Judgment : N. Kirubakaran, J. This writ petition is filed to call for the records of the first respondent vide R.O.C.2A/2004-Con.B2 dated 15. 2006 and quash the same and direct the respondents to extend the petitioner’s service upto the age of 60 years. The facts of the case are as follows: 2. The petitioner was selected for the post of District Munsif by TNPSC in the year 1976 and he was appointed for the post of Rent Controller on 30.11.1977 and he served in the Court of Small Causes till 14. 1978. Subsequently, he served as District Munsif Dindigul from April 1978 to December 1979 and as Sub Judicial Magistrate, Ramanathapuram from December 1979 to May 1983. 3. The petitioner was posted as Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai from May 1983 to April 1986 and thereafter he was promoted as Subordinate Judge and posted as Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras and served there from April 1986 to April 1988. The petitioner thereafter was deputed to function in the post of Chairman, Taxation Appeals committee, Madurai Corporation from April 1988 to May 1991. Again, he was posted as Assistant Judge in the City Civil Court, Madras and served from Judge 1991 to May 1993 and thereafter he was transferred to Devakottai as Sub Judge and served as subordinate Judge at Ranipet from May 1993 to August 1993. Subsequently, he was posted as subordinate Judge at Ranipet from August 1993 to April 1995. He worked as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srivilliputhur from April 1995 to April 1997. 4. The petitioner was promoted as District Judge on 11. 1995 and the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate was upgraded as District Judge and he continued there till 30.4.1997 and thereafter he was posted as Presiding Officer, Labour Court from May 1997 to December 1999. 5. The petitioner, subsequently, was posted as Registrar, State Human Rights Commission, Chennai from December 1999 to September 2001. He served as Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate Kumbakonam at Thanjavur from September 2001 to April 2002 and subsequently, he worked as Principal District Judge, Thiruvannamalai from May 2002 to December 2003 and was transferred as Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Madras from February 2004 and retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation. He served as Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate Kumbakonam at Thanjavur from September 2001 to April 2002 and subsequently, he worked as Principal District Judge, Thiruvannamalai from May 2002 to December 2003 and was transferred as Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Madras from February 2004 and retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation. The petitioner was denied the benefits of extension of service till 60th year as per the Administrative decision of the High Court which was communicated to him as per R.O.C. 2A/2004-Con.B2 dated 11. 2004. The petitioner also filed an appeal and review petition before the Government and thereafter writ petitioner filed W.P. No.39845 of 2005 and W.P.No.39846 of 2005 challenging the validity of the amendment of the Fundamental Rules 56(1) made by the State Government. The writ petition W.P. No.39846 of 2005 was dismissed on 30.1.2006. W.P.No.39845 of 2005 was filed challenging the order of the first respondent dated 11. 2004 and consequent order of the first respondent dated 7. 2005 against the petitioner’s representation dated 16. 2005 issued to the petitioner and quash the same and direct the respondents to extend the petitioner’s service upto 60 years. 6. The main contention of the petitioner in the said writ petition was that he had good record and therefore, non extension of service of the petitioner beyond 58 is not in accordance with law with the decision of the Supreme Court All India Judges Association and Others v. Union of India and Others AIR 1993 SC 2493 . He further contended that the decision not to accord benefit of service upto 60 years of age is not based on any material and it was an arbitrary decision unfairly arrived at. 7. The first respondent filed a counter denying the contentions of the petitioner and stated that the case of the petitioner had been considered by the Full Court and it was decided not to extend the service of the petitioner beyond the age of 58 and such order was not arbitrary and does not call for any interference. The Division Bench of this Court heard the matter. The Division Bench called for the records and examined the service Bio-data, Confidential entries and the work done statement for the period of 1998-99, 2000-01 and 2002 and the medical certificate and details of leave taken and vigilance report. The Division Bench of this Court heard the matter. The Division Bench called for the records and examined the service Bio-data, Confidential entries and the work done statement for the period of 1998-99, 2000-01 and 2002 and the medical certificate and details of leave taken and vigilance report. After perusing the service records as stated above, the Division Bench noted that regarding Annual Confidential Report for the year 1998-2001 is concerned, the learned portfolio Judge made endorsement as follows: 1998 - Good 1999 - Satisfactory 2000 - not available October 2001 to 312. 2001 – satisfactory 1. 2002 to 30.4.2002 - satisfactory 35. 2002 to 312. 2002 – Current satisfactory Old-short fall in Civil Appeals The aforesaid adverse remark viz., short fall in Civil Appeals was communicated to petitioner. The endorsement in the report relating to 35. 2002 to 312. 2002 indicated that there was advocates boycott for 60 days and the officer was on earned leave for 17 days and on other duty for 9 days. 8. The Division Bench analyzing the service records observed that the decision not to extend the service of the petitioner had been taken during October 2004. However, the work done for the year 2003 was not placed for consideration. The Division Bench directed to re-examine the petitioner’s case by the appropriate committee as well as the Full Court. Paragraph 18, 19 and 20 of the Division Bench order dated 33. 2006 are as follows: “18. A Conspectus of the records, which had been placed before the Full Court, indicate that during the year 2002 there has been shortfall. However, the fact remains that there was advocates’ boycott for 60 days and the officer was on earned leave for 17 days and on other duty for 9 days. The entries relating to the earlier period do not indicate anything alarming against the officer. On the other hand, the entries for the year 1998 was good and the work done was much in excess and the entries for the year 1999 was also satisfactory and the norms had been more or less reached. Even for the year 2002, except the entry relating to short fall in the norms, other entries in the Annual Confidential Report indicate satisfactory. Nothing was available relating to the period of 2000 and major period of 2001 as the officer was discharging duty as Registrar of the State Human Rights Commission. Even for the year 2002, except the entry relating to short fall in the norms, other entries in the Annual Confidential Report indicate satisfactory. Nothing was available relating to the period of 2000 and major period of 2001 as the officer was discharging duty as Registrar of the State Human Rights Commission. The Confidential entries for the year 2003 and the work done for the year 2003 have not been considered. Therefore, the case of the petitioner was not considered for the full five years in terms of the guidelines dated 210. 1993. 19. Keeping in view these aspects, there appears to be sufficient justification in the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the question of permitting such officer to continue beyond 58 years perhaps requires a further consideration. If the entries and work done relating to the year 2003 would have been produced, it would be of some assistance to the Hon’ble Administrative Committee/Full Court. If nothing was available for the year 2000 and a major portion of 2001, the entries and the workdone statement for the previous years 1996 or 1997 could have also been assessed. If all these materials had been placed before the Administrative Committee, it could have helped the Administrative Committee in the decision making process. Except to state this we do not wish to state anything on merits of the claim of the petitioner as regards his service records. 20. In the above view of the matter, we feel interest of justice would be served if the question of extension of service of the petitioner beyond 58 years is re-examined by the Appropriate committee as well as the Full Court as expeditiously as possible.” 9. As per the Directions of the Division Bench, the Administrative Committee reconsidered the petitioner’s case along with Annual Confidential Report and the work done statement for the year 1996-97 of the writ petitioner. In the meeting held on 24. 2006 the following minutes were passed. “The performance of the officer, as far as the disposal of civil matters is concerned, is found to be below average and he is less than mediocre. His performance in judicial work is considered to be not satisfactory. In the meeting held on 24. 2006 the following minutes were passed. “The performance of the officer, as far as the disposal of civil matters is concerned, is found to be below average and he is less than mediocre. His performance in judicial work is considered to be not satisfactory. The decision taken already by the High Court is re-examined thoroughly, and considering the work-done statements and all other relevant records and overall performance of the officer concerned, it is resolved that he is found not fit to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years in public interest.” 10. The decision of the Administrative Committee was placed before the Full Court in the meeting held on 24. 2006 which accepted the recommendation of the Administrative Committee and decided not to continue the petitioner’s service beyond the age of superannuation at 58 years in public interest. The said decision was communicated to him by Official Memorandum issued in R.O.C.2A/2004-Con.B2 dated 15. 2006 against which only the present writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioner. 11. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner challenged the said order contending that only one line was written that in view of the public interest the petitioner is not fit to continue in service and there was no other reason mentioned in the impugned order and therefore, the impugned order is clearly contrary to the view of the earlier Division Bench judgment. The learned counsel further submitted that the rejection of the petitioner’s request by the Administrative Committee is without application of mind over the judgment passed by the Division Bench. In paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit, it has been mentioned that the writ petition has become infructuous, since the petitioner completed 60 years of age as on 30.11.2006. 12. We carefully considered the submissions made by both parties and perused the records. The earlier Division Bench directed reexamination of the petitioner’s case taking into consideration of the entries and the work done statement for the previous year i.e. 1996-97, as the previous Administrative Committee looked into the service records only from 1998 to 2002 and it was not in tune with the following norms and guidelines to be followed by the screening committee. (1) Confidential records of the Judicial Officer for the immediate last 5 years. (1) Confidential records of the Judicial Officer for the immediate last 5 years. (2) The statement of quantum of work turned out by the officer for the immediate last 5 years. 13. We have perused the confidential return statement and quantum of work turned out by the petitioner for the years 1996-97 and the same is extracted as follows: 1. 1996 to 18. 1996 “Satsifactory.” Sd/-T.J.C.J. /14. 1997 “Satisfactory.” Sd/-K.A.T.J. as A.C.J. 26. 1997 18. 1996 to 312. 1996 “Satisfactory” Sd/- M.K.V.J. 1. 1997 to 35. 1997 “Satisfactory” Sd/- M.K.V.J. “Seen, Satisfactory.” Sd/- N.K.J.J. as A.C.J. 14. 1999. 6. 1997 to 312. 1997 “Satisfactory” Norms Work Turnedout Shortfall Excess 6.S.C./AFT S.C.-48| - 14 A.S/per month 215 mcop S-43|91 - - A.S.-24 144 - Norms –Excess- 19 S.C. Shortfall- 144 A.S. Note:1. The officer has also disposed of 10 IPC & 13 Spl. Act Cases. 2. The Officer was other duty for 8 days 3. The officer was on Earned Leave for 5 days & on Medical Leave for 25 days. 1. 1997 to 35. 1997 as Addl. Dist. Judge-cum-Chief Judl. Magistrate, Srivilliputhur (5 Months) Work Turnedout Shortfall Excess S.C. – 7|63MCOPs eq.to – 13|20 10 -A.S-7 63 -Norms –Below. Note: 1. The Officer has also disposed of 1 IPC case; & 33 Spl. Act Cases. 2. The Officer was on other duty for 2 days. 3. The Officer was on Medical Leave for 5 days. 6. 1997 to 312. 1997 as Presiding Officer, I Addl. Labour Court, Chennai ( 7 months) Sd/S.M.S.J./211. 1998 1. 1996 to 312. 1996 as Addl.Dist.Judge-Cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srivilliputhur (12 Months) Norms Work Turnedout Shortfall Excess 10 I.D.IAFT ID-187 -117 20 CP I per month C.P.-230 - Norms-Above 14. The portfolio Judge found the performance of the Petitioner from the year 1. 1996 to 312. 1997 to be satisfactory. However, for the period from 1. 1996 to 312. 1996, there was a short fall of 144 cases in the civil side (A.S.) and there was excess of 19 SC (Criminal cases) for the period from 1. 1996 to 35. 1997. There was a short fall of 10 criminal cases and short fall of 63 A.S. (Civil cases). 15. As far as the period from 6. 1997 to 312. 1997 is concerned, there were excess of 117 criminal cases and 90 civil cases. 1996 to 35. 1997. There was a short fall of 10 criminal cases and short fall of 63 A.S. (Civil cases). 15. As far as the period from 6. 1997 to 312. 1997 is concerned, there were excess of 117 criminal cases and 90 civil cases. The aforesaid details would reveal even during 1996 and 1997, though the portfolio Judges observed as satisfactory there were short fall in both civil cases as well as criminal cases. Even there were short falls in the performance which was examined by the previous Division Bench, After taking into account the datas for the year 1996-97 the Administrative Committee passed the following minutes in the meeting held on 24. 2006. “The performance of the officer, as far as the disposal of civil matters is concerned, is found to be below average and he is less than mediocre. His performance in judicial work is considered to be not satisfactory. The decision taken already by the High Court is reexamined thoroughly, and considering the work-done statements and all other relevant records and overall performance of the officer concerned, it is resolved that he is found not fit to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years in public interest.” Hence, it cannot be said that the Administrative Committee did not apply its mind over the judgment passed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court on 312. 2006 in W.P.No.39845 of 2006 filed by the petitioner. The entries for 1996-97 do not help the petitioner. On the contrary, it only proved there was short fall in the disposal of cases by the petitions during that period. Hence, the contention of the petitioner in this regard is liable to be rejected. 16. Another contention of the petitioner is that the Administrative Committee did not give any reason for the petitioner’s request for extension of service is also without any substance as the Administrative Committee clearly stated that the petitioner’s disposal of civil matters was found to be below average and the petitioner was found to be less than mediocre and the petitioner’s performance in judicial work was considered to be not satisfactory. The administrative Committee’s minutes would also disclose that the overall performance of the officer was considered and the petitioner was found not fit to continue in service beyond 58 years in public interest. 17. The administrative Committee’s minutes would also disclose that the overall performance of the officer was considered and the petitioner was found not fit to continue in service beyond 58 years in public interest. 17. Moreover, there was allegation of corruption against the petitioner during 1999 and on discrete enquiry, no action was taken and again there was an allegation of corruption during 2001 also. However, it was recorded that no vigilance case was pending as on date. The Administrative Committee reconsidered the petitioner’s case. Subsequently, the Full Court of the High Court confirmed the opinion that the petitioner was not suitable to continue the service beyond the age of 58 years. 18. When the petitioner’s case was sent back to be re-considered by the Administrative Committee by the Division Bench, the same was considered by the Administrative Committee taking into account of the entries of the petitioner made during 1996-97 and consequently, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not fit to be given extension of service. The decision of the Administrative Committee was also approved by the Full Court. The challenge of the said decision by the petitioner is misplaced. All the materials were considered and the decision taken could not be said to be wrong and without any material particulars. It is not matter of right the petitioner could seek extension beyond service period and it is only subjective satisfaction of the Administrative Committee as approved by the full Court. It was already found by the Administrative Committee that his overall performance was found to be below average. These findings could not have been given without materials. The materials were very much available in the service records. Hence, in the absence of any ground to attack the impugned order, the petitioner has to fail. The Honourable Supreme Court in S.D. Singh v. Jharkand High Court through R.G. and Others AIR 2006 SC 670 : ( 2005 13 SCC 737 has held as follows: “13. It may be noted, at the outset, that the petitioner has not urged any grounds of mala fides. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the Evaluation Committee had taken into consideration the petitioner’s ACRs from 1976 to 1977, many of which showed that the petitioner was an average officer particularly in respect of the years immediately preceding the petitioner’s achieving the age of 58 years. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the Evaluation Committee had taken into consideration the petitioner’s ACRs from 1976 to 1977, many of which showed that the petitioner was an average officer particularly in respect of the years immediately preceding the petitioner’s achieving the age of 58 years. Additionally, it was noted that a vigilance proceeding had been initiated against the petitioner on the basis of several allegations made against him including a report made by the inspecting Judge who had made an inspection and had reported that the petitioner did not have a good reputation. However, it was also noted that as far as the allegation of the inspecting Judge was concerned, the matter was placed in the Standing Committee meeting and was ultimately dropped. Although the petitioner has denied the allegations on merits, he has not denied in response to the counter-affidavit that such a vigilance case was in fact pending, in the circumstance’s it cannot be said that there was no material on the basis of which the Evaluation Committee and subsequently, the Full Court of the High Court formed the opinion that the petitioner was not suitable for continuing in service beyond the age of 58 years.” In view of the aforesaid judgment also, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 19. The petitioner’s case was considered twice by the Administrative Committee and confirmed by the Full Court. All the materials were taken into consideration and based on that only the decision was taken. There was neither procedural violation nor non consideration of records. Hence, three is no perversity in the order. If the higher judiciary consistently and continuously comes to the same conclusion regarding extension of service of the petitioner and the same cannot be questioned. There is no right of extension available to the petitioner. It is only subjective satisfaction of the High Court and it is not automatic. 20. Under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has got control over the Subordinate Courts including District Courts. Article 235 is extracted as follows: “235. There is no right of extension available to the petitioner. It is only subjective satisfaction of the High Court and it is not automatic. 20. Under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has got control over the Subordinate Courts including District Courts. Article 235 is extracted as follows: “235. Control over subordinate Courts- The control over district Courts and Courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law” 21. It has been decided by the Apex Court, in the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh and Another AIR 2003 SC 1029 : (2003) 4 SCC 239 ) : (2003) 2 MLJ 24, that it is beyond any pale of controversy that the control over the subordinate Courts within the meaning of Article 235 of the Constitution of India is that of the High Court. Such control of the High Court includes general superintendence of the working of the subordinate Courts, disciplinary control over the Presiding Officers, disciplinary proceedings, transfer, confirmation and promotion and appointment etc. Such control vested in the High Court is complete. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and Another AIR 1998 SC 1079 : (1998) 3 SCC 72 : (1998) 3 MLJ 11 : 1999-1-LLJ-885, held as follows at p. 18 of MLJ: “36. This article shows that the High Court has to exercise its administrative judicial and disciplinary control over the member of the Judicial Service of the State. This article shows that the High Court has to exercise its administrative judicial and disciplinary control over the member of the Judicial Service of the State. The word “Control”, referred to in this article, is used in a comprehensive sense to include general superintendence of the working of the subordinate Courts, disciplinary control over the Presiding Officers of the subordinate Courts and to recommend the imposition of punishment of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank or compulsory retirement, “Control” would also include suspension of a member of the Judicial Services for purposes of holding a disciplinary enquiry, transfer, confirmation and promotion.” 23. It is the duty of the High Court to keep a control over the Subordinate Judiciary. It has got discretion to extend the services of the judicial officers who are found to be good in service based on their performance and personal records. It is being done only in the interest of public. The High Court has got public responsibility to discharge its function by having honest and efficient judicial officers. 24. The contention of the first respondent that the service records for the year 2003 was not made ready is to be rejected. We are in 2009. Even after 5 years, the service datas and work done datas of the petitioner are not made ready. It only demonstrates that there is a lapse on the part of the first respondent. The lapse would definitely invite criticism. In any event the service records, annual confidential reports regarding 1996 and 1997 of the petitioner were looked into by the Administrative Committee and therefore, the lapse on the part of the first respondent would not vitiate the proceedings. 25. As far as the plea of the first respondent in the counter affidavit that writ petition has become infructuous is concerned, it has to be negatived. If this Court comes to the conclusion that the order of the first respondent is vitiated or not valid in law, then the petitioner could be given the terminal benefits as if he was in service up to 60 years. This kind of too technical plea cannot be allowed to be taken by the first respondent. 26. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.