JUDGMENT Honble R.A. Singh, J.—This writ petition has been moved by petitioner Sharad Kumar Agrawal against State of U.P. and three others under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to grant following reliefs : “(1) Issue a Writ, Order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned order/letter No. D- 92/Sat-Nyaya-3-09-1(74)/01 TC, – Nyaya Anubhag- 3 (Niyuktiyan), Lucknow, dated 26th/27th February, 2009 (Annexure No. 20 to the writ petition), issued by Acharya Suresh Babu, Up Sachiv, Uttar Pradesh Shashan- respondent No. 1 to District Magistrate, Maha Maya Nagar (Hathras), respondent No. 3 whereby the petitioner has been removed from the post of District Government Counsel (Civil), Maha Maya Nagar (Hathras) (hereinafter referred to as “DGC (Civil)”. (2) Issue Writ, Order or Direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to consider petitioner’s name, for extension of his term or retainership as DGC (Civil) Maha Maya Nagar (Hathras), for a further period of 3 years i.e. from 30.9.2006 to 30.9.2009 on the basis of the renewal application dated 1.6.2006 which is already pending before respondents. (3) Issue writ, Order or Direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Respondents No. 1 to 3 to disburse the entire outstanding arrears of petitioner’s bills pertaining to the periods since March, 2006 to December 2008 and outstanding dues since January, 2009 to February, 2009 with interest along with damages as decided by this Hon’ble Court. (4) Issue any other Writ, Order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case to meet the ends of justice. (5) Award costs to the petitioner.” 2. Brief facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioner was engaged as District Government Counsel (Civil) as retainer in District Hathras by Government of U.P. through order/letter No. - D- 353/Sat-Nyaya-3-09-1 (74)/99 dated 11th March, 1999 (Annexure 1) for a period of one year from the date of taking over charge and the petitioner after completing necessary formalities took over as DGC (Civil) Hathras on 18.3.1999 (Annexure 3). Government of U.P. enhanced retainer’s fees etc. with effect from 26.4.1999, 1.4.2005 and 9.1.2007 for DGC (Civil) posted in Districts of U.P. The petitioner’s appointment as DGC (Civil) Hathras was extended with effect from 30.9.2000 to 30.9.2003 vide Government’s order dated 30.9.2000 (Annexure 5). Government of U.P. enhanced retainer’s fees etc. with effect from 26.4.1999, 1.4.2005 and 9.1.2007 for DGC (Civil) posted in Districts of U.P. The petitioner’s appointment as DGC (Civil) Hathras was extended with effect from 30.9.2000 to 30.9.2003 vide Government’s order dated 30.9.2000 (Annexure 5). District Government Counsels were also granted telephone allowances at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month for official calls. Petitioner submitted his application dated 20.8.2003 through District Magistrate, Maha Maya Nagar (Hathras) for extension/renewal of his retainership for another three years, but the same remained under consideration. Petitioner further submitted a fresh application dated 1.6.2006 for his renewal for a further period of three years with effect from 30.9.2006 to 30.9.2009. Suddenly the petitioner received a letter dated 15.12.2007 from Additional District Magistrate Hathras to this effect that Sri Arvind Kumar Sharma, President, District Bar Association, Hathras had sent written complaint against the petitioner on 4.8.2007 levelling twelve allegations including that the petitioner had wrongly drawn Rs. 20 lacs from Government Treasury. The petitioner was asked to submit his point wise reply latest by 26.12.2007. Another letter dated 15.12.2007 was also served upon the petitioner asking him to submit his explanation with regard to complaint of Shri Manohar Singh Arya. The petitioner submitted his written reply to this letter on 25.12.2007 and he also submitted his reply to above mentioned letter. The enquiry into the allegations made in the complaint of President District Bar Association was conducted by the Additional District Magistrate (F and R), Maha Maya Nagar and he further asked the petitioner to submit his clarification in respect of three points vide his letter dated 7.8.2008 and the petitioner submitted his clarification as desired by Enquiry Officer on 11.8.2008. The State Government vide order/letter No. D- 92/Sat-Nyaya-3-09-1(74)/01 TC, dated 26th/27th February, 2009, removed the petitioner from the post of DGC (Civil), which was received by the petitioner on 5.3.2009. 3. The petitioner challenged the order dated 26th/27th February, 2009 (Annexure 20) through this writ petition on various grounds including that of false and frivolous complaint. The petitioner also submitted that no new appointment of DGC (Civil) for Maha Maya Nagar (Hathras) was made till date by Government of U.P. but the petitioner was stopped from performing his duties since 1.3.2009. The petitioner challenged the order dated 26th/27th February, 2009 (Annexure 20) through this writ petition on various grounds including that of false and frivolous complaint. The petitioner also submitted that no new appointment of DGC (Civil) for Maha Maya Nagar (Hathras) was made till date by Government of U.P. but the petitioner was stopped from performing his duties since 1.3.2009. The petitioner also challenged the findings of Enquiry Officer on the ground that he did not apply his mind as the allegations made in the complaint were not supported by any affidavit or any other oral or documentary evidence and the petitioner was not afforded adequate opportunity of being heard as well as the fair procedure in conducting the enquiry was not followed in the petitioner’s case. Moreover Additional District Magistrate (F and R) mentioned in his order dated 7.8.2008 that payment of bills would depend upon the enquiry report and such observation was wholly illegal, arbitrary and unfair. The District Magistrate and other officers were not authorised to refuse or stop payment of petitioner’s arrears of bills in view of principles of Promissory Estoppel. In the matter of extension of petitioner’s term of retainership as DGC (Civil), the State Government was bound to follow the directive issued by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13550 of 2003, but the State Government failed to follow the same. 4. The respondents No. 1 and 2 as well as respondent No. 3 filed their separate counter-affidavits controverting the allegations made in the petition. It was further alleged that petitioner was engaged as DGC (Civil) vide order dated 11.3.1999 with specific terms and conditions that his engagement could be cancelled at any time without giving any reason as indicated in Paragraph 2 of engagement order. Moreover the engagement of petitioner as DGC (Civil) was a professional engagement and not an appointment to the post under Government and being a counsel he was required to create trust and confidence but due to his own act he lost his trust and confidence. Sri Arvind Sharma and Sri Pramod Kumar Sharma submitted a complaint against the petitioner about withdrawal of heavy amount from Treasury in a forged manner and the District Magistrate was directed to make enquiry into the same. Sri Arvind Sharma and Sri Pramod Kumar Sharma submitted a complaint against the petitioner about withdrawal of heavy amount from Treasury in a forged manner and the District Magistrate was directed to make enquiry into the same. The District Magistrate got the matter enquired by Additional District Magistrate, who submitted his report on 9.1.2009, to State Government with a recommendation to remove the petitioner from his post. The matter was then scrutinized at the level of Government and ultimately State Government took a decision to relieve the petitioner from the post of DGC (Civil) and accordingly order was passed on 27.2.2009 and the petitioner was relieved from the post by cancelling his engagement, against which the petitioner filed this writ petition on false and frivolous grounds, which are not sustainable in the eye of law. The copy of enquiry report has been filed along with counter-affidavit as Annexure CA-3 and prayer has been made to dismiss the petition. Sri Manohar Singh Arya also submitted a complaint against the petitioner to the effect that in Original Suit No. 543 Manohar Singh v. Committee of Management the petitioner demanded Rs. 15,000/- as bribe for getting an order passed in his favour and this complaint was also enquired. During inquiry it was also found that the petitioner had withdrawn excess amount of Rs. 6,21,367/- against the relevant Government orders which amounted to embezzlement of Government fund. Thus the petitioner was found guilty of the charges levelled against him and as such he was rightly and legally removed from his post. The petitioner was also given full opportunity of hearing during enquiry. New DGC (Civil) has already been appointed vide letter dated 16.3.2009 and Sri Ram Das has been nominated in view of paragraph 7 (10) (2) of Legal Remembrancer’s Manual. 5. We have heard the petitioner in person and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel, assisted by Dr. Y.K. Srivastav for the respondents at length, perused the record and gone through the relevant provisions of Legal Remembrancer’s Manual as well as the cases cited before us. 6. The petitioner has submitted that he was engaged as DGC (Civil), vide Government order dated 11.3.1999 and he worked with full devotion and dedication and the Division Bench of this Court comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Katju and Hon’ble Mr. 6. The petitioner has submitted that he was engaged as DGC (Civil), vide Government order dated 11.3.1999 and he worked with full devotion and dedication and the Division Bench of this Court comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Katju and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.S. Tripathi held that ordinarily the recommendation of District Judge should be accepted and if a termination order is passed while the term of incumbent is continuing, such termination shall be illegal unless it was done on recommendation of District Judge. The petitioner has cited para 7.06 (1), 7.06 (2), 7.08 and 7.09 of Legal Remembrancer’s Manual with regard to appointment of District Government counsel, his tenure, removal of term and maintenance of character roll. The Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13550 of 2003, V.P.S. Rana v. State of U.P. and others has made certain observations with regard to provisions of Appointment and Removal of District Government Counsel, which are quoted below : “I. If the initial selection of Government counsel was made in contravention to para 7.02 to para 7.05 of the Legal Remembrancer’s Manual the appointment will be totally void and totally illegal and the term of office of such government counsel shall be terminated forthwith. When the initial appointment is made, it is the opinion of the District Judge which must ordinarily be accepted unless there was some adverse material against the applicant in which case the material could be placed before the District Judge by District Magistrate and another opinion obtained from District Judge. II. If the procedure of Legal Remembrancer’s Manual was followed in making the initial appointment and if a termination order is passed while the term of the incumbent is continuing, such termination shall be illegal unless it was done on the recommendation of District Judge, or if the initial appointment/extension itself was done without following the procedure in Legal Remembrancer’s Manual. III. If the term of Government counsel has expired and the counsel applies for renewal of his term ordinarily the government should follow the recommendation of District Judge. IV. All orders terminating the engagement of government counsel or refusing to resume their term against the recommendation of District Judge, or without considering the recommendation of District Judge which is in his favour are quashed providing the petitioner’s appointment/renewal was made in accordance with Legal Remembrancer’s Manual. IV. All orders terminating the engagement of government counsel or refusing to resume their term against the recommendation of District Judge, or without considering the recommendation of District Judge which is in his favour are quashed providing the petitioner’s appointment/renewal was made in accordance with Legal Remembrancer’s Manual. Such persons will continue in office till the expiry of their term and thereafter they should be considered for renewal of their term in accordance with this judgment”. 7. We have considered the submissions made by the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents and found that the petitioner in his petition as well as in the rejoinder affidavit has admitted that his term as DGC (Civil) was extended upto 30.9.2003 vide order dated 30.9.2000 and thereafter his term was never extended by Government of U.P. though he applied for extension of his term through District Magistrate from time to time, but Government of U.P. did not issue any order extending his term. It has been established from the pleadings and submissions of parties that the term of the petitioner was not continuing after 30.9.2003 and thus his termination order dated 26th /27th February, 2009 cannot be said to be illegal, because the case of the petitioner is not covered by above provisions of Legal Remembrancer’s Manual. Moreover, the appointment of DGC (Civil) is only a professional engagement. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Sharma, AIR 1996, SC 864 has held that the appointment of DGC (Civil) being professional engagement on a legal part is not an appointment to a post under the Government service which entitles the appointee to continue till the date of superannuation. 8. Before we proceed to consider the respective submission it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions of L.R. Manual governing the engagement, renewal and termination of their engagement. Paragraph 7.06, 7.08 are quoted as below : Paras 7.06, and 7.08 read thus : 7.06. Appointment and renewal.—(1) The legal practitioner finally selected by the Government may be appointed District Government Counsel for one year from the date of his taking over charge. Paragraph 7.06, 7.08 are quoted as below : Paras 7.06, and 7.08 read thus : 7.06. Appointment and renewal.—(1) The legal practitioner finally selected by the Government may be appointed District Government Counsel for one year from the date of his taking over charge. (2) At the end of the aforesaid period, the District Officer after consulting the District Judge shall submit a report on his work and conduct to the Legal Remembrancer together with the statement of work done in Form No. 9 should his work or conduct be found to be unsatisfactory the matter shall be reported to the Government for orders. If the report in respect of his work and conduct is satisfactory, he may be furnished with a deed of engagement in Form No. 1 for a term not exceeding three years. On his first engagement a copy of Form No. 2 shall be supplied to him and he shall complete and return it to the Legal Remembrancer for record. (3) The appointment of any legal practitioner as a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and is not appointment to a post under the Government. Accordingly the Government reserves the power to terminate the appointment of any District Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause. 7.08. Renewal of term.—(1) At least three months before the expiry of the term of a District Government Counsel, the District Officer shall after consulting the District Judge and considering his past record of work, conduct and age, report to the Legal Remembrancer, together with the statement of work done by him in Form No. 9 whether in his opinion the term of appointment of such counsel should be renewed or not. A copy of the opinion of the District Judge should also be sent along with the recommendations of the District officer. (2) Where recommendation for the extension of the term of a District Government Counsel is made for a specified period only, the reasons therefor shall also be stated by the District Officer. A copy of the opinion of the District Judge should also be sent along with the recommendations of the District officer. (2) Where recommendation for the extension of the term of a District Government Counsel is made for a specified period only, the reasons therefor shall also be stated by the District Officer. (3) While forwarding his recommendation for renewal of the term of a District Government Counsel— (I) the District Judge shall give an estimate of the quality of the counsel’s work from the judicial stand point, keeping in view the different aspects of a lawyer’s capacity as it is manifested before him in conducting State cases, and specially his professional conduct; (II) The District Officer shall give his report about the suitability of the District Government Counsel from the administrative point of view, his public reputation in general, his character, integrity and professional conduct. (4) If the Government agrees with the recommendations of the District Officer for the renewal of the term of the Government Counsel, it may pass orders for reappointing him for a period not exceeding three years. (5) If the Government decides not to reappoint a Government counsel, the Legal Remembrancer may call upon the District Officer to forward fresh recommendations in the manner laid down in para 7.03. (6) The procedure prescribed in this para shall be followed on the expiry of every successive period of renewed appointment of a District Government Counsel.” 9. The learned counsel for respondents has contended that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court can evaluate question of fact for limited purpose of scrutinizing decision making process. Reliance has been placed on State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, AIR 2004 SC 3800 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held : “22. The power of judicial review is now well defined in a series of decisions of this Court. It is trite that the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a writ application in a matter governed by contract qua contract (assuming such professional engagement to be one), as therein public law element would not be involved. 24. The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. 24. The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. For a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the authority need to fall in the realm of public law be it a legislative act of the state, an executive act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or authority imbued with public law element. The question is required to be determined in each case having regard to the nature of and extent of authority vested in the state. However, it may not be possible to generalize the nature of the action which would come either under public law remedy or private law field nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list of such actions. 28. The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the Courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the supreme lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review Court. The limited scope of judicial review succinctly put are : (I) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies. (II) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds. (III) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal. (IV) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasions miscarriage of justice. (IV) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasions miscarriage of justice. (V) The Courts cannot be called upon to undertake the Government duties and functions. The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a Judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies. (See Ira Munn v. State of Ellinois, 1876 (94) US (Supreme Reports) 113). 37. The Legal Remembrancer Manual clearly states that appointment of a public prosecutor or a district counsel would be professional in nature. It is beyond any cavil and rightly conceded at the Bar that the holder of an office of the public prosecutor does not hold a civil post. By holding a post of district counsel or the public prosecutor, neither a status is conferred on the incumbent. 39. The appointment of public prosecutors, on the other hand, are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or the executive instructions framed by the State governing the terms of their appointment. Proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India is not applicable in their case. Their appointment is a tenure appointment. Public prosecutors, furthermore, retain the character of legal practitioners for all intent and purport. They, of course, discharge public functions and certain statutory powers are also conferred upon them. Their duties and functions are onerous but the same would not mean that their conditions of appointment are governed by any statute or statutory rule. 40. So long as in appointing a counsel the procedures laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure are followed and a reasonable or fair procedure is adopted, the Court will normally not interfere with the decision. The nature of the office held by a lawyer vis-a-vis the State being in the nature of professional engagements, the Courts are normally charry to over-turn any decision unless an exceptional case is made out. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not speak of renewal or extension of tenure. The question as to whether the State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel or not is primarily a matter between it and the counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not speak of renewal or extension of tenure. The extension of tenure of public prosecutor or the district counsel should not be compared with the right of renewal under a licence or permit granted under a statute. The incumbent has no legal enforceable right as such. The action of the State in not renewing the tenure can be subjected to judicial scrutiny inter alia on the ground that the same is arbitrary. The Courts normally would not delve into the records with a view to ascertain as to what impelled the state not to renew the tenure of a public prosecutor or a district counsel. The jurisdiction of the Courts in a case of this nature would be to invoke the doctrine of ‘Wednesbury Unreasonableness’ as developed in Associated Picture House v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 640). 55. Appointment of the District Government counsel cannot be equated with the appointments of the High Court and the Supreme Court Judges. A distinction must be made between professional engagement and a holder of high public office. Various doctrines and the provisions of the Constitution which impelled this Court to give meaning of consultation as concurrence and wherein the Chief Justice of India will have a primacy, cannot be held to be applicable in the matter of consultation between the District Magistrate and the District Judge for the purpose of preparation of a panel of the District Government Counsel.” 10. In the present case the term of the petitioner as DGC (Civil) was not extended by Government of U.P. after 30.9.2003. It appears that the petitioner continued to work as DGC (Civil) without any extension or order of authorization to work as such. It has been observed by Apex Court that in order to invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 the legal right of the petitioner should be based upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. The Legal Remembrancer’s Manual is merely a compilation of execution orders and is not a ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 13 of Constitution of India. The Legal Remembrancer’s Manual is merely a compilation of execution orders and is not a ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 13 of Constitution of India. Thus the petitioner has no legal right to be enforceable in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances we are not inclined to accept the submission of the petitioner in this regard, because the right of the petitioner is not enforceable under any law or statute and the same is also not founded upon a contract or an instrument having the force of law. We are also not inclined to sit in appeal against the impugned order issued by the Government of U.P. More so when the State Government has taken a decision to discontinue the petitioner’s engagement after considering the reports on various allegations made against the petitioner along with the reply given by the petitioner to show cause notices issued to him. The decision of the State cannot be termed as arbitrary or perverse nor it can be said to be based on no material. We do not find any error in the procedure adopted by the State Government for terminating the petitioner’s engagement. The petitioner was made aware about the complaints received against him and he also submitted his reply. This Court while exercising writ jurisdiction shall neither act as an Appellate authority nor reappraise the materials to record findings of facts. The decision of State Government terminating the petitioner’s professional engagement does not require any interference in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. In view of above discussions the writ petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed with regard to relief No. (1) and (2). So far the relief No. 3 in relation to disburse the entire outstanding arrears of petitioner’s bill pertaining to the periods since March 2006 to Dec 2008 and outstanding dues since January, 2009 is concerned, the respondents in Para 16 of their counter-affidavit have mentioned that during enquiry it has been transpired that the petitioner has withdrawn excess amount of Rs. 6,21,367/- against the relevant Government Order which amounts to embezzlement of Government amount. In para 18 it has been mentioned that the petitioner was asked to clarify the position as to how he was demanding money for the work done by him. 6,21,367/- against the relevant Government Order which amounts to embezzlement of Government amount. In para 18 it has been mentioned that the petitioner was asked to clarify the position as to how he was demanding money for the work done by him. In para 27 it has been mentioned that the petitioner has committed certain serious financial irregularities. 12. In this writ petition the above dispute cannot be decided because the same will require evidence for adjudication. Thus the petitioner may seek remedy for his amount alleged to be due towards respondents, in accordance with law. Consequently the writ petition with regard to relief (I) and (II) is dismissed. The petitioner may seek remedy permissible under law in respect of relief (III). Parties will bear their own costs of this writ petition. ————