and is dismissed. 20. The writ petition No. 19995 of 1991, in view of the above discussion, fails and is dismissed. 21. No costs. ————