JUDGMENT By the Court.—The learned Single Judge while hearing this petition on 21.3.2007 and finding conflicting views between the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in the case reported in 2000(1) UPLBEC 707 and 2006(3) ESC 1765 (All), referred, under Rule 6 Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, the following questions for determination by a larger Bench : (i) Whether prior approval for awarding punishment of dismissal to a Class-IV employee is contemplated and required under Chapter-III, Regulation 31 of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921? (ii) Which of the Division Bench judgments, as noticed above, lays down the correct law? 2. In the light thereof, the case was posted for consideration before a Division Bench on 12.8.2009 which, finding conflict between the judgments rendered by the two Division Benches as referred in the order of the learned Single Judge, directed the matter to be heard by a larger Bench and accordingly the matter has come up before us for consideration. 3. The facts lie in a narrow compass. Petitioner-Rishikesh Lal Srivastava is a class IV employee working in Intermediate College, Vedupar in the district of Kushi Nagar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the College’). While he was in service, the Principal of the College by order dated 5th of July, 1994 dismissed him from service and aggrieved by the same, he filed Writ Petition No. 473 of 1996 (Rishikesh Lal Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others) before this Court inter alia praying for a direction to the District Inspector of Schools to pay salary. This Court directed the District Inspector of Schools to examine his case and in the light thereof, the District Inspector of Schools passed order dated 21st of April, 1998 for payment of his salary. The Committee of Management of the College challenged the said order of the District Inspector of Schools by filing another writ petition and the same was disposed off with a direction to the District Inspector of Schools to record reasons as to whether the service of the said employee was legally terminated, whether approval of the District Inspector of Schools was required for such termination and whether in fact approval was granted or not. In the light of the aforesaid direction, the District Inspector of Schools passed order dated 28th of July, 1998 and upheld the order of removal of the petitioner from service. In the light of the aforesaid direction, the District Inspector of Schools passed order dated 28th of July, 1998 and upheld the order of removal of the petitioner from service. It is this order of the District Inspector of Schools, which has been challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19101 of 1999 (Rishikesh Lal Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others). 4. Chandra Bali, a class IV employee of Seth Ganga Ram Jaiswal Inter College, Baraut, Allahabad, aggrieved by the order of termination passed by the Principal of the College, represented before the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad who disapproved his dismissal by order dated 12th of May, 2003 inter alia observing that before terminating his service, prior approval under Regulation 31 of Chapter III framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 was not obtained. The Principal of the College aggrieved by the same has preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21965 of 2003 (Principal, Seth Ganga Ram Jaiswal Inter College, Baraut, Allahabad v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and others). 5. It is not in dispute that both the Colleges are duly recognized by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (U.P. Act 2 of 1921) [hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’] and the Regulations framed thereunder. It is also an admitted position that both the Colleges receive grant-in-aid from the State Government and disbursement of salary of the employees is governed by the U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971). 6. We have heard Sri Harish Chandra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner in writ petition No. 19101 of 1999, Sri R.C. Dwivedi, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and Sri N.K. Pandey, learned counsel for respondent No. 5. We have also heard Sri R.K. Ojha, learned counsel for the Principal of the College-petitioner in writ petition No. 21965 of 2003 and Sri R.C. Singh, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 4-employee therein and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the State in both the petitions. 7. Before we enter into merit of the case, it is apt to go into the legislative history. The legislature enacted the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (U.P. Act No. 2 of 1921) for regulating and supervising the system of the High School and Intermediate Education. 8. 7. Before we enter into merit of the case, it is apt to go into the legislative history. The legislature enacted the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (U.P. Act No. 2 of 1921) for regulating and supervising the system of the High School and Intermediate Education. 8. Sections 16-A to 16-I were inserted in the Act by Section 7 of Intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958 (U.P. Act No. 35 of 1958). Section 16-G of the Act as inserted by the U.P. Act No. 35 of 1958 reads as follows : “16-G. Conditions of service of teachers.—(1) Every person employed in a recognized institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by Regulations and any agreement between the management and such employee insofar as it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or with the Regulations shall be void. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the Regulations may provide for— (a) the period of probation, the conditions of confirmation and the procedure and conditions for promotion and punishment, including suspension pending inquiry and the emoluments for the period of suspension and termination of service with notice; (b) the scales of pay, and payment of salaries; (c) transfer of service from one recognized institution to another; (d) grant of leave and Provident Fund and other benefits; and (e) maintenance of record of work and service. (3)(a) No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. (b) The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management : Provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders, the Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal, the Headmaster or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted. (c) An appeal against the order of the Inspector under clause (b), may be made to the Regional Appellate Committee constituted under clause (d) within one month from the date of such order being communicated to the parties concerned and the Regional Appellate Committee may, after such enquiry as it considers necessary, confirm the order or set aside or modify it, and the order passed by the Regional Appellate Committee shall be final. (d) The Regional Appellate Committee in each region shall consist of— (i) the Regional Deputy Director, Education who will be President of the Committee, (ii) a member of the State Manager’s Association nominated by that Association, and (iii) a member of the U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Sangh nominated by that Sangh. (4) An order made or decision given by the competent authority under sub-section (3) shall not be questioned in any Court and the parties concerned shall be bound to execute the directions contained in the order or decision within the period that may be specified therein. (5) In this section and Section 16-F the powers conferred on or the duties assigned to the Inspector and the Regional Deputy Director of Education shall, in the case of an institution for girls, be respectively exercised or discharged by the Regional Inspectress of Girl’s Schools and the Deputy Director of Education (Women). 9. Section 2 of the U.P. Act No. 7 of 1966 amended Section 16-G of the Act and substituted Section 16-G (3)(c). Section 2(i) of U.P. Act 7 of 1966 reads as follows : “2. Amendment of Section 16-G of U.P. Act II of 1921.—In sub-section (3) of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, hereinafter referred to as the principal Act,— (i) For clause (c) the following shall be substituted, namely— “(c) Any party may prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director, Education, against an order of the Inspector under clause (b), whether passed before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1966, within one month from the date of communication of the order to that party, and the Regional Deputy Director may after such further enquiry, if any, as he considers necessary, confirm, set aside or modify the order, and the order passed by the Regional Deputy Director shall be final. In case the order under appeal was passed by the very person holding the office of Regional Deputy Director while acting as Inspector, the appeal shall be transferred by order of the Director to some other Regional Deputy Director for decision, and the provisions of this clause shall apply in relation to decision by that other Regional Deputy Director as if the appeal had been preferred to himself.” 10. Further Section 15 of the U.P. Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act No. 26 of 1975) amended Section 16-G of the Act. Same reads as follows : "15. Amendment of Section 16-G.—In Section 16-G of the principal Act— (i) in the marginal heading for the words “conditions of service of teachers” the words “conditions of service of Head of Institutions, teachers and other employees” shall be substituted; (ii) in sub-section (2), in clause (a), for the words “including suspension pending enquiry”, the words and brackets “(including suspension pending or in contemplation of enquiry or during the pendency of investigation, enquiry or trial in criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude)” shall be substituted; (iii) for sub-section (5), the following sub-sections and Explanation shall be substituted, namely : “(5) No Head of Institution or teacher shall be suspended by the Management, unless in the opinion of the Management— (a) the charges against him are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank; or (b) his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him; or (c) any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, enquiry or trial. (6) Where any Head of Institution or teacher is suspended by the Committee of Management, it shall be reported to the Instructor within thirty days from the date of the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, in case the order of suspension was passed before such commencement, and within seven days from the date of the order of suspension in any other case, and the report shall contain such particular as may be prescribed and be accompanied by all relevant documents. (7) No such order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by the Inspector, remain in force for more than sixty days from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 or as the case may be, from the date of such order and the order of the Inspector shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court. (8) If, at any time, the Inspector is satisfied that disciplinary proceedings against the Head of Institution or teacher are being delayed, for no fault of the Head of Institution or the teacher, the Inspector may after affording opportunity to the Management to make representation revoke an order of suspension passed under this section. (9) All appeals pending before the Deputy Director of Education (Women) immediately before the commencement of this sub-section shall be transferred to the Joint Director of Education (Women) for disposal : Provided that where the Deputy Director of Education (Women) has already commenced the hearing of any such appeal before the commencement of this sub-section, the appeal shall be disposed of by the Deputy Director of Education (Women) herself. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression "Regional Deputy Director, Education shall, in relation to a girls’ institution mean the Joint Director of Education (Women).” 11. In exercise of power conferred under Section 16-G of the Act, Regulations have been framed and Chapter 3 thereof pertains to Conditions of Service. Regulation 31, which is relevant for the purpose, reads as follows : “31. Punishment to employees for which prior sanction from Inspector or Regional Inspectress would be essential may be any one of the following : (1) Discharge, (2) Removal or Termination, (3) Demotion in grade, (4) Reduction in emoluments." 12. Principal or Headmaster would be competent to give above punishment to Fourth-class employees. In case of punishment awarded by competent officer, the Fourth-class employee may appeal to Management Committee. This appeal must be preferred within one month of the date of intimation of the punishment and Management Committee on receipt of appeal will decide the matter within six weeks. On consideration of all necessary records and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the employee, if he wants to appear before the Management Committee, it will give its decision. 13. On consideration of all necessary records and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the employee, if he wants to appear before the Management Committee, it will give its decision. 13. Fourth-class employee would also have a right to represent against the decision of the Management Committee on his appeal to the District Inspector of Schools/Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools within one month of the date of intimation of the decision : 14. By this juncture, it would be appropriate to quote Regulation 100 of Chapter 3, which reads as follows : “100. In respect of clerks, which includes Librarian also, the Management Committee and in respect of Fourth class employees, the Principal/Headmaster shall be the appointing authority. Regarding appointment, probation of clerk, which includes Librarian also, and Fourth class employees, the period for which is one year, confirmation and other service conditions, etc. relating to it, provisions with necessary changes described in Regulations 1, 4 to 8, 10, 11, 15, 24 to 26, 30, 32 to 34, 36 to 38, 40 to 43, 45 to 52, 54, 66, 67, 70 to 73 and 76 to 82 shall apply. But in respect of Fourth class employees Regulations 77 to 82 would apply only when necessary directions in this regard are issued by the State Government. Provisions in Regulations 9, 12, 13, 14, 16 to 20, 27, 28, 54, 55 to 65 and 97 would not apply in respect of such employees.” 15. From a plain reading of the aforesaid Regulation, it would be evident that various Regulations would be applicable in the case of Class IV employees for the purpose of confirmation and other service conditions, but Regulation 31 has not been made applicable in the case of Class IV employees. It is, at this stage, to apt to quote Regulation 37, which reads as follows : “37. Soon after the report of the proceedings and recommendation from the inquiring authority are received, the Committee of Management shall after notice to employee, meet to consider the report of the proceeding and recommendation made and take decision on the case. The employee shall be allowed, if he so desires, to appear before the Committee in person to state his case and answer any question that may be put to him by any member present at the meeting. The employee shall be allowed, if he so desires, to appear before the Committee in person to state his case and answer any question that may be put to him by any member present at the meeting. The Committee shall then send a complete report together with all connected papers to the Inspector or Regional Inspectress as the case may be, for approval of action proposed by it. But, regarding fourth-class employees, no report shall be sent to the Inspector or Inspectress for approval. Abovesaid all proceedings in this regard shall be done by appointing authority.” 16. It has been contended on behalf of Class IV employees that prior approval from the District Inspector of Schools is sine qua non for dismissing Class IV employee and in support of the submission, reliance has been placed on the following judgments of this Court : Shankar Saran v. Vesli Inter College, 1991 (1) UPLBEC 467; Daya Shankar Tewari v. Principal, R.D.B.M. Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Neogaon, Mirzapur and others, 1998(1) ESC 403; Principal, Rashtriya Inter College, Bali Nichlaul, District Maharajganj and another v. District Inspector of Schools, Mahrajganj and others, 2000 (1) UPLBEC 707 ; Sita Ram v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and others, 2000 (3) ESC 1880 (All); Committee of Management, St. Charles Inter College, Sardhana and others v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut and others, 2001 (1) UPLBEC 487 ; Ram Khelawan Maurya v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur and others, 2002 (4) ESC 201. 17. However, counsel representing the Committee of Management and the Principal, contend that prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools is not necessary before terminating the services of Class IV employees and in support thereof, reliance has been placed on the following judgments of this Court : Principal, Shitladin Inter College, Bagbana, District Allahabad v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and another, 1994 (3) ESC 112 (All); Swami Vivekanand Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Unnao and another v. District Inspector of Schools, Unnao and another, 1998 (3) AWC 1940 (LB); Ali Ahmad Ansari v. District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar and others, 2006 (3) ESC 1765 (All)(DB). 18. In the case of Shankar Saran (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held that an order of dismissal passed against a class IV employee without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools, is illegal. 18. In the case of Shankar Saran (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held that an order of dismissal passed against a class IV employee without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools, is illegal. Relevant portion of the judgment of this Court in the aforesaid case reads as follows : "13- blds vfrfjDr vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr cuk;s fu;eksa ds v/;k;&3 ds fofu;e 31 ds vk/kkj ij ;kph dh lsok;sa fcuk ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd dh iwoZ vuqefr ds lekIr fd;k tkuk Hkh iw.kZr;k voS/kkfud FkkA iwjs rF;ksa ls ;g Hkh Li"V gS fd ÁcU/k lfefr vkSj Á/kkukpk;Z us ?kksj :i ls vuqfpr n`f"Vdks.k ;kph ds lEcUèk esa viuk;k vkSj ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd vkSj iz/kkukpk;Z us ;kph dks voSèkkfud :i ls ckgj j[kkA” 19. A more detailed and exhaustive consideration is found in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra), wherein the learned Single Judge concluded as follows : “8. While considering the aforesaid contention, I find that sub-section (3) of Section 16-G of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 clearly provides for approval of Inspector in case of discharge, removal, dismissal from service, reduction in rank diminution in emoluments and termination of service but this provision only makes reference of Principal, Headmaster and teachers and no categorical reference of Class-IV employee has been made therein. But sub-section (1) of Section 16-G provides that the condition of service of every person employed in a recognized institution shall be governed by Regulations. Therefore, Statute permits framing of Regulations providing conditions of service of every person employed and therefore, this includes Class-IV employees also. Regulation 31 of Chapter-III of the Regulations so framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, provides for prior approval in case of certain punishments including termination. Regulation 100 of the said Regulations though does not categorically make Regulation 31 applicable in case of Class-IV employees but it also does not categorically exclude Regulation 31 from its applicability to Class-IV employees. Therefore, the only provisions of Regulation 31 indicates its scope of applicability. It is true that first paragraph of Regulation 31 while providing for prior approval in case of some punishment, does not refer to Class-IV employees specially but the said first paragraph providing for prior approval refers to all employees and there is no reason to presume exclusion of Class-IV employees from the applicability of the said Regulation. It is true that first paragraph of Regulation 31 while providing for prior approval in case of some punishment, does not refer to Class-IV employees specially but the said first paragraph providing for prior approval refers to all employees and there is no reason to presume exclusion of Class-IV employees from the applicability of the said Regulation. The subsequent paragraphs in Regulation 31 clearly refer to Class-IV employees.” 20. A perusal of the said decision indicates that the Court came to the conclusion that even though Regulation 100 does not categorically apply Regulation 31, yet it also does not exclude the same. Further, the learned Single Judge in paragraph 11 found that Regulation 37, which provides for sending of a report, limits the same in respect of Class-IV employees to be sent to the appointing authority instead of the Inspector and nothing more, which is quoted below : “11. A perusal of Regulations 36 and 37 of the said Regulations indicate that they provide for procedure in respect of disciplinary proceeding. Proviso to Regulation 37 only excludes Class-IV employees to the extent the said Regulation 37 requires sending of the report and the recommendation to the District Inspector of Schools for approval making it clear that the said entire proceedings relating to Class-IV employees are to be performed by the appointing authority. This has been done as in respect of Class-IV employees the appointing authority is the Principal whereas in respect of teachers the appointing authority is committee of management and Regulation 37 provides for sending of report and recommendation of the Enquiry Officer to committee of management which was to consider the same and take a decision and then to send the entire record to the Inspector for his approval. Therefore, proviso to Regulation 37 was required making it clear that for Class-IV employees ending of papers to the Inspector was to be made by the Principal, being the appointing authority and in this case papers were not to be sent by the committee of management which is not the appointing authority.” 21. For ready reference, at this juncture, we may record that even though there was a decision to the contrary in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), the same appears to have not been noticed in the judgment of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra), which was rendered at later point of time. 22. For ready reference, at this juncture, we may record that even though there was a decision to the contrary in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), the same appears to have not been noticed in the judgment of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra), which was rendered at later point of time. 22. The decision in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra) came to be considered by a Division Bench in the case of Principal, Rastriya Inter College, (supra) and the Division Bench affirmed the decision of Daya Shankar Tewari’s case (supra), with an approval in paragraph 4 and 5, which is as follows : “4. A learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Aloke Chakrabarti, J.) in Daya Shankar Tewari v. Principal and others, 1998(1) ESC 403, has held that such prior approval is necessary. The learned Single Judge has gone into the matter in great detail and has examined the relevant provisions in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act as well as Regulations 31 and 100 of the Regulations made under the aforesaid Act. 5. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge in Daya Shankar Tewari’s case. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Magadh Ram Yadav v. Dy. Director of Education and others, 1979 ALJ 1351, which is relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is in our opinion not applicable as it has not considered Regulations 31 and 100 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act.” 23. A learned Single Judge of this Court followed the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra) in the decision of Sita Ram v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and others, 2000 (3) ESC 1880 (All) and held as follows : “6. Now there is no escape from the in holding that prior approval of the DIOS is essential in awarding punishment of termination, dismissal etc. of Class-IV employee. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that approval was not required because petitioner was a Class-IV employee, is not acceptable. It is not disputed by the respondents that no approval of the DIOS prior to his termination by the Principal was obtained. The petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed and the impugned order of termination be quashed on this ground alone. It is not disputed by the respondents that no approval of the DIOS prior to his termination by the Principal was obtained. The petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed and the impugned order of termination be quashed on this ground alone. Since the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground that no approval of the DIOS was obtained in the case of the petitioner, prior to terminating him from service, the other grounds sought to challenge the propriety of the impugned order is not considered.” 24. It may again be pointed out that none of the aforesaid decisions took notice of the decision in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra). The same position was reiterated in the case of Committee of Management, St. Charles Inter College, Sardhana (supra) by a learned Single Judge of this Court, as contained in paragraph 12, which reads as follows : “12. The next question is whether the management could dismiss a class IV employee without obtaining prior approval of the DIOS as provided in Chapter III, Regulation 31. Counsel for the petitioners argued that no prior approval of DIOS was required for dismissing a class IV employee. On the other hand Counsel for the respondent No. 2 urged that prior approval of DIOS was necessary. In the alternative the learned Counsel urged that in cases where prior approval of DIOS has not been obtained the class IV employee could prefer appeal before the management and representation before the DIOS. The argument is supported by a Single Judge decision of this Court in Daya Shanker Tiwari v. Principal, R.D.B.M. Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Neogaon, Mirzapur and others, 1998 (1) ESC 403 (All). The learned Single Judge held that the provisions of Regulation 31 read with Section 16-G (1) were applicable before dismissing a class IV employee. And prior approval of Inspector or Regional Inspectress was required to be obtained by the management. This decision was approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Principal, Rastriya Inter College, Bali Nichlaul, District Maharajganj and others v. District Inspector of Schools, Maharajganj and others, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 707 . Therefore, since prior approval of DIOS was not obtained by the petitioners before dismissing the respondent No. 2, the DIOS rightly set aside the dismissal order.” 25. Therefore, since prior approval of DIOS was not obtained by the petitioners before dismissing the respondent No. 2, the DIOS rightly set aside the dismissal order.” 25. Another learned Single Judge in the case of Ram Khelawan Maurya v. District Inspector of Schools (supra) arrived at the same conclusion by holding as follows : “7. It is settled law that the punishment can be awarded after prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools or the Regional Inspectress of Girls School. Since approval of the District Inspector of Schools has not been obtained, the decision of the Committee of Management is bad in law. It is submitted on behalf of respondents that Regulation 31 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act while providing for prior approval in case of Class IV employees the said paragraph refers to all employees and there is no reason to exclude Class IV employees from the applicability of the said regulation. Subsequent paragraph of the Regulation 31 also refers to Class IV employee. This Court in the case of Principal, Rashtriya Inter College (supra) has held that prior approval in case of dismissal of non-teaching staff is necessary and if such prior approval is not taken before termination of the services, the termination is illegal. The learned Single Judge in Daya Shankar Tiwari v. Principal, Smt. Ramwati Devi Beni Madho Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Mirzapur and others, 1998 Lab IC 1252, has held that the provision of Regulation 31 read with Section 16-G (1) of the Act make it clear that in case of Class IV employees prior approval of Inspector or Regional Inspectress is necessary. This case has been approved by the Division Bench of this Court.” 26. There is yet another decision of a learned Single Judge to the same effect in the case of Principal, P.N.V. Inter College, Chilli Hamirpur and another v. D.I.O.S. Hamirpur and another, (2007) 1 AWC 253. 27. Thus, it can be seen that the decision in the case of Shankar Saran v. Vesli Inter College (supra), which was delivered on 3rd March, 1991, there was no detailed discussion on the various provisions of the Act and a conclusion was drawn on the strength of Regulation 31 only to the effect that prior approval was required. 27. Thus, it can be seen that the decision in the case of Shankar Saran v. Vesli Inter College (supra), which was delivered on 3rd March, 1991, there was no detailed discussion on the various provisions of the Act and a conclusion was drawn on the strength of Regulation 31 only to the effect that prior approval was required. The latter decisions from Daya Shankar Tewari’s case (supra) onwards, upon a discussion of the relevant provisions, came to the conclusion that prior approval was required, but as pointed out hereinabove, none of the said decisions took notice of the decision in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra). 28. The decisions, which hold that no such prior approval is required begin with the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), wherein a learned Single Judge drew the following conclusion : “9. Regulations 35 to 44-A provide the manner in which enquiry is to be conducted. In case the enquiry is not conducted against the delinquent employee, any order awarding punishment will be illegal. In case all the procedures were followed, the order of punishment imposed by the authority concerned cannot be set aside. The District Inspector of Schools has not recorded any finding that the enquiry officer or the Principal did not follow the procedure prescribed for holding enquiry and in giving opportunity of hearing before awarding punishment. 10. The disciplinary proceedings against a Class IV employee of the institution is in the nature of domestic enquiry. If the disciplinary authority, after holding the enquiry, in a fair manner, comes to the conclusion on the basis of appreciation of evidence on record that the charges against the delinquent employee is proved, the Committee of Management on appeal being filed can re-appraise the evidence and can come to different conclusion. The aggrieved employee is given right of making representation against the decision of the Committee of Management given in appeal. The power given to the District Inspector of Schools is in the nature of supervisory jurisdiction. He can set aside the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority of the Committee of Management when it is either perverse or based on no material evidence or certain material evidence has been ignored. He has further to examine whether procedure prescribed for holding the enquiry was followed and it was fair and impartial enquiry. He can set aside the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority of the Committee of Management when it is either perverse or based on no material evidence or certain material evidence has been ignored. He has further to examine whether procedure prescribed for holding the enquiry was followed and it was fair and impartial enquiry. He has, however, no jurisdiction to re-appraise the evidence on record." 29. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the order of dismissal from service was otherwise illegal as before passing the order of dismissal no prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools was taken as provided under Regulation 31 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Act had been amended by Notification No. 7/562/5-8 (Board, September 1974) Allahabad dated 10th March, 1975 issued in pursuance to the approval of the State Government contained in G.O. No. 789(1)-15/(7) 75 dated March 1, 1975 and by the amendment so brought specific provisions have been made pertaining to appointment, disciplinary proceedings, appeal etc. in so far as Class IV employees are concerned. Amendment to Regulation 31 lays down power to appoint, punish and further provides for the appellate authority to hear appeals against punishment imposed and procedure for disposal of appeal and against the said appeal a further representation has been provided to the District Inspector of Schools, Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools concerned. Amendment to Regulation 31 lays down power to appoint, punish and further provides for the appellate authority to hear appeals against punishment imposed and procedure for disposal of appeal and against the said appeal a further representation has been provided to the District Inspector of Schools, Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools concerned. The said Regulation is extracted hereunder : “31&deZpkfjksa dks Ák;% n.M] ftlds fy, fujh{kd vFkok e.Myh; fujhf{kdk dh iwoZ LohÑfr vko’;d gksxh] fuEufyf[kr esa ls fdlh ,d :i ls gks ldrh gS%& ¼d½ i`FkDdj.k vFkok ÁeqfDrA ¼[k½ Js.kh esa voufrA ¼x½ ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa dehA prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkfj;ksa dks mijksDr dksbZ n.M nsus gsrq Á/kkukpk;Z vFkok Áèkkukè;kfidk l{ke gksxkA l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk n.M fn;s tkus dh n’kk esa prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkfj;ksa }kjk Áca/k lfefr dks vihy dh tk ldsxhA ;g vihy n.M lwfpr fd;s tkus dh frfFk ls ,d ekg ds vUnj ÁLrqr gks tkuh pkfg, vkSj ml ij Ácaèk&lfefr }kjk fu.kZ; dj vihy dh izkfIr frfFk ls vf/kdre N% ekg ds Hkhrj ns fn;k tk;sxkA leLr vko’;d vfHkys[kksa ij fopkj djus ,oa deZpkjh dks] ;fn og Ácaèk&lfefr ds le{k Lo;a mifLFkr gksuk pkgs] lquokbZ ds i’pkr~ Áca/k&lfefr vihy ij fu.kZ; nsxhA prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh dks ;g Hkh vf/kdkj gksxk fd mldh vihy ij fd;s x;s Áca/k lfefr ds fu.kZ; ds fo:) og ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd e.Myh; ckfydk fo|ky; fujhf{kdk dks] fu.kZ; lwfpr fd;s tkus dh frfFk ls ,d ekg ds vUnj lE;kosnu dj ldsxkA fdUrq ÁfrcU/k ;g gksxk fd ;fn Áca/k lfefr mi;qZDr fu/kkZfjr N% lIrkg dh vof/k ds Hkhrj viuk fu.kZ; mijksDr vihy ij u ns rks lEcaf/kr deZpkjh viuk vH;kosnu lh/ks ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd e.Myh; ckfydk fo|ky; fujhf{kdk dks mijksDr N% lIrkg dh vof/k chr tkus ij ns ldrk gSA ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd e.Myh; ckfydk fo|ky; fujhf{kdk }kjk mijksDr vH;kosnu ij vH;kosnu dh ÁkfIr dh frfFk ls vf/kdre rhu ekg ds Hkhrj fu.kZ; ns fn;k tk;sxk vkSj ;g fu.kZ; vfUre gksxkA vH;kosnu ds ÁLrqrhdj.k] fopkj ,oa fu.kZ; ds laca/k esa vko’;d ifjorZu ds lkFk bl v/;k; ds fofu;e 86 ls 92 ykxw gksxsA” 30. Regulation 100 of Chapter III inserted by the said Notification Regulations 1, 4 to 8, 10, 11, 15, 24 to 26, 30, 32 to 34, 36 to 38, 40 to 43, 45 to 52, 66, 67, 70 to 73 and 76 to 82 with necessary modifications have been made applicable in the case of Class IV employee. Regulation 100 of Chapter III inserted by the said Notification Regulations 1, 4 to 8, 10, 11, 15, 24 to 26, 30, 32 to 34, 36 to 38, 40 to 43, 45 to 52, 66, 67, 70 to 73 and 76 to 82 with necessary modifications have been made applicable in the case of Class IV employee. Unamended Regulation 31 has not been applicable. 31. From a reading of amended Regulation 31 it is clear that as far as employees who are employed by Committee of Management a different procedure has been prescribed but as regards Class IV employees, different procedure has been prescribed before passing an order of punishment. In case of an employee other than Class IV employee it is Committee of Management who has to impose punishment and such punishment cannot be made without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools/Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools concerned. But in a case of Class IV employee the imposition of punishment is made by the Principal or the Headmaster of the institution concerned and against the said order an appeal is maintainable before the Committee of Management of the institution within a prescribed time and after the dismissal of appeal by the management a right to make further representation has been given within a prescribed time. The procedure for disposal of representation by the District Inspector of Schools is to be made in accordance with Regulations 86 and 98 of the Regulations framed under the Act. 32. This provision clearly makes distinction in the manner of imposition of punishment. In case of Class IV employees no prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools is required. In case, the intention of the Legislature had been to obtain prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools before imposition of penalty, the right of appeal could have not been given to the Management and thereafter a further right to make representation to the District Inspector of Schools. 33. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has placed reliance upon the Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Karni, Faizabad v. District Inspector of Schools, Faizabad and others, 1981 UPLBEC 135, wherein it was held that prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools is to be obtained to the decision of the Committee of Management to award punishment. 33. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has placed reliance upon the Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Karni, Faizabad v. District Inspector of Schools, Faizabad and others, 1981 UPLBEC 135, wherein it was held that prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools is to be obtained to the decision of the Committee of Management to award punishment. It was a case of Class III employee and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 34. In Brij Raj Singh v. District Inspector of Schools and others, 1988 UPLBEC 123, it was held that if the order of termination is passed in violation of Regulations 35 and 36 in terminating the services of a Class IV employee the same cannot be upheld. The Court did not hold that prior approval was necessary even in Class IV employees’ services. 35. In Shankar Sharan v. Waslee Inter College, 1991(2) ALR 1, it was held that "if the services of Class IV employee is terminated without giving opportunity of hearing it is liable to be quashed. The decision was mainly based on the facts of the case.” 36. The other decision, which has been cited at the Bar in support of the said proposition is that of Swami Vivekanand Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Unnao and another v. District Inspector of Schools, Unnao and another, 1998 (3) A.W.C. 1940 (LB). We are not referring to any paragraph of the said judgment, as in our opinion, the same is not a case directly for the proposition as advanced before us as we shall explain it later on. 37. The Division Bench decision, on the basis whereof the conflict has been referred to be resolved by us, is the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari v. District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar and others (supra), where the Division Bench after having traced the various provisions held as follows : “8. Although the opening words of Regulation 31 provides that punishment to employee requires prior sanction from the District Inspector of Schools or Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools but the later part of the said regulation provides that Principal or the Headmaster would be competent to give the above punishment to Class-IV employee. Although the opening words of Regulation 31 provides that punishment to employee requires prior sanction from the District Inspector of Schools or Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools but the later part of the said regulation provides that Principal or the Headmaster would be competent to give the above punishment to Class-IV employee. The first part of the said regulation specifically provide that prior sanction from Inspector for awarding punishment to employee is necessary whereas in the next part of the said regulation it is said that for Class-IV employee the Principal or Headmaster would be competent to give punishment. Further with regard to punishment awarded to a Class-IV employee, right of appeal has been given to the employee before the Management Committee within one month. The Class-IV employee has also been given right of representation against the decision of the Management Committee on his appeal to the District Inspector of Schools. The proviso to the said regulation further provides that if the Management Committee does not give a decision on the appeal of the employee within six weeks, the employee has right to represent the District Inspector of Schools directly. Had the prior approval for awarding the punishment to the Class IV employee was also required, there was no object and purpose for giving the right of representation to the same authority. The provisions of seeking prior approval for awarding punishment from the District Inspector of Schools and the provisions for right of representation to the District Inspector of Schools cannot go together. The above intend is further clear from the subsequent regulations of Chapter-III, i.e., Regulations 44 and 44-A. Regulation 44 clearly mentions that the Inspector or Regional Inspectress shall for the purpose of proceedings as envisaged in sub-section (3)(a) of Section 16-G of the Act or for adjudication of proposed punishment against any employee of clerical cadre within six weeks of receipt of complete proposal inform the Management about his decision. Regulation 44-A further provides that Inspector or Regional Inspectress may accept or reject the punishment proposed in respect of employee of clerical cadre. Had the prior approval of Inspector was also contemplated for Class-IV employees under Regulation 31, the mention of only Class-III employee in Regulations 44 and 44-A would not have been there. Regulations 44 and 44-A are extracted below : “44. Had the prior approval of Inspector was also contemplated for Class-IV employees under Regulation 31, the mention of only Class-III employee in Regulations 44 and 44-A would not have been there. Regulations 44 and 44-A are extracted below : “44. The Inspector or Regional Inspectress shall for the purpose of proceedings as envisaged in sub-section (3)(a) of Section 16-G of the Act or for adjudication of proposed punishment against any employee of clerical cadre within six weeks of receipt of complete proposal inform the Management about his/her decision. If incomplete proposal is received from the Management, the sanctioning authority shall ask to re-submit the complete proposal and period of six weeks as proposed in this regulation would be counted from the date of receipt of complete papers to the sanctioning authority. These papers may be sent either by registered post or by special bearer. 44-A. (1) The Inspector or Inspectress may accept or reject the punishment proposed in respect of employees of clerical cadre. He may either extend or reduce it : Provided that Inspector or Inspectress would give a notice to the concerned employee before issuing an order in respect of punishment to show cause within fifteen days of service of the notice as to why he should not be punished as proposed. Either party within a period of one month from the date of receipt of information may appeal to the Regional Deputy Director of Education against an order of Inspector or Inspectress and Regional Deputy Director of Education, after any such additional enquiry, if any, which he may deem fit, can affirm or cancel or modify the order, which will be final. On appeal of an employee, decision of Regional Deputy Director of Education would be given within a period of three months.” The scheme of the Regulations 31 to 45 of Chapter-III, thus, do not provide that prior approval is required for awarding punishment of removal or termination of a Class-IV employee from the District Inspector of Schools.” 38. On appeal of an employee, decision of Regional Deputy Director of Education would be given within a period of three months.” The scheme of the Regulations 31 to 45 of Chapter-III, thus, do not provide that prior approval is required for awarding punishment of removal or termination of a Class-IV employee from the District Inspector of Schools.” 38. Learned counsel, appearing for the employees, namely Sri Harish Chandra Singh and Sri R.C. Singh, have urged that Regulation 31, clearly stipulates that the Conditions of Service of all Employees of an Intermediate College including Class-IV employees are to be governed by the same and, therefore, the decision by the Division Bench in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari v. District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar and others (supra) does not lay down the law correctly. 39. Sri R.C. Singh vehemently urged that the opening part of Regulation 31 leaves no room for doubt that prior approval is required for all class of punishments referred to therein in respect of all employees and that such prior approval cannot be excluded. He contends that the latter part of the procedure, which makes provision for appeal from the decision of the Head of the Institution to the Committee of Management and further representation to the District Inspector of Schools does not take away the power of granting prior approval. 40. He further submits that Regulation 37, which carves out a proviso in respect of Class-IV employees, not obliging the disciplinary authority to forward papers for approval, does not curtail the powers of District Inspector of Schools to grant prior approval. He contends that if such an interpretation is given, then Regulation 31 would become redundant and, therefore, the principle of harmonious construction should be applied for which, he drew support from the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra). He further contends that Class-IV employees are clearly covered by Regulation 31, and if the legislature has omitted the use of specific words, then the said gap or omission, being an accidental omission, should be filled in by this Court by applying the tools of purposive interpretation. 41. He further contends that Class-IV employees are clearly covered by Regulation 31, and if the legislature has omitted the use of specific words, then the said gap or omission, being an accidental omission, should be filled in by this Court by applying the tools of purposive interpretation. 41. Shri R.C. Singh in his written submissions has also invited the attention of the Court to the general principles relating to addition of words when permissible and the duty of the Court to avoid anomalies and ambiguity including inconsistencies and repugnancies. The rules of interpretation, as enunciated in Chapter II of the Statutory Rules of Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, have been pressed into service. He contends that the Court should avoid a construction that was never intended by the legislature and the provisions made for the protection of an employee should be construed in a manner that it provides for a complete umbrella under the law to an employee, designed for protection of his interest against any arbitrary action by the disciplinary authority. 42. The submission is that the level of satisfaction at the time of grant of prior approval by the District Inspector of Schools would be different and would be of a far lesser intensity, as at that point of time, he has to simply accord his approval and not enter into the validity or otherwise of the merits of the charges for punishment. He contends that if the provision is read in this way, then there would be no embarrassment to the Committee of Management to hear an appeal against an order of dismissal even if there is a prior approval and the District Inspector of Schools would not be deprived of his authority to decide a representation on merits, which he can do uninfluenced by the prior approval granted by him. It is urged that when an appeal or representation is filed, then the level of investigation and the scope of power exercised would be entirely different from that at the stage of prior approval being granted at the time of dismissal. It is urged that when an appeal or representation is filed, then the level of investigation and the scope of power exercised would be entirely different from that at the stage of prior approval being granted at the time of dismissal. He, therefore, submits that the omission by the legislature and keeping in view the provisions of Regulation 31, 37 and 100, this Court should interpret the provisions so as to resolve the conflict by pressing into service the recital in the title heading of Section 16-G, which has neither been considered or interpreted from this angle in any of the decisions which have been cited by the Bar. 43. Sri Harish Chandra Singh has supported the same contentions and submitted that the view expressed by this Court in Daya Ram Tewari’s case (supra), as upheld by the Division Bench later on should be approved as laying down the correct law. 44. Sri R.K. Ojha, Sri R.C. Dwivedi and Sri Yadav, for the employers, namely the Principal of the Institution have relied their submissions in spite of only a couple of decisions in their favour, to urge that the entire Scheme of the Act is clear enough to hold that prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools is not contemplated and any such interpretation would be a violation of the provisions resulting in absurdity. They contend that this situation has arisen on account of the decision in Principal, Shitladin Inter College, (supra) having not been noticed either in Daya Shankar Tewari’s case (supra) or any of the latter decisions. On the strength of his written submissions, he also invited the attention of the Court to the fact that the Division Bench decision in the case of Principal, Rashtriya Inter College (supra) holding that prior approval was necessary and approving the decision of Daya Shankar Tewari’s case (supra) was put in jeopardy before the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition No. 2337 of 2001, wherein initially the judgment of the Division Bench was stayed by the Apex Court in the following terms : “The Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition, numbered as Appeal (Civil) No. 2337 of 2001 and Hon’ble Apex Court in its interim order was pleased to pass following orders : “LA 1 is allowed. It is contended that the action under Regulation in question does not require prior approval of the Inspector in the case of Class IV employee and further more the action in question was taken on the basis of the complaint and order of the Inspector himself. Issue notice. Stay in the meanwhile. Sd/- B.N. Kirpal J. Sd/- Ruma Pal, J.” 45. It has been stated that the said appeal was even though dismissed on 02.11.2001, yet the question of law raised therein was left open to be decided. The said order of the Apex Court is quoted below : “Leaving the question of law open, the Special Leave petition is dismissed.” 46. Relying on the decision of Shri Shitladin Inter College (supra) case and the latter Division Bench judgment in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra), Sri Ojha contends that the words of Regulation 31 read with Regulation 37, are unambiguous and clear enough, which do not require any purposive interpretation as suggested by the other side and further, the history of various amendments brought about in Section 16-G and the Regulations framed would clearly demonstrate that had the legislature intended to bring about any such provision seeking prior approval, then the same would have been expressly included, and the legislature or the Regulation making authority having not done so, there is no occasion for this Court to read into the provisions, the requirement of a prior approval in respect of a punishment to be awarded to a Class-IV employee. He further submits that if that is done, then it would be encroaching upon the function of the legislature or the rule making authority, which our Courts have held to be outside their jurisdiction and even otherwise, there is no necessity of doing so, as there is an ample protection in the Act making room for reconsideration of the matter at the stage of appeal before the Committee of Management and by way of a representation even thereafter to the District Inspector of Schools himself. 47. Mr. Ojha further submits that Regulation 37 clarifies the position, where the sending of reports for the purpose of approval has been clearly excluded, and Regulation 31 stands specifically excluded in the matter of Class-IV employees by way of Regulation 100. 47. Mr. Ojha further submits that Regulation 37 clarifies the position, where the sending of reports for the purpose of approval has been clearly excluded, and Regulation 31 stands specifically excluded in the matter of Class-IV employees by way of Regulation 100. He submits that Regulation 31, therefore, cannot be read beyond for which it has been intended, and he further submits that if such a provision was necessary, then the legislature could have done it, as was done in the case of Class-III employees by introducing Regulation 44 and 44-A of the Regulations under Chapter III aforesaid, which have been already quoted and reproduced hereinbefore while referring to Ali Ahmad Ansari’s case. 48. He submits that if the interpretation of having a prior approval is accepted, then it would be an anomalous situation where the Committee of Management would hear an appeal in respect of a decision taken after approval by a higher authority, namely the District Inspector of Schools. This incongruity would further stand multiplied, if the District Inspector of Schools is called upon to hear a representation in respect of the same matter, for which he has granted prior approval. 49. He further submits that the words ‘prior approval’ in respect of the punishments referred to in Regulation 31 also envisage the examination of the matter by the District Inspector of Schools on merits, and it is for this reason that all documents are required to be sent to the District Inspector of Schools, as per Regulation 37. However for Class-IV employees, such documents would not be required to be sent to the District Inspector of Schools and the entire procedure has to be followed by the disciplinary authority, i.e., the Head of the Institution in the instant case. Sri Ojha, therefore, submits that this provision itself specifically excludes the exercise of power by the District Inspector of Schools to grant prior approval, as he cannot enter into the merits of the charges nor the papers in respect thereof are required to be sent to the District Inspector of Schools. He submits that, fortified with the decisions in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra) and Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), his submissions should be accepted and the ratio in the aforesaid two decisions should be approved as laying down the correct law. 50. He submits that, fortified with the decisions in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra) and Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), his submissions should be accepted and the ratio in the aforesaid two decisions should be approved as laying down the correct law. 50. Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State with the aid of his written submissions and the decisions cited at the Bar, raised the same submissions, and urged that the District Inspector of Schools is under no legal obligation to grant prior approval in respect of the proposal of punishment against a Class-IV employee. He submits that the word ‘employees’ occurring in the opening part of Regulation 31 would stand restricted to such employees about whom reference has been made in the latter Regulations and a Class-IV employee would stand excluded by virtue of the specific provision contained in Regulation 100. He contends that the ratio of the decision in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari’s (supra) does not lay down the correct position of law inasmuch as the Court could not have read into a provision by employing any tool of interpretation, so as to include something, which has been specifically excluded. He contends that the wisdom of the legislature cannot be doubted as the legislature will be presumed to be conscious of the existence of Regulation 31, while framing Regulation 100, and when there is a conscious departure by excluding the applicability of Regulation 31, then in that event, it would be inappropriate for this Court to read into a provision, which has not been made applicable. He submits that in the event the interpretation as contended by the other side is accepted, the same would result in incongruity and would not be in accordance with the Scheme of the Act and Regulations referred to hereinabove. 51. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate for us to declare the law on the basis of first principles underlying the interpretation on the basis whereof the dispute has to be resolved. This is necessary in view of the conflict of the two Division Bench decisions, as pointed out in the referring order. 52. 51. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate for us to declare the law on the basis of first principles underlying the interpretation on the basis whereof the dispute has to be resolved. This is necessary in view of the conflict of the two Division Bench decisions, as pointed out in the referring order. 52. Before proceeding to do so, we may, at the very outset, record that another Division Bench decision relating to the same subject, which arose out of a reference in a second appeal and which was not cited at the Bar, has come to our notice and which, in our opinion, substantially answers the issues referred before us. The same is reported in 2006 (65) ALR 767, Pujari Yadav v. Ram Briksh Yadav decided on 9.10.2006. The said decision has distinguished the ratio of the decisions in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra) as approved in Principal Rashtriya Inter College (supra), by tracing the legislative history of Section 16-G of the Act and Regulation 31, and has proceeded to approve and follow the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra), thereby holding that it is not necessary to seek prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools before terminating the services of a Class-IV employee. Our task therefore, has been rendered more convenient and our burden is lessened. 53. The Scheme of the provisions as contained in Regulation 31 clearly demonstrates that the said Regulation uses the word ‘employees’ in the opening sentence, where the recital is that prior sanction from the Inspector would be essential for awarding any of the punishments as enumerated from Sl. No. 1 to 4 therein. The word ‘employees’ has not been defined under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. However, the said word employee has been defined under Section 2 (f) of the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 as follows : “2. Definitions.—‘employee’ of an institution means a non-teaching employee in respect of whose employment maintenance grant is paid by the State Government to the institution;” 54. However, the said word employee has been defined under Section 2 (f) of the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 as follows : “2. Definitions.—‘employee’ of an institution means a non-teaching employee in respect of whose employment maintenance grant is paid by the State Government to the institution;” 54. In our opinion, the word ‘employees’ occurring in the opening words of Regulation 31 does not include Class-IV employees, as it is clearly distinct in its operation as compared to the definition of the word ‘employees’ occurring in Section 2(f) of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The reason is not far to see. In the Regulations framed under Chapter III, a specific procedure has been carved out for taking disciplinary action against Class-IV employees, whereas in U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971, the purpose is distinct, namely the payment of salary to all the employees who receive the same, as a result of extension of benefit of grant-in-aid given by the Government. Thus, the purpose for which the said words have been used in the two enactments are clearly different and, therefore, the word ‘employee’ as understood in U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 is altogether in a different context. It is well settled that the same words used in separate statutes may not connote the same meaning as they operate in different fields. 55. Regulation 31 was amended twice, firstly by notification dated 1st March, 1975 and subsequently vide notification dated 27th February, 1978. The Division Bench judgment in the case of Pujari Yadav v. Ram Briksh Yadav (supra) clarified and interpreted the aforesaid amendments in Regulation 31 and the impact thereof was discussed in paragraph 21 to 23 of the said decision which is as follows : “21. The Board has framed regulations under Section 15 of the Act. Regulation 31 of Chapter-III of the Regulation (see Appendix-II of the judgment) provides that the prior approval of the Inspector will be necessary for the punishments enumerated therein. This includes dismissal also which is the case in present. Regulation 31 unlike Section 16-G(3) of the Act is not confined to the teachers and Head of Institutions but refers to the ‘employees’ which prima facie include non-teaching staff as well as Class-IV employees also. 22. This includes dismissal also which is the case in present. Regulation 31 unlike Section 16-G(3) of the Act is not confined to the teachers and Head of Institutions but refers to the ‘employees’ which prima facie include non-teaching staff as well as Class-IV employees also. 22. Regulation 31 has been amended twice : By the Notification No. 789 (1)/15 (7)-75 dated 1st March, 1975 published vide No. Board-7/562-V-8 (Board September, 1974) Allahabad dated 10th March, 1975 (the 1975 Notification). By this notification two clauses were added in Regulation 31. By Notification No. 8372/15 (7)-12(103)/77 Lucknow: dated 27th February, 1978 (the 1978 Notification). By this Notification the two clause added by the 1975 Notifications were modified. 23. The effect of the first clause added by the 1975 Notification was to empower the principal to award any punishment to Class-IV employees and his order is subject to appeal before the Committee of Management. The second clause provides further appeal to the D.I.O.S./Regional Inspector. These clauses are further amended by the 1978 Notification, however substantially they remain the same.” 56. Thereafter, the Court came to the conclusion that in view of the aforesaid amendments as noted above and the addition of the two clauses in Regulation 31, the Principal or Headmaster of the Institution became competent to terminate the services of a Class-IV employee with further provision of an appeal and a representation to the Inspector of Schools thereafter. The Division Bench carefully examined the impact of the said amendments and came to the conclusion that the purpose of including the two clauses as brought by way of amendments in 1975 and 1978, clearly establish that the Principal is empowered to terminate the services of a Class-IV employee without taking prior approval of the Inspector. Such a decision by the Principal or Headmaster was to be final, subject to an appeal before the Committee of Management and then a further appeal to the Inspector. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment namely paragraphs 24 to 26 are quoted below : “24. The services in the present case were terminated on 12.6.1977 and as such the Regulation 31 as amended by the 1975 notification was applicable. The question is, whether Regulation 31 as amended by the 1975 Notification requires prior approval of the Inspector before terminating the services a Class-IV employee or not. 25. The services in the present case were terminated on 12.6.1977 and as such the Regulation 31 as amended by the 1975 notification was applicable. The question is, whether Regulation 31 as amended by the 1975 Notification requires prior approval of the Inspector before terminating the services a Class-IV employee or not. 25. It is correct that the cases (mentioned in paragraph 19 of this judgment) do support the submission of the plaintiff-appellant. However, these cases have not taken into account the amendment made in Regulation 31 by the 1975 or 1978 Notification. They have taken into account Regulation 31 as it was originally framed. These cases have not considered the Regulation 31 as amended from time to time and cannot be pressed to show that prior approval was necessary before terminating services of Class-IV employees. This question has to be decided in the light of the Regulation 31 of Chapter-III as amended. 26. Regulation 31 as it was originally framed required prior approval of the D.I.O.S. before terminating service of an employee. However, after addition of two clauses in Regulation 31 in 1975 it clearly empowered the principal to terminate the services of Class-IV employee. It further provided an appeal to the Committee of Management and thereafter to the Inspector itself. In case prior approval of Inspector was necessary before terminating services of Class-IV employee then what was the point in providing appeal first to the Committee of Management and then to the Inspector. In case the Inspector has already granted approval for terminating the service then can he change his decision in the appeal. In our opinion the purpose of including two clauses by 1975 notification, which continued with some modification by 1978 notification, clearly show that the principal is empowered to terminate the services of the Class-IV employee without taking any prior approval of the Inspector and his decision is final; it is subject to an appeal before the Committee of Management then to the appeal before the Inspector.” 57. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid reasoning given in the decision of Pujari Yadav (supra) and we find that Regulation 31 stands qualified by making an express and separate provision for the procedure to be followed in the case of Class-IV employees and, therefore, the word ‘employees’ occurring in the opening sentence of Regulation 31 does not include within its fold, a Class-IV employee. It is for this reason that Regulation 31 to that extent stood excluded in its applicability to Class-IV employees. To our mind, the Regulation making Authority was conscious of the amendments brought about in Regulation 31 in 1975 and 1978, and it is for the said reason that the applicability of Regulation 31 to that extent has not been included in Regulation 100. The reasoning given in Pujari Yadav’s case (supra) has our firm approval as we find that the amendments bring about a sea-change of procedure in relation to Class-IV employees with an exclusive dominant role assigned to the Head of the institution for taking disciplinary action. These amendments, which were introduced stepwise, in our opinion, exclude the role of the Inspector of Schools at the stage of taking action by the disciplinary authority. The amendments clearly and unambiguously, which have been quoted in detail in Appendix A to the judgment in Pujari Yadav’s case (supra), exhibit the intention of the rule making authority to clothe the Head of the institution with exclusive powers of initial disciplinary control unfettered by any prior sanction from any other authority. 58. With profound respect, we find fallacy in the reasoning of learned Single Judge, in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra) as upheld by the Division Bench in the case of Principal, Rashtriya Inter College (supra) and quoted hereinabove. The learned Single Judge in Daya Shankar Tewari’s case proceeded on a consideration of Section 16-G (3) of the Act, and held that the said provision provides for Conditions of Service of all employees including Class-IV employees as well. According to the learned Single Judge, Regulation 31 of Chapter III, so framed would, therefore, apply to a Class-IV employee and in order to explain the impact of Regulation 100, held that even if, Regulation 31 had not been made specifically applicable, yet the same was not categorically excluded. 59. Apart from the reasons given by the Division Bench in the case of Pujari Yadav (supra) hereinabove, we may further add that there is a legal principle engrained in the maxim “expressum facit cessare tacitum”. The said maxim means when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. The aforesaid well-known maxim was described as a principle of logic and commonsense and not merely a technical rule of construction. The said maxim means when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded. The aforesaid well-known maxim was described as a principle of logic and commonsense and not merely a technical rule of construction. Reference may be had to the decision in the case of B. Shankara Rao Badami v. State of Mysore, 1969 (1) SCC 9 and followed in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 [paragraph 70]. 60. In our opinion, the aforesaid principle squarely applies in the present context and for the reasons given hereinabove and hereinafter, we would interpret Regulation 31 read with Regulation 100 to mean that the sanction of prior approval in respect of the termination of a Class-IV employee would stand excluded. The reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in Daya Shankar Tiwari (supra) to that extent does not lay down the law correctly and, therefore, its approval by the Division Bench in the case of Principal Rashtriya Inter College, (supra) also cannot be said to be laying correct law. 61. There is yet another reason to come to this conclusion, which has also been taken note of in the case of Pujari Yadav (supra). The provision of appeal against an order of termination passed by the Head of the Institution lies to the Committee of Management. The order of the Committee of Management can be put in jeopardy in a further appeal before the District Inspector Schools. The hierarchy so provided, therefore, clearly amplifies the intention of the legislature that a Class-IV employee would have the benefit of appeals to the higher authorities at two stages. If a prior approval or sanction was intended before the punishment to be awarded, then the District Inspector of Schools would be supposed to go into the merits of such a punishment. That is the purpose for a prior approval or sanction, which requires the sanctioning authority to examine an order of punishment in depth before proceeding to grant sanction. It is for this reason that Regulation 37 quoted hereinabove, makes it imperative for the punishing authority to send all documents including reports to the Inspector of Schools for approval. 62. There is yet another reason to come to the same conclusion. It is for this reason that Regulation 37 quoted hereinabove, makes it imperative for the punishing authority to send all documents including reports to the Inspector of Schools for approval. 62. There is yet another reason to come to the same conclusion. Regulation 37 specifically excludes for sending of any such report to the Inspector in the case of Class-IV employees and all proceedings in relation to Regulation 37 have to be undertaken by the appointing authority. The aforesaid statutory provision, therefore, does not allow the sending of any such documents to the Inspector in the case of Class-IV employees. It injuncts the sending of any such papers to the District Inspector of Schools for examination. In our opinion, the intention of the legislature is clear enough that the District Inspector of Schools is not required to examine the material on the basis whereof any punishment has been awarded to a Class-IV employee. To our mind, there is no purpose to seek prior approval or sanction when the Inspector cannot examine the documents, which are necessary for granting such sanction. To interpret it otherwise, would be to do violation to the procedure, which specifically states that all proceedings in this regard have to be performed by the appointing authority, namely the Head of the Institution. If we interpret the provisions making it compulsory to obtain a sanction, then the aforesaid procedure as engrained in Regulation 37 would be rendered inoperative. There being no requirement of sending the papers to the Inspector, the intention appears to be clear that the role of the Inspector stands excluded at that stage. The question of granting prior sanction without any purpose would be a meaningless exercise, and therefore, we would refrain from rendering an interpretation that leads to futility. 63. While applying the rules of harmonious construction, the Court has to be cautious in interpreting the provisions, which may lead to anomalous results. The question of granting prior sanction without any purpose would be a meaningless exercise, and therefore, we would refrain from rendering an interpretation that leads to futility. 63. While applying the rules of harmonious construction, the Court has to be cautious in interpreting the provisions, which may lead to anomalous results. We find it apt to record that the rules of harmonious construction, while interpreting such statutes, immediately come into play in a situation of the present kind and reference in this connection can be made from Interpretation of Statutes by Justice Markandey Katju in which it has been stated as follow : “Where different interpretations of a statute are possible, the Court can adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible as it can be presumed that the legislature would have used the words in the sense which least offends our sense of justice. Similarly, if the harmonical construction leads to some absurd or repugnant result or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, it may be departed from so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency. There may be cases where there appears to be inconsistency or repugnancy in a statute and in such cases the principle of harmonious construction is applied. This is, however, subject to the principle that the special rule will override the general rule. Similarly, it is ordinarily not open to the Court to add words to a statute on the grounds that there is an omission in the words used in the statute.” (Interpretation of Statutes by Justice Markandey Katju, Judge Supreme Court of India.) 64. In the case of Padmasundara Rao and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, AIR 2002 SC 1334 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that the principle of casus omissus can be permitted to be pressed into service in case of a clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred. 65. In the case of Magor and St. 65. In the case of Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation, (1951) 2 All ER 839, the remarks of Lord Denning in the Court of Appeals has been quoted, which read as follows : “We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis.” 66. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 that the Court has to avoid a construction, which may render devoid any part of the statute. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin and others v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577 in paragraph 37 that the use of negative words are mandatory in character and the Court has to proceed accordingly. Sounding a caution to the Courts while interpreting a Rule, the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala and another v. P.V. Neelakandan Nair and others, (2005) 5 SCC 561 in paragraphs 8 to 16 held that while interpreting a Rule, attention should be paid not only to what has been said, but also to what has not been said. The Rule has to be interpreted not like a Euclid’s theorem, but with some imagination of the purposes, which lie behind the Rule. A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in B. Prabhavathi v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, 2002 (3) ESC 108 in paragraph 44 ruled that Rules framed under the Act should be harmoniously interpreted as they form part of the Act. 67. Having considered the principles enunciated and referred to hereinabove and applying them to the present controversy, it is clear to us that nothing has been omitted by the legislature, which may require filling up by the Court as suggested by Sri R.C. Singh. As explained hereinabove in Pujari Yadav (supra), the rule making authority itself proceeded to fill in the gaps by making express recitals in Regulations 31, 37, 100 and the other provisions relating thereto. The amendments in Regulation 31 lead to a heavy full stop to the role of the Inspector and is not a silent comma expressing doubt. As explained hereinabove in Pujari Yadav (supra), the rule making authority itself proceeded to fill in the gaps by making express recitals in Regulations 31, 37, 100 and the other provisions relating thereto. The amendments in Regulation 31 lead to a heavy full stop to the role of the Inspector and is not a silent comma expressing doubt. The same brings about a clarity which has an almost window pave effect and removes the cloud of doubt that has been raised to be resolved by us. 68. There is yet another principle, which deserves to be taken notice of. If the sanction is required prior to giving effect to a punishment in respect of a Class-IV employee, then the District Inspector of Schools would hear an appeal against his own approval. This, to our mind, would bring about an anomaly, which may extend to an absurdity. The same authority cannot be presumed to have been conferred with a power to hear an appeal against its own approval. This would be rendering nugatory the hierarchy provided for in Regulation 31 itself, where an appeal is provided to the Committee of Management against the order of disciplinary authority and a further appeal to the Inspector of Schools. The purpose, therefore, is clear enough and it does not suffer from any ambiguity which may require us to render an interpretation, which otherwise would bring about an incongruous result. As observed above, the Rules of Interpretation as enunciated by the Apex Court do not permit us to give an interpretation, which would obviously result in a clear anomaly as pointed out hereinabove. This we adopt, as the law permits us to apply ‘the intention seeking’ Rule of Interpretation to illustrate the anomaly that may result in the event we accept the proposition that a prior sanction is required. 69. A feeble submission raised by Sri R.C. Singh was that the District Inspector of Schools has to merely grant prior approval and not to make an in-depth examination, as at that stage, he would be proceeding as if to perform a routine work. Such an action would not, therefore, prevent him from hearing an appeal when the matter may arise out of an appeal before the Committee of Management. 70. Such an action would not, therefore, prevent him from hearing an appeal when the matter may arise out of an appeal before the Committee of Management. 70. We are not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission for the simple reason that the District Inspector of Schools, in our opinion, does not perform a mere ministerial act while granting sanction. We agree with the submission of Sri Ojha that a combined reading of Regulations 31 and 37 makes it amply clear that the District Inspector of Schools is not required to undertake any such exercise, which is to be done only by the Head of the Institution in the case of Class-IV employees. The submission is, therefore, devoid of substance and has been noted only to be rejected. 71. We have also perused the notes submitted by Sri R.C. Singh annexing therewith the General Principles of Interpretation as contained in Chapter II of the Statutory Rules of Interpretation, by Justice G.P. Singh. Having given our anxious consideration to the said Rules, as contained therein and as pointed out by Sri R.C. Singh, we find that said Rules on the contrary militate against the submissions as advanced on behalf of the employees pointed out hereinabove. The aforesaid principles have been considered in a large number of authorities and the conclusion drawn is that the intent and purpose of the provisions in the light of the enactment made, has to be considered in order to avoid any absurdity. We have already pointed out that by a reading of the Regulations, it is more than clear that the Rule making authority clearly intended to exclude the applicability of prior sanction as contained in Regulation 31 in respect of Class-IV employees. To add further, would be repeating what has already been observed hereinabove. 72. Another aspect of the matter, which clarifies the intention of the Rule making authority as pointed out by Sri R.K. Ojha is that in respect of Class-III employees, Regulations 44 and 44-A were expressly included under Chapter III, which envisage a separate procedure in respect of disciplinary action for the clerical cadre of employees. This however, illustrates that the Rule making authority did not apply any other provision to Class-IV employees and specifically empowered the Head of the Institution, namely the Principal or the Headmaster to take action at his end in respect of a disciplinary proceeding against a Class-IV employee. This however, illustrates that the Rule making authority did not apply any other provision to Class-IV employees and specifically empowered the Head of the Institution, namely the Principal or the Headmaster to take action at his end in respect of a disciplinary proceeding against a Class-IV employee. The aforesaid illustration further removes the cloud and expresses clarity on a comparison of the provisions that had been referred to hereinabove. 73. Responding to the submissions that were raised, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel appears to be right in his submissions that the Rule making authority clearly intended to restrict the meaning of the word ‘employees’ occurring in Regulation 31 in accordance with Regulation 100 to mean that a prior sanction would not be required in the case of a Class-IV employee. We accept his submission that the wisdom of the legislature should not be doubted and the Rule making authority will be presumed to be conscious of the departure that was deliberately made for the procedure to be adopted in the case of Class-IV employees. 74. Having laid threadbare the first principles on which we have interpreted the provisions, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that there is no requirement under the Regulations for a prior sanction or approval of the Inspector of Schools in respect of order of termination of Class-IV employees. 75. Coming to the decisions that have been cited at the Bar, we may point out that in the case of Shankar Saran v. Vesli Inter College (supra), the learned Single Judge has merely recorded conclusions without discussing the impact of the provisions, and it appears that no such issues were raised therein to contradict the opinion of the requirement of a prior sanction. The decision in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra), which was rendered in the year 1998, unfortunately did not take notice of the decision in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), which had been rendered way back in 1994 itself. The decision in the case of Principal Shitladin Inter College (supra), in our opinion, has correctly construed the provisions and we accordingly, approve the same. 76. The decision in the case of Principal Shitladin Inter College (supra), in our opinion, has correctly construed the provisions and we accordingly, approve the same. 76. Unfortunately, the Division Bench judgment in the case of Principal Rashtriya Inter College (supra), which approved the decision in the case of Daya Shankar Tewari (supra) also did not notice the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra). The same was religiously followed in the subsequent decisions in the case of Sita Ram (supra) as well as in the decision of Ram Khelawan Maurya v. District Inspector of Schools (supra). 77. On the other hand, the Division Bench decision in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra) also did not take notice of the earlier Division Bench decision in the case of Rashtriya Inter College (supra) and while holding that no prior approval/sanction is required, the said Division Bench also appears to have not been apprised of the decision in the case of Principal Shitladin Inter College (supra). The other decision in the case of Swami Vivekanand Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya (supra), in our opinion, does not dwell upon the controversy presently involved and does not contain any discussion on the issue raised in the present matter, as such a reference to the said decision by the learned counsel is of no assistance in resolving the present dispute. As noticed above, the Court has come across the Division Bench decision in Pujari Yadav (supra), which has substantially answered the question referred before us and having taken notice of the same, we fully approve the view taken therein. 78. In view of the conclusions, as drawn hereinabove, we are respectfully unable to agree with the view expressed in Daya Shankar Tiwari’s case as upheld by the Division Bench in the case of Principal Rashtriya Inter College (supra) and followed later on in the decisions of learned Single Judges referred to hereinabove. 79. We approve the view taken in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), the Division Bench judgment in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra) and the decision in the case of Pujari Yadav (supra) as laying down the correct law. 80. 79. We approve the view taken in the case of Principal, Shitladin Inter College (supra), the Division Bench judgment in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra) and the decision in the case of Pujari Yadav (supra) as laying down the correct law. 80. Our answer to the questions referred to us are as under : (i) For awarding a punishment as enumerated under Regulation 31 Chapter III of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 to a Class-IV employee of a institution recognized under the aforesaid Act, no prior approval or sanction from the Inspector of Schools is required. (ii) The Division Bench judgments in the case of Ali Ahmad Ansari v. District Inspector of Schools, Kushinagar, 2006(3) ESC 1765 (All) and Pujari Yadav v. Ram Briksh Yadav, 2006(65) ALR 767 lay down the correct law in contradistinction to the Division Bench judgment of Principal, Rashtriya Inter College, Bali Nichlaul, District Maharajganj and others, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 707 and the other judgments to that effect. The reference is answered accordingly. Let the papers be placed before the learned Single Judges before whom the writ petitions are pending to proceed with the matter in the light of the answers given by us in the present reference. ————