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2009 DIGILAW 330 (ORI)

DURYODHAN LENKA v. CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS, KALINGA GRAMYA BANK

2009-04-13

B.P.DAS, B.P.RAY

body2009
JUDGMENT : B.P. Das, J. - The Petitioner, who was working as Field Officer in Naharana Branch of Cuttack Gramya Bank and also the General Secretary of Kalinga Gramya Bank Officers' Association, has filed this Writ Petition challenging the Order Dated 21.11.2003 (Annexure-19) passed by the Appellate authority-Chairman of the Bank, O.P. 2, confirming the order of punishment of dismissal from service passed by the disciplinary authority on 21.6.2003 (Annexure 18). 2. The charges framed against the Petitioner read as follows: I) Sri Lenka did not work as per instruction given to him by he General Manager. He was instructed to exclusively look after deposit mobilization ana" to submit a weekly progress report. He did not function sincerely & properly & defied higher Officer's instructions. Thus, he violated Regulation 17 of Cuttack Gramya Bank Officers & Employees Service Regulation 2000. II) Sri Lenka did not obtain prior sanction of his leave nor informed in advance about his absence of duty. He did not resume his duty in bank's exigencies during Annual Closing in spite of two Telegrams and three letters served to him. There by Sri Lenka has intentionally not carried out higher Official's order in violation of Service Regulation 17 and 19 of Cuttack Gramya Bank Officers & Employees Service Regulation 2000. III) Sri Lenka has remained on sudden leave without any prior information/ sanction in the month of February /March 03 during Annual Closing work despite repeated instructions to him through Telephone/Telegram and letters. Sri Lenka's above action is detrimental to the interest of the Bank, thereby violated Regulation 22 of Cuttack Gramya Bank Officers and Employees Service Regulation 2000. IV) Sri Lenka had sanctioned and disbursed four Gold Loan accounts at Brahmapura Branch where the pledged ornaments were spurious in nature and could not be auctioned. These loan accounts had became NPA and the bank suffered nearly a loss of Rs. 18,300 plus unapplied interest. 3. The charge sheet was issued on 22.3.2003 & the Petitioner on 26.3.2003 made a representation requesting the Management to allow 15 days' time to file written statement of defence. On 28.3.2003 preliminary defence statement was submitted by the Petitioner with a request to supply the relevant papers/documents, basing on which charges were framed. Ultimately, an Enquiry Officer was appointed & he issued notice to the Petitioner to attend the enquiry on 30.4.2003. On 28.3.2003 preliminary defence statement was submitted by the Petitioner with a request to supply the relevant papers/documents, basing on which charges were framed. Ultimately, an Enquiry Officer was appointed & he issued notice to the Petitioner to attend the enquiry on 30.4.2003. But the Petitioner received the notice oh 1,5.2003, for which he intimated the Enquiry Officer regarding his late receipt of notice. Accordingly, on 30.4.2003 the Enquiry Officer issued second notice to attend the enquiry on 5.5.2003 but again the same was also received by the Petitioner on 8.5.2003 & the Petitioner had to again intimate the said fact to the Enquiry Officer. On 5.5.2003 the Enquiry Officer was stated to have issued third notice to the Naharana Branch for the Petitioner to attend the enquiry on 8.52003. According to the Petitioner, the Enquiry Officer in his enquiry proceeding dated 8.5.2003 had mentioned that notice dated 5.5.2003 sent to Naharana Branch had returned back with the remark 'not available'. Thereafter on 10.5.2003 the Enquiry Officer fixed the date of enquiry to 28.5.2003. Notice was sent through courier, which returned back on 23.5.2003 with the remark 'refused to accept'. On 28.5.2003 the enqujry was concluded ex parte in absence of the Petitioner. The Presenting Officer .submitted only a list of documents, but no list of witnesses was submitted nor was any witness examined. The Enquiry Officer allowed the Presenting Officer to get himself examined as a witness to prove the charges. The Enquiry Officer gave a ruling that both the Presenting Officer & the Petitioner would submit their written brief' by 12.6.2003. On 9:6:2003 the Enquiry Officer communicated a letter to the Petitioner informing him that enquiry was concluded ex parte on 28.5.2003 & he had to submit his written brief by 12,6.2003. The said letter was received by the Petitioner on 23.6.2003. The courier receipt in that regard, according to the Petitioner, indicates that the letter was sent to Nuabazar instead of his address at Mahanadi Vihar, for which the letter could not reach him. Ultimately, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority on 12.6.2003 without waiting for the written brief of the Petitioner & the disciplinary authority communicated the enquiry report to the Petitioner through courier to submit his comments within a week, which returned back on 18.6.2003, vide Annexure-16. 4. On. Ultimately, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority on 12.6.2003 without waiting for the written brief of the Petitioner & the disciplinary authority communicated the enquiry report to the Petitioner through courier to submit his comments within a week, which returned back on 18.6.2003, vide Annexure-16. 4. On. 21.6.2003 the disciplinary authority issued final order of dismissal from service without waiting for any reply from the Petitioner. According to the Petitioner, neither any second show cause notice was issued nor he was afforded the opportunity of personal hearing, which were mandatory and the practice in bank. Ultimately, order of dismissal was passed by the disciplinary authority and the Appellate authority confirmed the same. 5. On a bare perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the O.Ps. sworn to by the General Manager (Admn.), Kalinga Gramya Bank, Cuttack, it appears that a stand has been taken that several notices, had been issued to the Petitioner but he either refusecl to receive the same or in somehow or other avoided to receive the same. That apart, another stand has been taken that the selfsame matter being referred by the Government is pending before the Central Industrial Tribunal for resolution of the disputes. 6. Now the Petitioner raises the following questions: i) Whether the ex parte order of dismissal dated 21.6.2003 without even examining the witnesses can be sustained in the eye of law; ii) Whether the penalty of dismissal imposed by Order Dated 21.6.2003 IS shockingly disproportionate to the charges; and iii) Whether there is any infirmity in the process of the disciplinary proceeding when a second show cause, which was mandatory, had not been issued. 7. With the aforesaid background, let us have a look at the enquiry report. The charges were stated to have been proved basing upon the documents filed by the Presenting Officer. Secondly, the final order was passed by the disciplinary authority as the Bank had lost confidence on the Charge-sheeted Officer (CSO).The Disciplinary Authority also found that the past record of the CSO was not at all good and he was earlier charge-sheeted on 11.1.2000 for his misconduct and otherfinancial irregularities. He was also earlier cautioned by the Board of Directors of the Bank for his misleading information to the Board. The CSO was also warned earlier for his serious misconduct. He was also earlier cautioned by the Board of Directors of the Bank for his misleading information to the Board. The CSO was also warned earlier for his serious misconduct. On the aforesaid observations and agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority inflicted the punishment of dismissal from service on the Petitioner. 8. The Petitioner thereafter filed an appeal on 5.8.2003 and the Appellate authority, as stated in the Appellate order, after carefully going through the memorandum of appeal, proceedings file and all the materials on record, without giving any reason dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority. 9. In the written note of submission, so far as the first question is concerned, we have relied upon the chronology of events submitted by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, which also shows that the notice issued by the Enquiry Officer was admittedly not served on the Petitioner and the same had returned back and the courier service also returned back the same with an endorsement that the Petitioner had refused to accept. Non-receipt of notice issued by the Enquiry Officer raises a serious doubt and there may be a case where the notice so issued might have been avoided by the CSO to receive the same. The past conduct of the CSO is also not above board. But the interest of justice would have been served best if the notice, which has been returned back without being served on the CSO, could have been published in any local newspaper fixing the date of hearing. Had the Petitioner not appeared thereafter, they could have proceeded against him in accordance with law. That apart, in an ex-parte proceeding, the mandate of law is that the evidence should be taken and the Enquiry Officer shall consider the materials available against the person. Though certain materials have been considered and as the evidence has not been taken, the enquiry is not wholesome. 10. So far as second question is concerned, we have already gone through the charges, details of which have been extracted in the foregoing paragraphs. All the charges, if taken cumulatively, in our considered opinion, the punishment is harsh and disproportionate to the charges. 11. Learned Counsel for the O.Ps. referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) Vs. All the charges, if taken cumulatively, in our considered opinion, the punishment is harsh and disproportionate to the charges. 11. Learned Counsel for the O.Ps. referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) Vs. A.T. Mane submits that once a domestic tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion, normally it is not open to the Appellate Tribunal & Courts to substitute their subjective Opinion in place of the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal. There cannot be a second opinion about the principles, as enunciated above, but in the case at hand, there is no evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer as well as there is no definite finding, save & except, recording that the charges have been proved. 12. Now the question arises whether there is further procedural irregularity by not giving the second show cause notice to the Petitioner before passing the order of dismissal. It is submitted by Mr. Mishra, Learned Counsel for the O.Ps., that the authorities were not mandated by any rule to give such a notice, for which the action taken by the O.Ps. cannot be faulted with. But on the other hand, Mr. Routray, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, draws our attention to the Guidelines for the procedure to be adopted for disciplinary action in Regional Rural Banks dated 20th June, 1987 issued by the National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development (Annexure-21). C1ause-20 of the said guidelines indicates that having decided as to punishment, the Disciplinary Authority should issue a show cause notice to the official concerned and in that notice the official should be apprised of the reasons on which the authority had come to the conclusion that the official was guilty, asking him to show cause why the proposed penalty would not be imposed on him. Mr. Mishra for the Bank raises an objection saying that no reliance can be placed on the above Guidelines, which are only advisory in nature, and therefore, the Bank is not obliged to follow the same. The settled principle of law is that the rule of natural justice is embodied in every statute and even where there is no specific provision for the same and when an administrative action involves civil consequence, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. (Ref.: Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ). The settled principle of law is that the rule of natural justice is embodied in every statute and even where there is no specific provision for the same and when an administrative action involves civil consequence, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. (Ref.: Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ). In paragraph-7(iv) of the decision of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc. it is indicated that in the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, ) should apply to employees in all establishments whether government or non-Government, public or private. 13. In view of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements and the facts and in the circumstances leading to passing the order of dismissal, we are of considered opinion that the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and order of confirmation passed by the Appellate authority fail to withstand the judicial scrutiny. Hence, the same are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, we quash the order of dismissal of the Petitioner from service passed by the disciplinary authority on 21.6.2003 (Annexure-18) and confirmed by the Appellate authority Chairman of the Bank, O.P. 2, on 21.11.2003, (Annexure-19) and direct the O.Ps. to reinstate the Petitioner in service. It will in no way stand as a bar to the Management to go for a de novo enquiry. Mr. Routray for the Petitioner prays for full back wages during the period when the Petitioner remained out of service. Mr. Mishra for O.Ps. strongly objects to the said proposal. Mr. Routray submits that interest of justice would be served best, if the Petitioner is given 50% of the back wages, as he undertakes to forgo the rest. This being so, we direct that 50% of back wages shall be paid to the Petitioner and the entire exercise shall be completed within a period of one month from the date of communication of writ. Issue writ accordingly. B.P. Ray, J. I agree.