JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—The present second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 15.5.2009 passed by Second Additional District Judge, Kheri in Civil Appeal No. 26/06, (Rameshwar and others v. Smt. Ram Kumari and others) and also against the judgment and decree dated 31.5.2004 passed by the Civil Judge (J.D.), Mohammadi, District Kheri, in Original Suit No. 39/1994 (Smt. Ram Kumari and others v. Rameshwar and others). 2. In brief the facts which is involved in the present second appeal are to the effect that plaintiff respondent had filed a suit for permanent injunction and eviction against the defendant appellants claiming therein that they were the owner in possession as Bhumidhari of gata No. 2318 situated in Gola under Nagar Mahapalika, Gola, District Kheri where they had set up boring for irrigation, had their hut and four trees of eucallyptus and one Neem tree. The defendants have nothing to do with No. 2318 and towards east of 2318 is Gata No. 2317 were Abadi of Jahanpur is situated and the house of defendants are situated in 2317. On 10.3.1994 in absence of plaintiffs without any right defendants extended their land towards west and put their thatched house on southern part of the plaintiffs land and are further trying to take possession of the remaining land, hence suit. 3. The defendants appellants thereafter filed therein a written statement denying the contents taken by the plaintiffs defendants in their suit by way of pleading but admitted that plaintiffs are owner of Gata No. 2318 as Bhumidhar and are still in their possession and defendants had neither taken possession over plot No. 2318 nor they wanted to take possession of it. It is further stated that southern houses are situated on Gata No. 2317 in which houses of Rameshwar and others are constructed and until and unless Gata No. 2318 was demarcated. It was not possible to ascertain whether the dispute construction i.e. thatched houses are constructed upto what extent on Gata No. 2318 or the same are on Gata No. 2317, therefore, the revenue Court under the provisions of Section 41 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901 has jurisdiction not the Civil Court. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the Trial Court had framed the following issues (English Version) : (i) Whether plaintiffs are owner and in possession of the disputed land ? 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the Trial Court had framed the following issues (English Version) : (i) Whether plaintiffs are owner and in possession of the disputed land ? (ii) Whether the disputed land lies in Gata No. 2318 ? (iii) Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to hear the suit ? (iv) Relief ? 5. After taking into the oral evidence and material documents the Trial Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiff respondents by means of judgment and order dated 31.5.2005. 6. Aggrieved by the said order the appellants had filed an Civil Appeal No. 26/06 before the Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, Kheeri, the same was dismissed by means of judgment and decree dated 15.5.2009. 7. The above said judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are challenged by the appellants before this Court by way of the present second appeal. 8. When the present second appeal is taken for admission before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant in a very casual manner said that he is pressing all the substantial questions of law, which is framed by him from “a to o”. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the record. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of substantial question of law, which he had taken in the present appeal advance his arguments on the following two points. (a) that the land in dispute is not situated in Gata No. 2318 but the same is in Gata No. 2317 as such the Court below had wrongly held that the appellants had taken forcibly possession of the part of Gata No. 2318 and had encroached therein and further the defendant has constructed their thatched house on the land which is part of Gata No. 2318. (b) by way of survey of Commissioner it is not possible to ascertain that the thatched houses in dispute are situated in Gata No. 2318 or 2317 as such the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction whatsoever to adjudicate the dispute involved in the present case but the matter can be only adjudicated by way of demarcation of land which can be done only under Section 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 by the Revenue Court. 11. 11. So far as the first submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants is concerned, from perusal of the judgment passed by the Court below it is clear that the gata No. 2318 is in ownership of plaintiffs/respondents and gata No. 2317 is in ownership of appellants/defendants and the said fact is also admitted between the parties. 12. In order to find out that whether the defendant had extended their land towards west and put their thatched house on southern parts of plaintiff land i.e. land situated in gata No. 2318 or not and whether the appellants/defendants have encroached and taken the possession of that land in part or not ? 13. The Trial Court had issued a survey commissioner and the said survey commissioner had conducted the survey in the presence of parties on 23.3.2003 and has prepared the survey report (paper No. 55 C-2 and survey map56-C/2). 14. Thereafter, the trial Court taking into account the report/survey map submitted by the survey commissioner, and other documentary evidence namely the Khasra and Khatauni (filed by the plaintiff) had came to the conclusion the appellants had taken forceful possession of part of Gata No. 2318 and had encroached therein and the lower Court allowed the suit of the plaintiff with the direction that the construction should remove made by them on the land in dispute within forty five days and hand over the possession of the same to the plaintiff and further the defendants are restraint for entering into the peaceful possession of the plaintiff. The said finding were also confirmed by the Appellate Court for its judgment and decree dated 15.5.2009 passed in Civil Appeal No. 26/06 as such the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the disputed thatched house does not lie in Gata No. 2318 and they had encroached there in is not a correct fact rather contrary to the facts of the present case thus the submission made in this regard by the learned counsel for the appellant has got no force, accordingly the same is rejected. 15. 15. The second submission raised by the learned counsel for the appellants has got no force because from perusal of the judgment passed by the two Court below, it is evident rather crystal clear that the Court below has given a categorical finding to the fact that it is not a disputed that the Gata No. 2318 is in ownership of the respondents and Gata No. 2317 is ownership of the appellant and only the question, which is to be decided is whether the disputed land is situated in Gata No. 2317 or Gata No. 2318, the same can easily be ascertained by survey only and in view of the said facts the Court below had came to the conclusion that the said finding of fact has been confirmed by the Appellate Court while dismissing the appeal of the appellant. 16. It is well settled proposition of law as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court and by this Court that while adjudicating the dispute in the second appeal the finding of fact, which is recorded by the Court below can only be set aside if the same is contrary to the facts and perverse in nature. However, in the present case, the learned counsel for the appellant fails to point out that under what circumstances the findings which are recorded in this regard by the Court below are contrary to the records and perverse in nature thus the submission made in this regard by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the jurisdiction lies under Section 41 of the Land Revenue Act, has got no force accordingly the same is rejected. 17. In view of the above said facts, findings recorded by the Courts below cannot be set aside on flimsy arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and without there being any question of law. In the instant case, arguments of the counsel for the appellants are factual in nature and by no stretch of imagination can constitute substantial questions of law. Re-appraisal of evidence is not permissible. Interference of the facts from recital or content of the document or after shifting oral evidence does not leave any scope of re-appraisal in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. 18. Re-appraisal of evidence is not permissible. Interference of the facts from recital or content of the document or after shifting oral evidence does not leave any scope of re-appraisal in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, C.P.C. 18. It is well settled by a long series of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of this Court, that a High Court, in second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however, erroneous the findings of fact recorded by the Courts of fact may be, the learned counsel for the appellant did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two Courts of fact. (See Mustafa v. Vakil @ Iqbal and anothers, 2008 (105) RD 392 ). 19. The Apex Court depreciated the liberal construction and generous application of provisions of Section 100 C.P.C. Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that only because there is another view possible on appreciation of evidence that can not be sufficient for interference under Section 100, C.P.C. For ready reference, extract of paragraph No. 7, of the vase of Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, 2002 (1) SCC 134 : 2001(45) ALR 691 (SC) is quoted below : “7......We have noticed with distress that despite amendment, the provisions of Section 100 of the Code have been liberally construed and generously applied by some judges of the High Courts with the result that objective intended to be achieved by the amendment of Section 100 appears to have been frustrated. Even before the amendment of Section 100 of the Code, the concurrent finding of facts could not be disturbed in the second appeal. 20. In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari, 2001 (92) RD 336 (SC) had held that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be preposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. If will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of the each case whether a question of law is substantial one and involved in the case or not. The same view has been expressed again by the Apex Court in the case of Govinda Raju v. Marriamman, 2005 (98) RD 731. 21. For the afore-going reasons the judgment and decree under challenged are perfectly valid and needs no interference. Accordingly, the second appeal lacks merit and is dismissed. 22. Cost on the parties. ————