JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Fifteen petitioners working as Constable posted in District Etah have been transferred by means of the impugned orders dated 18.9.2009, 20.9.2009 and 22.9.2009, copy whereof has been filed collectively as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The aforesaid orders of transfer have been passed in public interest by the Superintendent of Police (Establishment), acting on behalf of Deputy Inspector General of Police (Establishment), U.P. Police Head Quarters, Allahabad. It is also evident from the impugned orders that the same have been issued after concurrence of the Police Establishment Board which has been obtained in view of the Apex Court decision in Prakash Singh and others v. Union of India and others, (2006) 8 SCC 1. It is clearly averred in para 5 of the writ petition that the petitioners are posted in District Etah for the last more than ten years. 2. Sri Nisheeth Yadav, Advocate has assailed the impugned orders of transfer contending : (A) The transfer of all the members of police officers of subordinate rank is governed by the Government Orders dated 7.2.1980, 27.6.1984 and 25.3.1995, but ignoring the same the impugned orders have been passed. (B) All the petitioners belong to a particular community who have been shifted from Etah to Baghpat, Meerut and Muzaffarnagar. it is a clear case of victimization of the petitioners on caste lines and the impugned order is not a simple order of transfer, but malicious in law. (C) By Government Order dated 6.6.2009, transfer policy for the session 2009-10 has been laid down and it is provided therein that no transfer in the session shall be made but ignoring the same, the impugned orders of transfer have been passed in violation of the said Government policy and, therefore, are liable to be set aside. He contended that the transfer policy has been laid down by the respondents themselves and they are bound to observe the same as held by the Apex Court in Home Secretary, U.T. of Chandigarh and another v. Darshjit Singh Grewal and others, JT 1993 (4) SC 387;Virendra S. Hooda and others v. State of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 696 and Union of India v. Mamta Anurag Sharma and another, (2001) 2 UPLBEC 2559. (D) The petitioners are all constables belong to lowest rung of the police force and, hence, being petty members of police force would be in great difficulty in maintaining their family at far flung places if their transfer is allowed in such a usual, casual and routine manner. (E) The transfer orders have been passed in mid session causing great difficulty to the family since the children of the petitioners are studying and, therefore, it would not be prudent to disturb the entire family of the petitioners in mid session. The respondents without applying mind to all these difficulties have illegally passed the impugned orders. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Director of School Education, Madras and others v. O. Karuppa Thevan and another, (1994) Supp (2) SCC 666, till the end of the session, the petitioners should be allowed to continue at the present place of posting. 3. Though, learned counsel for the petitioners has canvassed all the above points at length arguing the matter with great labour, diligence and ability, but having given my anxious and deepest thought to the matter, I find myself unable to accept any of the above submission. In my view, this writ petition does not call for any interference. 4. It is no doubt true that an employee and in particular a Government servant is entitled to be treated fairly, impartially, free from any external influence and strictly in accordance with his service conditions, and rules and regulations framed in this regard. Like any other person, various fundamental rights are applicable to the Government servants also and in particular Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. If there is a case demonstrating that a Government servant has been dealt with unfairly or has been discriminated on one or the other ground, which are impermissible under Article 16 (2) of the Constitution like, caste, religion, race, sex, descent place of birth etc. this Court would not hesitate to interfere and restrain the State from doing so immediately. However, all these question pre conceive one fact that the Government employee has some kind of right which is being interfered either by singling him out or on account of mala fide etc. There are several aspects in service and in particular Government service. this Court would not hesitate to interfere and restrain the State from doing so immediately. However, all these question pre conceive one fact that the Government employee has some kind of right which is being interfered either by singling him out or on account of mala fide etc. There are several aspects in service and in particular Government service. Some arise out of the rights of the Government servant and in some he has no right but exist there merely because one is a Government servant holding a position and status and by virtue thereof such incident of service has fallen upon him. Further, there are a number of incidents of service, some of which confer a legal right upon the Government servant and some do not result in a legal right. For example once a person is appointed as Government servant, his seniority by virtue of his date of entering the service is an incident of service. It confers a legal right upon him to claim that his seniority should be determined in accordance with the rules or the executive instruction in the absence of the statutory rules laying down the criteria for determining seniority. Similarly, another incident of service is that he is entitled to claim salary or wages as prescribed under statutory rules or executive orders. This also confer upon him a legally enforceable right whether flows from statutory rules or from executive instructions. Then if there is a hierarchy of posts and the rules allow a Government servant working on a particular post to be considered for promotion to a higher post, in certain circumstances, in such a case consideration for promotion is also an incident of service and here also it confers a legally enforceable right whether it emerges from rules or executive instructions. Simultaneously there are certain aspects which though are incidents of service but do not result in conferring any legal right upon the Government servant concerned, Enforceability in later cases varies from case to case. In some matters to a limited extent they may be enforceable and in some matters they may not be enforced at all. Simultaneously there are certain aspects which though are incidents of service but do not result in conferring any legal right upon the Government servant concerned, Enforceability in later cases varies from case to case. In some matters to a limited extent they may be enforceable and in some matters they may not be enforced at all. For example if by an executive order it is provided that a Government servant holding a particular post will have to show his performance upto a particular level, compliance thereof on the part of the Government servant is also an incident of service but its enforceability varies from case to case. For example the executive higher authorities may take action against such Government servants who fail to perform upto the desired level and such failure may result in adverse consequences in the matter of promotion, crossing of efficiency bar etc. Similarly such matter may also be considered by an executive higher authority at the time of considering whether the Government servant concerned has rendered a dead wood necessitating compulsory retirement or not but Government servant cannot challenge the said standard in a Court of law on the ground that those standards according to capacity of the Government servant are excessive etc. and cannot be followed uniformly by all the Government servant since the capacity of every person varies depending on various aspects of the matter. Similarly another Government servant or the people at large may not claim something in his favour on the ground that a particular Government servant has not been able to discharge as per desired the level. For example if in a territorial jurisdiction of a particular Police Station, number of offenses in a particular period are more than another Police Station, the citizens residing in the former Police Station cannot come to a Court of law and say that in view of the executive instructions issued by the State Government, the Officer In-charge of the Police Station having failed to achieve the target or show his performance according to desired level and, therefore, he should be proceeded against in one or the other manner or should be removed from his office or from that Police Station. Similarly, if a member of a Subordinate Judiciary, who is supposed to decide certain number of cases in a month, fails to achieve the target, no litigant or advocate can come to a Court of law to ask that such judicial officer is not able to hold the office and should be removed or should be transferred to some other place. The executive orders, in this regard though require performance upto a particular standard for the public benefit and interest but non achievement thereof is not enforceable. In the administrative side, the executive authority higher in office may take into consideration the above executive instructions and the performance of the Government servant concerned while assessing his performance, but otherwise the executive instructions of the nature stated above are not enforceable since they do not result in creating a legally enforceable right. The executive instructions providing certain monetary benefit to Government servants or their family members are enforceable. However, the executive instructions constituting guidelines for the authority competent to transfer a Government servant from one place to another do not fall in the same category i.e. enforceable as they do not confer any legal right upon a Government servant. This is what the law has been in the matter of transfer throughout in the light of the authorities of the Apex Court as well as this Court. I will not burden this judgment with number of authorities on this subject but would like to come straightway on the main issue but before doing so, I propose to refer certain authorities to show how the matter of transfer of a Government servant has been treated by the Courts in India. After having in-depth study on the subject I find it beyond doubt that throughout it has been held that transfer is an incident of service, which does not affect any legal right of a Government servant holding a transferable post. 5. Initially, in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 the Court said that it is an accepted principle that in a public service transfer is an incident of service. It is also an implied condition of service and appointing authority has a wide discretion in this matter. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. 6. It is also an implied condition of service and appointing authority has a wide discretion in this matter. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. 6. Thereafter, dealing with the transfer of the Hon’ble Judges of High Court, in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, 1977 (4) SCC 193 the Apex Court observed that transfer is an incident of service. It was further held that once a person has entered service he is bound by the conditions imposed either by the Service Rules or the Constitutional provisions. No person after having joined the service can be heard to say that he shall not be transferred from one place to another in the same service without his consent. Having accepted the service, the functionary has no choice left in the administrative action that can be taken by empowered authorities namely, transfer from one place to another, assignment of work and likewise. 7. In B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka, JT 1986 (1) SC 249 the Court said that it is now well settled that a Government servant is liable to be transferred to a similar post in the same cadre. It is a normal feature and incident of Government service. No Government servant can claim to remain at a particular place or in a particular post unless, of course, his appointment itself is to a specified, non-transferable post. 8. In B. Varadha Rao (supra) an attempt was made to argue that since in E.P. Royappa (supra) it was held that the transfer is an implied condition of service, therefore, the transfer affecting the petitioner must be treated to have altered the service conditions to his disadvantage and such an order would be deemed to be an adverse order appealable under the provisions applicable in the rules pertaining to disciplinary action, but was rejected by the Court observing that transfer is always understood and construed as an incident of service. It does not result in alteration of any of the conditions of service to the disadvantage of the employee concerned. It does not result in alteration of any of the conditions of service to the disadvantage of the employee concerned. In the reference of E.P. Royappa (supra) with respect to observation “an implied condition of service” the Apex Court in B. Varadha Rao (supra) held as “just an observation in passing” and it was held that it cannot be relied upon in support of the contention that an order of transfer ipso facto varies to the disadvantage of a Government servant, any of his conditions of service making the impugned order appealable. 9. In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433 , the Apex Court further said that transfer from one place to another is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Whenever, a public servant is transferred he must comply with the order but if there be any genuine difficulty in proceeding on transfer it is open to him to make representation to competent authority for stay, modification or cancellation of the transfer order. If the order of transfer is not stayed, modified or cancelled the concerned public servant must carry out the order of transfer. In the absence of any stay of the transfer order a public servant has no justification to avoid or evade the transfer order merely on the ground of having made a representation, or on the ground of his difficulty in moving from one place to the other. If he fails to proceed on transfer in compliance to the transfer order, he would expose himself to disciplinary action under the relevant Rules. 10. In Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 532 , it was held “A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department.” 11. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department.” 11. In the same judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court also held that a transfer order, even if, is issued to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same can not and should not be interfered by the Court merely because transfer orders were passed on the request of the concerned employees. No person has a vested right to remain posted to a particular place, and unless the transfer order is passed in violation of any mandatory rule, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer orders. Relevant extract is quoted as under : “If the competent authority issued transfer orders with a view to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same cannot and should not be interfered by the Court merely because the transfer order were passed on the request of the employees concerned. The respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. Since they hold transferable posts they are liable to be transferred from one place to the other. The transfer orders had been issued by the competent authority, which did not violate any mandatory rule, therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer orders." (Para-3) 12. In Rajendra Roy v. Union of India and another, JT 1992 (6) SC 732, it was said “in a transferable post an order of transfer is a normal consequence and personal difficulties are matters for consideration of the department.” 13. In Rajendra Rai v. Union of India, 1993 (1) SCC 148 and Union of India v. N.P. Thomas, 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 704 it was said that the Court should not interfere with the transfer orders unless there is a violation of some statutory rule or where the transfer order was mala fide. 14. In Rajendra Rai v. Union of India, 1993 (1) SCC 148 and Union of India v. N.P. Thomas, 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 704 it was said that the Court should not interfere with the transfer orders unless there is a violation of some statutory rule or where the transfer order was mala fide. 14. In N.K. Singh v. Union of India, JT 1994 (5) SC 298, the Court said, “Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm of principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinised judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising all transfers.....” 15. In Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa and others, 1995 suppl. (4) SCC 169 the Court observed “It is settled law that a transfer which is an incident of service is not to be interfered with by the Courts unless it is shown to be clearly arbitrary or vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer.” 16. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan, 2001 (8) SCC 574 , the Apex Court held that transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. 17. In Public Service Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and another, 2003 (4) SCC 104 the Court said, “Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the Courts. This Court consistently has been taken a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner.” 18. In State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, 2004 (11) SCC 402 , the Court said “Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or conditions of service.” 19. In State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, 2004 (11) SCC 402 , the Court said “Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra in the law governing or conditions of service.” 19. In Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath, JT 2004 (2) SC 371, the Apex Court said, “No Government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or place of his choice since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals normally cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the employer/management....” 20. Thus, the scope of judicial review in the matter of transfer is restricted inasmuch if an order of transfer is challenged on the ground of violation of statutory provision or lack of competence of the person who has passed the order or mala fide, only then the Court should interfere otherwise it is not liable to be interfered in judicial review. The reason for such a view taken by the Courts repeatedly is that no Government servant has a right to be posted in a particular post or position once appointed in service. He cannot claim that he should continue at same place as long as he desire. 21. Noticing distinction in transfer of civilian employee including those working in public sector undertakings and those of disciplined forces, in Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India, 2005 (7) SCC 227 , the Apex Court said “The scope of interference by Courts in regard to members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The Courts should be extremely slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made.” 22. Considering J.K. Bansal (supra), a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 1296 of 2005 (Gulzar Singh v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 7.11.2005 in respect to member of police force observed as under : “The present case, if not strictly identical to the case of Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India and others (supra), is quite nearer to the same. The petitioner-appellant in the present case is a member of a discipline force, namely, U.P. Police. His requirement and urgency as well as the exigency regarding posting would be totally different than other civil employees. There may be numerous factors on account whereof the competent authority has to post a particular member of Police Force at a particular place and unless and until a case of mala fide is made out or there is violation of statutory provision, there would be no occasion for this Court to interfere in the case of transfer of a member of a Police Force. The scope of judicial interference would definitely be limited and narrow in case of a disciplined Force comparing to scope available in the case of other civil servants. It is not the case of the petitioner-appellant that the impugned order of transfer is in contravention of any statutory mandatory provision.” 23. In Prabir Banerjee v. Union of India, (2007) 8 SCC 793 , transfer of a member of central service, namely, Central Excise, from one zone to another zone was challenged on the ground that inter zonal transfer was prohibited in the department of Central Excise and Customs pursuant to the circular dated 19.2.2004 issued by the department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. The Court held that it is no doubt true that transfer is an incident of service in all India service under the Central Service Rules, but in the absence of any direct rule relating to transfer between the two collectorates, the field may be covered by the administrative instructions. 24. In Mohd. The Court held that it is no doubt true that transfer is an incident of service in all India service under the Central Service Rules, but in the absence of any direct rule relating to transfer between the two collectorates, the field may be covered by the administrative instructions. 24. In Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2007 (12) SC 467, the Apex Court said “Transfer is an exigency of service and is an administrative decision. Interference by the Courts with transfer order should only be in very rare cases.” It further held “This Court has time and again expressed its disapproval of the Courts below interfering with the order of transfer of public servant from one place to another. It is entirely for the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. Ordinarily the Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of transfer.” 25. In Prasar Bharti v. Amarjeet Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 539 , the Court said that an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt that the transfer being an incident of service should not be interfered except some cases where, inter alia, mala fide on the part of the authorities is proved. 26. In Union of India and another v. Murlidhar Menon and others, 2009 (11) SCALE 416 the Court observed that even if the conditions of service are not governed by the statutory rules, yet the transfer being an incident of service, an employee can be transferred which may be governed by the administrative instruction since an employee has no right to be posted at a particular place. 27. Recently, in Rajendra Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, JT 2009 (10) SC 187, the Court observed that a Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to other. 28. The Court in Rajendra Singh (supra) also observed that the transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of the legal rights of the concerned employee. 28. The Court in Rajendra Singh (supra) also observed that the transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of the legal rights of the concerned employee. If a transfer order is passed in violation of a executive instruction or order, the Court ordinarily should not interfere with the order and the affected party should approach the higher authority in the department. 29. Thus, from the above it is evident that since an employee holding a transferable post has no right to continue at a particular place or position, an order of transfer does not violate any of his legal right whatsoever. That being so, an order of transfer cannot be interfered except of the contingency of mala fide, violation of Rule and competence since it cannot be said to be an order affecting the legal rights of an employee. The limited scope of interference in a judicial review, therefore, has been left to the cases where the order is either violative of statutory provision or is vitiated on account of mala fide or has been issued by a person incompetent. The transgression of administrative guidelines at the best provide an opportunity to the employee concerned to approach the higher authorities for redressal but its consequences would not go to the extent to vitiate the order of transfer. The question as to whether violation of transfer policy or guide lines relating to transfer contained in an executive order or executive insturcitoins or policy for a particular period laid down by the Government would result in vitiating the order of transfer has also been considered repeatedly in past by Apex Court as well as this Court. 30. The enforceability of a guideline laid down for transfer specifically came to be considered by the Apex Court in Shilpi Bose (supra) and it was held that even if transfer order is passed in violation of the executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order and instead affected arty should approach the higher authorities in the Department. 31. Again in Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 a similar argument was considered and in para 7 of the judgment the Court said, “The said guidelines, however, does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right.” 32. 31. Again in Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 a similar argument was considered and in para 7 of the judgment the Court said, “The said guidelines, however, does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right.” 32. Referring its earlier judgment in Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, 1992 (1) SCC 306 the Apex Court in S.L. Abbas (supra) observed as under : “The said observations in fact tend to negative the respondents contentions instead of supporting them. The judgment also does not support the Respondents’ contention that if such an order is questioned in a Court or the Tribunal, the authority is obliged to justify the transfer by adducing the reasons therefor. It does not also say that the Court or Tribunal can quash the order of transfer, if any of the administrative instructions/guidelines are not followed, much less can it be characterized as mala fide for that reason. To reiterate, the order of transfer can be questioned in a Court or Tribunal only where it is passed mala fide or where it is made in violation of the statutory provisions.” 33. Same thing has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Gobardhan Lal (supra) in the following words : “Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments.” 34. Besides the judgments of the Apex Court, this Court has also considered the same time and again and has reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. Some of such authorities are as under. 35. Some of such authorities are as under. 35. In Rajendra Prasad v. Union of India, 2005 (2) ESC 1224 , a Division Bench observed, “Transfer policy does not create legal right justiciable in the Court of law.” 36. In Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52249 of 2000 (Dr. Krishna Chandra Dubey v. Union of India and others) decided on 5.9.2009 said : “It is clear that transfer policy does not create any legal right in favour of the employee. It is well settled law that a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by an employee that there is a breath of statutory duty on the part of the employer.” 37. In Gulab Singh (supra) and Ram Niwas Pandey and others v. Union of India and others (Special Appeal No. 769 of 2005) decided on 29.11.2005 also this Court held that transgression of transfer policy or executive instructions does not give a legally enforceable right to challenge an order of transfer. 38. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 243 (SB) of 2007 Uma Shankar Rai v. State of U.P. and others decided on 31.7.2007 this Court observed as under: “Dr L.P. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner seriously contended that though the transfer of Government servant is made in exigencies of service, yet where transfer policy has been framed, the same is expected to be adhered to and cannot be defied in a discriminatory and selective manner. Any action of the authorities, even in respect of the matter of transfer, if is inconsistent to such policy would vitiate the order of transfer since it would render the same arbitrary and illegal. Referring to para 2 and 3 of the transfer policy dated 11.5.2006, he contended that the respondent no. 4 having completed his tenure of six years in the District and ten years in the Commissionery even at Mirzapur yet he has again been sought to be posted at Mirzapur to accommodate him and the petitioner has been transferred to Varanasi, therefore, the impugned order is patently illegal. 4 having completed his tenure of six years in the District and ten years in the Commissionery even at Mirzapur yet he has again been sought to be posted at Mirzapur to accommodate him and the petitioner has been transferred to Varanasi, therefore, the impugned order is patently illegal. In support of the submission that order of transfer, if has been issued in violation of transfer policy, the same can be assailed since the transfer policy was laid down to adhere to and not to violate, reliance has been placed on the apex Court’s decision in Home Secretary, U.T. of Chandigarh and another v. Darshjit Singh Grewal and others, (1993) 4 SCC 25 ; N.K. Singh v. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 SCC 98 ; R. v. Secretary of State, (1985) 1 All. ER 40; and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Gyatri Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 1998 (16) LCD 17. In other words the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even through the order of transfer may not be challenged on the ground of mere violation of transfer policy, yet such order can be interfered with if the authorities who are supposed to adhere with the guidelines, have failed to do so. In our view the submission is mutually destructive and self contradictory. What the petitioner in fact has sought to argue is that the Executive once has laid down certain standards for guidance in its functioning, it must adhere to and any deviation thereof would vitiate the consequential action, which may be challenged in writ jurisdiction. The argument though attracting but in the matter of transfer, however, in our view, the same has no application. Transfer of Govt. servants in the State of U.P. is governed by the provisions contained in Fundamental Rule- 15, which reads as under : .................................. It is not disputed that the post held by the petitioner is transferable and he is liable to be transferred from one place to another. The employer once possess right to transfer an employee from one place to another, in our view, there is no legal or otherwise corresponding obligation upon him to inform his employee as to why and in what circumstance an employee is being transferred from one place to another. The employer once possess right to transfer an employee from one place to another, in our view, there is no legal or otherwise corresponding obligation upon him to inform his employee as to why and in what circumstance an employee is being transferred from one place to another. Shifting and transferring of the employee from one place to another involves more than thousand reasons and it is difficult to identify all of them in black and white. The commonest reason may be a periodical shifting of person from one place to another, which does not require any special purpose; the other reasons include necessity of a particular officer at a particular place; avoidance of disturbance or inconvenience in working of the officer on account of a person at a particular place; unconfirmed complaints and to avoid any multiplication thereof; transfer may be resorted to and so on. These are all illustrations. The question as to whether in any of the circumstances when a person is transferred from one place to another without casting any stigma on him, does it infringe, in any manner, any right of such employee which may cause corresponding obligation or duty upon the employer to do something in such a reasonable manner which may spell out either from its action or from the record and when challenged in a Court of law, he is supposed to explain the same, In our view, the answer is emphatic no.” 39. It further held : “In view of the aforesaid well settled principles governing the matter of transfer, the consistent opinion of the Courts in the matter of judicial review of the transfer orders has been that the order of transfer is open for judicial review on very limited grounds; namely if it is in violation of any statutory provisions or vitiated by mala-fides or passed by an authority holding no jurisdiction. Since the power of transfer in the hierarchical system of the Government can be exercised at different level, sometimes for the guidance of the authorities for exercise of power of transfer, certain executive instructions containing guidelines are issued by the Government so that they may be taken into account while exercising power of transfer. At times orders of transfer have been assailed before the Court on the ground that they have been issued in breach of the conditions of such guidelines or in transgression of administrative guidelines. At times orders of transfer have been assailed before the Court on the ground that they have been issued in breach of the conditions of such guidelines or in transgression of administrative guidelines. Looking to the very nature of the power of transfer, the Courts have not allowed interference in the order of transfer on the ground of violation of administrative guidelines and still judicial review on such ground is impermissible unless it falls within the realm of malice in law. The reason behind appears to be that the order of transfer does not violate any right of the employee and the employer has no corresponding obligation to explain his employee as to why he is being transferred from one place to another.” 40. The Division Bench judgment in Uma Shanker Rai (supra) has been followed by another Division bench in Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. and another, 2009(3) ADJ 569 (DB). 41. Now coming to the authorities cited by Sri Nisheeth Yadav, this Court finds that in Darshjit Singh Grewal (supra), the case before the Apex Court was not of transfer of Government servant but transfer of students from one affiliated College to another. In order to govern migration of students from one college to another, certain rules were framed by Syndicate of Punjab University in exercise of its power under Section 20 of the Punjab University Act, 1947. Similarly for migration of students in various technical/profession college under the control of Chandigarh Administration, since Chandigarh Administration provides finance to the engineering colleges within the union territory of Chandigarh, it has issued a policy vide letter dated 6.9.1991 governing such migration. It was found that said guideline was not inconsistent with the Rules and Regulations made under the Punjab University Act, 1947 but contains similar provisions. The students for Medical Colleges are normally not liable to be transferred from one College to another during the Course they are studying in particular College and in a particular discipline since it has various repercussions. Students while seeking admission in Medical Colleges are entitled to give their option for admission against a seat in a particular Medical College and allotment is normally made on the basis of the merit of the students concerned. Students while seeking admission in Medical Colleges are entitled to give their option for admission against a seat in a particular Medical College and allotment is normally made on the basis of the merit of the students concerned. Migration, if allowed in a routine course, would be destructive to the said scheme where the students are given admission in a particular Medical College based on their merit position and their option etc. The rules, regulations and scheme for migration, thus, were bound to affect the right of the concerned students of one or the other Medical College or those students who were seeking admission in a particular Medical College, but may not get due to migration allowed by the authorities concerned to that College. The rules and regulations, therefore, had the effect of directly effecting the rights of the students community undergoing medical education in the State of Punjab or otherwise. Thus, in the absence of any otherwise right of seeking transfer to some extent the same was allowed by the rules and regulations which were found statutory and the policy guidelines issued by the Chandigarh Administration, which, therefore, conferred a limited right upon a student studying in a particular College to seek migration in given certain circumstances and following the conditions laid down therein. Thus, here was a case where the executive instructions conferred though limited but a right upon the student community and in these context, the executive order was held to be binding upon the administration. It is in these circumstances, the Court held that the policy of general application having been enunciated and communicated to all, the administration was bound by it and until changed, it is bound to adhere to it. Thereafter, considering the validity of the order of transfer i.e. migration of the students from one college to another, the Court found the same to be contrary to the statutory rules and, therefore, judgment in Darshjit Singh Grewal (supra), in my view, has no application at all to the cases of the transfer of Government servants. In the matter of transfer of Government servant, since they have no legal right whatsoever to seek their posting at a particular place. The order of transfer does not affect their legal rights, this question does not arise at all. In the matter of transfer of Government servant, since they have no legal right whatsoever to seek their posting at a particular place. The order of transfer does not affect their legal rights, this question does not arise at all. The executive orders and guidelines which were available in the case of Darshjit Singh Grewal (supra) cannot be placed at par with the guidelines pertaining to transfer of Government servants issued by the State Government though by an executive order. When the Government Servant has no right in the matter of posting etc. the guidelines cannot create something which was not already existed and, therefore, will not result in creating a better right to the Government servant which otherwise is not there even though the matter of transfer is governed by the statutory rules. 42. In Virendra S. Hooda (supra), the matter pertains to appointment to the post of Haryana Public Service Commission. A circular was issued by Haryana Government that if the vacancies arise within six months from receipt of recommendation of Public Service Commission, they have to be filled in out of waiting list recommended by the Commission. 12 vacancies arose but the said circular was not given effect to and in these circumstances a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the issue. It was held in para 4 of the judgment that when a policy has been declared by the State as to the manner of filling of the post, so long these instructions are not contrary to the rules, the respondents ought to have followed the same. Here we find that a right to be considered for appointment of a person was under consideration. The said right is enforceable in a Court of law in accordance with the rules and regulations. Since, there was a right, if an executive order or policy also support such right, the same ought to have been followed unless found otherwise inconsistent with law. Here was not a case where enforcement of a policy was sought to be enforced in a matter where the person has no legal right at all to the real issue. In my view, the judgment in Hooda’ case (supra) therefore has no application. 43. Here was not a case where enforcement of a policy was sought to be enforced in a matter where the person has no legal right at all to the real issue. In my view, the judgment in Hooda’ case (supra) therefore has no application. 43. It would also be prudent to refer at this stage that under Article 16 (4) the provision for reservation can be made by the State and it is now well settled in the light of the Constitution Bench judgment in Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 597 that such reservation can be provided even by an executive order and such an executive order relating to appointments in service is enforceable as it does confer a legally enforceable right. The enforceability of executive orders thus would depend on the existence of a right and that too a legal right. 44. The case of Mamta Anurag Sharma (supra) deserve special attention since apparently, it appears to be a case of transfer of a member of All India service, but it has to be considered in the light of the statute dealing with the members of All India Services. The matter pertains allotment of cadre in Indian Police Service. Smt. Mamta Anurag Sharma joined Indian Police Service (hereinafter referred to as “IPS” in short) on 1.9.1982 and was allotted West Bengal cadre of IPS, though her home State was Andhra Pradesh. In the year 1985, she got married to Mr. Anurag Sharma who was also an IPS officer in Andhra Pradesh Cadre. After marriage, Smt. Mamta requested for change of her cadre from West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh on the ground of marriage with a IPS officer of Andhra Pradesh cadre. This request was rejected. Later on both were transferred to IPS cadre of Karnataka by order dated 2.2.1994. Some officers of Karnataka cadre objected to that order and filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Bangalore challenging the aforesaid allocation to Karnataka cadre. The order was stayed by the Tribunal. Thereafter, the Government of Karnataka withdrew its concurrence to the allocation of Smt. Mamta Sharma and her husband to IPS cadre Karnataka. The Government of India sought further option from Smt. Mamta Sharma and her husband, but they declined to indicate any other option and insisted for change in IPS cadre from West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh. Thereafter, the Government of Karnataka withdrew its concurrence to the allocation of Smt. Mamta Sharma and her husband to IPS cadre Karnataka. The Government of India sought further option from Smt. Mamta Sharma and her husband, but they declined to indicate any other option and insisted for change in IPS cadre from West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh. The Government of India by order dated 10.3.1998 permitted transfer of husband of Smt. Mamta Sharma from Andhra Pradesh to West Bengal. But this order was declined by Sri Anurag Sharma. Smt. Mamta Sharma filed an Original Application before the Tribunal at Hyderabad contending that she ought to have been transferred to Andhra Pradesh IPS cadre but application was rejected by the Tribunal on 15.9.1999. The High Court, however, in the writ petition filed by Smt. Mamta Sharma directed the Central Government to consider her request for transfer to Andhra Pradesh and it is this order of the High Court, which was taken in appeal by the Union of India. The Apex Court found that the High Court’s direction was contrary to the policy of the Government of India regarding inter-cadre transfer of All India Service which prohibit transfer of spouse to their home State and, thus, set aside the jdugment of the High Court. Here was not a case of a transfer of a Government servant in his own cadre in a routine manner. 45. It would be necessary to notice at this stage that the members of Indian Police Service are governed by the provisions of All India Services Act, 1951 and various rules and regulations framed thereunder. Though it is an all India service and appointing authority of a member of All India Service is President of India but Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “Cadre Rules, 1954” ) constitute State level cadres of the members of Indian Police Service. After appointment in the service, every officer is allocated a particular State cadre where he remains throughout his service career and all his matter of seniority, promotion etc. are governed in that very State cadre only. After appointment in the service, every officer is allocated a particular State cadre where he remains throughout his service career and all his matter of seniority, promotion etc. are governed in that very State cadre only. Once an officer is allotted a particular State cadre, his transfer from one place to another can be made by the State Government concerned in that very State but if he is posted outside the State, despite of he being a member of All India Service, even the Central Government suo moto cannot do so unless the consent is given by the concerned State, the cadre whereof the officer belong. Therefore a particular cadre allotted to a number of All India Police Service becomes his real cadre in service. Change of cadre under the rules is permitted and it required consent of not only the concerned State where the officer concerned is working but also of that State where the officer concerned seeks his/her transfer and also the consent of the officer concerned. This is all provided in Cadre Rules, 1954. For effecting such change in the cadre consistent with the scheme of the Rules, the Government of India has issued executive orders laying down certain conditions wherein such change of cadre can normally be allowed. It is not a case where the incumbent has no legally enforceable right inasmuch without the consent of the officer concerned, his cadre cannot be changed suo moto by the Central Government. A member of Indian Police Service has an enforceable right to continue in the cadre in which he was allotted at the time of appointment and if any change is made therein, contrary to the rules, he can challenge the same on the ground that he is entitled to continue in the cadre. Therefore, right to continue in a cadre of a member of IPS is a legal right and in that matter, if any executive order or policy decision has been taken, which affect or support the right of the concerned Government servant in one or the other manner, the same can be enforced and the authorities may be directed to adhere to the same. However that would not help a case where the incumbent has no right to the place of the posting and the same can be changed by the Government without any intervention or consent of the Government servant concerned. 46. However that would not help a case where the incumbent has no right to the place of the posting and the same can be changed by the Government without any intervention or consent of the Government servant concerned. 46. No authority of this Court or the Apex Court has been placed before me which has considered this question in the matter of transfer and has taken a different view and is binding on me. In the absence of any otherwise binding precedent, I feel myself bound to follow the law laid down by the Apex Court in Shilpi Bose (supra), S.L. Abbas (supra), Gobardhan Lal (supra) etc. and this Court’s Division Bench judgments as discussed above. 47. The matter can be considered from another angle. Here is a case dealing with transfer of a member of the police force. The transfer of the members of police force is governed by the provisions made in the Police Regulations. The service conditions of petitioners are admittedly governed by the provisions of Police Act, 1861 (hereinafter referred to as “1861 Act”) and rules and regulations framed thereunder. Considering the provisions of 1861 Act, this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29506 of 2009 (Ashok Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P. and others) and other connected matters decided on 9.6.2009 in para 22 of the judgment has found that the terms “police officer” includes a “constable”. This is also evident from Regulations 397 and 398 which shows that the Officers of police force are divided in two categories namely Gazetted Officers and Non-gazetted Officers and the said provision reads as under : “397. The gazetted officers of the Force are— 1. Inspector-General. 2. Deputy Inspectors-General. 3. Superintendents. 4. Assistant Superintendents. 5. Deputy Superintendent. 398. The non-gazetted officers of the Force are- 1. Inspectors. 2. Sub-Inspectors. 3. Head Constables. 4. Constables.” 48. Chapter XXXIV of Police Regulations contains Regulations 520 to 526 and deals with transfer of police officers. It would be necessary to reproduce the same as under : “520. Transfer of Gazetted officers are made by the Governor in Council. The Inspector General may transfer police officers not above the rank of inspector throughout the province. 4. Constables.” 48. Chapter XXXIV of Police Regulations contains Regulations 520 to 526 and deals with transfer of police officers. It would be necessary to reproduce the same as under : “520. Transfer of Gazetted officers are made by the Governor in Council. The Inspector General may transfer police officers not above the rank of inspector throughout the province. The Deputy Inspector General of Police of the range may transfer inspectors, sub-inspectors, head constables and constables, within his range; provided that the postings and transfers of inspectors and reserve sub-inspectors in hill stations will be decided by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Headquarters. Transfers which result in officers being stationed far from their homes should be avoided as much as possible. Officers above the rank of constable should ordinarily not be allowed to serve in districts in which they reside or have landed property. In the case of constables the numbers must be restricted as far as possible. Sub-inspectors and head constables should not be allowed to stay in a particular district for more than nine years and ten years respectively and in a particular police station not more than three years and five years respectively. In the Tarai area (including the Tarai and Bhabar Estates) the period of stay of sub-inspectors, head constables and constables should not exceed five years. 521. The Inspector-General may, without the sanction of Government— (a) transfer to— (i) foreign service within the province other than to service in an Indian State, and (ii) another department of Provincial Government, any Government servant whom he can without reference to Government appoint or transfer in the ordinary course of administration and may also fill any post so vacated by promotion and enlistment when necessary. (b) and subject to the same restrictions as in clause (a) transfer as Government servant to a temporary appointment outside the province for a period not exceeding two years in the first instance and may extend the period of such temporary transfer up to a period of two years. 522. The Superintendent when proposing a transfer from the district should send the character and service roll of the officer to be transferred. With the consent of the Superintendents concerned mutual exchanges may be arranged by head constables or constables. The proposed exchanges shall be reported to the Deputy Inspector General. Travelling allowance will not be payable on the occasion of such transfers. 523. With the consent of the Superintendents concerned mutual exchanges may be arranged by head constables or constables. The proposed exchanges shall be reported to the Deputy Inspector General. Travelling allowance will not be payable on the occasion of such transfers. 523. On receipt of an order of transfer of a subordinate officer to another district the Superintendent will arrange to relieve him of his duties within ten days. Officers transferred are entitled to joining time, but the Superintendent may not grant leave to an officer under order of transfer. An inspector relieved on transfer from another district is entitled to sign a certificate of taking over charge from the date of arrival in the new district. If the officers to be relieved cannot be present at headquarters, the charge certificate should be signed for him by the Superintendent of Police, or, in his absence, by an Assistant Superintendent of Police or Deputy Superintendent of Police. The effect of this will be that an officiating officer will be considered to have been reverted, and permanent incumbent’s joining time or leave or discharge, will be counted from the date on which the relieving officer takes over charge. 524. The Superintendent may, within his district, transfer all officers of and below the rank of inspector. In the case of inspectors and officers in charge of police stations, he must before passing orders obtain the approval of the District Magistrate. Should the District Magistrate, and Superintendent of Police be unable to agree in regard to the transfer of any officer, the matter may be referred to the Deputy Inspector General of range for decision: Provided that in the district where the Collector/Deputy Commissioner is Collector/Deputy Commissioner-in-charge of the Division, his functions under this sub-paragraph will be exercised by the Additional District Magistrate (Executive). Officers-in-charge of police stations shall ordinarily be retained in their charges for at least two years. Subordinate officers at police stations should not be transferred without good reason. No officer liable to station duty shall be withdrawn from that duty for a longer period than one year, except in Kumaun where the withdrawal of head constable for two years at a time from station duties is permitted. 525. Constable of less than two years’ service may be transferred by the Superintendent of Police from the armed to the civil police or vice versa. 525. Constable of less than two years’ service may be transferred by the Superintendent of Police from the armed to the civil police or vice versa. Foot Police constables may be transferred to the mounted police at their own request. Any civil police constable of more than two and less than ten years’ service may be transferred to the armed police and vice versa by the Superintendent for a period not exceeding six months in any one year. All armed police constables of over two years’ service and civil police constables of over two and under ten years’ service may be transferred to the other branch of the force for any period with the permission of the Deputy Inspector General. In all other cases the transfer of police officers from one branch of the force to another or from the police service of other Provinces to the Uttar Pradesh Police requires the sanction of the Inspector General. 526. Village chaukidars may not be transferred except with their own consent.” 49. The Apex Court in Jasveer Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (2) ADJ 484 (SC) has held that Regulations 525 Chapter XXXIV of the Police Regulations are statutory. Following the decision in Jasveer Singh (supra) this Court in Jay Narayan Prasad v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (5) ESC 3052 : 2008 (9) ADJ 267 held in para 56 that all the provision under Chapter XXXIV are statutory being part and parcel of the same Chapter in the Police Regulations. Para 66 of the judgment in Jay Narayan Prasad (supra) reads as under : “66. In Jasveer Singh (supra) the Apex Court held Regulation 525 statutory. Since Regulation 525 is a part and parcel of Chapter XXXIV of the Regulations which deals with “transfer” it cannot be said that only one part of Chapter is statutory and not rest of the provisions. In my view, therefore, all the provisions under Chapter XXXIV are statutory in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Jasveer Singh (supra).” 50. In my view, therefore, all the provisions under Chapter XXXIV are statutory in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Jasveer Singh (supra).” 50. Without diluting the provisions of Chapter XXXIV of the Police Regulations, in order to save the members of police force, the Apex Court in Prakash Singh (supra), in para 31 (5) observed that there shall be a Police Establishment Board which shall decide all transfers, postings, promoting and other service matters relating to the officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. It is evident from the impugned order of transfers that the directions of the Apex Court in Prakash Singh (supra) have been observed and the petitioners have been transferred after a decision has been taken by the Police Establishment Board for their transfer. In view of the existing statutory provisions, can it be said that an executive order can empower any another authority to affect the discretion of the competent authority under the rules to decide whether a particular police officer of subordinate rank should be transferred or not and can such an executive instruction would be binding and will it not amount to give overriding effect to an executive order over the statutory provisions. It is well settled that an executive instruction or order cannot prevail over statutory provision and has to be sub surveyed thereto. Besides, if a power or discretion has been conferred upon a particular authority under the rules, the same cannot be required to depend upon the orders or directions of another authority and that too by means of an executive order. Considering from that angle, if I try to impress upon the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 over and above the statutory rules under Chpater XXXIV of the Police Regulations, apparently to me it appears to be inconsistent thereto and, therefore, would be inoperative being ultra vires. However, the vires of the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 may not be necessary to be considered in this case since there is another more substantial question up for consideration is whether the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 is applicable to the members of police force at all. I would consider both these aspects separately. 51. However, the vires of the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 may not be necessary to be considered in this case since there is another more substantial question up for consideration is whether the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 is applicable to the members of police force at all. I would consider both these aspects separately. 51. From the facts stated in the writ petition itself, it is also evident that whenever an executive decision was taken by the Government in respect to police officers of subordinate rank, a Government Order was issued clearly mentioning that the decision has been taken in supercession of the provisions contained in the Police Regulations and it further provides to take steps for making amendment in the Police Regulations. From a perusal of the Government Order dated 7.2.1980 (Page 38 of the writ petition) it is evident and para 5 of the said Government Order shows that a direction was issued to make a proposal to the Home Department for making appropriate amendment in the Regulations. Similarly, the Government Order dated 27.6.1984 which seeks to make some amendment in the earlier Government Order dated 7.2.1980 also provides in para 3 thereof that proposal for making appropriate amendment in the Police Regulations should be made. Whether the aforesaid Government Orders have resulted in amendment in the Regulations could not be shown by the learned counsel for the petitioners but the facts remains that these two Government Orders are evident to show that in the matter of the police officers of subordinate ranks, the Government Orders have been issued separately referring to the Police Regulations. Meaning thereby that in respect to members of subordinate rank of police officers, since they are governed by the provisions of 1861 Act, the matter has been dealt separately and their conditions of service have not been treated to be covered or governed by the rules and regulations applicable generally to the Government servants or the executive orders which are applicable to all other Government servants in general This is consistent to the law laid down by the Apex in Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla, AIR 2002 SC 2322 and by a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Vijay Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2004(4) ESC 2209 (All)(FB). 52. 52. The Government Order dated 25.3.1995 a copy whereof has been placed on record as Annexure-2 to the writ petition is also in similar line. In view of the above, the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 apparently can be said to be applicable to the members of the police force of subordinate rank, who are governed by the provisions of 1861 Act and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. 53. If the said Government Order is sought to apply to the police officers of subordinate rank as discussed above, that would be inconsistent with the provisions of Police Regulations and, therefore, would be ultra vires to that extent and cannot be applied even otherwise. 54. I may also consider this aspect by analysing various Regulations. Regulation 520 provides that all gazetted officers are transferable by the Government. The police officers upto the rank of Inspector throughout the province can be transferred by the Inspector General. Learned Standing Counsel pointed out and as admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Inspector General, as it then was, is now Director General of Police since the power of Inspector General is now restricted to a Police Zone concerned and not the entire State of U.P. Similarly, Deputy Inspector General of Police within his range can transfer the police officers of subordinate rank. For the time being, I am not taking specific cases provided under Rule 520 of the Police Regulations since for my purpose, the general description of the rules would be suffice. Regulation 524 empowers a Superintendent of Police to transfer a police officer below the rank of Inspector within a District. In respect to the Inspectors and officers- In-charge of a Police Station, the Superintendent of Police within his District may transfer but before that he has to obtain approval of the District Magistrate since under the Police Regulations, District Magistrate is the authority principally responsible for criminal administration within the district. The aforesaid powers are statutory and do not admit of any interference of any other authority. Considering the nature of the service, it is well understandable. The aforesaid powers are statutory and do not admit of any interference of any other authority. Considering the nature of the service, it is well understandable. Within the zone, a Inspector General of Police is responsible for the administration of Police force and same is the position in respect to the Deputy Inspector General of Police posted in a range and Superintendent of Police and Senior Superintendent of Police in a district as the case may be as is evident from Section 4 of 1861 Act. If there is any disturbance or deficiency in of law and order situation etc. it is not only the individual lowest police officer in the rank would be responsible but even the officers in the hierarchy would be responsible. In order to ensure the law and order and proper administration, if higher authority finds transfer and posting of a police officer at a particular place necessary, under the statute he can be transferred by such an authority and so long as the decision is bona fide, I do not find as to how such exercise of power by such authority under the statute can be set at naught by referring to an executive order introducing a third authority. That would amount to interference in the discretion of the authority in exercise of statutory power on the basis of an executive order though not provided by the Statute. This would vitiate the executive order itself. It is well settled that an executive order cannot be enforceable if it is inconsistent with the statutory provisions. Similarly, a discretion conferred by a statute on a particular authority cannot be made dependent upon the direction and dictates of higher authorities by means of an executive order unless and until the statutory rules are amended. Such an inclusion of third, may be a higher authority, is impermissible as that would amount to enforcing executive order which are in the teeth of the statutory rules. Considering from this angle also, in my view, the Government Order dated 6.6.2009 cannot be enforced in the matter of members of police officers of subordinate rank whose matters of transfer are governed by the statutory rules contained in Chapter XXXIV of the Police Regulations. Moreover, the Apex Court has made it clear that the transfer of police officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police would be approved by a Police Establishment Board. Moreover, the Apex Court has made it clear that the transfer of police officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police would be approved by a Police Establishment Board. If the government Order dated 6.6.2009 is made applicable to the police force, that would also infringe the Apex Court’s decision in Prakash Singh (supra) since the very reason for giving such direction in Prakash Singh (supra) was to protect the members of police force of subordinate rank from political influence. 55. So far as the contention of the petitioners that only members of a particular caste have been transferred, suffice is to mention that each and every order is in respect to an individual petitioner. The petitioners have not stated that to how many orders of transfer have been issued and whether all such persons, who have been transferred belong to any particular caste. There is nothing to show that the transfers which have been effected are only that of a police offices of a particular caste and not otherwise. By simply collecting transfer orders of persons belong to a particular caste and filing a single writ petition challenging them collectively on the ground that the transfers of officers of only a particular caste have been effected would neither be proper nor would prove that the impugned orders of transfer have been issued only to victimize the police officers of subordinate rank of a particular caste. 56. Besides, the petitioners have also not placed relevant material on record to show as to what is strength of the police force in the State of U.P., what is the strength of the members of police force belong to the caste to which the petitioners belong etc. In the absence of adequate relevant on vague pleading, in my view, such a serious issue ought not to have been raised and it would not appropriate for this Court to adjudicate the same. 57. So far as the Government Orders dated 7.2.1980, 27.6.1984 and 25.3.1995 are concerned, as already noticed, I do not find that they resulted in amending the provisions of Police Regulations relating to transfer and unless the Police Regulations are amended, mere Government Orders would not result in amendment of the Police Regulations which are statutory in nature as held by the Apex Court in Jasveer Singh (supra). 58. 58. Lastly, so far as the plea pertaining to personal hardship is concerned, it is suffice to mention that now it is well settled that the issue of personal hardship, if any, must be raised by the employee concerned before the higher authorities in the department and it is for the departmental authorities to consider this aspect and take appropriate decision. This observation also apply to the petitioners’ complaint of mid session transfer inasmuch the judgments of the Apex Court in O. Karuppa Thevan (supra) has been considered by this Court in Gulzar Singh (supra) and this Court observed as under : “The case before the Hon’ble Apex Court pertains to education department and while granting indulgence clearly took into consideration the factum of absence of any urgent exigency of service in the case before it as is apparent from the following : “ We are of the view that in effecting transfer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent.” (Para-2)” “Even otherwise the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above case observed that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight. This shows that the matter is to be examined by the employer as to whether the transfer of an employee can be deferred till the end of the current academic session or not and not by the Court. The Court has neither any means nor sufficient material to assess as to whether there is any rule or urgency of administrative exigencies for necessitating immediate transfer or that such transfer can be deferred in a particular case. Therefore, the Hon’ble Single Judge has rightly allowed liberty to the petitioner-appellant to raise this grievance before the authority concerned by making a representation, who will consider and pass a reasoned order thereupon.” 59. So far as the last submission that the petitioner are petty members belong to the lowest rank of the police force and, therefore, should not be transferred, suffice is to mention that under the Regulations, the Constables are non gazetted officers and being members of a disciplined force, they hold a transferable post, liable to be transferred from one place to another in accordance with the rules. It is not the case of the petitioners that the transfer of the petitioners is in violation of statutory rules. It is not the case of the petitioners that the transfer of the petitioners is in violation of statutory rules. No pleading of mala fide has been raised. It is also not the case that the authority concerned, who has issued the order is not competent to pass the order under the rules. Hence, I do not find any reason which may warrant interference in the orders of transfer of the petitioners. However, if the petitioners have any grievance on account of personal hardship etc., it is always open to the petitioners to approach higher authorities by making representation and this Court hope and trust that if any such representation is made, the competent authority would consider the same sympathetically and pass appropriate order. 60. In the result, in view of above discussions and observations, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. ————