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Allahabad High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 3266 (ALL)

SIYA RAM YADAV v. COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT

2009-10-13

ANIL KUMAR

body2009
JUDGMENT Honble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Sri O.P. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri M.M.Asthana, and the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the opposite parties. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.2.1995 passed by the Committee of Management, Jagannath Junior High School, Durgapur, Tehsil Amethi, District Sultanpur. Thereby terminating the services of the petitioner from the post of Headmaster. 3. In the District Sultanpur, there is a Junior High School known as Jaganath Junior High School, Durgapur, Tehsil Amethi, district Sultanpur(hereinafter referred as the School) which is governed by the provisions of U.P.Basic Education Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Brief Facts 4. By order dated 23.7.1979, the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher and in pursuant to his appointment, the petitioner joined his duties in the month of July,1979 in the School. 5. The petitioner being the senior most teacher and fully qualified for promotion to the post of Head Master and accordingly he was promoted to the post of Head Master by means of order dated 25.2.1980 passed by Committee of Management of the School which was subsequently approved by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Sultanpur. 6. In the year 1989 the new committee of Management was elected to look after the affairs of the school in question in which the petitioner was performing his duties as Head Master. The relationship between the petitioner and the Manager of the newly elected Committee was not cordial and further the petitioner was not able to satisfy illegal demands of the Manager which were against the interest of the school in question as such with the oblique motive, purpose and mala fide intention, the Manager of the Committee of the Management had served a charge sheet dated 5.12.1994 without relying upon any documentary evidence. Further, neither any documentary evidence nor the name of any witnesses were mentioned in the charge-sheet to support the charges imposed therein and the petitioner was directed to submit his reply to the charges which were levelled on him vide charge sheet 5.12.1994 within two days i.e. by 7.12.1994 7. Further, neither any documentary evidence nor the name of any witnesses were mentioned in the charge-sheet to support the charges imposed therein and the petitioner was directed to submit his reply to the charges which were levelled on him vide charge sheet 5.12.1994 within two days i.e. by 7.12.1994 7. However, the petitioner had submitted his reply to the charges which were levelled against him on 19.12.1994 and after receipt of the reply submitted by the petitioner to the chargesheet, the Manager of the Committee of the Management by means of order dated 31.12.1994 which was published in the Daily News Paper ‘Sultanpur Kiran’ placed him under suspension. 8. On 17.2.1995, the Manager of the Committee of the Management of the School issued a letter to the petitioner to appear before the inquiry committee on 23..2.1995 at 11. a.m., in the school premises for the purpose of conducting an enquiry in the matter in question. 9. As per the version of the petitioner, he went to the school on 23.2.1995 at scheduled time and remain there till 4.15 p.m. but none of the members of the Enquiry Committee came on the said date for the purpose of conducting the enquiry. In this regard the petitioner had also written a letter to the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee on 25.2.1995 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition). 10. On the other hand, the version of the Manager of the Committee of Management of the School was to the effect that on 23.2.1995 the petitioner did not turn up for participation of the inquiry proceedings before the Inquiry Committee as a result of which the Inquiry Committee did not able to conduct the enquiry proceedings and submitted an inquiry report on 24.2.1995 which was considered by the Committee of the Management of the School on 24.2.1995 and the decision was taken to terminate the services of the petitioner from the post of Headmaster. Accordingly, the Manager of the Committee of Management on 25.2.1995 has terminated the services of the petitioner from the post of Headmaster. Submission on behalf of the Petitioner 11. Accordingly, the Manager of the Committee of Management on 25.2.1995 has terminated the services of the petitioner from the post of Headmaster. Submission on behalf of the Petitioner 11. Sri O.P. Yadav learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order of termination dated 25.2.1995 thereby terminating the services of the petitioner from the post of Headmaster of the school by opposite party No. 1, is illegal and arbitrary as neither any opportunity whatsoever has been given to the petitioner to adduce his evidence nor any opportunity is given to the petitioner to cross examine the witness. Further, it has been submitted on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on 23.2.1995, the petitioner was present in the school premises for participating in the enquiry proceedings but the members of the Enquiry Committee did not turn up as a result of which the enquiry was not conducted and without holding any enquiry whatsoever the order of termination had been passed which is against the principles of natural justice and fair play. 12. Moreover, it has also been submitted by the the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of termination is in contravention of Rule15 of the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as Rule 15) as no prior approval has been taken from the Basic Shiksha Adhikari and thus, the impugned order of termination is arbitrary in nature and liable to be quashed. In this regard, he has relied upon the following judgments passed by this Court : (1) Ram Nayan Shukla v. The District Basic Education Officer, Gorakhpur and another, 1981 UPLBEC 127 (2) Smt. Rehana Begum v. State of U.P. and others, 1993 (2) ESC 303(All), (3) Yashwant Singh v. District Basic Shiksha Adhikari Jhansi and others, 2003 (1) ESC 560 (All). Submission on behalf of the opposite parties 13. Sri M.M. Asthana learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and the learned Standing Counsel, who has put in appearance on behalf of opposite parties No. 2 to 4 has submitted that the order of termination dated 25.2.1995 passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management is perfectly valid and in accordance with law. Sri M.M. Asthana learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and the learned Standing Counsel, who has put in appearance on behalf of opposite parties No. 2 to 4 has submitted that the order of termination dated 25.2.1995 passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management is perfectly valid and in accordance with law. In support of his contention Sri Asthana has submitted that on 23.2.1995, the date fixed for inquiry proceedings but the petitioner himself had not appeared on the said date as such the opportunity was given to the petitioner but the petitioner himself has not availed the said opportunity so the petitioner cannot transfer his liability on the shoulder of the other, because he himself remained absent from the venue where the enquiry was to be conducted as a result of which the enquiry could not conduct and the Enquiry Committee had submitted its report on 24.2.1994 and taking into consideration the report submitted by the Enquiry Committee and the charges which were levelled against the petitioner vide charge-sheet dated 5.12.1994, the Committee of Management had taken a decision on 24.2.1995 to terminate the services of the petitioner and accordingly, the order for terminating the services of the petitioner dated 25.2.1995 had been passed so there is neither any violation of principle of natural justice, nor there is mala fide intention while passing the order by which the services of the petitioner had been terminated. Although no prior approval has been taken by the Committee of Management from the Basic Shiksha Adhikari before terminating the services of the petitioner but later on the same was given by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari and there is no illegality in passing the impugned order. In this regard, he relied on the contents of paragraph-19 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1 which is reproduced below : “That the contents of para -17 of the writ petition are denied. The Committee have passed resolution as regards dismissing the services of the petitioner with immediate effect and the same came into operation after the approval was given by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari and there is no illegality in passing any resolution. The petitioner has to suffice his contention by showing the documentary evidence of his contention, otherwise merely mentioning a fact has no relevancy in the eye of law.” 14. The petitioner has to suffice his contention by showing the documentary evidence of his contention, otherwise merely mentioning a fact has no relevancy in the eye of law.” 14. In view of the above facts learned counsel for the respondent submits that there is no illegality, arbitrariness or mala fide intention as regards passing of impugned order is concerned and the order is within the jurisdiction of the Manager. Findings and Conclusion 15. Before dealing with the facts of the case, it would be useful to refer the law as to how an enquiry should be held before a major punishment like dismissal or removal etc is imposed. 16. After a charge sheet is given to the employee an oral enquiry is a must whether the employee requests for it or not. Hence a notice should be issued to him indicating him the date, time and place of the enquiry. On that date the oral and documentary evidence against the employee should first be led in his presence vide A.C.C.Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1963)II LLJ 396 (SC).Ordinarily, if the employee is examined first it is illegal vide Anand Joshi v. MS.FC, 1991 LIC1966 (Bom) ; S.D. Sharma v. Trade Fair Authority of India, 1985 (II) LLJ 193 ; Central Railway v. Raghubir Saran, 1983 (II) LLJ 26 . 17. No doubt in certain exceptional cases the employee may be asked to lead evidence first, vide Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1968 SC, 236, but ordinarily the rule is that first the employer must adduce his evidence. The reason for this principle is that the charge sheeted employee should not only know the charges against him but should also know the evidence against him so that he can properly reply to the same. 18. Where no witnesses were examined and no exhibit or record is made but straightaway the employee was asked to produce his evidence and documents in support of his case, it is illegal vide P.C. Thomas v. Mutholi Co-operative Society Ltd., 1978 LIC 1428 (Ker), and Meenglas Tea Estate v. Their Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 . 19. 18. Where no witnesses were examined and no exhibit or record is made but straightaway the employee was asked to produce his evidence and documents in support of his case, it is illegal vide P.C. Thomas v. Mutholi Co-operative Society Ltd., 1978 LIC 1428 (Ker), and Meenglas Tea Estate v. Their Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 . 19. It is also necessary that ordinarily the statement of all the witnesses of the employer should be recorded in presence of the employee unless there are compelling reasons to act otherwise vide Kersoram Cottom Mills v. Gangadhar, AIR 1964 SC 708 ; Central Bank of India v. Prakash Chand, AIR 1969 SC 983 etc. 20. If the witnesses are examined in the absence of the employee and their recorded statements were also not supplied to him, this procedure is illegal vide Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963 (II) LLJ 78; India General Navigation and Rly Co. Ltd. v. Its Employees, 1961 (II) LLJ 372 (SC); Bharat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Jai Singh, 1961 (II) LLJ 644 (SC); Vysya Bank v. N.M. Pai, 1994 LIC 1429 (Kant), etc. 21. In Meenglas Tea Estate v. Their Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 the Supreme Court observed, ” It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer the charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled if the result of the enquiry can be accepted. 22. In S.C. Givotra v. United Commercial Bank, 1995 (Supp) (3) SCC 212 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order which was passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross examination. 23. In State of U.P.v.C.S. Sharma, AIR 1968 SC 158 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that omission to give opportunity to an employee to produce his witnesses and lead evidence in his defence vitiates the proceedings. 23. In State of U.P.v.C.S. Sharma, AIR 1968 SC 158 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that omission to give opportunity to an employee to produce his witnesses and lead evidence in his defence vitiates the proceedings. The Supreme Court also held that in the enquiry the witnesses have to be examined in support of the allegations and opportunity has to be given to the delinquent to cross examine those witnesses and to lead evidence in his defence. 24. In Punjab National Bank v. AIPNBE Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 (vide paragraph 66) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in presence of the charge sheeted employee and he must be given opportunity to rebut such evidence. 25. Having clarified the law on the point how the enquiry is to be conducted, now I proceed to discuss the facts of the present case. 26. Admittedly, in the present case the chargesheet was issued to the petitioner on 5.12.1994 to which the petitioner submitted his reply on 19.12.1994 thereafter he was placed under suspension vide order dated 31.12.1994 passed by the Committee of the Management. 27. The Manager of the Committee of Management issued a letter dated 17.2.1995, informing the petitioner that on 23.2.1995 he should appear before the Enquiry Committee in the school premises at 11.00 a.m. for the purpose of inquiry. As per the version of the petitioner, he went to school on 23.2.1995 at the schedule time but the members of the Enquiry Committee were not present as such no enquiry proceedings were conducted. 28. On the other hand, the version of the learned counsel for the respondents is that on 23.2.1995 the petitioner himself had not appeared before the Enquiry Committee as such the Enquiry Committee has no option except to proceed ex parte and accordingly, an ex parte enquiry was conducted and on the basis of the same, an inquiry report dated 24.2.1995 was submitted by the Enquiry Committee to the Manager and the same was considered by the Committee of the Management on 24.2.1995 who had recommended for terminating the services of the petitioner and accordingly the Manager of the Committee of Management had passed the order of termination dated 25.2.1995. 29. 29. From the above said fact, it is crystal clear that no proper enquiry was conducted in the matter in question thereby giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to put forward his case, even if the version of the respondents was accepted that on 23.2.1995 the petitioner did not turn up to participate in the enquiry proceedings, in that circumstances the principle of natural justice demands that the Enquiry Committee should have fixed some other date, time and place for the purpose of conducting the enquiry proceedings and thereafter informed the petitioner to appear on the next date fixed for the purpose of conducting the enquiry in order to enable him to put forward his defence but the same had not been done in the present case. 30. It is well settled proposition of law that regular inquiry means opportunity to submit reply to charge-sheet and also to lead evidence in defence. Even if the delinquent employee does not cooperate, it shall always be incumbent on the inquiry officer to record oral evidence to substantiate the charges. If the enquiry is not done in the manner as stated herein above then in that circumstances the enquiry conducted is in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice and the impugned order passed on the basis of enquiry report, suffers from substantial illegality and violative of principles of natural justice and the order of punishment vitiates. 31. In the case of State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and another, (1986) 6 SCC 651, the Supreme Court observed that it is not sufficient to say that the petitioner was allowed to inspect but a date has to be fixed for inspection which should be duly communicated to the delinquent and access to the record should be permitted. In the absence of any such evidence it cannot be said that reasonable opportunity was given to the delinquent.It is also settled that in case the delinquent is not supplied the copies of the relevant documents and he is not allowed to inspect the documents he would not be in a position to give any effective reply to the charges levelled against him which deprives him of his legal and fundamental right to put his defence effectively. Holding of an enquiry in such circumstances, would be in gross violation of the principle of natural justice. 32. Holding of an enquiry in such circumstances, would be in gross violation of the principle of natural justice. 32. Similar view has been taken in the case of Avtar Singh v. State of U.P. and another, 1989 (7) LCD 199, where the High Court found that the reasonable opportunity includes opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses relied in support of the charges and to lead his defence. Order passed only on charge sheet and explanation filed by the employee is not sufficient and clearly violates CCA Rules. Article 311 of the Constitution of India as well as principle of natural justice. 33. This Court in Gajendra v. Administrator, U.P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation Ltd and others, 1991 SCD 544, set aside the order of dismissal from service of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had not been afforded opportunity to show cause against the charges, no oral Enquiry was conducted to substantiate the charges and the petitioner was not given any opportunity to cross examine the witness and produce evidence in his defence. 34. In the case of Uma Shanker Yadav v. Registrar Cooperative Society, 1992(2) UPLBEC 349 the High Court found that it was incumbent on the enquiry officer to have sent a notice to the petitioner informing the date time and place of enquiry so that the petitioner could produce his witnesses and cross-examine the witnesses. Since this was not done, rules of natural justice have been violated. 35. In the case of Yash Pal Verma v. M/s Hindustan Machines Tools Limited, 1994 (12) LCD 594 wherein it has been held that all the relevant documents which were relied upon in support of the charges were not furnished which prejudiced the defence, as such the disciplinary proceedings held against the petitioner were vitiated and the impugned orders are illegal and liable to be quashed. 36. 36. In the case of Radhey Shayam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Limited, (1999) 2 SCC 21 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gether evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee;s conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are arrived at behind the back of the employee- even though such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases”. 37. A division Bench of this Court in Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 541 observed that after service of the charge-sheet evidence has to be led and opportunity has to be given to the employee to cross-examine the witnesses. The relevant observations are as follows : “In our opinion after the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet a date should have been fixed for the enquiry and the petitioner should have been intimated the date, time and place of the enquiry and on that date the oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been led in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. If the petitioner in response to this intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry then an ex parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioner’s services should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. If the petitioner in response to this intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry then an ex parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioner’s services should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. In the present case it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioner’s reply to the charge sheet,he was given a show cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In our opinion, this was not the correct legal procedure and there was violation of the rules of natural justice. Since no date for enquiry was fixed nor any enquiry held in which evidence was led in our opinion the impugned order is clearly violative of natural justice.” 38. In the case of Om Pal Singh v. District Development Officer Ghaziabad and others, in (2000) 2 UPLBEC 1591 this Court held that after service of charge sheet and submission of reply no date was fixed for evidence or for examination of witnesses which clearly shows that the principle of natural justice were violated. Thus the entire enquiry proceedings and the order of dismissal were bad and liable to be quashed including the order of dismissal. 39. In Hulashi Ram Sagar v. State of U.P. and others, 2002 ESC 497, a Division Bench of this Court also set aside the order of punishment on the ground that it had been passed only after obtaining the reply to the charges, without holding any regular enquiry. 40. In the case of R.P. Srivastava v. Pradeshik Cooperative Dairy Federation and others, (2009) 1 UPLBEC 643 this Court has held (relevant paragraphs 13, 14, 18 and 19 are quoted) as under : “13.The other contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner now needs to be examined. It is not in dispute that in the present case only a charge sheet was served upon the petitioner to which the petitioner submitted a detailed reply. The Enquiry Officer did not fix any date for enquiry and neither was any evidence led and nor was any opportunity given to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. It is not in dispute that in the present case only a charge sheet was served upon the petitioner to which the petitioner submitted a detailed reply. The Enquiry Officer did not fix any date for enquiry and neither was any evidence led and nor was any opportunity given to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. The Enquiry Officer considered the reply submitted by the petitioner and the enquiry report indicates that the Enquiry Officer also personally visited the firm which had issued the cash memo and perused the carbon copy of the cash memo and concluded that some interpolations had been made in the original cash memo. However, the petitioner was not confronted with the duplicate copy of the cash memo. There is nothing on the record to indicate whether the corrections were made in the cash memo by the petitioner or by the firm which issued the cash memo and only an inference has been drawn by the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was responsible for the interpolations made in the cash memo. 14. This Court in Gagendra v. Administrator, U.P. Co-opeative Processing and Cold Storage Federation Ltd. and others, 1991 SCD 544, set aside the order of dismissal from service of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had not been afforded reasonable opportunity to show cause against the charges, no oral Enquiry was conducted to substantiate the charges and the petitioner was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witness and produce evidence in his defence. 18. In the present case also no evidence was led and nor were the witnesses examined and only on the basis of the reply filed by the petitioner, the punishment of dismissal has been imposed upon him. This apart, as noticed above, the petitioner was not even confronted with the duplicate copy of the cash memo which had been referred to in the enquiry report. 19. In view of the aforesaid, the order of punishment cannot be sustained as it has been passed in breach of principles of natural justice. It is, therefore, not necessary to examine the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate the charges levelled against him.” 41. 19. In view of the aforesaid, the order of punishment cannot be sustained as it has been passed in breach of principles of natural justice. It is, therefore, not necessary to examine the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate the charges levelled against him.” 41. In the case of State of Uttaranchal and others v. Kharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court had laid down the following principles as to who the enquiry is to be conducted : “(i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject-matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the enquiry officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the enquiry officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. (iii) in an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he want to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any.” 42. In the case of Gyan Das Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, 2009 (27) LCD 926 this Court has held that : “In the present case, undoubtedly, no oral evidence was recorded during the course of inquiry proceedings, It is incumbent on the inquiry officer to record oral evidence to substantiate charges. Documents on record should have been proved by cogent reasons by recording finding of fact on merit by the inquiry officer but the same has not been done. The inquiry has been conducted in utter disregard to principle of natural justice. Documents on record should have been proved by cogent reasons by recording finding of fact on merit by the inquiry officer but the same has not been done. The inquiry has been conducted in utter disregard to principle of natural justice. Since the impugned order has been passed on the basis of the inquiry report which suffers from substantial illegality and violative of principles of natural justice, the order of punishment vitiates. The writ petitioner deserved to be allowed.” 43. Further the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank and others v. Shri Devendra Kumar Upadhyay, 2009 (27) LCD 990 has held that : “In case an employee is charged of misconduct and charge-sheet is issued, it is to contain precise and specific charges along with the evidence which the department wants to rely upon, in proving the charge and the charges along with the copy of document should be provided to the delinquent. After asking the reply from the delinquent, the enquiry is to proceed where the charges are to be proved by the department concerned, on the basis of the evidence of the evidence which the department chooses to produce, oral as well as documentary. The delinquent also has to be provided, adequate and reasonable opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal, may be oral or documentary or both. It is on the basis of evidence so led and the material available on record that the Inquiry Officer has to apply his mind to find out whether the charge levelled against him stands proved or not.” 44. In the present case also neither any enquiry was held nor any evidence was led and the witnesses were examined only on the basis of the reply filed by the petitioner, the punishment of termination has been imposed upon him. Further, apart from this, the petitioner was not even given the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Committee dated 24.2.1995 which is the basis of passing of the impugned order of termination dated 25.2.1005. So in view of the above said judicial pronouncements, the impugned order of termination dated 25.2.1995 passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management is against the principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. 45. So in view of the above said judicial pronouncements, the impugned order of termination dated 25.2.1995 passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management is against the principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. 45. So far as the next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no prior approval had been taken by the Committee of Management before terminating the services of the petitioner from Basic Shiksha Adhikari as such the same is in contravention of Rule 15 of the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 has got force because as per the aforesaid Rule before terminating the services of the teachers, who are governed by the said rules, the prior approval of Basic Shiksha Adhikari is mandatory. 46. Rule 15 of the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 is quoted below : “No Head Master or assistant teacher of the recognized school may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service, except with the prior approval in writing of the District Basic Education Officer.” 47. This Court in the Case of Ram Nayan Shukla v. The District Basic Education Officer, Gorakhpur and another, 1981 UPLBEC 127 has held that : “It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in any case the District Basic Education Officer did accord his approval through his letter dated 28.5.1979 (Annexure C-/9 of the counter affidavit of Sri Ganesh Prashad Shukla). There is more than one reasons for which this argument cannot be accepted. In the first instant, what is mentioned in the letter dated 28.5.1979 is that order terminating the petitioner’s services was approved because the appointment of the petitioner for the session 1977-78 did not carry the approval of the District Basic Education Officer. From this it is obvious that the District Basic Education Officer did not examine the merits of the impugned order. In any case, this approval having been accorded on 26th May, 1979, cannot render valid the decision that had been taken earlier on 30th July, 1978 terminating the petitioner’s services retrospectively viz with effect from 31st May,1978. From this it is obvious that the District Basic Education Officer did not examine the merits of the impugned order. In any case, this approval having been accorded on 26th May, 1979, cannot render valid the decision that had been taken earlier on 30th July, 1978 terminating the petitioner’s services retrospectively viz with effect from 31st May,1978. We may mention at the cost of repetition that the requirement of Rule 15 is that the approval of the District Basic Education Officer should be prior and not subsequent to the date of the resolution. We accordingly hold that the respondent No. 2 acted in breach of Rule 15 of 1978 Rules while passing the resolution dated 30th July, 1978 terminating the petitioner’s service. We further hold that the letter of approval of the District Basic Education Officer dated 28th May, 1979 is also not in conformity with the aforesaid rule and is invalid.” 48. In the case of Rehana Begum v. State of U.P. and others, 1993(2) ESC 303 (All) this Court has held that : “If the management wants to terminate the services of a teacher or wants to impose any other penalty specified in this rule, it must obtain prior approval of the District Basic Education Officer and such approval must be in writing. If the requisite approval is not so granted, the management is bound to take the teacher back and such teacher is entitled to the salary.” 49. In the case of Yashwant Singh v. District Basic Shiksha Adhikari Jhansi and others, 2003(1) ESC 560 (All) this Court has held that : “In view of the mandatory provisions for grant of prior approval before even serving a notice for termination of service of a Head Master, the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that approval would be deemed to have been granted as the papers had already been sent to the District Basic Shiksha Adhikari cannot be accepted. Since admittedly the mandatory provisions have not been followed, in my view, the impugned order dated 26.10.2002 passed by the respondent No. 3, Committee of Management Shree Shanker Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Jauri Bujurg, Jhansi, is liable to be quashed.” 50. Since admittedly the mandatory provisions have not been followed, in my view, the impugned order dated 26.10.2002 passed by the respondent No. 3, Committee of Management Shree Shanker Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Jauri Bujurg, Jhansi, is liable to be quashed.” 50. For the foregoing reasons as in the present case, no prior approval has been taken by the Committee of Management before terminating the services of the petitioner which is also admitted from the pleading of the respondents. The order of termination dated 25.2.1995 thereby terminating the services of the petitioner from the post of Headmaster of the School in question is in contravention of Rule 15 of the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978. 51. In the light of the above said fact,the question which is now arises what relief is to be granted to the petitioner in the present case, in normal circumstances the matter should be remanded for a fresh enquiry in accordance with law but in the present case besides that order of termination dated 25.2.1995 passed by opposite party No. 1 thereby terminating the services of the petition is in contravention to the principles of natural justice as neither any proper enquiry was done nor any opportunity whatsoever had been given to the petitioner before passing the same and is also in contravention of Rule 15 of the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High School) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules 1978, the interest of justice will be sub served if the order of termination dated 25.2.1995 passed by opposite party No. 1 is quashed. 52. Accordingly, the order dated 25.2.1995 passed by opposite party No. 1 is set aside with the direction that the petitioner should be reinstated in service without any back wages, however the intervening period will be counted for other consequential service benefits. 53. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. ————