Judgment GIRISH CHANDRA GUPTA, J. :- This appeal preferred by, the State is directed against a judgment and order dated 25th November 1987 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Coochbihar, in Sessions Trial No.4(4) of 1987 arising out of Sessions Case No. 19 of 1984 acquitting the accused Bijay Modak, Rajen Modak, Tarapada Modak, Chitra Modak, Hira Modak and Madhab Modak of the charges under Sections 302 and 201 both read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts and circumstances of the case briefly stated are as follows :- On 14th Bhadra 1388 B. S. corresponding to 31st August 1981 hearing a hue and cry, the de facto complainant Smt. Mayarani Roy and Smt. Buli Roy both wives of Narayan Chandra Roy accompanied by the other members of the family rushed to the house of the accused Rajen Modak and found their husband Narayan Chandra Roy confined in the courtyard of the accused Rajen. Upon enquiry they were told by Rajen that Narayan had entered his house and tried to press the mouth of his wife with an ulterior motive. He did not succeed in his attempt because Rajen's wife pad cried out. The detainee however denied to have done any such thing. The de facto complainant requested for release of her husband which was bluntly refused. She was told that he would be taught a good lesson. The accused Madhab then reached the place. He was told about the incident by the accused Bijay. Madhab became very furious. He instigated the accused Rajen, Hira, Bijay, Chitra, and Trapada to take Narayan to the Pakhidanga Club for trial. Prayer of the de facto complaint to let the victim off was brushed aside. The accused persons together with the victim set out for the intended destination. The de facto complainant and the co-wife followed them. They were forbidden from doing so but they persisted. The accused persons made the, victim to enter the club and thereafter they shut out the door. The de facto complainant by peeping could gather that an injury with a knife was dealt into his chest. Her husband dropped down. His shirt became bloodstained. The de facto complainant returned to her matrimonial house and informed the matter to her parents-in-law. Assistance of the village chowkidar was sought for but he refused to extend any. The de facto complainant by peeping could gather that an injury with a knife was dealt into his chest. Her husband dropped down. His shirt became bloodstained. The de facto complainant returned to her matrimonial house and informed the matter to her parents-in-law. Assistance of the village chowkidar was sought for but he refused to extend any. In the morning the brothers of the victim and his mother accompanied by the de facto complainant went to the club room but no one was found there. The de facto complainant thereafter lodged the written complain at about 13.30 hrs, on 1st September 1981 which has been marked Exbt. 4. 3. On 2nd September 1981, the dead body of the victim packed in a gunny bag was found floating at the junction of Jhajhalia and Mara Dharla rivers. The bag was brought on the bank and the dead body of the victim Narayan was recovered. 4. Ms. Gomes, learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal submitted that from the evidence of the eyewitnesses it has been established beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused persons abducted the deceased Narayan Chandra Roy with the intention of holding trial for the alleged attempted molestation of the wife of the accused Rajen. The prosecution has also established beyond any reasonable doubt that the victim was taken to the Pakhidanga Club. Inside the clubroom the victim was stabbed and thereafter his body was recovered on 2nd September 1981 from the junction of two rivers. She submitted that both the charges under Section 302 and 201, both read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code were adequately proved but the learned Trial Judge based on insignificant variations in the account of the eyewitnesses given in 'Court during the trial chose to acquit the accused persons, who, there can be no doubt are guilty of this heinous crime. She submitted that the helplessness of the victim and the members of his family; futile attempt to save him; cruelty with which the victim and the members of the family were treated appearing from the evidence of the witnesses present a heart rending picture. It is surprising that the learned Trial Judge in such a case recorded the finding of acquittal which is bad and illegal and should be set aside. She therefore prayed that the accused persons should be convicted and adequately punished. 5. Mr. It is surprising that the learned Trial Judge in such a case recorded the finding of acquittal which is bad and illegal and should be set aside. She therefore prayed that the accused persons should be convicted and adequately punished. 5. Mr. Kabir, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, advanced the following submissions :- (a) The victim is alleged to have been confined in the house of Rajen. This allegation according to him his falsified by the fact that the P. Ws. 2 and 3 deposed in Court that the victim was confined in the house of Tarapada whereas the P. W. 4 deposed that the victim was confined in the house of Bijay. He submitted that the case of the prosecution loses ground when it is considered that each one of the witnesses has given the same account but the site is different according to the different witnesses. He added that it has been firmly established that Tarapada, Bijay and Rajen live in separate houses. Therefore, there was no scope for any confusion either. (b) P. W. 1 the de facto complainant in her cross examination deposed that in the month of Bhadra the river which has to be crossed in order to reach the Pakhidanga club remains full to the brim having man height water. But there is no explanation as to how was the river crossed by the accused and the victim. (c) P. Ws. 1 and 2 both deposed that they saw the victim being stabbed by peeping through the window whereas the P. W. 7 deposed that there was no window in the Pakhidanga club. (d) Both the P. Ws. 1 and 2 deposed that they saw their husband Narayan being stabbed in the chest whereas the Autopsy Surgeon found stab injury in the belly. (e) The dead body was recovered from water on 2nd September but it was not decomposed which goes to nullify the story of the prosecution. (f) Lastly he submitted that even according to the evidence of the P. W. 1 only the accused Rajen and Hira were holding the dagger inside the room and the rest of the accused persons were outside the clubroom. Therefore, the rest of the accused persons cannot be involved in this matter. 6. The first, the third and the fourth submission advanced by Mr. Therefore, the rest of the accused persons cannot be involved in this matter. 6. The first, the third and the fourth submission advanced by Mr. Kabir, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents in reiteration of the reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Judge. Therefore those submissions need not be separately dealt with for we propose to deal the reasoning advanced by the learned Trial Judge in any event. 7. The first finding of the learned Trial Judge is as follows :- "I am of the opinion that the evidence of the P. Ws. as to confinement of Narayan are not credible at all and that the prosecution failed to prove satisfactorily that the deceased Narayan Roy was actually confined in the house of accused Rajen Modak as alleged." 8. The P. W. 1 Mayarani Roy who is also the de facto complainant deposed that the place of confinement of her husband was the house of Rajen. She also deposed that Rajen told her that Narayan tried to molest his wife. Considering the alleged cause of detention it is probable that the victim was confined in the house of Rajen which is also corroborated by the statement of the P. W. 1 made under Section 154 of the Cr. P. C. wherein she stated that in the courtyard of the accused Rajen her husband was confined. The P. W. 2, who is another eyewitness all throughout accompanied the P. W. 1 from the first to last. She has corroborated the evidence of the P. W. 1. It is also not in dispute that Rajen, Tarapada and Bijay are all sons of Rohini Modak. Therefore, when a house has been identified as that of Rajen it could also have been identified as the house of Bijay or the house of Tarapada. They are full brothers. The incident has taken place in a village way back in 1981 where people are even today known by their parentage. P. W.4 deposed that "Hearing this I went to the house of Bijoy. Bijoy and Rajen live in the same house." It is not in dispute that the separate house of Tarapada is contiguous to the house of Rajen. 9. This also explains why the P. W. 3 deposed that "at about 9 P.M. on that day I heard 'halla' coming from the house of Tarapada, adjacent to the house of accused Rajen. 10. 9. This also explains why the P. W. 3 deposed that "at about 9 P.M. on that day I heard 'halla' coming from the house of Tarapada, adjacent to the house of accused Rajen. 10. P. W. 5 deposed that "Narayan was taken to the house of Rajen and Bijoy and detained there". 11. P. W. 6 also deposed the same thing. "At night, Surya came and informed that Narayan was caught and taken to the house of Rajen and Bejoy and that he was detained there by Hira, Rajen, Bejoy, Tarapada, Chitra and that they would try him and I should go there. Hearing this, myself, my husband, two wives of Narayan and my sons Nibaran, Surya along their two' other brothers and my brother Suklal went to the house of Rajen". 12. It would become apparent from the evidence of the P. W. 6 that he has referred to the house of Rajen as the house of both Rajen and Bejoy. P, W. 4 has also done the same thing. 13. P. W. 8 has also deposed the same thing. "At about 9 P. M. my son Surya informed me that Narayan was detained at the house of Rajen and Bejoy. Hearing this my wife, my other sons, two wives of Narayan went there." 14. There is no other eyewitness. 15. From the discussion made above it would become clear that the place of confinement is the house of Rajen which is also known as the house of Bejoy. The house of Tarapada is contiguous to the house of Rajen and Bijoy. They are all sons of Rohini Modak. The learned Trial Judge failed to delve deep into the matter to find out the truth. This also disposes of the first point of Mr. Kabir, learned Advocates appearing for the respondent. The submission that the eyewitnesses went to three different places and found the same thing is an incorrect impression sought to be created by the defence. The eyewitnesses went to one place and found one incident. The first point urged by Mr. Kabir and the same reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Judge are thus rejected. 16. The learned Trial judge was of the view that the evidence given in Court as regards the incident which took place in the Pakhidanga club was at variance with what was recorded in the written complaint. The first point urged by Mr. Kabir and the same reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Judge are thus rejected. 16. The learned Trial judge was of the view that the evidence given in Court as regards the incident which took place in the Pakhidanga club was at variance with what was recorded in the written complaint. He, as a matter of fact, tabulated variations and/ or discrepancies which are as follows :- FIR EVIDENCE (a) All accused entered Excepting accused Rajen and into clubhouse, closed the Hira all others came out. door. No story of coming out of any accused. (b) Nothing about if (b) Both P. Ws. 1 and 2 entered, entering of P. Ws. 1and 2 and were driven out. inside clubhouse and driven out. (c) Rajen stabbed with knife (c) Nothing about stabbing. Saw in his hand on the chest of Rajen had a knife in his hand Narayan and he fel1 on the and wearing shirt of Narayan in ground. the left side near chest seen wet blood and lying on the ground. (d) Incident inside the (d) Saw through the window. clubhouse seen through gap in the split bamboo fencing. 17. It is well settled that an FIR is not an encyclopedia of fact. Sight cannot also be lost of the fact that the written complaint in this case was lodged by a rustic illiterate woman. Her statement, as a matter of fact, was recorded by the Officer-in-Charge (P. W. 12) of Dinhata Police Station. When she deposed that except for Hira and Rajen others came out that presupposes that all the accused persons had entered into the club room along with the victim. The fact that four of the accused persons came out is a circumstance which can co-exist with the fact that they had entered into the club room. Therefore it is by no stretch of imagination a contradiction, of what she had stated earlier. The learned Trial Judge was evidently wrong in disbelieving the P. W. 1 on the basis of supposed discrepancy when it is actually not. In the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012 : (1959 Cri LJ 1261). The learned Trial Judge was evidently wrong in disbelieving the P. W. 1 on the basis of supposed discrepancy when it is actually not. In the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012 : (1959 Cri LJ 1261). Their Lordships clarified "If the statement before the police officer in the sense we have indicated aha the statement in the evidence before the Court are so inconsistent or irreconcilable with each other that both of them cannot co-exist, it may be said that one contradicts the other." 18. The second discrepancy indicated above by the learned Trial Judge is equally without any merit because the omission to indicate in the written statement that the P. Ws. 1 and 2 had entered into the clubhouse and they were driven out does not amount to any contradiction because whatever they have seen as regards the incident taking place inside the club room was seen from outside by peeping both according to the written complaint as also according to the evidence given in Court. Therefore, the mere fact that the de facto complainant omitted to disclose in her written complaint that she and the co-wife (P.W.2) had entered the clubroom and they were driven out does not in our view assume any importance. Moreover, this part of her deposition sounds probable. 19. The third discrepancy noted by the learned Trial Judge is also without any merit. Rajen had the knife in his hand. It is stated in the written complainant that the husband of the de facto complaint was stabbed by Rajen. In the Court she deposed that Rajen had the dagger in his hand and the shirt of the victim became bloodstained. The statement as regard stabbing made in the FIR could well have been an inference from the fact that Rajen was having the knife in his hand and the shirt of the victim became bloodstained. There is as such no discrepancy. 20. The last discrepancy noted by the learned Trial Judge is not also significant. Both in the written complaint and in the Court it is stated that by peeping the de facto complainant saw whatever she could see. Whether it is through bamboo fencing or whether it was through a window makes hardly any difference. 20. The last discrepancy noted by the learned Trial Judge is not also significant. Both in the written complaint and in the Court it is stated that by peeping the de facto complainant saw whatever she could see. Whether it is through bamboo fencing or whether it was through a window makes hardly any difference. It should be borne in the mind that the P. W. 1, a rustic woman, was giving evidence in Court on 28th April 1987 whereas the incident took place on 31st August 1981. The memory in the normal course of time is bound to become faded. The learned Trial Judge has allowed him- that their entreaty to release their husband self to be persuaded by insignificant discrepancies which do 'not touch the story in the main. The Apex Court has times without but number been administering caution against this kind of an approach. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of Rammi alias Rameshwar v. M. P. reported in AIR 1999 SC 3544 : (1999 Cri LJ 4561) "When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some• discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But Courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so in-, compatible with the credibility of his version that the Court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny." 21. The next reason of importance according to the learned Trial Judge in disbelieving the case of the prosecution is, the evidence of the P. W. 7. The learned Trial Judge expressed his views as follows :- "This witness has said that he was in the house all along from evening and did not hear any noise coming from the club house. Thus, evidence of prosecution own witness belies the alleged incident in the club house and the said house having any window. The learned Trial Judge expressed his views as follows :- "This witness has said that he was in the house all along from evening and did not hear any noise coming from the club house. Thus, evidence of prosecution own witness belies the alleged incident in the club house and the said house having any window. This witness was not declared hostile and as such there is no reason to disbelieve him especially when he is a resident of the house adjacent to the club house. His evidence no doubt gives death blow to the prosecution case so far it relates to taking of Narayan in Pakhidanga Club and murdering him there." 22. P. W. 7 is a mere seizure list witness. In his presence bloodstained and controlled earth were seized by the police. P. W. 7 is a signatory to the seizure list which has been marked Exbt. 3. Out of the 17 witnesses of the prosecution only P. Ws. 1 and 2 were present when the accused persons took the victim Narayan inside the clubroom. Neither the P. W. 1 nor the P. W. 2 has deposed about any commotion or any noise in the clubroom. Both the P. Ws. 1 and 2 deposed that their entreaty to release their husband was brushed aside by the accused persons. The P. Ws. 1 and 2 entered into the clubroom but they were driven out and the door was shut from inside upon them. On behalf of the defence during cross examination of the P. W. 7 this sentence was elicited :- "I did not hear any commotion, noise in the club house on that night." 23. We fail to understand how can this sentence deposed by the P. W. 7 be prejudicial to the case of the prosecution which according to the learned Trial Judge has dealt a death blow to the case of the prosecution. Even assuming that there had been some hustle and bustle in front of the club, sight cannot be lost oftl1e fact that this incident must have taken place after 10 or 11 P. M. because the de facto complainant (P. W. 1) was informed about the detention of her husband at about 8/8.30 P. M. whereas villagers are in the habit of going to bed early. Moreover everyone is not interested in seeing what is happening in the neighbourhood, The P. W. 7 was not asked any question as to the distance of the Pakhidanga Club from his residence. Therefore we are firmly of the view that the learned Trial Judge was obviously wrong in laying emphasis on the aforesaid sentence deposed to by the P. W. 7. As regards the absence of any window in the club house deposed to by the P. W. 7 we have evidence to the contrary before us. Besides the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 the P. W. 17 deposed that the club house had windows. Even the P. W. 7 did not depose that the club house did not have windows. His evidence merely is that on the east side of the club there is a door and no window which does not mean that the club house did not have any window. It is unthinkable that a house in the village used for the purpose of a club was without windows particularly when the evidence of the P. W. 7 is that the club house is a chhapra ghar which means earthen tiles used for the purpose of thatching. This also takes care of the third submission of Mr. Kabir. 24. The next reason advanced by the learned Trial Judge is as follows :- "There are other aspects. If according to evidence of P. W. I about 100 persons present when Narayan was taken to club house and about 20/.25 persons present when Rajen. Hira and Narayan were inside the club house and the other accused came out, why the prosecution did not examine any of those persons said to be present at the relevant time? In the instant case I find that there is no independent witness to corroborate evidence of P. Ws. who are very close relation of Narayan, on any point. This is very significant especially when evidence on record shows that there was ample scope to adduce corroborative evidence by independent witness. P. Ws. 10, 11, 14 and 16 appeared to be independent witnesses but none of them supported the prosecution story." 25. Why were no' other witnesses examined is answered by the learned Trial Judge's own finding that the P. Ws. 10. 11, 14 and 16 turned hostile. P. Ws. 10, 11, 14 and 16 appeared to be independent witnesses but none of them supported the prosecution story." 25. Why were no' other witnesses examined is answered by the learned Trial Judge's own finding that the P. Ws. 10. 11, 14 and 16 turned hostile. Experience shows that in our country people are seldom willing to come forward to give evidence in Court. The P. Ws. 1 and 2 were only family members of the victim who present at the Pakhidanga Club. It was therefore not possible for the prosecution to bring any other witness. The learned Trial Judge Has missed the point of substance that the prosecution has been able to firmly establish that after the victim was taken away by the accused persons and pushed into the Pakhidanga Club room only his dead body was found. In those circumstances in the absence of any explanation by the accused as to what happened of the victim so long as he was in their custody. Court can presume, if the victim was found dead thereafter within a short period, that the accused had murdered him. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of State of West Bengal V. Mir Md. Omar reported in 2000 (8) SCC 382 : (2000 Cri LJ 4047). "When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone Knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody." 26. Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment in the case of Ram Gulam Chowdhury V. State of Bihar reported in 2001 (8) SCC 311 : (2001 Cri LJ 4632) wherein the following view was expressed :- "Even otherwise, in our view, this is a case where Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply. Krishanand Chaudhary was brutally assaulted and then a chhura-blow was given on the chest. Krishanand Chaudhary was brutally assaulted and then a chhura-blow was given on the chest. Thus chhura blow was given after Bijoy Chaudhary had said "he is still alive and should be killed". The appellants then carried away the body. What happened 'thereafter to Krishnanand Chaudhary is especially within the knowledge of the appellants. The appellants have given no explanation as to what they did after they took away the body. Krishnanand Chaudhary has not been since seen alive. In the absence of 'an explanation, and considering the fact that 'the, appellants were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed the child of the family of the appellants, it was for the appellants to have explained what they did with him after they took him away. When the abductors withheld that information from the Court, there is every justification for drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy. Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the Court to draw a different inference. We, therefore. see no substance in this submission of Mr. Mishra," 27. The next reasoning advanced by the learned Trial Judge reads as follows :- "Turning to the question of injury sustained by Narayan because of the alleged assault I find that the P. W. 1, the maker of FIR (Ext. 4) has stated that Rajen stabbed Narayan on the chest though in her evidence she remained silent about alleged stabbing by Rajen. Be that as it may, both in FIR and evidence of P. W. 1 have that she saw blood in the wearing shirt of Narayan in the left side near chest. Evidence of P. W. 13 who held postmortem examination on the dead body of Narayan transpires that Narayan had no injury on the chest. Therefore, in view of evidence of P. W. 13 evidence of P. W. 1 has no leg to stand so far injury and seeing blood of Narayan are concerned." 28. Evidence of P. W. 13 who held postmortem examination on the dead body of Narayan transpires that Narayan had no injury on the chest. Therefore, in view of evidence of P. W. 13 evidence of P. W. 1 has no leg to stand so far injury and seeing blood of Narayan are concerned." 28. The learned Trial Judge has obviously not considered the evidence in a dispassionate manner otherwise he would not have failed to notice that the Autopsy Surgeon (P.W. 13) deposed, inter alia, as follows :- "I found one deep penetrating wound just above the umbilicus and the intestines were coming out." 29. The P. W 1, de facto complainant has given the information in her written complaint on the basis of what she could gather by peeping through the window in the light of a lantern when she said that the victim was stabbed in the chest and the doctor found stab injury in the belly. Any prudent person would conclude that the evidence of the P.W. 1 has been corroborated. The distance between the chest and the belly is of a few inches but surprisingly the learned Trial Judge has on this account disbelieved the P. W. 1 which is clearly wrong. This also disposes of the fourth point of Mr. Kabir, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents. 30. The last reason advanced by the learned Trial Judge reads as follows :- "When the P. Ws. 1 and 2 instead of lodging complaint at the P. S. in spite of their going in the morning took time till 1. 30 P.M. the presumption of embellishment of facts involving the accused persons cannot be rule, out all together as submitted by the Id. Lawyer for the defence. The last submission of the Id. P. P. was that the I. O. seized bloodstained earth, controlled earth and a bamboo pole containing blood from inside the club house (vide evidence of P. Ws. 7, 11 and 17) and probability of murdering Narayan there as alleged cannot be ruled out. There is no report on chemical analysis that the said blood was of human being which was essential to hold probability as contended by the Id. 7, 11 and 17) and probability of murdering Narayan there as alleged cannot be ruled out. There is no report on chemical analysis that the said blood was of human being which was essential to hold probability as contended by the Id. P. P. In absence of such report it cannot be held safely that the blood actually found was of human being when the place of occurrence is a club house where killing of hen, goat, etc. cannot be impossible in connection with feast or otherwise." 31. The de facto complainant (P. W. 1) in her evidence deposed about the steps taken by her on of 1st September 1981 from the morning till 13.30 hrs. when the written complaint was actually lodged which is as follows ;- "Next morning myself and Buli Rani went to the club house again and saw that the door of the club house was closed from outside and none was found there. Through the window we saw blood on the ground inside the club house. We made enquiry of our husband but did not get any trace. Thereafter we went to Dinhata Police Station and enquired if our husband were brought to the P. S. yesterday night. But we get answer in the negative. From there we went to Dinhata Sub-Divisional Hospital but did not get trace of our husband there. Thereafter we came back home and reported about our efforts to our father and mother-in-laws and elder 'brother of my husband. From our house my mother-in-law, my husband's elder brother, Buli Rani and myself went to the P. S. at about mid-day and narrated the incident to the officer on duty. My statement was reduced in writing and the contents thereof being read over I put my LTI thereon." 32. There is no serious cross-examination as regards the steps taken by the P. W. 1 and the P. W. 2 from the morning till 13.30 hrs. on 1st September 1981 still the learned Trial Judge concluded that the time of 8 hrs. must have been spent in concocting the story. This is surprising to say the least. There is no serious cross-examination as regards the steps taken by the P. W. 1 and the P. W. 2 from the morning till 13.30 hrs. on 1st September 1981 still the learned Trial Judge concluded that the time of 8 hrs. must have been spent in concocting the story. This is surprising to say the least. We are still more surprised that the blood collected by the I. O. from the club room was brushed aside by the learned Trial Judge by saying that this might have been the blood of hen or goat when no such case was even suggested to any of the witnesses. We have asked Mr. Kabir to find out whether any such suggestion was given to any of the witnesses of the prosecution and he frankly admitted that there was no such, suggestion. In spite thereof the learned Trial Judge took the view that the blood might have been the blood of an animal. The finding in over view is grossly erroneous. 33. We have thus dealt with all the points on the basis of which the learned Trial Judge returned the finding of acquittal. We also have dealt with the 1st, 3rd and 4th submission of Mr. Kabir while dealing with the reasoning advanced by the learned Trial Judge. 34. The second submission of Mr. Kabir was that there was man deep water in the river and there is no explanation as to how was the same crossed by the accused persons. Mr. Kabir relied on a general statement of the P. W. 1 but the specific deposition of the P. W. 1 with regard thereto is as follows :- "At the relevant time of the incident there was chest-deep water in the river and all our clothes were drenched while we crossed the river on the way to the club house." 35. If the water in the river was chest deep for the P. Ws. 1 and 2, co-wives of the' victim Narayan, it must have been belly deep for the accused persons and there was no difficulty in crossing river along with the victim, Moreover this point was not further pursued by the learned cross-examining counsel before the Trial Court. 36. The 5th point urged by Mr. Kabir was that the body was not decomposed even' after three days. 36. The 5th point urged by Mr. Kabir was that the body was not decomposed even' after three days. Evidently he proceeds on the basis that the victim was put to death on 31st August 1981 itself with regard to which there is no evidence before us. We only have the evidence that after the victim was abducted and pushed into the club house one blow was dealt on 31st August 1981 which was witnessed by the P. Ws. 1 and 2. Thereafter where was the victim taken, how was he killed and when was he killed, when was the body thrown into the water is bound to be in the special knowledge of the accused persons. There is no explanation coming forth from the accused-persons that the victim was set at liberty by them after dealing one blow on the belly or at any point of time. Therefore the point raised by Mr. Kabir, in our view, is not of any significance. 37. Lastly it was contended that only the accused Rajen and the accused Hira, according to the P. W. 1, were inside the club room and rest of the accused persons had come out. It was therefore contended by Mr. Kabir that the complicity of rest of the accused persons in the crime cannot be established. We are not inclined to accept this submission because the liability is based on common intention which has been amply proved by the fact that all the six accused persons in pursuance of their common object brought the victim to the Pakhidanga Club. The victim was pushed into the club house. Two of the accused persons remained inside the club. Four of them were on guard outside the club. Therefore even assuming that in dealing the blow witnessed by the P. W. 1 the others may not have participated but their active aiding and abetting was still there. All the six accused persons had together abduced the victim to the Pakhidanga Club. Therefore, we pave no manner of doubt that all the six accused persons are equally responsible for the murder of the victim Narayan. They are thus held guilty of the offence under Sections 302 and 201 both read with Section 34 of the IPC. All the six accused persons had together abduced the victim to the Pakhidanga Club. Therefore, we pave no manner of doubt that all the six accused persons are equally responsible for the murder of the victim Narayan. They are thus held guilty of the offence under Sections 302 and 201 both read with Section 34 of the IPC. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal pissed by the learned Trial Court are set aside and the respondents-accused are convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302/201 both read with Section 34 of IPC. 38. The minimum Punishment for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is imprisonment for life and fine. 39. This is not a rare, of the rarest cases where the maximum penalty of death can be inflicted. In our opinion imprisonment for life together with a fine of Rs.10.000/- each shall serve the purpose, of justice. Since we are inclined to award the minimum punishment, hearing the convicts on the question of punishment may be dispensed with following the law laid down in the case of Tarlok Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1977 SC 1747 : (1977 Cri LJ 1139). 40. We therefore sentence all the aforesaid convicts to rigorous imprisonment for life as also to pay fine of a sum of Rs.10.000/each, in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years each for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of IPC. No separate sentence is awarded for the offence punishable under sections 201/34 of IPC. In the event the amount of fine is realised it should be paid in equal share to the P. Ws. 1 and 2 or their heirs. 41. The appeal is thus allowed. The accused respondents were directed to be rearrested and released on bail by an order dated 4- 11- 2008. The bail bonds are cancelled. They are directed to surrender to the bail bond at once. Notice in that regard is given through the Counsel appearing before us. The learned Trial Court is also directed to take the respondent accused persons in custody at once so that they may serve out the sentence passed by this Court. 42. Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the learned Trial Court for information' and necessary action. 43. The learned Trial Court is also directed to take the respondent accused persons in custody at once so that they may serve out the sentence passed by this Court. 42. Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the learned Trial Court for information' and necessary action. 43. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, be delivered to the learned Advocates for the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of usual formalities. KISHORE KUMAR PRASAD, J. :- 44. 1 agree. Appeal Allowed.