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2009 DIGILAW 3306 (MAD)

Captain S. Dinakar v. Ms. Parvathi Subramanian

2009-08-24

S.PALANIVELU

body2009
Judgment : The petitioner is the tenant under the respondent. The respondent filed R.C.O.P.No.1659 of 2006 on the file of the XII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai for eviction and the same was allowed on 21. 2008 granting two months time for vacating the premises. The petitioner carried the matter in appeal in R.C.A.No.391 of 2008 on the file of VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai and the appeal suffered dismissal on 24. 2009. 2. Thereafter, for the purpose of filing the appeal, the petitioner filed copy application on 6. 2009. The certified copies of the appellate Courts order and decree were made ready on 26. 2009. He filed the Civil Revision Petition on 27. 2009. From the date of filing of the copy application till the date of filing of the revision before Court, there is a time gap of seventy two (72) days. Thirty (30) days has been prescribed in the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act for preferring appeal under Section 25(1) of the Act. Section 25 (2) allows further period of one month enabling the aggrieved party in the Rent control appeal to prefer revision before the High Court. But in this case, even after exhausting the period under Section 25(2) of the Act, there remains 12 days of delay. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. L. Thiyagiya would submit that the petitioner is pilot in aircraft, that he has to ply the flight from India to other foreign countries and in view of his schedule, he could not present the revision petition in time and the delay in filing the same is not wanton but on bona fide reason. He further submits that on equitable grounds this Court may consider condoning the delay in taking to the merits of the case. He also submits that he has also got good defence in the matter and that the matter and that the short period of delay may not be allowed to stand in the way to get the relief. 4. Conversely, Mr. He also submits that he has also got good defence in the matter and that the matter and that the short period of delay may not be allowed to stand in the way to get the relief. 4. Conversely, Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that it is well settled that the period prescribed by a special statute cannot at all be extended by Court in any account and it is the view of Court and settled law by the Apex Court and that as far as Section 25 of the Act is concerned, there cannot be any extension of time for preferring the revision before the High Court after expiry of sixty (60) days. Section 25 of the Act reads thus – (1) The High Court may, on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority, call for and examine the record of the Appellate Authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. (2) Every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates is communicated to the applicant: Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time specified in this sub section. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner place reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court Irene v. V.S. Venkataraman 2002 (1) CTC 631 in which Their Lordships were pleased to hold that while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, the Court may call for the record of the appellate authority and satisfy itself as to the legality of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein. 6. 6. Taking advantage of the findings contained therein, the learned counsel would also contend that the powers of this Court under Section 25 is plenary and this Court may exercise the jurisdiction on the point of limitation. His arguments could not be countenanced for the reason that the above said decision does not deal with the powers of the Court in extending the period of limitation while the same is prescribed in a special statute. 7. The learned senior counsel for the respondent places much reliance upon a decision of Supreme Court India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani AIR 2003 SC 2084 : (2003) 9 SCC 393 : (2003) 1 MLJ 98, wherein on discussion under Section 25 of the Act, their Lordships have elaborately dealt with the import of the provisions, taking into account Sections 12 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The operative portion of the judgment on the subject goes thus at p. 102 of MLJ: "11. So far as the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, the power of the Court to extend the prescribed period of limitation on the ground of availability of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, stands circumscribed by the limitation imposed on the power of the High Court by the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 25 of the Act. The discretionary power to condone the delay in filing the revision can be exercised for condoning any delay which does not exceed one month over and above the period liable to excluded from computing the period of limitation by reference to Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act". 8. A decision of this Court has been cited by the respondent side which is Pattanswami v. Amirtha Jothi (1997) 1 MLJ 435 : (1997) 1 L.W. 603 in which Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, (as His Lordship then was) while dealing with an identical situation under Section 25(2) of the Act, has categorically held that there is no question of extending the period of thirty (30) days limitation contained in the Act and if any revision is filed out of time, it could not be entertained. The following is the conclusion of this Court at p. 437 of MLJ: "13. The following is the conclusion of this Court at p. 437 of MLJ: "13. From a reading of Section 25(2) of the Act, it is clear that every revision petition under this Act shall be preferred to this Court within one month from the date on which the order was communicated to the petitioner and the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act empowers the High Court in its discretion to allow a further period not exceeding one month from the date of any such application. In the instant case, the time for filing the revision expired on 15. 1996, which was during the Summer Vacation of this Court. Therefore, under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, the revision petition should have been filed on the day when the Court reopened on 6. 1996 when it would be well within time. This however, will not have the effect of extending the period of thirty days of limitation upto 16. 1996 as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. If this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the petitioner will have the double advantage of extended period of limitation for filing the revision on the day when Court re-opens after Summer Vacation under Section 4 of the Limitation Act when the period of limitation expired during the vacation of the Court, and again filing a petition under the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act, showing the discretionary power of the High Court to allow a further time of one month from date of re-opening of the Court after vacation". 9. Following the decision of the Supreme Court as well as the earlier view taken by this Court on Section 25(1) and (2) of the Act, it is held that no question of extending the time for limitation to file a revision before this Court would arise after the expiry of sixty (60) days and it is also not out of place to mention that no equitable grounds could be considered in this regard. This Court is of the considered view that the Civil Revision is not maintainable and hence it has to be rejected. 10. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is rejected. The connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.