JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Both these appeals have been filed by petitioner-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the “petitioner”) N.C. Ganguli and being connected involving common questions of facts and law, have been heard together as requested by learned counsel for the parties and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. The Special Appeal No. 172 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the “first set”) arises from the judgment dated 26.11.1992 of the Hon’ble Single Judge dismissing the petitioner’s Writ Petition No. 1746 of 1992. 3. Special Appeal No. 176 is also against the judgment dated 26.11.1992 but pressed only to the extent it has dismissed the Writ Petition No. 3766 of 1991 of petitioner. 4. The facts in brief giving rise to the present dispute are that the petitioner while working as Manager of Malwa Branch of Bank of Baroda (hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”), Fatehpur was served with a charge-sheet dated 14.1.1986 containing several charges in respect to the period when he worked as acting Manager, Fatehpur and Malwa Branch of the Bank from 15.4.1978 to 30.6.1981 and 29.7.1981 till January 1986. It was served upon the petitioner on 4.1.1986. The petitioner submitted his statement of defence dated 1.4.1986 denying all charges and explaining his conduct. The Disciplinary Authority appointed inquiry officer who conducted oral inquiry and submitted his report dated 23.9.1987 holding allegations No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 relating to Fatehpur Branch of the Bank “proved” and allegations No. 5, 7, 8 and 9 relating to the said branch “not proved”. With respect to the allegations pertaining to Malwa Branch allegation No. 3 was found proved whereas allegations No. 1, 2 and 4 were found not proved. The inquiry officer based on the allegations found proved further held that the charges levelled against the petitioner stand proved. With respect to the allegations pertaining to Malwa Branch allegation No. 3 was found proved whereas allegations No. 1, 2 and 4 were found not proved. The inquiry officer based on the allegations found proved further held that the charges levelled against the petitioner stand proved. The Disciplinary Authority though in general agreed with the findings of the inquiry officer but in respect to the allegations No. 7, 8 and 9 relating to Fatehpur Branch and 1, 2 and 4 relating to Malwa Branch held that the evidence on record was not properly assessed by the inquiry officer and, therefore, it recorded his findings in his order dated 8.3.1988 holding the said allegations also proved and imposed punishment of “dismissal” in terms of Regulation 4(h) of the Bank of Baroda Officers Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the “Regulations, 1976”). Aggrieved by the order of punishment of dismissal, the petitioner preferred appeal dated 2.5.1988 under Regulation 17 of the Regulations 1976. Besides, he also filed a Writ Petition No. 9292 of 1988 before this Court challenging the order of dismissal wherein an interim order was passed by this Court on 12.5.1988 staying the dismissal order but granting liberty to the respondents to take work or to continue to pay usual emoluments to the petitioner every month. It is said that another appeal/supplementary appeal/representation was made by the petitioner to the Appellate Authority on 14.6.1990 and the Appellate Authority vide order dated 20.11.1990 rejected the appeal referring to the memo of appeal dated 14.6.1990 only. In the Writ Petition No. 3766 of 1991 the petitioner challenged the appellate order dated 20.11.1990 on the ground that the Appellate Authority has not considered his appeal dated 2.5.1988 and has passed order only on the subsequent supplementary appeal/representation dated 14.6.1990 which was not main appeal. 5. The Appellate Authority during the pendency of the Writ Petition No. 3766 of 1991 passed another order dated 11.4.1991 dismissing petitioner’s appeal dated 2.5.1988. A third Writ Petition No. 1746 of 1992 was filed by the petitioner challenging the appellate order dated 11.4.1991 as well as the dismissal order dated 8.3.1988. 5. The Appellate Authority during the pendency of the Writ Petition No. 3766 of 1991 passed another order dated 11.4.1991 dismissing petitioner’s appeal dated 2.5.1988. A third Writ Petition No. 1746 of 1992 was filed by the petitioner challenging the appellate order dated 11.4.1991 as well as the dismissal order dated 8.3.1988. Since the Writ Petition No. 9292 of 1988 which was preferred initially against the dismissal order dated 8.3.1988 had rendered infructuous for the reason that in the statutory appeal the Appellate Authority passed order resulting in the merger of the dismissal order in the appellate order, therefore, the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated 25.11.1992 dismissed the Writ Petition No. 9292 of 1988 as infructuous but with the further observation that the affidavits exchanged in the writ petition would be read in other two writ petitions also i.e. Writ Petitions No. 3766 of 1991 and 1746 of 1992. These two writ petitions having been dismissed by the Hon’ble Single Judge vide common judgment dated 26.11.1992, these two appeals have questioned the said judgment. 6. We have heard Sri Dhruv Narayan, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Kumar Singh holding brief on behalf of Sri Vijay Bahadur Singh for the respondent-Bank. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned judgment on the following grounds : (1) Regulation 4 of the Regulations 1976 whereunder the penalty of dismissal has been imposed upon the petitioner is arbitrary and ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the expression “for acts of misconduct or for any other good or sufficient reasons” occurring in Regulation 4 confer unguided and unbridled power upon the punishing authority to inflict any penalty whether major or minor in absence of any indication as to when the major penalty would be inflicted and when a minor one. (2) There is gross violation in holding Disciplinary inquiry. The procedure prescribed in the Rules has been ignored and even otherwise the proceedings have resulted in denial of adequate opportunity of defence to the petitioner, therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. (3) The petitioner’s complaint about the bias of inquiry officer and request for change has not been pondered but in an illegal manner the said inquiry officer was allowed to submit his report which is illegal being a biased report. (3) The petitioner’s complaint about the bias of inquiry officer and request for change has not been pondered but in an illegal manner the said inquiry officer was allowed to submit his report which is illegal being a biased report. (4) The findings of inquiry officer and the Disciplinary Authority are at variance but before giving findings against the petitioner the Disciplinary Authority failed to afford any opportunity to the petitioner and the disagreement note of the Disciplinary Authority was never communicated to him before inflicting punishment. (5) Even otherwise the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and highly disproportionate to the allegations/charges found proved against him and, therefore, the punishment is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (6) The Appellate Authority has also miserably failed to apply its mind to the various defects in the inquiry pointed out by the petitioner and, therefore, the appellate order also suffers the vice of non-application of mind. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, defended the judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge contending that each and every aspect has been dealt with in detail by the Hon’ble Single Judge and the appellant having failed to point out any legal or otherwise error in the said judgment, no interference is called for in this appeal. 9. The appellant, besides advancing his argument orally, has also submitted written arguments. We have considered the entire matter including the material on record and the submissions advanced before this Court orally as well as in writing and also the authorities cited at the bar. 10. The first question is about the vires of Rule 4 of Regulations, 1976. Sri Dhruv Narayan, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the Regulations is totally bereft of any guideline to the Disciplinary Authority as to when and in what circumstances, a penalty, whether minor or major, can be inflicted upon the employee concerned. The entire thing has been left on discretion and whim of the authority concerned. Therefore, the above Regulation is patently arbitrary, lacking proper guidelines pointing out the circumstances when a minor or major punishment would be imposed and is liable to be struck down being violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 11. In order to appreciate the submissions, it would be appropriate to have a bird eye of view of the Regulations, 1976. 12. 11. In order to appreciate the submissions, it would be appropriate to have a bird eye of view of the Regulations, 1976. 12. The Regulations have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1970”) which empowers the Board of Directors of the Bank to make regulations in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government. It is not in dispute that the Regulations, 1976 have been framed by the Board of Directors in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The Regulations came into force on 1.10.1976. They are applicable to all officers and employees of the Bank except following : (1) The Chairman of Bank; (2) The Managing Director; (3) The Whole Time Director (if any); (4) Those who are in casual employment or paid from contingencies; (5) The award staff; (6) The Officers on contract 13. Regulations 4 of Regulations, 1976 provides for penalties and reads as under : “4 Penalties : The following are the penalties which may be imposed on an officer employee, for acts of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reasons. Minor penalties : (a) Censure; (b) withholding of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect; (c) withholding of promotion; (d) recovery from pay of such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank by negligence or breach of orders. Major penalties : (e) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (f) compulsory retirement; (g) removal from service which shall not be disqualification for future employment; (h) dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. Explanation.—The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this regulation namely : (i) withholding of one or more increments of an officer employee on account of his failure to pass a prescribed departmental test or examination in accordance with the terms of appointment to the post which he holds. Explanation.—The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this regulation namely : (i) withholding of one or more increments of an officer employee on account of his failure to pass a prescribed departmental test or examination in accordance with the terms of appointment to the post which he holds. (ii) Stoppage of pay of an officer employee at the efficiency bar in a time scale, on the ground of his unfitness to cross the bar; (iii) non-promotion, whether in an officiating capacity or otherwise of an officer employee, to a higher grade or post for which he may be eligible for consideration but for which he is found unsuitable after consideration of his case; (iv) reversion to a lower grade or post, of an officer employee officiating in a higher grade or post on the ground that he is considered, after trial, to be unsuitable for such higher grade or post, or on administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct; (v) reversion to his previous grade or post, of an officer employee appointed on probation to another grade or post, during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or rules or orders governing such probation; (vi) reversion of an officer employee to his parent organisation in case he had come on deputation; (vii) termination of the service— (a) of an officer employee appointed on probation during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment, or the rules or orders governing such probation; (b) of an officer employee appointed in a temporary capacity otherwise than under a contract or agreement on the expiration of the period for which he was appointed, or earlier in accordance with the terms of his appointment; (c) of an officer employee appointed under a contract or agreement, in accordance with the terms of such contract or agreement; and (d) of an officer employee on abolition of— (viii) retirement of an officer employee on his attaining the age of superannuation in accordance with the rules and orders governing such superannuation; (ix) termination of employment of a permanent officer employee by giving 3 month’s notice or on payment of 3 month’s pay and allowances in lieu of notice; (x) termination of employment of an officer employee on medical ground; if he is declared unfit to continue in bank’s service by the bank’s medical officer.” 14. The procedure for imposing major penalty is prescribed in Rule 6 while procedure for imposing minor penalty is prescribed in Rule 8, which is a summery procedure applicable where Disciplinary Authority proposes to impose any of the minor penalties specified in Clauses (a) to (d) of Regulation 4. Regulation 9 deals with the communication of orders. Regulation 10 provides for common proceedings, Regulation 11 provides for special procedure in certain cases and Regulation 12 provides suspension of an officer or employee. Regulations 14 and 15 provides payment of subsistence allowance during suspension and payment of salary, allowances and treatment of service on cession of suspension. Regulation 17 deals with the appeals. 15. Besides above, Regulation 3 contained definitions of certain terms, which includes “Appellate Authority”; “Competent Authority”; “Disciplinary Authority” and “Officer Employee”, which are as under : “Definitions : In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) .......... (b) “Appellate Authority” means the authority specified in the Schedule to dispose of appeals; (c) .......... (d) .......... (e) .......... (f) “Competent Authority” means the authority appointed by the Board for the purpose of these regulations; (g) “Disciplinary Authority” means the authority specified in the Schedule which is competent to impose on an officer employee any of the penalties specified in regulation 4; (h) .......... (i) .......... (j) “officer employee” means a person who holds a supervisory administrative or managerial post in the bank or any other person who has been appointed and is functioning as an officer of the bank by whatever designations called and includes a person whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of the Central Government or a State Government or any other Government undertaking or any other public sector bank or the Reserve Bank of India or any other organisation, but shall not include casual, work charged or contingent staff or the award staff;” 16. The Schedule to the Regulations, 1976 read with Regulation 3 (g) provides for “Disciplinary Authority”, “Appellate Authority” and “Reviewing Authority” in the light of the hierarchy of the “officers employees”. It shows that “Disciplinary Authority” in hierarchy commences from the rank of Assistant General Manager/Deputy General Manager in respect to the officer employees in the Grades A to F and, thereabove, for all others, the Disciplinary Authority, as per Schedule, is Chairman and Managing Director. It shows that “Disciplinary Authority” in hierarchy commences from the rank of Assistant General Manager/Deputy General Manager in respect to the officer employees in the Grades A to F and, thereabove, for all others, the Disciplinary Authority, as per Schedule, is Chairman and Managing Director. Where the Disciplinary Authority is of the rank of Assistant General Manager/Deputy General Manager, the Appellate Authority in respect to the officer employees in Grade D, E and F is General Manager and in respect to the officer employees in the Grade A, B and C is Chief General Manager while reviewing authority in all these cases is Chairman and Managing Director. In the remaining cases, where the Disciplinary Authority is Chairman and Managing Director, the Appellate Authority as well as Reviewing Authority is the Board. 17. The term “misconduct” used in Regulation 4 is not defined in Regulations, 1976. However, it is not disputed that there is another set of regulations, namely, Bank of Baroda Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “Conduct Regulations, 1976") which are applicable to the officers employees of the Bank, namely, to the petitioner in the case in hand and the same have also been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 19 of 1976 Act by the Board of Directors of Bank of Baroda in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The said conduct Regulations, 1976 provides a set of conduct, which is to be observed by the officer employees of the Bank and non observance thereof may be termed as a “misconduct” as clearly provided in Regulation 24 of Conduct Regulations, 1976, which reads as under: “24. A breach of any of the provisions of these regulations shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under the Bank of Baroda Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976.” 18. At the moment, we are not dealing in detail with the various provisions contained in Conduct Regulations, 1976 but suffice is to mention here that it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the various allegations levelled against him have been treated to be, in one or the other manner, breach of one or the other Conduct Regulations, 1976 and in this regard, no issue has been raised before us. He (Sri D.N. Narayan, Senior Advocate) has confined his argument assailing the vires of Rule 4 of Regulations, 1976 only on the ground that expressions “for acts and misconduct or for any other good or sufficient reasons” are extremely vague, uncertain, laying down no guideline as to how and in what manner, the concerned authority would exercise its power of punishment after determining as to when a major or minor penalty shall be imposed upon an officer employee and this lack of guidelines leave a unbridled power upon the Disciplinary Authority in the matter of imposing punishment which infringes fundamental right against arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution of India. 19. As a matter of legal proposition, it cannot be disputed that Article 14 read with Article 16 (1) and 21 accords right to equality and an equal treatment consistent with the principles of natural justice. No law made or action taken by the employer, Corporate, statutory or or instrumentality under Article 12, may be unfair, unjust and unreasonable. Right to fair treatment is an essential inbuilt of natural justice. Exercise of absolute discretionary power infringes the right of citizens. Vesting of discretion is not wrong provided it is exercised purposively, judicially and without prejudice. Wider the discretion, greater the chances of misuse. Absolute discretion is disruptive of freedom, then of man’s other inventions. Absolute discretion marks the beginning as end of the liberty. The conferment of absolute power deprive an employee or a person his right to earn livelihood by imposing a penalty like dismissal or removal and is antitheses to justness unless the power is exercised reasonably, fairly and justly. The exercise of discretionary power wide of mark would break arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair actions and would be inconsistent to logic, reason and justice. The provisions of a statute, regulations or rules that empower an employer or the Management to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank an employee, must be consistent with just, reasonable and fair procedure. Right to continue in employment till the employee is suspended as per rules or compulsorily retired or duly terminated in accordance with the procedure established by law is an integral part of right to livelihood which is in integral factor of right to live assured by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Right to continue in employment till the employee is suspended as per rules or compulsorily retired or duly terminated in accordance with the procedure established by law is an integral part of right to livelihood which is in integral factor of right to live assured by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Any procedure prescribed to deprive such a right of livelihood must be judicial, fair and reasonable. In other words, an employee in a public employment must not be unreasonably and unjustly be deprived of his/her livelihood which is ensured in continued employment unless terminated in accordance with a just, fair and reasonable procedure otherwise any law or rule in violation thereof is void. 20. In the light of the above, if the power to impose penalty can be said to have been conferred upon the Disciplinary Authority without following a procedure, which is just, reasonable and valid in law, such power obviously would suffer the vice of arbitrariness infringing constitutional protection of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. In the case in hand, the learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the procedure prescribed for imposting penalty under Rules 6 and 8 is just, valid, reasonable and fair. What he in fact tried to canvass is that even after following procedure prescribed in the rules, which is just, fair and reasonable, lack of guideline under Rule 4 empowers the Disciplinary Authority to impose any kind of punishment provided therein, whether minor or major, in his sole discretion. It empowers the authority concerned, in the similar circumstances, to impose different punishment which may be major in one matter and minor in another and this leads the Regulation 4 as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The argument, therefore, is not strictly on the validity of the power but possibility of unfair exercise of power by the Disciplinary Authority in the cases of different employees without any regard to the nature of breach they are found guilty after the enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the rules is held. 21. Mere possibility of exercising a power arbitrarily cannot make the provision itself illegal or arbitrary. 21. Mere possibility of exercising a power arbitrarily cannot make the provision itself illegal or arbitrary. Besides, in order to find out the guideline or the policy of the rule framing authority, individual provision itself may not say so specifically but such policy or guideline can be inferred from the scheme of the legislation etc. and other relevant factors. 22. A perusal of Regulations, 1976 shows that the power to impose punishment has been conferred upon the officers holding high and responsible position in the Bank. Rule 4 itself provides that the punishment can be imposed if an officer employee is found guilty of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reason. The power has been conferred upon the officers of the Bank who are highest Executives like Assistant General Manager, Deputy General Manager in respect to the officer employees working in the Grades of F to A and in respect to the officer employees like Assistant General Manager, Deputy General Manager, Joint General Manager and Chief General Manager, it is vested in the highest Executives, i.e., Chairman and Managing Director of the Bank. Though these officers are not trained like judicial officers, but they are well trained Executive Officers knowing the requirement of the Bank, and in particular the discipline and the interest of the Bank and how and in what manner, the interest of the Bank by keeping the officer employees in discipline can be watched. 23. The power cannot be exercised by the Disciplinary authority unless procedure prescribed in Rule 6 and 8, as the case may be, is followed. Rule 6 provides a detailed procedure for imposing major penalties, i.e. those specified in clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) of Regulation 4 of Regulations, 1976, which reads as under : “6. Procedure For Imposing Major Penalties : (1) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) of regulation 4 shall be made except after an inquiry is held in accordance with this regulation. (2) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an officer employee, it may itself enquire into, or appoint any other public servant (hereinafter referred to as the inquiring authority) to inquire into the truth thereof. (2) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an officer employee, it may itself enquire into, or appoint any other public servant (hereinafter referred to as the inquiring authority) to inquire into the truth thereof. Explanation.—When the Disciplinary Authority itself holds the inquiry any reference in sub-regulation (8) to sub-regulation (21) to the inquiring authority shall be construed as a reference to Disciplinary Authority. (3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of allegations against the officer employee and the articles of charge, together with a statement of the allegations, on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the officer employee, who shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority (not exceeding 15 days), or within such extended time as may be granted by the said authority, a Written Statement of his defence. (4) On receipt of the written statement of the officer employee, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, an enquiry may be held by the Disciplinary Authority itself, or if it considered it necessary so to do appoint under sub-regulation (2) an inquiring Authority for the purpose. Provided that it may not be necessary to hold an inquiry in respect of the articles of charge admitted by the officer employee in his written statement but shall be necessary to record its findings on each such charge. (5) The Disciplinary Authority shall where it is not the inquiring authority, forward to the inquiring authority; (i) a copy of the articles of charges and statements of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; (ii) a copy of the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the officer employee; (iii) a list of documents by which and list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be substantiated; (iv) a copy of statements of the witnesses, if any, (v) evidence proving the delivery of articles of charge under sub-regulation (3); (vi) a copy of the order appointing the ‘Presiding Officer’ in terms of sub-regulation (6). (6) Where the Disciplinary Authority itself enquires or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry, it may, by its order, appoint a public servant to be known as the “Presenting Officer” to present on its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge. (7) The officer employee may take the assistance of any other officer employee but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose. (8) (a) The inquiring authority shall by notice in writing specify the day on which the officer employee shall appear in person before the inquiring authority. (b) On the date fixed by the inquiring authority, the officer employee shall appear before the inquiring authority at the time, place and date specified in the notice. (c) The inquiring authority shall ask the officer employee whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of charge, the inquiring authority shall record the plea, sign the record and obtain the signature of the officer employee concerned thereon. (d) The inquiring authority shall return a finding of guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which the officer employee concerned pleads guilty. (9) If the officer employee does not plead guilty, the inquiring authority shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding 30 days or within such extended time as may be granted by the inquiring authority. (10) (a) The inquiring authority shall, where the officer employee does not admit all or any of the articles of charge, furnish to such officer employee a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charges are proposed to be proved. (10) (a) The inquiring authority shall, where the officer employee does not admit all or any of the articles of charge, furnish to such officer employee a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charges are proposed to be proved. (b) The inquiring authority shall also record an order that the officer employee may for the purpose of preparing his defence— (i) inspect within five days of the order or within such further time not exceeding five days as the inquiring authority may allow, the documents listed; (ii) submit a list of documents and witnesses that he wants for the inquiry; (iii)be supplied with copies of statements of witnesses, if any, recorded earlier and the inquiring authority shall furnish such copies nor later than three days before the commencement of the examination of the witnesses by the inquiring authority; (iv) give a notice within ten days of the order or within such further time not exceeding ten days as the inquiring authority may allow for the discovery or production of the documents referred to in item (ii). Note : The relevancy of the documents and the examination of the witnesses referred to in item (ii) shall be given by the officer employee concerned. (11) The inquiring authority shall on receipt of the notice for the discovery or production of the documents, forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession the documents are kept with a requisition for the production of the documents on such date as may be specified. (12) On the receipt of the requisition under sub-regulation (11), the authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents, shall arrange to produce the same before the inquiring authority on the date, place and time specified in the requisition : Provided that the authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents may claim privilege if the production of such documents will be against the public interest or in the interest of the bank. In that event, it shall inform the inquiring authority accordingly. (13) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. In that event, it shall inform the inquiring authority accordingly. (13) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the officer employee. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine his witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on a new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit. (14) Before the close of the case, in support of the charges, the inquiring authority may, in its discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the charge-sheet or may itself call for new evidence or recall or re-examine any witness. In such case, the officer employee shall be given opportunity to inspect the documentary evidence before it is taken on record or to cross-examine a witness, who has been so summoned. The inquiring authority may also allow the officer employee to produce new evidence if it of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. (15) When the case in support of the charges is closed, the officer employee may be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the officer employee shall be required to sign the record in either case a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed. (16) The evidence on behalf of the officer employee shall then be produced. The officer employee may examine himself in his own behalf, if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the officer employee shall then be examined by the officer employee and may be cross-examined by the Presenting Officer. The officer employee shall be entitled to re-examine any of his witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter without the leave of the inquiring authority. The witnesses produced by the officer employee shall then be examined by the officer employee and may be cross-examined by the Presenting Officer. The officer employee shall be entitled to re-examine any of his witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter without the leave of the inquiring authority. (17) The inquiring authority may, after the officer employee closes his evidence, any shall if the officer employee has not got himself examined, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. (18) After the completion of the production of the evidence, the officer employee and the Presenting Officer may file written briefs of their respective cases within 15 days of the date of completion of the production of evidence. (19) If the officer employee does not submit the written statement of defence referred to in sub-regulation (3) on or before the date specified for the purpose or does not appear in person, or through the assisting officer or otherwise fails or refuses to comply with any of the provisions of these regulations, the inquiring authority may hold the inquiry ex parte. (20) Whenever any inquiring authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another inquiring authority which has, and which exercises, such jurisdiction, the inquiring authority so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself; Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall, examine, cross-examine and re-examine any such witnesses as herein before provided. (21) (i) On the conclusion of the inquiry the inquiring authority shall prepare a report which shall contain the following : (a) a gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; (b) a gist of the defence of the officer employee in respect of each article of charge; (c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge. (d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor. Explanation.—If, in the opinion of the inquiring authority, the proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge different from the original articles of charge, it may record its findings on such article of charge : Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the officer employee has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge. (ii) The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the Disciplinary Authority, shall forward to the Disciplinary the records of the inquiry which shall include— (a) the report of the inquiry prepared by it under clause (I); (b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the officer employee referred to in sub-regulation (15); (c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry; (d) written briefs referred to in sub-regulation (18), if any; and (e) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry.” 24. It is not the case of the appellant that the procedure prescribed under Rules 6 and 8 does not confirm to the principles of natural justice. It is only when the charges are proved according to the procedure prescribed in Rule 6, any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4, can, thereafter, be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority as provided under Regulation 7, which reads as under : “7. Action on the Enquiry Report : (1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority, may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case tot he inquiring authority for fresh or further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of regulation 6 as far as may be. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in regulation 4 should be imposed on the officer employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in regulation 8, make an order imposing such penalty. (4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the officer employee concerned.” 25. Where from the allegations levelled against the officer concerned, the Disciplinary Authority is of the view that if the allegations are not of such significance, but discipline in the Bank or any other like reason, only a minor penalty need be imposed, he need not to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 6, but after observing the procedure prescribed under Rule 8, by a reasoned order, such penalty can be imposed as provided in Rule 8, which reads as under : “8. Procedure for Imposing Minor Penalties : (1) Where it is proposed to impose any of the minor penalties specified in clauses (a) to (d) of regulation 4, the officer employee concerned shall be informed in writing of the imputations of lapses against him and given an opportunity to submit his written statement of defence within a specified period not exceeding 15 days or such extended period as may be granted by the Disciplinary Authority and the defence statement, if any, submitted by the officer employee shall be taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority before passing orders. (2) Where, however, the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied that an enquiry is necessary, it shall follow the procedure for imposing a major penalty as laid down in regulation 6. (3) The record of the proceedings in such cases shall include— (i) a copy of the statement of imputations of lapses furnished to the officer employee; (ii) the defence statement, if any, of the officer employee; and (iii) the orders of the disciplinary authority together with the reasons therefor.” 26. (3) The record of the proceedings in such cases shall include— (i) a copy of the statement of imputations of lapses furnished to the officer employee; (ii) the defence statement, if any, of the officer employee; and (iii) the orders of the disciplinary authority together with the reasons therefor.” 26. The Disciplinary Authority, being a senior and responsible Executive of the Bank has better knowledge of the administration, knows as to what kind of misconduct would be serious one, in the given circumstances, attracting a major penalty and where such penalty should be minor. There can not be any rule of thumb so that a particular kind of misconduct will always attract a particular kind of penalty inasmuch it is not the mere act or omission constituting misconduct but various other attending circumstances which are relevant to make it an act or omission constituting misconduct required to be viewed lightly attracting a minor penalty or needs serious action necessitating a major penalty. This Court would not like to dilute on this aspect even by giving some illustration as that may likely to be misconstrued, bereft of the relevant factors, in a case involving different circumstances. Suffice is to mention that a power can be said to be wholly unfettered, unguided and unbridled where there is no check or balance on the authority concerned exercising power. But, if power has been given to an authority, well acquainted with the matter in which it has to exercise such power, and, the procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice is provided which is to be followed by such an authority before exercising such power, and, further where the exercises of power is not absolute in the sense its review by further higher authority is provided, it is difficult to hold such power unfettered, unguided and unbridled. 27. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1998 (1) SCC 363 , the Court upheld a rule conferring a power to license a hoarding observing that is has to be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the order is to be supported by reasons, therefore, the rule cannot be said to be unfettered, unguided and unbridled. 28. In P. Narayana Bhat v. State of Tamilnadu and others, AIR 2001 SC 1736 , the Apex Court reiterated the view taken in M.C. Mehta (supra). 29. 28. In P. Narayana Bhat v. State of Tamilnadu and others, AIR 2001 SC 1736 , the Apex Court reiterated the view taken in M.C. Mehta (supra). 29. In Kishan Prakash Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 1493 , a Constitution Bench considered the legal position as to when a delegated legislation can be said to be arbitrary or giving uncanalised and uncontrolled power, and it was held : “The legislature in India have been held to possess wide power of legislation subject, however, to certain limitations such as the legislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions which consists in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. The Legislature cannot delegate uncanalised and uncontrolled power. The Legislature must set the limits of the power delegated by declaring the policy of the law and by laying down standards for guidance of those on whom the power to execute the law is conferred. Thus the delegation is valid only when the legislative policy and guidelines to implement it are adequately laid down and the delegate is only empowered to carry out the policy within the guidelines laid down by the Legislature. The Legislature may, after laying down the legislative policy, confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to work out the details within the framework of the policy. When the Constitution entrusts the duty of law-making to Parliament and the Legislatures of States, it impliedly prohibits them to throw away that responsibility on the shoulders of some other authority.” 30. To find out the policy and guidelines, one need not to go to the provision which confers such power, but one may have regard to the context of the statute, the object and purpose sought to be achieved and other attending and relevant factors. 31. In Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC1 602, the validity of Section 19 of Slum Areas (Improvements and Clearance) Act was challenged on the ground that it confers arbitrary and unguided power to pick and choose. 31. In Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC1 602, the validity of Section 19 of Slum Areas (Improvements and Clearance) Act was challenged on the ground that it confers arbitrary and unguided power to pick and choose. It was contended that the act has vested in the competent authority the power to withhold eviction in pursuance of the orders or decrees of Courts without affording any guidance or laying down any principles for his guidance on the basis of which he could exercise his discretion and, therefore, vested in him an arbitrary and unguided power to pick and choose the decree holders to whom he would permit execution and those to whom he would refuse such relief. Negativing the contention, it was held by the Court that purpose of the Act was two fold, i.e. (1) the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories, and (2) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction. The Court held that the object of the Act and the policy thereof seems to suggest that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him. In that view of the matter, it did not find the Act to be arbitrary or unguided. 32. Here also, policy under Regulations is to maintain discipline in the Bank, to take action against the erring officials who are not able to observe the conduct consistent with the Conduct Regulations, 1976, and by their act or omission, while discharging duties in the Bank, they are not able to watch the interest of the Bank. What kind of conduct an officer employee is supposed to maintain has been given in detail in Conduct Regulations, 1976. If an officer employee fails to maintain the same, after giving an opportunity to such a person, in accordance with the Regulations, 1976, an appropriate punishment has to be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. In deciding as to what would be the appropriate punishment, considering the act of misconduct of the erring officer employee, the decision of the Disciplinary Authority is not uncontrolled and unguided inasmuch, it can be appealed to the higher authority under Regulation 17, whose power is co-extensive with the Disciplinary Authority. In deciding as to what would be the appropriate punishment, considering the act of misconduct of the erring officer employee, the decision of the Disciplinary Authority is not uncontrolled and unguided inasmuch, it can be appealed to the higher authority under Regulation 17, whose power is co-extensive with the Disciplinary Authority. Such an appeal can be decided considering every aspect of the mater, namely, as to whether the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority are correct or not, whether the penalty is excessive or adequate as is evident from Regulation 17, which is reproduced as under : “17. Appeals : (1) An officer employee may appeal against an order imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in regulation 4 or against the order of suspension referred to in regulation 12. The appeal shall lie to the Appellate Authority. (2) An appeal shall be preferred within 45 days from the date of receipt of the order appealed against. The appeal shall be addressed to the Appellate Authority and submitted to the authority whose order is appealed against. The authority whose order is appealed against shall forward the appeal together with its comments and the records of the case to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall consider whether the findings are justified or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders. The authority whose order is appealed against shall forward the appeal together with its comments and the records of the case to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall consider whether the findings are justified or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders. The Appellate Authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case : Provided that— (i) if the enhanced penalty which the Appellate Authority proposed to impose is a major penalty specified in clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) of regulation 4 and an inquiry as provided in regulation 6 has not already been held in the case, the Appellate Authority shall direct that such an enquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of regulation 6 and thereafter consider the record of the inquiry and pass such orders as it may deem proper; (ii) if the Appellate Authority decides to enhance the punishment but an enquiry has already been held as provided in regulation 6, the Appellate Authority shall give a show-cause notice to the officer employee as to why the enhanced penalty should not be imposed upon him and shall pass final order after taking into account the representation, if any, submitted by the officer employee.” 33. Even this is not final inasmuch Regulation 18 provides for review and it will be evident from Schedule to Regulation, 1976 that in respect to the officers in Grade F to A, the reviewing Authority is next higher authority to the Appellate Authority and in case of the other officers like Assistant General Manager, Deputy General Manager etc. though it is the same authority, i.e., the Board, but it is the highest authority of the Bank. Therefore, the decision as to which punishment considering the circumstances and nature of the act or omission constituting misconduct found proved against the employees and the other relevant factors, the punishment imposed upon the officer, whether justified or not, can be checked and cross checked at difference levels. It, therefore, cannot be said that unguided and uncontrolled power has been conferred upon the Disciplinary Authority. It, therefore, cannot be said that unguided and uncontrolled power has been conferred upon the Disciplinary Authority. The mere possibility of exercise of power wrongly in a given case cannot not make an otherwise valid statutory provision illegal or unconstitutional inasmuch if the power in a given case has not been exercised validly, it is always subject to judicial review and can be set at right whenever matter is brought for judicial review. 34. It would be appropriate to refer one more decision at this stage, i.e. Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1803 , where the power under Section 14-B of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 came to be considered before the Apex Court. It was argued that it confers power on the Provident Fund Commissioner to levy punitive charges from a defaulting employer to the extent of 100% of the defaulted amount without any guideline and, therefore, it amount to confer nacked and unguided power upon the Commissioner to impose any quantum of damage as he fancy and the said power is not subject to any review, appeal etc. under the Act. The Court rejecting the argument held that the power has been conferred upon one of the highest officer of the Government to be exercised after giving opportunity of hearing to the party concerned and is to be exercised in a quasi judicial manner and the power is further subject to writ jurisdiction of the Court, therefore, cannot be said to be uncanalised and arbitrary. The Apex Court put a word of caution in lightly accepting the plea of unguided, unbridled and uncanalised power and that too where no appeal is provided observing that it depends upon the nature of the subject matter, other available correctives, possible harm flowing from wrong orders and a wealth of other factors. It further says—“The bogie of absence of guidelines in the provision and consequential possibility of the authority running berserk or acting hubristically does not frighten. Of course, the more bereft of explicit guidelines a statutory power is, the more searching must be the judicial invigilation to discover hidden injustice and masked mala fides. Even so, let us examine the ground that, absent detailed guidlines, the law is void. What is not explicit may still be implicit. What is not articulated at length may be spun out from a single phrase. Even so, let us examine the ground that, absent detailed guidlines, the law is void. What is not explicit may still be implicit. What is not articulated at length may be spun out from a single phrase. What is not transparent in particularised provisions may be immanent in the preamble, scheme, purpose of subject-matter of the Act. What is real is not only the gross but also the subtle, if I may strike a deeper note. Such a perspective dispels the submission that Section 14-B is bad as uncircumscribed and over-broad.” 35. Though the nature of penalties travel to a wider range, we have to consider the inbuilt guideline in the nature of power given by the rule framing authority for the purpose of achieving the object and to make the machinery workable. In such matters, rule framing authority is not supposed to provide as to how and when every ‘T’ has to be crossed or every ‘i’ is to be marked. Some leverage has to be allowed to the authority concerned to have an assessment of over all circumstances whenever any act or omission constituting misconduct is found against the officer concerned; and to decide the nature of punishment to be imposed upon him, which sometimes also depends upon certain aspects of the officers concerned also. An officer regularly committing some mistake, an officer despite of lack of intention commits a misconduct, an officer knowingly and in a planned way is found guilty of some act or omission constituting misconduct causing serious loss to the Bank and so on are same of such aspects which weigh in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority. Space in elbow is to be provided for effective management of the things. Here the interest of the Bank is supreme. The Disciplinary Authority is required to exercise its power of imposting penalty so as to maintain proper discipline in the Bank, which is in wider public interest. 36. Moreover, we find that similar provisions have been made under the rules governing Disciplinary matters of employees of other Banks or Government servants and they are being observed and followed for several decades having never been found to cause any serious irregularity so as to justify an inference that the power is generally being exercised by the Disciplinary Authority way beyond mark. Such set of rules are being followed satisfactorily for a long time showing that the Disciplinary Authority’s power in similar other rules has also not been found illegal for lack of specific guidelines. 37. Now coming to authorities cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the appellant, we find that in Nagraj Shivarao v. Syndicate Bank and another, JT 1991 (2) SC 529, an executive order issued by the Finance Ministry came up for consideration and it was found by the Apex Court that it was contrary to statuary regulations governing Disciplinary matters and thus ultra vires. The circular in the case of Nagraj (supra) provided that the advice of the Chief Vigilance Commissioner shall be binding on the Disciplinary Authority in the matter of punishment and the Disciplinary Authority following the said circular imposed punishment as advised by the Chief Vigilance Commissioner, though under the rules, the power to inflict punishment vested with the Disciplinary Authority. The Court held that the power of punishing authority in departmental proceeding is regulated by the statutory regulations. Regulation 4 does not provide for specific punishments for different misdemeanour except classifying the punishments as minor or major. Regulation left it in the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to impose appropriate punishment having regard to the gravity of the misconduct proved in the case. Similar power has been conferred upon the Appellate Authority, namely, the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority are to act independently of their own. It is quasi judicial power and unrestricted. The circular issued by the Government of India (Finance Ministry) has completely checked the discretion of the said two authorities and thus, being an executive order, contrary to the statute, is ultra vires. The Court also held that the Ministry of Finance, even otherwise, has no such power to issue such directives to the Bank authorities under provisions of Act, 1970. There also Regulation 4 of Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Condition of service) Regulations, 1976, which provides for various punishments worded similarly was not found illegal or arbitrary. In fact, the issue which is up before us was not all raised thereat. Therefore, this judgment does not help the appellant in any manner. 38. There also Regulation 4 of Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Condition of service) Regulations, 1976, which provides for various punishments worded similarly was not found illegal or arbitrary. In fact, the issue which is up before us was not all raised thereat. Therefore, this judgment does not help the appellant in any manner. 38. We find that in respect to pari materia provision of certain other Banks, the matter was considered by the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bank of India Officers’ Association, Madhya Pradesh and others v. Bank of India, Bhopal and others, 1979 (2) LLJ 401 , by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 3367 of 1977 and 3563 of 1977, D. Padmnabhan v. The Indian Overseas Bank and another, decided on 5.8.1980 and Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 1054 of 1977, Jayvanti Ghanshyam Sawant and others v. Central Bank of India and another decided on 2.3.1981 which have been considered and referred in detail by the Hon’ble Single Judge in the judgment in appeal and there also, the similar contentions have been repealed. We are in agreement with the view taken in the above judgments, though we have given our own reasons also in upholding the validity of Regulation 4 of Regulations, 1976. 39. Now coming to the second aspect that enquiry has not been conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the rules and it has resulted in denial of adequate opportunity of defence, we find that the grievance of the petitioner-appellant in this regard is as under : (a) There was neither any complainant nor any witness to prove the charge except the Presenting Officer who acted in both the above capacity. This violates Regulation 6 (11) and (12) of Regulations, 1976. (b) The Enquiry Officer is supposed to provide the list of documentary evidence to the employee concerned, which he needed for his defence but the said documents were not provided. The Enquiry Officer also did not take any step for summoning the relevant documents from the possession of the concerned authorities. (b) The Enquiry Officer is supposed to provide the list of documentary evidence to the employee concerned, which he needed for his defence but the said documents were not provided. The Enquiry Officer also did not take any step for summoning the relevant documents from the possession of the concerned authorities. (c) The Enquiry Officer proved only five allegations in his conclusion on Page 136 of the Paper Book, i.e. allegations No. 2, 3, 4 and 6 pertaining to Fatehpur Branch and allegations No. 3 pertaining to Malwa Branch and did not prove eight allegations, i.e., allegations No. 1, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Fatehpur Branch and allegations No. 1, 2, and 4 of Malwa Branch, yet the Disciplinary Authority treating the allegations proved has passed the impugned order of dismissal. (d) Separate findings have not been recorded by the Enquiry Officer on each and every article of charge. (e) The Enquiry Officer was biased inasmuch his findings are contradictory, yet he has said at the conclusion of his finding that all the charges are proved, though he did not find proved eight allegations. (f) The various dates of proceedings shows that the entire oral enquiry was farce. (g) The Disciplinary Authority on certain charges disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, but did not afford any opportunity to the petitioner-appellant before passing the impugned order and, therefore, the same is illegal and in violation of the principles of natural justice. 40. From the record, the chronological events in the enquiry, in brief, are as under : Date Development 14.01.1986 Charge-sheet issued. 20.09.1986 Respondent No. 3, Sri S.P. Gupta was appointed Enquiry Officer. 21.11.1986 Preliminary hearing. 30.01.1987 Charged officer submitted list of documents in defence. 03.02.1987 Presenting officer requested for one month’s time to make available documents demanded by charged officer in his defence. 20.03.1987 Additional list of documents submitted by both Presenting officer and Charged Officer. 18.05.1987 Enquiry concluded. The Enquiry Officer ordered the parties to submit written brief. 10.06.1987 Appellant submitted written brief. 01.07.1987 Presenting Officer submitted his written brief. 23.09.1987 Enquiry report submitted. 41. 20.03.1987 Additional list of documents submitted by both Presenting officer and Charged Officer. 18.05.1987 Enquiry concluded. The Enquiry Officer ordered the parties to submit written brief. 10.06.1987 Appellant submitted written brief. 01.07.1987 Presenting Officer submitted his written brief. 23.09.1987 Enquiry report submitted. 41. From the record and in particular from the report of the Enquiry Officer, it does appear that though the appellant denied all the charges on 21.11.1986, but the documentary evidences submitted by the Presenting Officer to substantiate the charges were admitted by him in to without any dispute after inspecting the originals of the same. Further the photocopies of the said documents is said to have been given to the appellant. 42. From the appeal preferred by the petitioner-appellant, we find that he has not raised any objection to the above facts stated in the enquiry report before the appellate authority and in the appeal basically raised the following grounds : (a) His acts and omissions were not illegal and did not amount to any misconduct inasmuch he, in fact, attempted to regularize the accounts and, therefore, there was no misconduct at all. (b) The sanction of loans etc. was granted by him having obtained oral sanction of the regional authority, which was later on confirmed by the said authority in writing. Therefore, there was no illegality in the procedure followed by him. (c) The charges on which the Disciplinary Officer has exonerated him, the Disciplinary Authority has recorded finding going out of his way to prove the allegations against the petitioner at the behest of certain interest parties. (d) Being an Officer Bearer of the association of the employees, he has been victimized. 43. However, there is one aspect which having considered the record, we find that the Disciplinary Authority has failed to act in accordance with law and this deficiency is sufficient to allow these appeals. Therefore, we are restraining ourselves in entering into other aspects of the matter regarding validity of the procedure in the departmental enquiry for the reason that the same may prejudice subsequent proceedings. 44. Therefore, we are restraining ourselves in entering into other aspects of the matter regarding validity of the procedure in the departmental enquiry for the reason that the same may prejudice subsequent proceedings. 44. In respect of certain charges/allegations, it is evident from the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority that the Enquiry Officer has recorded his finding holding the same as not proved, but the Disciplinary Authority took a view otherwise, but while doing so, no opportunity of explanation was rendered to the petitioner-appellant though it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to afford opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee if in respect to certain finding recorded by the Enquiring Authority exonerating the delinquent employee, the Disciplinary Authority intends to take a different view and to hold the charges proved as that amounts to taking into consideration material which was not disclosed to the delinquent employee before imposing punishment upon him. 45. The Hon’ble Single Judge on this aspect has recorded his finding as under: “Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the decision of the Punishing Authority is vitiated on the ground that some of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in favour of the petitioner on certain allegations, were reversed by the Punishing Authority without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of Lucknow Bench of this Court in case of K.N. Misra v. State Bank of India, (1992) I U.P.L.B.E.C. 33. Relying upon a Division Bench decision in R.P. Srivastava v. State Bank of India, (1996) L.C.D. (sic) Learned Judge (Hon. S.H.A. Raza, J.) allowed the writ petitioner and quashed the impugned order of dismissal upheld by the appellate authority on the ground that the disciplinary authority did not afford any opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before reversing the finding in his favour on certain charges recorded by the Inquiry Officer. It was held in R.P. Srivastava’s case (supra), reliance on which was placed in K.M. Misra’s case, that although there existed no provision under the rules for giving opportunity of hearing to the delinquent, in case the Disciplinary Authority gave its own finding dis-agreeing with the report of the Inquiry Officer and imposed punishment, principle of natural justice would require that opportunity of hearing should be given to him. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not apply to the facts of the present case in asmuch as in that case the finding of the Enquiry Officer on certain charges recorded in favour of the delinquent officer were reversed by the Disciplinary Authority, while in the instant case no finding on any of the charges recorded by the Inquiry Officer had been reversed by the Disciplinary Authority. What was reversed is the finding on some of the allegation on which charges were based. The Enquiry Officer has himself recorded a finding that all the charges were proved against the petitioner. No finding on any of the charges was reversed by the Disciplinary Authority. As already noticed the Punishing Authority recorded reasons for disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on some of the allegations of misconduct or misdemeanour as contemplated by Regulation 6(21). In this view of the matter the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not appeal to me.” 46. We, however, find ourselves not in agreement with the Hon’ble Single Judge. It would be appropriate to see as to how the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities have considered this aspect. The impugned order of dismissal passed by the Deputy General Manager, i.e. the Disciplinary Authority shows the following findings : “The Inquiring Authority submitted his findings dated 23.9.87 wherein the Inquiring Authority has held allegations Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 relating to Fatehpur Branch as proved, whereas allegation Nos. 5, 7, 8 & 9 as not proved. Regarding misconducts of Malwan Branch, allegation No. 3 has been held proved, whereas allegations Nos. 1, 2 & 4 has been held as not proved. However, the Inquiring Authority has held all the charges as proved. The undersigned disciplinary authority agree with the conclusion of the Inquiring Authority Mr. S.P. Gupta only to the extent of allegations Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 relating to Fatehpur branch and No. 3 relating to Malwan Branch which have been held as proved and allegation No. 5 relating to Fatehpur branch which has been held as not proved and in respect of all charges which are held proved. Regarding allegation Nos. 1, 2, & 4 of Malwan Branch and allegation Nos. Regarding allegation Nos. 1, 2, & 4 of Malwan Branch and allegation Nos. 7, 8 & 9 of Fatehpur Branch the undersigned is of the opinion that the Inquiring Authority has not properly assessed the evidence produced before him and therefore held these as not proved. The undersigned disciplinary authority is of the opinion after considering the records and evidence produced before the Inquiring Authority that these allegations stand proved as per Annexure attached which forms a part of this order sheet. The undersigned disciplinary authority has gone through the records of the enquiry, the submission of both sides in written briefs and findings of Inquiring Authority and his own findings in respect of certain allegation which are not held proved by Inquiring Authority and is of the opinion that all charges which have been found to be proved against Shri Ganguli (by Inquiring Authority as well as the undersigned), are extremely serious nature. Mr. Ganguli has committed acts which not only show a total disregard to the norms of the Bank but also exhibit lack of honesty and integrity on his part. His acts have caused huge financial loss to the Bank. In a banking institution where infrastructure rests on a pill of good faith, the conduct and integrity of employee must be above board.” 47. The Appellate Authority, while dealing with the objection of the appellant that while disagreeing with the report of Enquiry Officer on certain charges/allegations, no opportunity has been afforded to the appellant, has held as under : “I do not find that the Inquiry Authority had acquitted the appellant of the charges. What has been observed by the Inquiring Authority is that all the charges in the articles of charge served upon the appellant stand proved (page 11 of the Inquiry report). What the Inquiring Authority held as not proved were allegations No. 5, 7, 8 and 9 relating to Fatehpur Branch and allegations No. 1, 2 and 4 relating to Malwan Branch. The Disciplinary Authority has on the basis of evidence and record produced before the Authority found allegations No. 7, 8 and 9 of Fatehpur Branch and allegation Nos. 1, 2 and 4 of Malwan Branch to have been proved.” 48. The Disciplinary Authority has on the basis of evidence and record produced before the Authority found allegations No. 7, 8 and 9 of Fatehpur Branch and allegation Nos. 1, 2 and 4 of Malwan Branch to have been proved.” 48. It appears from the record that the charge-sheet contains in the part titled as “Article of Charge” 10 charges in general which did not contain details which have been given under the heading “Statement of Allegations” and therein charge No. 2 is divided in two parts and then there are further sub-divisions which in some part are statements of facts and in some statements of facts including the allegations constituting misconduct. This is in respect to the Fatehpur Branch. Then again in respect to Malwa Branch, the statements of allegations are sub divided but in fact there are four allegations. Broadly there are nine statement of allegations i.e. from sl. No. 1 to 9 in respect to Fatehpur Branch and four, i.e., 1 to 4 in respect to Malwa Branch. The Disciplinary Authority clearly says that allegations No. 1, 2 and 4 of Malwa Branch and allegations No. 7, 8 and 9 of the Fatehpur Branch have not been properly asserted by the Enquiry Officer and he has held the same as not proved and it is this finding of fact, which the Disciplinary Authority has disagreed. The Inquiry Officer has recorded his findings firstly with reference to statement of allegations and after recording his finding as conclusion whether those allegations are proved or not has given further conclusion about the charges in general. He has discussed about the charges in general. He has not discussed the charges separately but the discussion is about the allegations. Therefore, what has been found proved or not giving reasons are allegations. Thus the allegations cannot be isolated and distinguished with charges. 49. He has discussed about the charges in general. He has not discussed the charges separately but the discussion is about the allegations. Therefore, what has been found proved or not giving reasons are allegations. Thus the allegations cannot be isolated and distinguished with charges. 49. With great respect, we find it difficult to agree with the finding recorded by the Hon’ble Single Judge that this was reversal of finding not in respect of charges but in respect of certain allegations inasmuch here the charges and allegations were integrally connected and what has been discussed by the Enquiry Officer is in respect to number of allegations contained in the statement of allegations which were nine relating to Fatehpur Branch and four in respect to Malwa Branch, though in the Article of Charge, there are only 10 charges in general. The Enquiry Officer has held at least 6 out of 13 allegations not proved, but the said finding has been disagreed by the Disciplinary Authority and it has recorded its own finding holding the said allegations also proved. Therefore, it has taken into consideration his own findings on these allegations to impose punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner-appellant. It was a clear case of disagreement with respect to findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer exonerating the delinquent employee from certain charges and where the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the entire or some part of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and takes into account, its own findings for the purpose of imposing punishment upon the delinquent employee, in our view, it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to furnish copy of the enquiry report along with the note of disagreement and findings recorded separately by the Disciplinary Authority on the charges/allegations, which have not been found proved by the Enquiry Officer and to enable the delinquent employee to submit his defence and only thereafter an appropriate order could have been passed. Having failed to observe the above procedure, the Disciplinary Authority has erred in law and this being a serious lapse, the impugned order suffers the vice of breach of principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. The Hon’ble Single Judge, in our view, is not correct in observing that the findings of the disciplinary authority taking a different note on certain allegations, in fact, does not amount to reversal of findings on charges. 50. The Hon’ble Single Judge, in our view, is not correct in observing that the findings of the disciplinary authority taking a different note on certain allegations, in fact, does not amount to reversal of findings on charges. 50. Whether in such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to afford an opportunity to delinquent employee or not is an issue, no more res intetra having already been settled by the Apex Court in a catena of cases. 51. In Punjab National Bank and others v. Kunj Behari Mishra, AIR 1998 SC 2713 , the Apex Court held as under : “When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer’s report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final finding on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar’s case (supra).” 52. The aforesaid law has been reiterated and followed in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1999 SC 3734 , wherein the Apex Court held: “37. Since the Disciplinary Committee did not give any opportunity of hearing to the appellant before taking a final decision in the matter relating to findings on the two charges framed against him, the principles of natural justice, as laid down by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 : AIR 1998 SC 2713 : (1998 AIR SCW 2762 : 1998 Lab IC 3012 : 1998 All LJ 2009), referred to above, were violated.” 53. Again, in SBI and others v. Arvind K. Shukla, JT 2001 (4) SC 415, the Apex Court reiterated and followed Kunj Behari Mishra (supra). 54. Again, in SBI and others v. Arvind K. Shukla, JT 2001 (4) SC 415, the Apex Court reiterated and followed Kunj Behari Mishra (supra). 54. In State Bank of India and others v. K.P. Narayanan Kutty, 2003 (2) SCC 449 , the Court held : “In para 19 of the judgment in Punjab National Bank Case extracted above, when it is clearly stated that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulations 7(2) [Rule 50(3) (ii) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, is identical in terms applicable to the present case] and the delinquent officer will have to be given an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the inquiry officer, we find it difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that unless it is shown that some prejudice was caused to the respondent, the order of dismissal could not be set aside by the High Court.” 55. In Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India, J.T. 2004 (9) SC 620, in para 22 the Apex Court referred to Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another, 1999 (7) SCC 739 and referring to para 29 and 30 of the judgment, noticed the argument that the Service Rules enables the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the inquiring officer or any article of charge. The only requirement is that it shall record its reasoning for such disagreement, but then quoted the following to clarify the procedure to be followed in such case : ”It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer’s report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed.” 56. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed.” 56. Since, in our view, the appeals deserve to be allowed on the ground that before agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect to certain allegations constituting charges, the Disciplinary Authority did not give any opportunity to the petitioner-appellant to submit his representation against the disagreement note and findings of the Disciplinary Authority on the allegations which were not proved by the Enquiry Officer, we are restraining ourselves from considering other issues raised by the learned Senior Counsel before us since any observation on those issues may influence authority concerned while deciding the matter afresh after giving opportunity of representation to the petitioner. We make it clear that it would be open to the petitioner-appellant to raise all these aspects pertaining to irregularity, illegality, if any, in the enquiry proceeding before the Disciplinary Authority and it would be open to the Disciplinary Authority to consider all those aspects and pass a speaking order thereupon. 57. In view of the above, the Special Appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment dated 26.11.1992 of the Hon’ble Single Judge is hereby set aside. The Disciplinary Authority’s order dated 8.3.1988 as well as the appellate order dated 20.11.1990 and 11.4.1991 are also hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority to re-consider the matter after supplying the petitioner-appellant a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer along with the findings of disagreement recorded by him on such articles of Charges (allegations) on which the Enquiry Officer has recorded his finding as “not proved” but Disciplinary Authority disagreed, and, after giving an opportunity of making representation to the petitioner-appellant, shall pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The above exercise shall be completed by the Disciplinary Authority within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. The matter in respect of salary and other consequential benefits, which may be admissible to the petitioner-appellant in accordance with rules, would be decided in the light of the final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority in view of the above directions. 58. There shall be no order as to costs. ————