Judgment :- P.D. Dinakaran, C.J. Aggrieved by the order dated 21.3.2007 refusing to quash the preliminary notification dated 15.07.1982 and the final notification dated 05.08.1986 of the 3rd respondent herein, in so far as the petitioners lands are concerned, which were acquired by the 2nd respondent-Bangalore Development Authority, for the purpose of formation of Nagarbavi II stage Housing Scheme, the unsucce ssful writ petitioners in W.P.No.8340/2003 have filed the above writ appeal. 2. For the purpose of convenience the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the Writ Petition. 3. The undisputed factual matrix of the case are: .(i) The petitioners-1 to 3, who are the legal heirs of Muniyappa, the erstwhile original owner of the impugned land, did not question the acquisition of the impugned lands viz., land measuring 3 acres out of the total extent of 3 acres and 28 guntas, in Sy.No.55/1, situated at Malagalu Village, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, acquired for the purpose of formation of Nagarbhavi II stage Housing Scheme of the 2nd respondent herein vide preliminary notification dated 15.07.1982, which had culminated in final notification dated 05.08.1986 and award was also passed on 27.5.1997. .(ii) On verification of the original records produced by the BDA, it is found that a notice was issued to the original owner Muniyappa and he did not choose to challenge the acquisition proceedings and one S.M. Kannaiah, who was the owner of Sy.No.55, filed a Writ Petition challenging the acquisition proceedings in W.P.No.2272/1987, which came to be dismissed on 16.06.1995. Being aggrieved by the same, W.A.No.2055/1995 was filed and the same was dismissed on 10.01.1996 and therefore, the acquisition proceedings have become final. The award has been passed and possession of land has been taken on 12.7.2002 and handed over to the Engineering Department of BDA on 18.7.2002. (iii) Petitioners-5 to 10 are the subsequent purchasers of the impugned lands under a registered sale deed dated 13.3.1991 from petitioners 1 to 3 who are the legal heirs of erstwhile owners of the impugned lands. (iv) However, the petitioners have chosen to challenge the preliminary notification dated 15.07.1982 and final notification dated 05.08.1986 after more than 20 years. 4. (iii) Petitioners-5 to 10 are the subsequent purchasers of the impugned lands under a registered sale deed dated 13.3.1991 from petitioners 1 to 3 who are the legal heirs of erstwhile owners of the impugned lands. (iv) However, the petitioners have chosen to challenge the preliminary notification dated 15.07.1982 and final notification dated 05.08.1986 after more than 20 years. 4. According to the writ petitioners: i) The impugned acquisition proceedings are vitiated as no notice was served on the petitioners as contemplated under Section 17 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act (for short “the B.D.A. Act”); (ii) The impugned acquisition is bad in law in view of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short “the L.A. Act”) as the award was passed on 27.5.1997 i.e. after 11 years, while the preliminary notification was passed on 15.7.1982 and the final notification was passed on 05.08.1986; (iii) The petitioners are continuing to be in possession of impugned land as the petitioners are still in actual possession of the impugned land and no notification was issued under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act; and (iv) The impugned Housing Scheme got lapsed, as the same is not implemented within five years, as required under Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act. The decision in D. Narayanappa Vs. The State Of Karnataka, by its Secretary, Housing & Urban Development, Department Bangalore & Others (ILR 2005 KAR 295) is relied upon in this regard. 5. The writ petition was resisted by the respondent-State and the authorities on the ground that: .(i) the petition is not maintainable in view of laches on the part of the petitioners; .(ii) Since the erstwhile owners of the impugned land, despite service of valid statutory notice on them, had not chosen to challenge the acquisition proceedings and remained silent, the legal representatives of the erstwhile owners namely petitioners-1 to 4, also lost the right to challenge the impugned acquisition proceedings and therefore, the contention that no notice was served on them as per Section 17 of the B.D.A. Act fails. Consequently, the petitioners-5 to 10, who are subsequent purchasers, also have no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Consequently, the petitioners-5 to 10, who are subsequent purchasers, also have no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings. (iii) Even though the preliminary notification was passed on 15.7.1982, the final notification was passed on 05.08.1986 and the award was passed on 27.05.1997, the same by itself cannot be a ground to vitiate the impugned acquisition proceedings as Section 11 of the L.A. Act is not applicable to the impugned proceedings which is governed under the provisions of the B.D.A. Act, as per the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah Vs. State of Karnataka & Others [ 2002 (3) SUPREME 1 ]; .(iv) Since the entries made in the revenue records show that the 3rd respondent had already taken possession of the impugned land, the same is sufficient to hold that the respondents had already taken possession of the impugned land; and .(v) As the possession had already been taken by the B.D.A and that major portion of the land acquired for the Housing Scheme had already been laid into several house sites and disposed off to the third parties, the same is substantial implementation of the scheme and there is no violation of Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act. 6. After careful consideration of the rival contentions, the learned Single Judge by his order dated 21.3.2007 passed in the Writ Petition No.8340/2003 held thus: .(i) That as the original khatedars were not available at the addresses found in the revenue records, and on enquiry none of the neighbours knew the addresses, notices were served on their respective lands and therefore, the same is a proper compliance under Section 17 of the B.D.A. Act and that wherever the addresses of original khatedars were available, notices under Section 17 of B.D.A. Act were served on them. .(ii) That despite official gazette notification and publication of preliminary and final notifications dated 15.07.1982 and 05.08.1986 respectively, the original owner had not chosen to challenge the impugned acquisition proceedings at appropriate time. The failure on the part of the original owners to challenge the preliminary notification that was passed on 15.7.1982 and the final notification passed on 05.08.1986, is binding on their legal representatives, viz., petitioners-1 to 4 as well as on the petitioners-5 to 10 who are the subsequent purchasers of the impugned land from petitioners-1 to 4. The failure on the part of the original owners to challenge the preliminary notification that was passed on 15.7.1982 and the final notification passed on 05.08.1986, is binding on their legal representatives, viz., petitioners-1 to 4 as well as on the petitioners-5 to 10 who are the subsequent purchasers of the impugned land from petitioners-1 to 4. (iii) That even though the preliminary notification was passed on 15.7.1982 and final notification was passed on 05.08.1986 and the award was passed on 27.05.1997, of-course, after a lapse of 11 years, the same by itself would not vitiate the impugned acquisition proceedings as Section 11 of L.A. Act is not applicable, as per the decision of Apex Court in Munithimmaiah Vs. State Of Karnataka & Others [ 2002 (3) SUPREME 1 ]. .(iv) That out of the total extent of land in the Scheme viz., 604 acres and 23 guntas, the impugned acquisitions relates to only 7 acres and 34 guntas. As per the official records, the possession of impugned land has been taken by the respondents and non-issuance of notification under Section 16 (2) of L.A. Act would not, in any event, vitiate the impugned acquisition proceedings. .(v) That considering the magnitude of the impugned Housing Scheme over an extent of 604 acres and 23 guntas, out of which, the 2nd respondent had already formed a layout over an extent of 564 acres and 39 guntas of land, thereby, forming house sites in Block Nos.1 to 14 and disposed the same to various allottees, the amounts to substantial implementation of the scheme satisfying the requirement under Section 27 of B.D.A. Act, as per the ratio rendered in Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Dr. H.S. Hanumanthappa (ILR 1996 KAR 642) and Krishnamurthy Vs. Bangalore Development Authority (ILR 1996 KAR 1258); and .(vi) That in any event, though the preliminary notification was passed on 15.7.1982 and the final notification was passed on 05.08.1986 and the petitioners have chosen to challenge the acquisition proceedings after a lapse of nearly 20 years, the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches, as per the decision in Hari Singh and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others ( 1984 (2) SCC 624 ) and in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. D.R. Laxmi and Others ( 1996 (6) SCC 445 ). 7. 7. Based on the above findings, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Hence the present writ appeal. 8.1. Mr. Padmanabha Mahale, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Udaya Holla, learned Advocate General and Mr. Abdul Khader, learned counsel appearing for B.D.A. reiterated the submissions made before the learned Single Judge. 8.2 That apart, Mr. Padmanabha Mahale, learned Senior Counsel invited our attention that when some portion of the acquired impugned land belonging to one S.M. Kannaiah located in the same survey number, was denotified by the Government by order dated 05.10.2007, the refusal to de-notify the impugned land is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8.3. Per contra, the learned Advocate General, however, produced the proceedings of the Government dated 23.03.2009, withdrawing the de-notification order dated 05.10.2007 in respect of the land belonging to S.M. Kannaiah and therefore, the Government has taken a uniform stand. 9. We have heard the learned counsel and given our careful consideration to the submissions made by both sides. 10. Upon the above rival contentions, the following issues arise for our consideration: .(i) Whether the impugned acquisition proceedings is vitiated for non-compliance of Section 17(5) of the B.D.A. Act? .(ii) Whether the passing of award after 11 years vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings? (iii) Whether the non-issuance of notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act in the official gazette as to the taking of possession of the impugned land by the respondents vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings? .(iv) Whether non-formation of the layout in the impugned land vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings as per Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act? .(v) Whether the above writ petition is maintainable both on the ground of: (a) locus standi and (b) laches? and .(vi) Whether the refusal to de-notify the impugned land by the State Government is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? 11.1 Issue No.I: Whether the impugned acquisition proceedings is vitiated for non-compliance of Section 17(5) of the B.D.A. Act? 11.2 It is apt to refer to Section 17 of the B.D.A. Act which reads as hereunder: “17. 11.1 Issue No.I: Whether the impugned acquisition proceedings is vitiated for non-compliance of Section 17(5) of the B.D.A. Act? 11.2 It is apt to refer to Section 17 of the B.D.A. Act which reads as hereunder: “17. Procedure on completion of scheme: (1) When a development scheme has been prepared, the Authority shall draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme having been made and the limits of the area comprised therein, and naming a place where particulars of the scheme, a map of the area comprised therein, a statement specifying the land which is proposed to be acquired and of the land in regard to which a betterment tax may be levied may be seen at all reasonable hours. .(2) A copy of the said notification shall be sent to the Corporation which shall, within thirty days from the date of receipt thereof, forward to the Authority for transmission to the Government as hereinafter provided, any representation which the Corporation may think fit to make with regard to the scheme. .(3) The Authority shall also cause a copy of the said notification to be published in the Official Gazette and affixed in some conspicuous part of its own office, the Deputy Commissioner’s Office, the office of the Corporation and in such other places as the Authority may consider necessary. .(4) If no representation is received from the Corporation within the time specified in subsection (2), the concurrence of the Corporation to the scheme shall be deemed to have been given. .(5) During the thirty days next following the day on which such notification is published in the official Gazette the Authority shall serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the local authority or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax or land revenue assessment on any building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme or in regard to which the Authority proposes to recover betterment tax requiring such person to show cause within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the notice why such acquisition of the building or land and the recovery of betterment tax should not be made. .(6) The notice shall be signed by or by the order of the Commissioner and shall be served,- .(a) by personal delivery or, if such person is absent or cannot be found, on his agent, or if no agent can be found, then by leaving the same on the land or the building; or .(b) xxx xxx xxx .(c) xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied) 11.3 Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 17 of the B.D.A. Act referred to above contemplates that the notification for development scheme has to be prepared and the same shall be notified in the official gazette stating the fact of the scheme, the limits of the area comprised, map of the area comprised and the land proposed to be acquired; the said gazette notification shall be affixed in some conspicuous part of the office of the B.D.A., the office of the Corporation and such other place where the authority may consider it necessary and there is no complaint by the petitioners in this regard. 11.4. Section 17(5) of the B.D.A. Act referred to above contemplates that the notification published in the official gazette under Section 17(1) and (3) of the B.D.A. Act shall be served on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the local authority or as found in the land revenue register. It is not in dispute in the instant case that such notification as to the impugned acquisition were served on the persons whose name appeared in the assessment list of the local authority and who were available in the addresses as found in the land revenue register. Only in case of those persons who were not available in the addresses found in the assessment list of the local authority or in the land revenue register, notices were served by affixture on the land, which is also a valid service as per Section 17(6)(a) of the B.D.A. Act. 11.5. Consequently, petitioner-1 to 4 who are the legal heirs of the erstwhile owners and whose names were found in the assessment list, however, could not be found in the addresses shown in the assessment list of the local authority or in the land revenue register. It is under such circumstances, notices were served on the land, which is a valid service as per Section 17(6)(a) of the B.D.A. Act. It is under such circumstances, notices were served on the land, which is a valid service as per Section 17(6)(a) of the B.D.A. Act. Hence, as rightly held by the learned Single Judge, there is no violation of Section 17(3) and (5) of the B.D.A. Act and therefore, the impugned acquisition is not vitiated for non-compliance of Section 17(5) of the B.D.A. Act. 11.6. Issue No.I is answered, accordingly. 12.1. Issue No.II: Whether the passing of award after 11 years vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings? 12.2. It is not in dispute that the preliminary notification was passed on 15.07.1982 and the final notification was passed on 05.08.1986 and the award came to be passed on 27.05.1997 and on that ground, the writ petitioners/appellants contend that the impugned acquisition is bad in law as the award was passed after 11 years. 12.3. An identical issue camp up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in Khoday Distilleries Limited Vs. State of Karnataka (reported in ILR 1997 Kar. 1419). While deciding the said case, the Division Bench of this Court, meticulously analysed the relevant provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (the State Act) and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act), as amended by the Amending Act, 1984, and held as follows: “…….. The two sets of provisions under Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the L.A. Act are comparable with the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the B.D.A. Act. Under the provisions of the L.A. Act, if the final notification is not issued within the period mentioned therein and if any award is not made within the time prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act, the acquisition proceedings would lapse. In the case of schemes covered by the B.D.A. Act, the authority has to execute the schemes within a period of 5 years and if the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative. Thus in substance there are provisions under the B.D.A. Act to indicate the proposals for acquisition, considering the objections thereto, sanctioning the proposal for acquisition on consideration of such objections and if such acts did no take place within a period of 5 years the proceedings would lapse. Thus in substance there are provisions under the B.D.A. Act to indicate the proposals for acquisition, considering the objections thereto, sanctioning the proposal for acquisition on consideration of such objections and if such acts did no take place within a period of 5 years the proceedings would lapse. The Supreme Court in several decisions where questions of delay in the implementation of the proposals made under the L.A. Act for purpose of completion of the acquisition proceedings occurs, has taken the view that if the same is unreasonable, the acquisition proceedings could be quashed, prior to the introduction of Section 6 and 11-A of the L.A. Act prescribing limitation on the powers and the time within which such action should be taken. It would be a matter of policy for the Legislature to indicate the time within which such acts should be taken. In the case of B.D.A. Act, considering the nature and complexity of the implementation of the scheme, a period of 5 years has been fixed for purpose of completion of the scheme from the date of issue of the notification under Section 19 of the B.D.A. Act on sanction of the scheme. Therefore, when the Legislature itself has taken note of within what period the schemes have to be implemented and prescribes an authority thereto and also provides for as to what consequence would follow on non-implementation of the scheme within that period, we do not think this Court can take a view that such implementation of the scheme is in any way discriminatory when compared to the provisions of the L.A. Act. In substance, both the provisions provided for identical situation – may be in case of L.A. Act more details are set forth such as the period within which final notification has to be issued and the period within which award has to be passed. But in case of the B.D.A. Act implementation of the scheme has been limited to a period of 5 years as provided in Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act. 9. Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act provides that where within a period of 5 years from the date of the publication in the official gazette of the declaration under Section 19(1), the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative. 9. Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act provides that where within a period of 5 years from the date of the publication in the official gazette of the declaration under Section 19(1), the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative. In the L.A. Act certain period has been fixed which is considered to be reasonable within which the final notification will have to be issued and award has to be passed and if such acts are done beyond the time prescribed therein, the acquisition of land will lapse. To the same effect is Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act. If the B.D.A. Act provides for 5 years to be reasonable period for substantial compliance with the scheme, we cannot state that the said provision is unreasonable of not proper. Thus the scheme of the L.A. Act as modified by the B.D.A. Act would be applicable by reason of the provisions of Sections 17, 18, 27 and 36 of the B.D.A. Act.” 12.4 As far as compliance of Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act, viz., substantial compliance of the impugned Housing Scheme, would be dealt with, in the later portion of this judgment. 12.5. What is relevant for the present issue is, whether the passing of the award after 11 years vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings applying Section 11-A of the L.A. Act. 12.6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Munithimmaiah Vs. State of Karnataka and Others ( 2002 (3) Supreme 9 ) while approving the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Khoday Distillerie’s case, held as hereunder: “15. So far as the B.D.A. Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority to facilitate and ensure a planned growth and development of the City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. So far as the B.D.A. Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority to facilitate and ensure a planned growth and development of the City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. In pith and substance the Act is one which will squarely fall under, and be traceable to the powers of the State Legislature under Entry 5 of List II of the VIIth schedule and not a law for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 traceable to Entry 42 of List III of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the field in respect of which is already occupied by the Central Enactment of 1894, as amended from time to time. If at all, the B.D.A. Act, so far as acquisition of land for its developmental activities are concerned in substance and effect will constitute a special law providing for acquisition for the special purposes of the B.D.A. and the same was not also considered to be part of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It could not also be legitimately stated, on a reading of Section 36 of the B.D.A. Act that the Karnataka Legislature intended thereby to bind themselves to any future additions or amendments, which might be made by altogether a different legislature, be it the Parliament, to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The procedure for acquisition under the B.D.A. Act vis-à-vis the Central Act has been analysed elaborately by the Division Bench, as noticed supra, and, in our view, very rightly too, considered to constitute a special and self-contained code of its own and the B.D.A. Act and Central Act cannot be said to be either supplemental to each other, or pari materia legislations. That apart, the B.D.A. Act could not be said to be either wholly unworkable and ineffectual if the subsequent amendments to the Central Act are not also imported into consideration. On a overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably stated that the subsequent amendments to the Central Act get attracted or applied either due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under the B.D.A. Act. On a overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably stated that the subsequent amendments to the Central Act get attracted or applied either due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under the B.D.A. Act. When the B.D.A. Act, expressly provides by specifically enacting the circumstances under which and the period of time on the expiry of which alone the proceedings initiated thereunder shall lapse due to any default, the different circumstances and period of limitation envisaged under the Central Act, 1894, as amended by the amending Act of 1984 for completing the proceedings on pain of letting them lapse forever, cannot be imported into consideration for purposes of B.D.A. Act without doing violence to the language or destroying and defeating the very intendment of the State Legislature expressed by the enactment of its own special provision in a special law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively earmarked for the State Legislature. A scheme formulated, sanctioned and set for implementation under the B.D.A. Act, cannot be stultified or rendered ineffective and unenforceable by a provision in the Central Act, particularly of the nature of Section 6 and 11-A, which cannot also on its own force have any application to actions taken under the B.D.A. Act. Consequently, we see no infirmity whatsoever in the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd., case (supra) to exclude the applicability of Sections 6 and 11-A as amended and inserted by the Central Amendment Act of 1984 to proceedings under the B.D.A. Act. The submissions to the contra on behalf of the appellant has no merit whatsoever and do not commend for our acceptance.” (emphasis supplied) 12.7. In our considered opinion, therefore, applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Muni Thimmaiah’s case, referred to above, the impugned acquisition proceedings is not vitiated on account of passing of award after 11 years, as, whenever acquisition proceedings is initiated under the B.D.A. Act, Section 11-A of the L.A. Act is not applicable. 12.8. Issue No.II is answered accordingly. 13.1. Issue No.III: Whether non-issuance of notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act in the official gazette as to taking over possession of the impugned land by the respondents vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings? 13.2. 12.8. Issue No.II is answered accordingly. 13.1. Issue No.III: Whether non-issuance of notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act in the official gazette as to taking over possession of the impugned land by the respondents vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings? 13.2. Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act, as amended by the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension Amendment) Act of 1961, reads as hereunder: “16. Power to take possession.-When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (1) Section 16 of the Principal Act shall be re-numbered as sub-section (1) of that section, and after the sub-section as Section Officer re-numbered, the following subsection shall be added, namely: “(2) The fact of such taking possession may be notified by the Deputy Commissioner in the Official Gazette, and such notification shall be evidence of such fact.” .(2) For the word “Collector” read “Deputy Commissioner”.” (emphasis supplied) 13.3. In D. Narayanappa vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors. (ILR 2005 Kar. 295) and V. Gunda Reddy Vs. The Secretary, Department of Revenue and Others (ILR 2005 Kar. 5692), the learned single Judge of this Court held that in the absence of taking actual possession of the land acquired, even the issuance of notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act is not sufficient to hold that the possession has been taken over by the BDA. It is in this regard, the learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners, placing reliance on the decision in D. Narayanappa’s case and V. Gunda Reddy’s case, contends that as the respondents have not even issued a notification under Section 16 (2) of the L.A. Act in the instant case, the appellants/petitioners are in continuous possession of the impugned lands. 13.4.1. It is true in both the above decisions referred to above, the learned Single Judge has made a reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Balwant Narayan Bhagde Vs. M.D. Bhagwat and Other ( (1976) 1 SCC 700 ) equivalent to AIR 1975 SC 1767 ). 1.4.4.2. In Bhlwant Narayan Bhagde’s case, the Apex Court has held: “21. The so-called paper possession or possession on paper is no delivery of possession, actual, formal or symbolical. M.D. Bhagwat and Other ( (1976) 1 SCC 700 ) equivalent to AIR 1975 SC 1767 ). 1.4.4.2. In Bhlwant Narayan Bhagde’s case, the Apex Court has held: “21. The so-called paper possession or possession on paper is no delivery of possession, actual, formal or symbolical. A Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J. and Rajagopala Aiyangar, J. had stated at page 762 in the case of Pethaperumal Ambalam v. Chidambaram Chettiar: The next question is whether it makes any difference in legal effect if possession is taken through Court. The Code contemplates no notice to the judgment-debtor at that stage or any objection being raised by him to the delivery of possession under Rule 95, or Rule 96, and as the full title to the property has passed from the judgment-debtor to the auction purchaser, he has no interest in the property to protect. It has further been pointed out: The characterization of possession taken under Order 21, Rule 96, as “paper possession” is hardly justified and runs counter to the principle on which the provision is based. Symbolical possession obtained under Order 21, Rule 96 is quite a different thing from paper possession, which might correctly describe only the possession obtained by a party who being entitled to actual possession, the judgment-debtor himself being in possession, obtains delivery of possession on paper without actual possession; or those cases where without complying with the requisites of the statue a false return is made as if they were complied with. 22. It would thus be seen that a symbolical or formal delivery of possession as understood in law has the effect of dispossessing the judgment-debtor from his right title or interest in the property. It does not dispossess the person in actual possession in his own right not liable to be evicted under the decree or in pursuance of the auction sale. A symbolical or formal delivery of possession against the judgment-debtor is giving of actual possession of the property in the eye of law and has the effect of dispossessing him although as a matter of fact he may have succeeded in resuming back possession as before shortly after dispossession. 23. In a proceeding under the Act for acquisition of land all interests are wiped out. Actual possession of the land became necessary for its use, for the public purpose for which it has been acquired. 23. In a proceeding under the Act for acquisition of land all interests are wiped out. Actual possession of the land became necessary for its use, for the public purpose for which it has been acquired. Therefore, the taking of possession under the Act cannot be “symbolical” in the sense as generally understood in Civil Law. Surely it cannot be a possession merely on paper. What is required under the Act is the taking of actual possession on the spot. In the eye of law the taking of possession will have the effect of transferring possession from the owner or the occupant of the land to the Government. 25. When a pubic notice is published at a convenient place or near the land to be taken stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, then ordinarily and generally there should be no question of resisting or impeding the taking of possession. Delivery or giving of possession by the owner or the occupant of the land is not required. The Collector can enforce the surrender of the land to himself under Section 47 of the Act if impeded in taking possession. On publication of the notice under Section 9(1) claims to compensation for all interests in the land has to be made; be it the interest of the owner or of a person entitled to the occupation of the land. On the taking of possession of the land under Section 16 or 17(1) it vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is, therefore, clear that taking of possession within the meaning of Section 16 or 17(1) means taking of possession on the spot. It is neither a possession on paper nor a “symbolical” possession as generally understood in civil law. But the question is what is the mode of taking possession? The Act is silent on the point. Unless possession is taken by the written agreement of the party concerned the mode of taking possession obviously would be for the authority to go upon the land and to do some act which would indicate that the authority has taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a written declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a written declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession is not necessary. No further notice beyond that under Section 9(1) of the Act is required. When possession has been taken, the owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed. Once possession has been taken the land vests in the Government. 26. …….. The appellant’s resuming possession of the land after once it was validly taken by the Government had not the effect of undoing the fact of the vesting of the land in the Government. The Government or the Commissioner was not at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any portion of the land of which possession has been taken, under Section 48(1) of the Act. 27. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx 28. ……..There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. ………….. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tahsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.” (emphasis supplied) 13.5. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan’s case, is derived as hereunder: i) What is required under the Act is the taking of actual possession; ii) It may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a written declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession is not necessary. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession is not necessary. (iii) When possession has been taken, the owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed. .(iv) Once possession has been taken the land vests in the Government. .(v) Resuming possession of the land after once it was validly taken by the Government had not the effect of undoing the fact of the vesting of the land in the Government; and .(vi) The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. (emphasis supplied) 13.6. Without taking into consideration the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Balwant Narayan’s case, as referred to above, the learned Single Judge in both the decisions viz., (i) D. Narayanappa vs. The State of Karnataka and Others (ILR 2005 Kar. 295) has held thus: “It cannot be said that BDA took possession of the land in question on 28.12.1976 as asserted by it as mentioned in the notification. The notification issued under Section 16 (2) dated 16.6.1977 cannot be accepted by this Court, as it only shows taking over of symbolic possession and actual possession of the land was not taken from the petitioner by the Government by following the mandatory procedure as held by the apex Court in the case of Balwant Narayan referred to supra. Therefore the claim so made by the BDA regarding taking possession of the land in question is wholly untenable and unacceptable to this Court. Therefore, it can be safely said that the notification issued under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act to show that the possession of the land was taken is factually incorrect. (emphasis supplied) And (ii) V. Gunda Reddy vs. The Secretary, Department of Revenue and Others (ILR 2005 Kar 5692) has held thus: “24. ……. The possession claimed to have been taken by the Tahsildar as stated in the impugned notification in both the petitions, is not in accordance with law as observed at paragraph 26 by the Apex Court in the case in AIR 1975 SC 1716 . The contention urged by the learned counsel for the society and learned Government Pleader by placing reliance upon the impugned notification regarding taking possession of the lands in question, cannot be accepted by this Court. The contention urged by the learned counsel for the society and learned Government Pleader by placing reliance upon the impugned notification regarding taking possession of the lands in question, cannot be accepted by this Court. They are far from truth from the admitted facts. Therefore, the petitioners must succeed and they are entitled to the reliefs as sought for in these writ petitions.” (emphasis supplied) 13.7. However, in both the decisions, viz., D. Narayanappa’s case and V. Gunda Reddy’s case referred to above, though reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in Balwant Narayan’s case, the ratio laid down therein, had not been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge for his proper appreciation. 13.8. That apart, the issue regarding mode of taking possession also came up for consideration before the Apex court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. A. Viswam (Dead) by Lrs. ( AIR 1996 SC 3377 ), wherein, the Apex Court after referring to Balwant Narayan’s case held thus: “9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of memorandum or Panchanama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not co-operative in taking possession of the land.” 13.9. In the instant case, the revenue records disclose that possession had been taken by the Officials of the Revenue Department. Of-course, an argument was also incidentally advanced that possession of the impugned lands were taken over only by the revenue officials but not by the Deputy Commissioner. But what is relevant is whether possession was taken or not, by the respondents or by their representatives. Strictly speaking, what all, Section 16(2) of the B.D.A. Act contemplates is, the Deputy Commissioner may notify the fact of taking possession. Section 16(2), therefore, either does not contemplate a situation that the Deputy Commissioner shall himself take possession of the land in question nor Section 16(2) mandatorily requires that there shall be a gazette notification for taking over possession of the lands acquired. Section 16(2) only provides that the Deputy Commissioner may notify the fact of taking such possession. Section 16(2), therefore, either does not contemplate a situation that the Deputy Commissioner shall himself take possession of the land in question nor Section 16(2) mandatorily requires that there shall be a gazette notification for taking over possession of the lands acquired. Section 16(2) only provides that the Deputy Commissioner may notify the fact of taking such possession. If such notification is published, the same shall be the conclusive proof of taking over possession of the land acquired and any other interpretation would be contrary to the spirit and object of Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act. Therefore, whether gazette notification was issued under Section 16(2) as to the taking over possession of the land acquired that itself is a valid piece of evidence to hold that possession had already been taken over by the acquiring authority. Therefore, what follows is that, the issuance of notification under Section 16(2), in our considered opinion, in addition to taking over possession of the acquired land, as provided under the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, operates as a conclusive proof of taking possession of the land and ignoring such notification on the ground that actual possession was not taken, in our considered opinion, is contrary to the legal presumption supported by Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act. Therefore, the non-issuance of gazette notification under Section 16(2) in the instant case, will not in any way be a ground to contend that the respondent-B.D.A. had not taken over possession of the impugned land from the petitioners/appellants. 13.10. Therefore, the non-issuance of gazette notification under Section 16(2) in the instant case, will not in any way be a ground to contend that the respondent-B.D.A. had not taken over possession of the impugned land from the petitioners/appellants. 13.10. That apart, as held by the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board and Balwant Narayan’s cases that the accepted mode of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of memorandum by the revenue authorities would itself constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land and such entries in the revenue records is itself conclusive proof of taking actual possession of the land on the spot; the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate taking of possession is not necessary; once possession had been taken, the owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed; once possession had been taken, the land vests in the government; and the resumption of possession of the land after once it has been validly taken by the Government, had not the effect of undoing the fact of vesting of the land in the Government, there is no necessity that taking of possession shall be only by the Deputy Commissioner as per Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act, because the option is for the Deputy Commissioner to issue notification as to taking of possession and the same is not mandatory and in such cases, where possession was taken and entries are made in the revenue records, the issuance of notification under Section 16(2) is not mandatory. 13.11. Hence, the non-issuance of Section 16(2) notification, will not, in any event, vitiate the acquisition and if any notification is issued under Section 16(2), that is the conclusive proof for taking possession and the same would not suffer from either presumption or assumption that actual possession had not been taken from the owners or occupants of the impugned lands. 13.12. Issue No.III is answered accordingly. 14.1. Issue No.IV: Whether non-formation of the layout in the impugned land vitiates impugned acquisition proceedings as per Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act? 14.2. For better appreciation of the issue under consideration, it is apt to refer to Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act, which reads as hereunder: “27. 13.12. Issue No.III is answered accordingly. 14.1. Issue No.IV: Whether non-formation of the layout in the impugned land vitiates impugned acquisition proceedings as per Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act? 14.2. For better appreciation of the issue under consideration, it is apt to refer to Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act, which reads as hereunder: “27. Authority to execute the scheme within five years: Where within a period of five years from the date of the publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under Sub-section (1) of Section 19, the Authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative.” 14.3. The undisputed facts are that out of total extent of 604 acres and 23 guntas of land, the 2nd respondent had already formed a layout over an extent of 564 acres and 39 guntas of land and had distributed house sites to various allottees. 14.4. Under similar facts and circumstances of the case, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Dr. H.S. Hanumanthappa (ILR 1996 Kar. 642) held thus: “10. We are unable to appreciate how the learned Single Judge could strike down the Final Notification on the ground that the release of certain lands amounts to violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. In the first instance, as mentioned herein above, we are not at all satisfied that the release of lands was in accordance with law. Indeed, the Counsel for the Authorities submitted that steps have already been taken for cancellation of the order providing for release. Even assuming that the release of lands is proper and legal, still the area released in favour of M.S. Ramaiah and Dr. Ramaiah, Bangalore Manikshadarga, Venktappa and Gopalaraju admeasures 90 acres. The total area proposed to acquire is about 1334 acres and 12 guntas and even assuming that the area of 90 acres is released, that itself cannot lead to the conclusion that the Authority and the Government were acting illegally and were not serious to implement the scheme and the acquisition proceedings must fall. The total area proposed to acquire is about 1334 acres and 12 guntas and even assuming that the area of 90 acres is released, that itself cannot lead to the conclusion that the Authority and the Government were acting illegally and were not serious to implement the scheme and the acquisition proceedings must fall. In the first instance, in our judgment, the release of these lands were not in accordance with law and therefore that release cannot lead to the conclusion that the action of the Government and the Authority in proceeding with the acquisition was fraud on the power of acquisition. It was then contended that the release of area of about 700 acres in favour of Housing Co-operative Societies must lead to the conclusion that the Authority was not serious in implementing the scheme. We do not find any merit in the contention because retention of the lands with the Housing Co-operative Societies does not lead to destruction of the scheme. But on the contrary aids and assists in the implementation of the scheme, the object being to provide housing to the people. The submission of the learned Counsel that the scheme lapses in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, is also required to be turned down. The Section provides that in case the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially within a period of five years from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, then the scheme shall lapse. The plain reading of the Section makes it clear that the scheme can lapse provided the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially. This expression “fails to execute the scheme” clearly indicates that the section will attract only in cases where the authority is in a position to implement the scheme and then fails to do so. It was pointed out on behalf of the Authority that several writ petitions were filed in this Court to challenge the publication of the notifications and the acquisition proceedings and in view of the interim orders granted in those petitions restraining the Authority from proceeding further with the scheme and the acquisition, it was impossible for the authority to execute the scheme within the stipulated period of five years prescribed under Section 27 of the Act. The Counsel for the respondent-1 very rightly did not dispute that several petitions were filed and stay orders were issued. In these circumstances, it is difficult to appreciate how it can ever be suggested that the scheme has lapsed because the Authority had failed to execute the scheme. It must also be noted that the provisions of Section 27 prescribes that the failure of the authority to execute the scheme must be in respect of the substantial part of the scheme. In the present case, on the showing of respondent-1, an area of 700 acres is allotted to the Housing Co-operative Societies for construction of houses. The Counsel appearing for the two appellants, who were allotted sites No.85 and 115 by the Authority points out that not only allotments were made to various persons, but houses have been constructed by those allottees. In case, now, it is held that the scheme had lapsed, it would result into serious prejudice to large number of allottees from the authority. In our judgment, it is not proper in exercise of writ jurisdiction to nullify the action taken by the statutory authority in pursuance of the powers conferred by the statute. It is not permissible for the Writ Court to assume that illegalities must have been committed because the Authority has released some lands. Even assuming that the release of lands is not in accordance with law, still the Writ Court should not have disturbed the entire scheme and struck down the Notification which was published in the year 1978. The learned Single Judge should not have turned down the contention urged on behalf of the authority that the petition filed after 11 years after the date of publication of the Notification should not be entertained of the ground of delay and laches. We are unable to appreciate how the Final Notification can be struck down on the ground that the Government and the Authority have released some lands from acquisition. (emphasis supplied) 14.5. Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act operates only where there is no substantial compliance or implementation of the Scheme. We are unable to appreciate how the Final Notification can be struck down on the ground that the Government and the Authority have released some lands from acquisition. (emphasis supplied) 14.5. Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act operates only where there is no substantial compliance or implementation of the Scheme. But in the instant case, when the fact remains that out of 604 acres and 23 guntas, the 2nd respondent had already formed a layout over an extent of 564 acres and 39 guntas of land and house sites have been distributed to various allottees, which establishes that the scheme is substantially executed, in our considered opinion, it is not permissible for the appellants/petitioners to contend that the scheme has lapsed, particularly, when the award has already been passed and that the owners/occupants had already been dispossessed from the impugned land in question. Considering the magnitude of the housing scheme, we are satisfied that the scheme is substantially implemented and therefore, Section 27 is not attracted. 14.6. Issue No.IV is answered accordingly. 15.1. Issue No.V: In any event whether the above writ petition is maintainable both on the ground of (a) locus standi and (b) laches? 15.2.1 As regards locus standi: We have already seen that neither the erstwhile land owners not petitioners-1 to 4, who are the legal representatives and petitioners-5 to 10 who are the subsequent purchasers from petitioners-1 to 4, have challenged the acquisition proceedings. It is settled law that all steps and proceedings taken by the State in exercise of its eminent domain power starting with the issuance of preliminary notification and ending with passing of award made against the original owners shall have a legal bearing on the legal heirs of the original owners and the subsequent purchasers thereto. It is settled law that all steps and proceedings taken by the State in exercise of its eminent domain power starting with the issuance of preliminary notification and ending with passing of award made against the original owners shall have a legal bearing on the legal heirs of the original owners and the subsequent purchasers thereto. In the instant case, as the father of the petitioners-1 to 3 who was served with legal notice did not challenge the acquisition proceedings, the petitioners-5 to 10, who are the purchasers of the land after issuance of preliminary notification, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and they would only be entitled to get the compensation and any sale subsequent to preliminary notification would not be binding upon the BDA and would not confer any title as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Meera Sahani v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Others (ILR 2009 Kar 551) and therefore, the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the impugned acquisition proceedings. 15.2.2. In this regard, it is apt to refer the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Meera Sahani Vs. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others, referred to above, which reads as hereunder: “18. In U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Kerala Properties (P) Limited ( (1996) 3 SCC 124 )) it was stated by this Court that: (SCC p.126, para 3) “3…… Having regard to the facts of this case, we were not inclined to further adjourn the case nor to remit the case for fresh consideration by the High Court. It is well-settled law that after the Notification under Section 4(1) is published in the gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. 19. In Sneh Prabha vs. State of U.P. ( (1996) 7 SCC 426 it is stated as under: (SCC p.430, para 5) “5…… It is settled law that any person who purchases land after publication of the Notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her own peril. The object of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. The object of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. It authorizes the designated officer to enter upon the land to do preliminaries, etc. Therefore, any alienation of the land after the publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights, title and interests in land stand vested in the State, under Section 16 of the Act, free from all encumbrances and thereby absolute title in the land is acquired thereunder.” 20. The said proposition of law as also reiterated in Ajay Krishna Shinghal vs. Union of India ( (1996) 10 SCC 721 ) and Star Wire (India) Limited vs. State of Haryana ( (1996) 11 SCC 698 ). 21. In view of the aforesaid decisions it is by now well-settled law that under the Land Acquisition Act, the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and that he would be only entitled to get the compensation.” 15.2.3. Hence, the petitioner-5 to 10 who are the subsequent purchasers of impugned land have no locus standi to challenge the above writ petition. 15.3.1. As regards laches: From the very fact that the preliminary notification was passed on 15.07.1982, the final notification was passed on 05.08.1986, the award was passed on 27.05.1997 and the appellants/petitioners have chosen to move this Court in the year 2003, shows there is a glaring and apparent delay in challenging the impugned notification. It is fatal even to entertain the above writ petition. 15.3.2. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for laches by applying the ratio rendered in the case State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Dr. Laxmi and Others ( (1996) 6 SCC 445 ), wherein it is held as hereunder: “Delay in challenging the notification was fatal and writ petition entails with dismissal on grounds of laches. It is thus, well settled law that when there is an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the court should be loathe to quash the notifications. It is thus, well settled law that when there is an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference.” 15.4. Issue No.V is therefore, answered accordingly. 16.1. Issue No.VI: Whether the refusal to de-notify the impugned land by the State Government is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? 16.2. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, the de-notification order dated 5.10.2007 made in respect of land belonging to one S.M. Kannaiah located in the same survey number has been withdrawn by the government by order dated 23.3.2009 and that the Government has taken a uniform stand, which, in our considered opinion, is neither discriminatory nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 16.3. Issue No.VI is, therefore, answered in the negative. 17. In view of the findings rendered on the above Issue Nos.I to VI, the writ appeal fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed. However, no order as to costs.