JUDGMENT Devi Prasad Singh, J.—Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred against the impugned judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal (in short hereinafter referred as Tribunal) whereby the Tribunal had dismissed the original application with regard to petitioner’s claim for appointment on compassionate ground. The brief matrix of the case is summarized hereinafter. 2. The petitioner’s father late Shri Sahaj Ram was working on the post of Postmen in the Head Post Office, Barabanki died in-harness on 16.8.2002 because of heart attack. According to petitioner’s counsel petitioner belongs to scheduled caste category. Late Shri Sahaj Ram is survived by five family members. According to certificate dated 17.2.2003 issued by the office of District Magistrate, Barabanki, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition, the dependants of late Shri Sahaj Ram are as under : (1) Smt. Dharmawati alias Sundra—Wife aged about 57 years. (2) Awadhesh Kumar—Son aged about 28 years. (3) Manoj Kumar—Son aged about 24 years. (4) Mukesh Kumar—Son aged about 21 years. (5) Km. Nidhi—Minor daughter aged about 11 years. 3. The income of the family of the deceased Government employee according to revenue record has been shown to the tune of Rs. 750 per month. The income certificate has been filed as Annexure-11 to the writ petition. 4. It has been stated by the petitioner that all the dependants of late Shri Sahaj Ram are unemployed and they are having no source of livelihood except salary drawn during the course of employment with the Post Office. Petitioner had moved an application for compassionate appointment supported with no objection given by mother and brothers. The petitioner had passed High School and Intermediate from the U. P. Board. Application was moved on 4.10.2002, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-12 to the writ petition. The competent authority had rejected the petitioner’s application after lapse of one and a half years keeping in view the recommendation of the committee constituted for the purpose by an order dated 28.4.2004, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 5. The competent authority had rejected the petitioner’s application after lapse of one and a half years keeping in view the recommendation of the committee constituted for the purpose by an order dated 28.4.2004, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 5. While rejecting the petitioner’s representation it has been observed that the committee had not recommended for appointment on compassionate ground after taking into account the liability of family like education of minor children, marriage of daughters, responsibility of aged old parents (mother), medical aid to family members, availability of dependable and secure shelter and financial condition, etc. 6. Feeling aggrieved with the impugned order dated 28.4.2004 the petitioner had preferred a statutory appeal before the Chief Post Master General U. P. Circle, Lucknow on 18.11.2004, a copy of memo of appeal has been filed as Annexure-13 to the writ petition. Petitioner has pleaded that widow of the deceased employee, all sons and daughter were unemployed. Daughter is minor and liability of her education and also after getting her majority liability of her marriage falls on the shoulder of petitioner being eldest son. 7. Statutory appeal filed against the impugned order dated 18.11.2004 was not decided by Chief Post Master and kept pending for more than one and a half years, hence the petitioner preferred original application before the Tribunal. 8. An application was also moved before the Tribunal for condonation of delay in preferring the original application stating that till the filing of original application before the Tribunal appeal was not decided by the competent authority. Only an assurance was given that appeal shall be decided on an early date. The Tribunal though recorded a finding that original application preferred was time barred but at admission stage dismissed the original application on merit also with finding that after lapse of three years under the office memorandum dated 5.5.2003 no compassionate appointment can be made. The Tribunal on one hand observed that delayed original application was preferred on the other hand, dismissed the same on merit at admission stage. 9. From the perusal of application for condonation of delay and material on record it appears that there was sufficient ground to condone the delay. It was because of slackness in discharge of duty by the authorities the petitioner approached the Tribunal after some delay. 9. From the perusal of application for condonation of delay and material on record it appears that there was sufficient ground to condone the delay. It was because of slackness in discharge of duty by the authorities the petitioner approached the Tribunal after some delay. The appeal was not decided in spite of assurance given from time to time by the appellate authority. It appears that delay caused because of no-fault on the part of petitioner. 10. On merit also petitioner’s claim seems to be rejected without application of mind and without considering the financial destitution and penurious condition of the deceased family. No finding has been recorded while passing the order dated 28.4.2004 as to how and under what circumstances the authority had declined to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground. No finding has been recorded as to how the petitioner’s family will be able to meet out the education of minor sister, brothers and other family members (five in number) on payment of pension money of only Rs. 1,982 per month. The amount given to the family D.C.R.G. of Rs. 80,000 and C.G.I.S. of Rs. 14,500 cannot be termed as regular source of income to meet out the routine expenses of daily life. The Tribunal had relied upon the judgment in General Manager (D and PB) and others v. Kunti Tiwari and another, 2004 (7) SCC 271 . In the case of Kunti (supra) the earlier judgment of Umesh Kumar Nagpal, (1994) 4 SCC 138 . has been followed by Hon’ble Supreme Court where Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while considering the case for appointment on compassionate ground keeping in view the financial condition of the family, the family pension, gratuity amount received, employee’s/employer’s contribution to provident fund and any compensation paid by the Bank or its Welfare Fund, proceeds of L.I.C. policy and other investments of the deceased employee, income of family from other sources, employment of other family members and size of family and liabilities, if any are to be seen. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the penury condition of the family should be seen and should find out whether the family is without any means of livelihood. For convenience relevant portion from the judgment of Kunti Tewari (supra) are reproduced as under : “Para 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the penury condition of the family should be seen and should find out whether the family is without any means of livelihood. For convenience relevant portion from the judgment of Kunti Tewari (supra) are reproduced as under : “Para 7. In adoption of this principle, an office memorandum was circulated to all banks on 7.8.1996 emphasizing that the observations of this Court would have to be complied with. The Indian Bank’s Association also adopted the directive of this Court in Umesh Kumar Nagpal case in the scheme which was proposed for appointment of heirs of deceased employees. In that proposal it was recommended that in order to determine the financial condition of the family the following amounts would have to be taken into account— (a) Family pension. (b) Gratuity amount received. (c) Employee’s/employer’s contribution to provident fund. (d) Any compensation paid by the Bank or its Welfare Fund. (e) Proceeds of L.I.C. policy and other investments of the deceased employee. (f) Income of family from other sources. (g) employment of other family members. (h) size of family and liabilities, if any, etc. 9. On the basis of the criteria as recommended by the Indian Bank’s Association and adopted by the appellant Bank, it could not be said that the family of the late K. N. Tiwari had been left in “penury” or without any means of livelihood”. The particulars of their income have been noted in their application and it certainly could not be said on the basis thereof that the respondents were living hand to mouth. The Division Bench erred in diluting this criteria of penury to one of “not very well-to-do.” 11. Keeping in view the ratio of Kunti Tewari’s case it appears that respondents had not applied their mind towards the facts and circumstances of the present case. The total income including family pension of the family comes to Rs. 2,732 per month (Rs. 1,982 + Rs. 750). All the three sons are unemployed having burden to meet the expenses of minor daughter who shall be of marriageable age in couple of years. We fail to understand how the member of five persons having old aged mother would be able to meet out their minimum expenses of fooding, lodging, medical aid and convenience etc. for Rs. 2,732 only. All the three sons are unemployed having burden to meet the expenses of minor daughter who shall be of marriageable age in couple of years. We fail to understand how the member of five persons having old aged mother would be able to meet out their minimum expenses of fooding, lodging, medical aid and convenience etc. for Rs. 2,732 only. The lump-sum amount received by the petitioner’s family is also less than two lakhs. 12. While declining to appoint a person on compassionate ground it shall always be necessary on the competent authority to assign reason based on material which may speak with regard to financial soundness of deceased family. The decision should not be taken on the unfounded facts or in a casual manner. A specific finding should be recorded that dependants of deceased employee has got sufficient resources to meet out minimum expenses necessary to live a human life. 13. In the present case, while passing the impugned order the competent authority had not applied mind towards the fact that the income incurred by the deceased family shall be sufficient to meet out the immediate requirement as a source of livelihood. It has been settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court by catena of judgments that right to life does not mean animal living. Income should be sufficient to meet out the minimum requirement of family like food, lodging, medical and clothing etc. While evaluating the financial destitution or penurious condition authorities have to kept in mind as to whether dependants of deceased employee has got sufficient source of livelihood to meet out the minimum requirement of life. While deciding the financial destitution it is not necessary for the employer to decide the issue keeping in view the status of the dependant of employees but it should always be kept in mind the availability of minimum requirement, necessary to live a human life. The word “Life” has been used prominently in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (Article 3). The fundamental rights under the Constitution are almost in consonance with the Rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. India is a party of Universal Declaration had ratified the declaration has been considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kubic Darusz v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 605 . The fundamental rights under the Constitution are almost in consonance with the Rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. India is a party of Universal Declaration had ratified the declaration has been considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kubic Darusz v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 605 . That being so since life is recognized as a basic human right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, it has to be considered in the same manner and interpretation as has been placed on that word by this Court in its various decisions relating to Article 21 of the Constitution. The meaning of word “Life” cannot be narrowed down. According to the tenor of the language used in Article 21 it will be available not only to every citizen of this country, but also to a “person” who may not be a citizen of the country vide Chairman, Railway Board and others v. Mrs. Chandrima Das and others, AIR 2000 SC 988 . The meaning of word “life” has been interpreted by Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time. In Kharak Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 , it was held that the term life indicates more than mere animal existence. The inhibitions contained in Article 21 against its deprivation extends even to those facilities by which life is enjoyed. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 , it was held that right to life under Article 21 means the right to live with dignity, free from exploitation. 14. In a case of 1997 (9) SCC 377 ; Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour, 1999 (3) SCC 601 , Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed that Social justice, equality and dignity of person are cornestones of social democracy and it include all essential facilities and opportunities means to develop and to live with minimum comforts, food, shelter, clothing and health. Relevant para from the judgment of Air India Statutory Corporation (supra) is reproduced as under : “21. In the case of Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure to workman are part of their meaningful right to life and to achieve self expression of their personality and to enjoy the life with dignity. In the case of Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure to workman are part of their meaningful right to life and to achieve self expression of their personality and to enjoy the life with dignity. In case, the ceiling is fixed over the dearness allowance of the work charge employees, after rise in consumer price index in case the hike in price is not neutralised by payment of full dearness allowances payable to regular employee, they may suffer with serious consequences in quality of life. For convenience relevant portion of the Apex Court judgment from Air India Statutory Corporation (supra) is reproduced as under : “Social justice, equality and dignity of person are cornestones of social democracy. The concept of “social justice” which the Constitution of India engrafted, consists of diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. “Social Justice” is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic device to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribal and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single idea of a society but is an essential part of complex social change to relieve the poor etc. from handicaps, penury to ward off distress and to make their life livable, for greater good of the society at large. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation and constitutional goal. Social security, just and humane condition of work and leisure to workman are the part of his meaningful right to life and to achieve self expression of his personality and to enjoy the life with dignity. The State should provide facility and opportunities to enable them to reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security and civilized living while sharing according to their capacity, social and cultural heritage.” All essential facilities and opportunities to the poor people are fundamental means to development, to live with minimum comforts, food, shelter, clothing and health. The State should provide facility and opportunities to enable them to reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security and civilized living while sharing according to their capacity, social and cultural heritage.” All essential facilities and opportunities to the poor people are fundamental means to development, to live with minimum comforts, food, shelter, clothing and health. Due to economic constraints, though right to work was not declared as a fundamental right, right to work of workman, lower class, middle class and poor people is a means to development and source to earn livelihood. Though, right to employment cannot, as a right, be claimed but after the appointment to a post or an office, be it under the State, its agency, instrumentality, juristic person or private entrepreneur, it is required to be dealt with as per public element and to act in public interest assuring equality, which is a genus of Article 14 and other concomitant rights emanating therefrom are species to make their right to life and dignity of person real and meaningful. Democracy offers to everyone as a doer, an exerted developer and enjoyer of his human capacities, rather than merely as a consumer of utilities. In a socialist democracy governed by the rule of law, private property, right of the citizen for development and his right to employment and his entitlement for employment to the Labour, would all harmoniously be blended to serve larger social interest and public purpose.” 15. Apart from above quality of life is also part and parcel of Article 21 of the Constitution vide Dr. Ashok v. Union of India and others, 1997 (5) SCC 10 ; Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 (1) SCC 248 ; Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 251 ; Vincent Panikulangara v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 165 ; Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni, (1983) 1 SCC 124 ; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 ; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 ; Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598 ; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545 ; C.E.S.C. Ltds. v. Suhhash Chandra Bose, (1992) 1 SCC 441 and Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 10 SCC 104 . 16. v. Suhhash Chandra Bose, (1992) 1 SCC 441 and Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 10 SCC 104 . 16. In view of above, while deciding the penurious condition of dependant of deceased family and financial destitution for the purpose of compassionate appointment it shall be incumbent upon the authorities to keep in mind the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It shall be necessary to record a finding while rejecting an application for compassionate appointment that the dependants of deceased family is in a position to lead a life with dignity free from exploitation. Members of the deceased family may lead a life to enjoy the faculties of a life and not mere animal existence. Dependants of deceased family shall be able to cope up with the minimum requirement of food, cloth, shelter, education and medical aid etc. In the absence of finding on these points a decision rejecting the claim shall be unjust and illegal and shall amount to arbitrary exercise of power hence shall be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Fundamental right protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India neither can be diluted nor circumvented by any scheme or statutory provisions. 17. The financial destitution or penurious condition of a family may vary from person to person. The minimum requirement of the dependant of deceased Class IV employee may be lesser than the requirement of the dependant of Class III, II or Class I employees. Accordingly, while evaluating the claim with regard to compassionate appointment this aspect of the matter should also be taken into account. Keeping in view the relevant facts and circumstances of the case it shall be appropriate for the competent authority to evaluate the minimum requirement of the family in terms of cash keeping in view the minimum requirement for shelter, education, medical aid number of dependant family members etc. The assessment should be based objectively and consciously keeping in view the fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 (supra) of the Constitution. 18. In a case of Balbir Kaur and others v. Steel Authority of India, 2000 (6) SCC 493 , which has been relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the monetory benefit provided to the deceased family member lump-sum cannot be substituted to compassionate appointment. 18. In a case of Balbir Kaur and others v. Steel Authority of India, 2000 (6) SCC 493 , which has been relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the monetory benefit provided to the deceased family member lump-sum cannot be substituted to compassionate appointment. The lump-sum amount received by the family in the form of various fund may give solace to the mental agony and manage the affairs of the family in normal course of events but it cannot be equated with the compassionate appointment. Relevant portion from the judgment of Balbir Kaur (supra) is reproduced as under : “13………..Apparently these considerations weighed with the High Court and the latter thus proceeded on the basis that by reason of adaptation of a Family Benefit Scheme by the employees’ union, question of any departure therefrom or any compassionate appointment does not and cannot arise. But in our view this Family Benefit Scheme cannot in any way be equated with the benefit of compassionate appointments. The sudden jerk in the family by reason of the death of the breadearner can only be absorbed by some lump-sum amount being made available to the family-this is rather unfortunate but this is a reality. The feeling of security drops to zero on the death of the breadearner and insecurity thereafter reigns and it is at that juncture if some lump-sum amount is made available with a compassionate appointment, the grief-stricken family may find some solace to the mental agony and manage its affairs in the normal course of events. It is not that monetary benefit would be the replacement of the breadearner, but that would undoubtedly bring some solace to the situation. 16. Adverting to the provident fund, be it noted that the same is payable to an employee under the provisions of a statute and this statutory obligation cannot possibly be deferred in the event of an untimely death of a worker or an employee. As noticed above, the family needs the money in lump sum and availability of this amount is the only insulating factor to such a grief-stricken family. The amount is payable in one lump-sum and as a matter of fact it acts as a buffer to the retirement of or on the death of an employee. As noticed above, the family needs the money in lump sum and availability of this amount is the only insulating factor to such a grief-stricken family. The amount is payable in one lump-sum and as a matter of fact it acts as a buffer to the retirement of or on the death of an employee. Situations are not difficult to conceive when the family needs some lump sum amount but in the event of deposit of the same with the employer, the heirs of the deceased employee could be put into the same problems of realities of life, even though, if this money would have been made available to them the situation could have been otherwise.” 19. In a case of Mumtaz Yunus Mulani (Smt.) v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2008 (11) SCC 384 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though the amount of family pension may be relevant factor but compassionate appointment cannot be denied merely because family pension is being paid. 20. Keeping in view the proposition of law discussed hereinabove the petitioner seems to be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. The lapse of three years because of pendency of original application before the Tribunal or pendency of appeal before the appellate authority shall not create a ground to deny the compassionate appointment. On 4.10.2002, petitioner has submitted a representation for compassionate appointment which was decided after one and a half year on 28.4.2004. The appeal/representation moved against the order dated 28.4.2004 on 18.11.2004 was never decided and kept pending. The period of three years lapsed because of fault of respondents and not because of fault of petitioner. Accordingly, lapse of three years without any fault on the part of petitioner shall not create a ground to deny the appointment on compassionate ground. 21. The present writ petition was filed on 8.3.2006 and is pending since last three years. It is settled law that no one should suffer for fault or lapses on the part of Courts. 22. According to legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit means “an act of the Court shall prejudice no man”. The maxim is founded upon justice and good sense ; and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. It is settled law that no one should suffer for fault or lapses on the part of Courts. 22. According to legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit means “an act of the Court shall prejudice no man”. The maxim is founded upon justice and good sense ; and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. Herbert Broom in his famous treatise Legal Maxims observed as under : “In virtue of it, where a case stands over for argument on account of the multiplicity of business in the Court, or for judgment from the intricacy of the question, the party ought not to be prejudiced by that delay, but should be allowed to enter up his judgment retrospectively to meet the justice of the case.” Learned Author again proceeded to observe as under : “The preceding examples will probably be sufficient to illustrate the general doctrine, which is equally founded on common sense and on authority, that the act of a court of law shall prejudice no man; and in conformity with this doctrine, it has been observed, that, as long as there remains a necessity, in any stage of the proceedings in an action, for an appeal to the authority of the Court, or any occasion to call upon it to exercise its jurisdiction, the Court has, even if there has been some express arrangement between the parties, an undoubted right, and is, moreover, bound to interfere, it perceives that its own process or jurisdiction is about to be used for purposes which are not consistent with justice.” 23. There is one more legal maxim which comes in the aid of petitioner and, i.e., ubi jus ibi remedium means there is no wrong without a remedy. According to Broom’s (supra) if a man has a right, he have a means to vindicate and maintain it. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium has been considered to be very well valuable and has led to the invention of various forms of actions and principles by Courts to do justice. 24. According to Broom’s (supra) if a man has a right, he have a means to vindicate and maintain it. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium has been considered to be very well valuable and has led to the invention of various forms of actions and principles by Courts to do justice. 24. While considering the Maxims Herbert Broom in his famous treatise (supra) proceeded to observe as under : “The common law lives and grows, and while only a bold man will say that the maxim is today of universal application and that novelty can never defeat a claim new in principle, at least it can justly be claimed that “although we have not yet discovered any general principle of liability, the law is slowly but surely moving in that direction.” The learned author again proceeded to observe as under : “Any invasion of the civil rights of another person is in itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair its necessary or natural consequences, in so far as these are injurious to the person whose rights are infringed, whether the motive which prompted it be good, bad or indifferent.” 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, AIR 1966 SC 1631 , has observed in para 6 as under : “It is, therefore, quite clear that if there was an error the Court and its officers largely contributed to it. It is no doubt true that a litigant must be vigilant and take care but where a litigant goes to Court and asks for the assistance of the Court so that his obligations under a decree might be fulfilled by him strictly, it is incumbent on the Court, if it does not leave the litigant to his own devices, to ensure that the correct information is furnished. If the Court in supplying the information makes a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on the faith of that information the Courts cannot hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself caused. If the Court in supplying the information makes a mistake the responsibility of the litigant, though it does not altogether cease, is at least shared by the Court. If the litigant acts on the faith of that information the Courts cannot hold him responsible for a mistake which it itself caused. There is no higher principle for the guidance of the Court than the one that no act of Courts should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of Courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the Court he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. This is aptly summed up in the maxim : “Actus curiae neminem gravabit.” 26. Accordingly, the time lapsed because of pendency of present writ petition shall also not come in the way of petitioner to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground. Petitioner seems to be entitled to be considered for appointment on compassionate ground keeping in view the scheme/rules occupying the field in October, 2002, i.e., the time when petitioner had submitted a representation. 27. However, learned counsel for the respondents submits that when the writ petition was filed the petitioner was aged about 28 years now he must be aged about 35 years. In case petitioner is overage because of pendency of litigation then either respondents should consider the relaxation in age or other dependant of the petitioner’s family may be appointed on compassionate ground who is not overage. People shall loose the faith in the administration of justice in case rightful claim is rejected only because of pendency of litigation in the Courts. The cases should be considered in accordance with law from the stage when the controversy cropped up and raised in the Courts. 28. In view of above, writ petition deserves to be allowed. It shall not be proper to relegate the matter again to the Tribunal after lapse of almost four years. It shall be appropriate that respondents should reconsider the petitioner’s case in the light of observation made hereinafter. 29. In view of above, writ petition is allowed. 28. In view of above, writ petition deserves to be allowed. It shall not be proper to relegate the matter again to the Tribunal after lapse of almost four years. It shall be appropriate that respondents should reconsider the petitioner’s case in the light of observation made hereinafter. 29. In view of above, writ petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned judgment and order dated 6.1.2004, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition as well as order dated 28.4.2004, passed by the competent authority as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition with consequential benefits. A writ in the nature of mandamus is also issued commanding the opposite parties to reconsider the petitioner’s case for compassionate appointment expeditiously and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order and communicate the decision to the petitioner. Cost made easy.