JUDGMENT : J.M. MALIK, J. (CHAIRPERSON) 1. On 29th August, 2006 State Bank of India, original applicant, moved an application for substitution of Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. in its place. Mr. S.K. Gupta appeared on behalf of the respondents including Vee Aar Polymers Pvt. Ltd., which has been arrayed as respondent No. 1 in this appeal. Mr. S.K. Gupta sought time for filing objection against the said application. The case was adjourned to 19th October, 2006. On 19th October, 2006 Counsel for the defendants moved an application for adjournment. The case was adjourned on 20th December, 2006. From 20th December, 2006 the matter was adjourned to 13th March, 2007 for disposal of substitution application and for the orders. On 13th March, 2007 ten days time was granted to the defendants for filing objections against substitution application. The case was adjourned on 24th April, 2007. 2. On 24th April, 2007 the learned DRT allowed the substitution application. Its relevant extract is reproduced as follows: Substitution application dated 29th August, 2006 of the applicant Bank is allowed as the learned Counsel for the defendants has no objection. 3. On 19th July, 2007 and again on 18th September, 2007, 29th November, 2007 and 24th January, 2008 the Presiding Officer was not available as he was either on leave or had left for official tours. 4. On 18th August, 2008, Mr. S.K. Gupta, Counsel for the defendants was present and he moved an application for adjournment. The defendants also filed Vakalatnama on behalf of Mr. Salabh Singh, Advocate. No written statement was filed till then. The defendants were directed to file written statement within 15 days. The case was adjourned for final arguments on 29th October, 2008. On 24th October, 2008 the application Bank submitted an application to close the opportunity to file written statement by the defendants. On 29th October, 2008 the case was adjourned to 5th January, 2009 due to resolution passed by the Bar Association, DRT as the bar went on strike. 5. The defendants moved an application dated 1st October, 2008 under the caption "Application under Section 19 (25) of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 read with Section 12(7) of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993 for a clarification". 5. The defendants moved an application dated 1st October, 2008 under the caption "Application under Section 19 (25) of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 read with Section 12(7) of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993 for a clarification". It was further stated underneath the said caption: this application is on the premise that proceedings before your honour are judicial proceedings vide Section 22(3) and the principle of natural justice applies de rigour and, therefore, comprehensive adjudication on the subject of assignment and clarification is required, notwithstanding observation made in the order-sheet entry dated 24th April, 2007. Other averments are as follows: Mr. S.K. Gupta did not make any statement giving the aforesaid consent. He was not instructed by the defendants to make such a statement. The defendants also pleaded ignorance of law in regard to the matter of substitution. Even if it was a mistake on part of the Counsel, that has to be ignored. The said application was moved through Mr. Salabh Singh, Advocate. 6. Vide impugned order dated 2nd April, 2009 the said application was permitted by the order of the learned DRT. The relevant extract of the impugned order is reproduced as under: It is on record that the defendants were represented by the learned Counsel Mr. S.K. Gupta at that time. Today at the time of hearing of this application. Learned Counsel Mr. S.K. Gupta is present in the Tribunal who categorically informed that he had not given any consent to allow the substitution application. On specific inquiry that if he had not given any consent then how it is recorded in the order. The learned Counsel replied that under some confusion he might have stated no objection which was treated as the consent on the substitution application by this Tribunal. During the course of arguments learned Counsel Mr. Salabh Singh on behalf of the defendants stated that the Advocate Mr. S.K. Gupta representing the defendants had not given consent. Moreover client should not suffer for the mistake of an Advocate. He also referred the views of the Hon'ble Apex Court on this issue. I have examined the facts and circumstances of the case and also the legal issue raised by the learned Counsel of both the sides. S.K. Gupta representing the defendants had not given consent. Moreover client should not suffer for the mistake of an Advocate. He also referred the views of the Hon'ble Apex Court on this issue. I have examined the facts and circumstances of the case and also the legal issue raised by the learned Counsel of both the sides. I observed that the substitution application was allowed on the basis of the consent of the learned Advocate who himself is now denying the same stating that he has not given any consent. There is nothing on record in black and white to prove the consent of the Advocate. Further, I appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the defendants Mr. Salabh Singh that there are certain legal and technical issues involved in the substitution which have not been considered by this Tribunal. It is true that the application was simply allowed on the basis of the consent and those issues remained undecided. I have also examined the contention of the learned Counsel Mr. D.K. Pathak that the application amounts to the review of the order which is highly time-barred. In view of the circumstances of the case I am prepared to take a lenient view with regard to the limitation as the application has been moved under Section 19(25) of RDDBFI Act, 1993 which provides that the Tribunal may pass such orders as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to secure the ends of justice. In the instant case I find that the impugned order was passed on the basis of the consent stated to be given by the Advocate who has emphatically denied the same I am of the opinion that to meet the ends of justice the party should not suffer for the mistake if any of the Advocate more specially in the instant case the defendants should not suffer for the consent given by the Advocate, if any. 7. I have heard the Counsel for the parties. Counsel for the respondents made the following submissions. The delay was caused due to convenience of the Court itself. The Court itself adjourned the case because the learned DRT was looking after the cases pending in Lucknow and Allahabad as well as Jabalpur. Consequently, he was not available at Lucknow on all the above said dates of hearing. Counsel for the respondents made the following submissions. The delay was caused due to convenience of the Court itself. The Court itself adjourned the case because the learned DRT was looking after the cases pending in Lucknow and Allahabad as well as Jabalpur. Consequently, he was not available at Lucknow on all the above said dates of hearing. He argued that the matter of substitution is very serious matter and it has gone to the Apex Court. The Apex Court has not yet passed any order. He explained that Counsel for the appellant was ignorant about the prevalent position and it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Income-tax case that ignorance of law is an excuse. He has referred to an authority reported in Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh 118 I.T.R. 326 (SC). 8. He has also referred to another authority reported in Kaushal Deewan v. ITO 1983 (3) I.T.D. 432 wherein it was held: The old theory that ignorance of law is to an excuse does not hold good in view of complexities of laws in modern days. It is impossible for any one let alone well informed people to know all the technicalities of the law. 9. He has referred to the following authorities. Collector Land Acq. Mst. v. Mst. Kalizi 167 I.T.R. 471 (S.C.); Concord of India v. Nirmala Devi 118 I.T.R. 507 (S.C.); C.I.T. v. U.P. Shoe Industries 235 I.T.R. 663 (All.); S.B. Samgar Sons v. ITAT 58 I.T.R. 626 (All.); Smart (P) Ltd. v. ITAT 182 I.T.R. 384 (Del); Champa Lal Chopra v. State of Rajasthan 257 I.T.R. 74 (Raj.); CIT v. Ramesh Chandra Modi 249 I.T.R. 323 (Raj.); CWT v. Chiranji Lal Agarwal 140 I.T.R. 687 (Ori); L.C. Java v. R.G. Nitsure : 132 ITR 631 (Bom.); Mahaweer Pd. v. CIT 172 I.T.R. 331 (M.P.); C.I.T. v. India Capacitors Ltd. 180 I.T.R. 641 (Cal.); C.I.T. v. Ram Krishna Devi 84 I.T.R. 94 (All.); ITO v. S.B. Singer Singh & Sons 75 I.T.R. 646 (All.); C.I.T. v. Darshan Talkies 217 I.T.R. 744 (M.P.); Kotak Mahindra Bank v. State of U.P. (All.) (Lko. Bench) W.P. 620 (M/S) 2009; Kotak Mahindra Bank v. State of U.P. W.P. 2358 M/S 2009 (All. LKO); Kotak Mahindra Banks. State of UP., Sp. App. 344 of 2009 (All. Bench) W.P. 620 (M/S) 2009; Kotak Mahindra Bank v. State of U.P. W.P. 2358 M/S 2009 (All. LKO); Kotak Mahindra Banks. State of UP., Sp. App. 344 of 2009 (All. Lko); ICICI Bank v. APS Star (S.C.); Kotak Mahindra Bank v. APS Star and 19 Ors. (Guj.) 05 Appeal No. 156 of 2007; ITAT v. V.K. Agarwal 235 I.T.R. 175 (S.C.); UOI v. Paras Laminates P. Ltd. 186 I.T.R. 722 (S.C.); N.T.P.C. v. C.I.T. 229 I.T.R. 383 (S.C.); Arunachalam Mutthu v. State Bank of India W.P. No. 11080/2008. 10. In these authorities it was held that the bona fide mistake on part of the Counsel is reason to condone the laches. The applicant cannot be made to suffer for negligence of Counsel assignment has not been accepted by the Court. The Court also dismissed the assignment due to improper stamp duty. The jurisdiction of the High Court is binding. The Tribunal can rectify its own order by recall and hear afresh on merits. 11. On the other hand Counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the application for clarification is not maintainable. He explained that no request for review or recall or setting aside the order/of the learned DRT dated 24th April, 2007 was moved. The impugned order was illegally reviewed after the elapse of 18 months. It was argued that no written statement has been filed up till now. Counsel for the appellant has also invited my attention towards an authority reported in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar (1997) 9 SCC 736 : (1997) CLT 338 (SC); wherein it was held: It is salutary to note that the Court spends valuable time in deciding a case. Review petition is not, and should not be an attempt for hearing the matter again on merits. Unfortunately, it has become, in recent time, a practice to file such review petitions as a routine; that too, with change of Counsel, without obtaining consent of the Advocate-on-Record at earlier stage. This is not conducive to healthy practice of the Bar which has the responsibility to maintain the salutary practice of profession. In Review Petition No. 2670 of 1996 in CA No. 1867 of 1992, a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a member, had held as under: The record of the appeal indicates, that Mr. In Review Petition No. 2670 of 1996 in CA No. 1867 of 1992, a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a member, had held as under: The record of the appeal indicates, that Mr. Sudarsh Menon was the Advocate-on-Record when the appeal was heard and decided on merits. The review petition has been filed by Mr. Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing Counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. It is unknown on what basis he has written the grounds in the review petition as if it is rehearing of an appeal against our order. He did not confine to the scope of review. It would not be in the interest of the profession to permit such practice. That apart, he has not obtained 'No-objection Certificate' from the Advocate-on-Record in the appeal, in spite of the fact that Registry had informed him of the requirement or doing so. Filing of the 'No-objection Certificate' would be the basis for him to come on record. Otherwise, the Advocate-on-Record is answerable to the Court. The failure to obtain the 'No-objection Certificate' from the erstwhile Counsel has disentitled him to file the review petition. Even otherwise, the review petition has no merits. It is an attempt to reargue the matter on merits. On these grounds, we dismiss the review petition. 12. Learned Counsel for the appellant also cited the Apex Court's order passed in the case of ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Official Liquidator of APS Star Industry Ltd. in application for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 2240/2009 dated 16th February, 2009, wherein while staying the judgment passed by the Gujarat High Court, it was ordered that: Pending hearing and final disposal of the Special Leave Petitions, we further direct that any disbursement to secured creditors shall, where the debt stands assigned; be made to the assignees. This order will not be construed as an acceptance of the assignments pending the present Special Leave Petitions. Findings 13. The Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad in a case R.S. Sharma v. Union of India in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9908 of 2009 dated 26th May, 2009 was pleased: On behalf of the writ petitioner it is contended that the Gujarat High Court in O.J. Appeal No. 156 of 2007, Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. O.L. of APS Star Ind. The Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad in a case R.S. Sharma v. Union of India in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9908 of 2009 dated 26th May, 2009 was pleased: On behalf of the writ petitioner it is contended that the Gujarat High Court in O.J. Appeal No. 156 of 2007, Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. O.L. of APS Star Ind. Ltd. vide judgment dated 12th January, 2009 has held that such assignment in favour of Kotak Mahindra by the State Bank of India was legally not permissible. On the contrary, on behalf of the respondents it has been pointed out that the Delhi High Court, in the case of Haryana Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. IFCI Ltd. A.I.R. 2007 Del 65 has held that such an assignment was legal and valid. Counsel for the parties before this Court have further made a statement that the issue as to whether such assignment is permissible under law or not is engaging attention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition filed against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court, referred to above. Having heard Counsel for the parties and having gone through the records, I am of the considered opinion that the issue with regard to assignment being valid or not need not be examined by this Court at this stage of the proceedings and a right be reserved in favour of the petitioner to agitate the matter, as and when final orders are passed by the DRT, before the appropriate authority or to bring to the knowledge of the Tribunal the final order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, whenever it is so delivered. So far as the second application made by the petitioner qua restoration of the suit proceedings by the DRT when it was dismissed by the Civil Court is concerned, this issue is also left open for the petitioner to be agitated, after the final orders are passed on the Original/Transfer Application, before the Appellate Authority. I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner must file his written statement as have been permitted under various orders of the DRT, inasmuch as the proceedings cannot be permitted to be lingered for indefinite period. 14. I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner must file his written statement as have been permitted under various orders of the DRT, inasmuch as the proceedings cannot be permitted to be lingered for indefinite period. 14. It must be borne in mind that although I find considerable force in the argument urged by the Counsel for the respondents, yet the fact that the so called application for clarification was moved at a very late stage, cannot be glossed over. 15. The argument urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the delay was caused due to the fact that the Presiding Officer of Court was not available is of no consequence. It may be reiterated that application for substitution was filed as back as on 29th August, 2006. The respondents took dates from 19th October, 2006 to 20th December, 2006, 13th March, 2007 and 24th April, 2007 and gave the consent on 24th April, 2007. The appellant did not file written statement within 15 days from 24th April, 2007. Thereafter, although the learned DRT was not available, yet, no written statement was filed and no application for clarification was moved. There was no legal impediment in moving the application irrespective of the fact whether or not the Presiding Officer was available. The mistake was committed by the Advocate on 24th April, 2007. That mistake came to light by efforts made by another Advocate after the lapse of 18 months. 16. It must be borne in mind that the above said O.A. was filed on 28th July, 1998. The appellant has prayed for issuance of recovery certificate against respondent Nos. 1 to 5 to pay Rs. 32,82,875.33 plus pendente lite and future interest @ 17.30% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of filing of the original application till the full realisation, costs and other reliefs. 17. With the addition of interest the debt must have increased by leaps and bounds. The above said procrastinating tactic goes to depict that the respondents want to delay the case by one pretext or the other. 18. It must be borne in mind that at the time of argument before the learned DRT Mr. S.K. Gupta, the previous Counsel, was also present, as is apparent from the above quoted extract from the order of the learned DRT. 18. It must be borne in mind that at the time of argument before the learned DRT Mr. S.K. Gupta, the previous Counsel, was also present, as is apparent from the above quoted extract from the order of the learned DRT. The respondents should not suffer due to mistake on the part of their Counsel. The question of substitution is a knotty and contentious question. 19. Counsel for the respondents also argued that both the State Bank of India as well as Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. are represented by the same Advocate Mr. D.K. Pathak. I see no force in this argument because the claims of both the parties do not clash. 20. Under the circumstances, 1 follow the guidelines provided by the Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad in the above said case of R.S. Sharma v. Union of India and direct the respondents to file written statement under all the circumstances within eight weeks from the announcement of this order before the learned DRT, failing which the right to file written statement shall stand forfeited and the respondents will be at liberty to raise objection regarding assignments in their written statement. the matter of assignment be decided as per the above said guidelines provided by the Hon'ble High Court and the delay in moving the application for clarification is condoned subject to deposit of Rs. 2.00 lacs which would be adjustable towards the loan, if any, without prejudice to the rights of the parties. The said amount be deposited with the Registrar, DRT, Lucknow who will deposit the same in a Bank in the form of FDR, renewable after every six months. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the respondents are liable to pay nothing to the Bank, the said amount will be returned to the respondents. The parties are directed to appear before the learned DRT on 15th December, 2009. 21. It is also made clear that it will be the option of the SBI to get the case finally adjudicated without pressing the application for substitution at the final stage, if the Apex Court does not decide the case until the completion of the instant case. 22. Copies of this judgment be furnished to the parties as per law and another copy be also dispatched to the learned DRT forthwith. Ordered accordingly.