Judgment :- CHITRA VENKATARAMAN, J. The appellant herein is the writ petitioner in W.P.(MD)no.1472 of 2008. The present writ appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, dated 011. 2008, wherein the learned Single Judge, having set aside the order of the Land Acquisition Officer (Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai) on his decision as to the title of the appellant, approved the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer refusing to refer the matter under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short “the Act”). 2. The appellant herein claims himself to be a joint owner of the properties along with the contesting 4th respondent herein. The property of an extent of 86 cents is situate in Survey Nos.15/1A2, 15/1B2 and 17/3C2, Chinthamani Village, Madurai South Taluk. The said properties were the subject matter of acquisition, Under Award No.1/93, dated 02.02.1993. The Special Tahsildar declared the 4th respondent as interested person and passed the award. As against the award, the 4th respondent had taken the matter on reference under Section 18 of the Act in L.A.O.P.No.51/2005 before the III-Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai. It is stated that already orders are passed in the LAOP. During the pendency of the LAOP, the appellant herein sought to implead himself in I.A.No.403/2005 and claimed himself to be a co-sharer. Rejecting the plea of the 4th respondent as to the claim of the appellant as the co-sharer, the impleading petition was allowed by the court below. The 4th Respondent challenged the same by way of civil revision before this Court. By the order dated 09.03.2007, C.R.P.No.895/2006 preferred by the 4th respondent was allowed by this Court holding that impleading of the appellant herein was not sustainable, that persons who make application under Section 18 alone are entitled to seek reference and that the reference court under Section 18 is required to determine the adequacy or otherwise of the amount of compensation paid under the award passed by the Collector. This prompted the appellant herein to move the Respondents 1 and 2 for making a reference under Section 30 of the Act, more so by reason of the 4th respondent sticking to his stand that the writ appellant had no title to the property acquired and was not a co-sharer. This prompted the appellant herein to move the Respondents 1 and 2 for making a reference under Section 30 of the Act, more so by reason of the 4th respondent sticking to his stand that the writ appellant had no title to the property acquired and was not a co-sharer. The 2nd Respondent passed the order dated 14.02.2008, wherein the Revenue Divisional Officer went into the title of the appellant herein and held that the appellant is not entitled to make any claim as an owner to share the award along with the 4th respondent. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant herein preferred the writ petition before this Court, which ended in a dismissal. Hence the present appeal. 3. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge shows that while agreeing with the contention of the appellant herein that the Land Acquisition Officer has exceeded his jurisdiction in giving a finding on title issue in favour of the 4th respondent, the learned Judge held that the conduct of the Land Acquisition Officer in refraining from referring the matter under Section 30 of the Act to the Sub-Court could not be faulted with. In so holding, the learned Single Judge considered the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2004) 7 SCC 362 – Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India and others, wherein the Apex Court considered the earlier decisions, and observed that since the appellant did not participate in the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act, he is not entitled to invoke Section 30 of the Act. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the scope of reference under Sections 18 and 30 of the Act operate on two distinct fields and that when the learned Single Judge had rightly held that the Land Acquisition Officer (Revenue Divisional Officer) has no jurisdiction to pass judgment on the title of the parties and in a case where there was admittedly no notice under Section 18, the only course available to the party claiming right to share the award amount is to go under Section 30 and if and when any such application is made, the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer is limited to make a reference to civil court for a decision on the title of the rival parties. 5. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the contesting 4th respondent placed heavy reliance on the decision reported in (2004) 7 SCC 362 – Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India and others, particularly paragraph 18, to contend that once a party had not made a claim under Section 18, the question of the said party invoking Section 30 of the Act does not arise. 6. We agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant as regards the jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer to pass an order on the title. While we hold that the learned Single Judge has correctly held that the Land Acquisition Officer is not entitled to give a finding on the title, we do not agree with the latter portion of the order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer not referring the issue under Section 30. In the decision reported in (1996) 6 SCC 408 – Arulmighu Lakshminarasimhaswamy Temple, Singirigudi vs. Union of India and others, the Apex Court considered the scope of jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 30 of the Act, wherein the Apex Court has pointed out that in a land acquisition proceedings where rival claims are raised as to the title, the Land Acquisition Officer alone has a jurisdiction to receive any such representation and if and when any plea is made, the proper course for the Land Acquisition Officer would be to make reference to the Civil Court under Section 30 of the Act to decide the dispute between the competing persons who set up rival title to the compensation. The Apex Court held: “ ... the only legal course open is that a direction be issued to the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference under Section 30 to decide the inter se title to receive the compensation either by the appellant or by the fourth respondent, as the case may be and the Reference Court would decide the matter in accordance with law.” On the face of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, the order of the learned Single Judge hence needs to be set aside in so far as the learned Single Judge held that the Land Acquisition Officer is justified in not making a reference. 7. 7. We had perused the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the 4th Respondent [ (2004) 7 SCC 362 – Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India and others]. It is seen from the above said judgment, particularly from paragraph 18, that if a person who sets up a rival claim is in receipt of notice of the acquisition proceedings and appears before the land acquisition officer and yet makes no claim on the subject matter of acquisition, the land acquisition officer is under no duty to make any further enquiry and that it would be a reasonable inference that the said person is claiming no right and in such a situation, it is not open to such party to raise a dispute by making an application under Section 30 of the Act seeking a reference from the Collector. In so holding, the Apex court referred to the decision reported in AIR 1966 SC 237 – G.H.Grant (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, wherein a distinction as regards the scope of Sections 18 and 30 had been discussed at length. The Apex Court pointed out in the said decision ( AIR 1966 SC 237 ), which had been extracted, that if a person not served with notice of the award proceedings, and hence has not appeared in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector may raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable and in that basis seek an assistance of the Collector to make a reference under Section 30 of the Act as regards the determination of his right to compensation. Section 18 deals with a situation where a claimant seeks a reference through the Collector as to the quantum payable by way of compensation. This postulates the participation through notice given to a party. The Apex Court also referred to the decision reported in (2003) 3 SCC 128 - - Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, wherein the Apex Court pointed out the difference between the scope of dealing with the Sections 18 and 30. This postulates the participation through notice given to a party. The Apex Court also referred to the decision reported in (2003) 3 SCC 128 - - Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, wherein the Apex Court pointed out the difference between the scope of dealing with the Sections 18 and 30. While so considering, the Apex Court considered the scope of expression person interested and held “A person present either personally or through a representative or on whom notice is served under Section 12(2) is obliged, subject o his specifying the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector within the time prescribed under Section 18(2) to make a reference to the Court. ...... The finality to the award spoken of by Section 29 is as between the persons interested inter se and is confined to the issue as to the correctness of the apportionment. Section 30 is not confined in its operation only to persons interested. It would, therefore, be available for being invoked by the persons interested if they were neither present nor represented in the proceedings before the Collector, nor were served with notice under Section 12(2) of the Act or when they claim on the basis of a title coming into existence post-award. The definition of persons interested speaks of an interest in compensation to be made. An interest coming into existence post-award gives rise to a claim in compensation which has already been determined. Such a person can also have recourse to Section 30.” 8. In the background of the said decision, we looked at the facts stated in the writ petition and in the counter made by the 4th respondent. It is a matter on record that the writ appellant had not been served with a notice in respect of Section 12 proceedings or at any point prior to this proceedings. Learned counsel for the 4th Respondent would rely on the evidence given by the appellant herein in the course of the proceedings on the impleading petition being ordered. However, going by the judgment of this Court in C.R.P.No.895/2006 which reversed the impleading order of the court below, we do not find any justification in the submission of the learned counsel for the 4th Respondent. However, going by the judgment of this Court in C.R.P.No.895/2006 which reversed the impleading order of the court below, we do not find any justification in the submission of the learned counsel for the 4th Respondent. In the order passed on 09.03.2007 in CRP No.895/2006 this Court held that the examination and cross-examination of the appellant herein in the Reference Court would not make the impleading application maintainable that the appellant is not entitled to get himself impleaded in Section 18 Reference Proceedings. Hence this Court held that the evidence given by the appellant herein, 2nd Respondent in LAOP is to be eschewed. In the background of this decision also, we hold that irrespective of the evidence given by the appellant in the proceedings before the court below, on the application made by the appellant under Section 30, a reference has to be made under Section 30 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer (Revenue Divisional Officer). 9. Inthe circumstances, while agreeing with the learned Single Judge that the Revenue Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to pass a judgment on the title issue, we express our inability to agree with the view of the learned Single Judge as to the Revenue Divisional Officer not making a reference under Section 30 when an application is filed setting up a title against the 4th Respondent. Consequently, we set aside this portion of the order of the learned Single Judge and thereby allowing the writ appeal, the 2nd respondent in the writ appeal is hereby directed to make necessary reference under Section 30 as enjoined therein to the Civil Court for adjudication on the question as to the title. 10. The writ appeal is allowed. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Madurai, the 2nd Respondent herein, shall make a reference within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. No order as to costs. Connected M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2009 is closed.