SHER ALI v. SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT JAIL, MUZAFFAR NAGAR
2009-10-12
IMTIYAZ MURTAZA, S.S.TIWARI
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Present petition has been preferred against the detention order dated 16.4.2009 passed by District Magistrate Muzaffarnagar (arrayed as respondent No. 2 in the instant petition). The reliefs sought herein if translated in English would substantially read as under : “(1) Issue an order or direction or writ in the nature of Habeas corpus commanding Opp. Parties to release the petitioner forth with. (2) Issue an order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned detention order dated 16.4.2009 passed by Opp. Party No. 2.” 2. A brief resume of the facts stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner has been slapped with detention order after he was falsely implicated in crime under Section 3/5/8 of the Cow Slaughter Act vide case crime No. 803 of 2009 registered pursuant to F.I.R. dated 4.4.2009 on the allegation that the police of P.S. Kotwali was tipped by the informer on 4.4.2009 at 2.45 p.m. that the accused had slaughtered cows in the house of one Shafi Pathan in locality Dakshini Khalapar and the beef was being processed for being transported to Haryana by loading in a Maruti Car attended with the allegation that when the police raided the place one of the accomplice of the accused namely Anshu son of Yasin succeeded in escaping; that at the time the accused was arrested he had in his hand implement used for slaughtering the cow and chopping the beef; that the police recovered beef from the place of occurrence and also the car from the dickey of which one quintal beef was recovered. The implements and the meat recovered from the place of occurrence were sealed and deposited in the Kotwali. 3. We have also traversed upon the impugned order of detention in which it is stated that the incident received wide publication in the local newspapers and as a result it led to heightened tension in a communally sensitive place which had mixed population and the people belonging to Hindu community took to street to protest over the incident. The shops it is further stated were closed down and people ran helter skelter taking shelter in the safety of their respective places and that the reinforcement was rushed to the place of occurrence where normalcy could be restored with great difficulty. 4.
The shops it is further stated were closed down and people ran helter skelter taking shelter in the safety of their respective places and that the reinforcement was rushed to the place of occurrence where normalcy could be restored with great difficulty. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and also learned A.G.A. Both the counsel argued at length bandying their respective contentions. 5. The arguments advanced across the bar quintessentially are that the petitioner had nothing to do with the house of Shafi Pathan from where the recovery is alleged to have been made nor has he ever visited the said place attended with further submission that the petitioner had neither been a tenant of that house nor has he ever been there and on the other hand, he was a native of village Kutsera where he was once elected Pradhan of that village. It is also argued that the person shown as accomplice of the petitioner has not been detained under the N.S.A.; that the car or any material recovered from the place of occurrence did not belong to him nor the same was proved to have been owned by him. However the main brunt of the argument advanced across the bar is that there was inordinate delay in the disposal of representation dated 23.4.2009 which was decided on 2.6.2009 at the end of Central Government. 6. From the submissions advanced across the bar, it would crystallize that there was no delay in disposing of the representation in so far as State Government is concerned and the grievance of the petitioner pivots on inordinate delay in disposing of the representation by the Central Government. We have scrutinised the counter affidavit filed by Smt. L.P. Srivastava, under Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India New Delhi. In para 5, it is averred that the representation of the detenu dated 23.4.2009 on 1.5.2009 through District Magistrate Muazaffarnagar vide letter dated 27.4.2009. The representation forwarded by State Government by means of letter dated 29.4.2009 was received in the concerned section on 13.5.2009. The same was considered together with report under Section 3 (5) of the National Security Act on 29.5.2009. The matter, it is averred, was processed at the level of under Secretary and Joint Secretary and was placed before the Union Home Secretary on 1.8.2009.
The same was considered together with report under Section 3 (5) of the National Security Act on 29.5.2009. The matter, it is averred, was processed at the level of under Secretary and Joint Secretary and was placed before the Union Home Secretary on 1.8.2009. The Union Secretary, it is averred, considered the representation alongwith connected papers which was discountenanced on 2.6.2009 and the file was sent on onward transmission of the order to Joint Secretary (IS). The file it is further averred, reached the concerned desk on 4.6.2009 and the same day, the order was communicated to the detenu through Home Secretary, Government of U.P. followed by letter dated 8.6.2009 by which all the authorities were communicated to inform the detenu accordingly. In para 6, it is averred that the dealing Asstt. who was seized of the matter, proceeded on leave spanning 20 days on medical ground attended with averments that in and about the time, large number of representations had been received particularly from the Government of Uttar Pradesh and hence there was accumulation of work. 7. It would thus transpire that whatever has occurred is attributable to explanation that the dealing Asstt. had proceeded on long leave i.e. for 20 days on medical ground and also that in and around the period large number of representation had been received and there was accumulation of work. Now the question remains whether the explanation offered for the delay is plausible one and was occasioned due to permissible reason and unavoidable causes. 8. Under the constitutional scheme, the representation of the detenu has to be considered without any delay. Article 22 of the Constitution does not envisage any specific period constituting the delay. The phrase used in clause (5) of Article 55 is “as soon as may be” In Rajammal v. State of T.N. and another, 1999 SCC (Cri) 93, the Apex Court observed that the “test is not the duration or range the delay but how it is explained by the authority concerned.” In para 9 of the said decision the Apex Court recapitulating the facts of that case observed as under : “In the present case, the representation was sent by the detenu on 13.1.1998 which reached the Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu on 5.2.1998.
The Government which received remarks from different authorities submitted the relevant file before the under Secretary for processing it on the next day. The under Secretary forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary on the next working day. Thereafter the file was submitted before the Minister who received it while he was on tour. The minister passed the order only on 14.2.1998. Though there is explanation for the delay till 9.2.1998 there is no explanation whatsoever as for the delay which occurred thereafter. Merely stating that the Minister was on tour and hence he could pass orders only on 14.2.1998 is not a justifiable explanation when the liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is involved. Absence of the Minister at the Headquarters is not sufficient to justify the delay since the file could be reached the Minister with utmost promptitude in cases involving the vitally important fundamental right of a citizen.” 9. Per contra, the decision cited is Union of India v. Laishram Lincola Singh, 2008 AIR SCW 2189. It is a decision of the Apex Court in which ratio of various other decisions have been noticed with approval. The first decision noticed is Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. and another, 2006 (5) SCC 676 in which it was substantially held that “there can be no hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time and each case has to be considered from the facts of the case and if there is no negligence or callous inaction or avoidable red tapism on the facts of a case, the Court would not interfere”. The Apex Court further observed that “it needs no reiteration that it is the duty of the Court to see that the efficacy of the limited, yet crucial, safeguards provided in the laws of preventive detention is not lost in mechanical routine, dull casualness and chill indifference on the part of the authorities entrusted with their application. When there is remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the authority, the detention becomes vulnerable.” 10.
When there is remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the authority, the detention becomes vulnerable.” 10. Another decision noticed with approval is L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral, 1981 (3) SCC 317 in which it was quintessentially held that there can be no doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition but as observed in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra, 1980 (2) SCC 275 “the time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. Likewise other decisions relied upon are Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 ; Birendra Kumar Rai v. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 272 etc. 11. A brief survey of all the decided cases considered in judicial crucible yield the conclusion the representation has to be decided with utmost expedition. 12. In the light of the above decision the question that remains is whether the explanation offered for the delay by the Government was such from which an inference of inaction or callousness on the part of the authorities could be inferred. 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the explanation substantially is that the dealing Asstt. was on leave for 20 days on medical ground and also that in or about the time, large number of representations had been received which led to accumulation. 14. It brooks no dispute that it was a matter involving the vitally important fundamental right of a citizen. The explanation that the dealing Asstt. was on leave for 20 days and hence the delay occurred cannot be said to be plausible and justifiable. All the decided cases discussed above, yield the conclusion that the representation must be decided with utmost expedition. Merely because the dealing Asstt. was on leave, the representation could not be processed is unacceptable when it involves the vitally important fundamental right of a citizen. Hence, the explanation offered for the delay does not commend for acceptance and on this ground alone, the detention is clearly unsustainable and is liable to be set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed. 15.
was on leave, the representation could not be processed is unacceptable when it involves the vitally important fundamental right of a citizen. Hence, the explanation offered for the delay does not commend for acceptance and on this ground alone, the detention is clearly unsustainable and is liable to be set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed. 15. The other grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that the Cow Slaughter Act does not fall within the category of cases to invoke the provisions of N.S.A. Yet another ground urged is that the District Magistrate rejected the representation on hyper-technical ground and not on merits. Since we are allowing the petition on the ground of unjustifiable delay, we do not propose to go into other aspects. 16. In the above conspectus, the petition is allowed and it is directed that the petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case. ————