JUDGMENT Honble Mrs. Poonam Srivastav, J.—Heard Sri Manish Trivedi and Sri A.K. Bajpai, learned counsels for the petitioners, Ms. Shikha Singh Advocate for the respondent No. 1, Sri Nikhil Kumar Advocate for the respondent No. 2 and Sri M. K. Gupta Advocate for the respondent No. 3. 2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and as agreed between the counsels for the parties, writ petition is heard finally. 3. Notices were accepted by Sri M.K. Gupta Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 3 Yogesh Kishan Dhall, son of Late Kishan Chand Dhall, Sri Nikhil Kumar Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 2 Sohan Agrawal and Ms. Shikha Singh Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 1 Bharat Press. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Sri M.K. Gupta Advocate filed an application on 3.9.2009 bringing on record a compromise application on behalf of the petitioners and respondent No. 3. Joint affidavits have been filed by Anoop Chandra Agrawal and Sri Neeraj Dhall where the parties have entered into an agreement on account of the reason that father of the respondent No. 3 who is a very old man and was admitted in Apolo Hospital, New Delhi and therefore he requested for some sympathetic consideration. Finally they entered into an agreement after institution of the writ petition that the respondent No. 3 will continue as tenant of the disputed shop on the ground floor for a period of 5 years at the government rental value of Rs. 3,000/- per month from the date of order of the Court and parties have agreed that for a period of 5 years, the petitioners will not seek eviction of the respondent No. 3 alone and the respondent No. 3 has further agreed to vacate the disputed shop in recognition of the fact that the petitioner No. 1 Dr. Ram Chandra Agrawal will require the shop for his proposed registered clinic for his private practice only. Accordingly the writ petition was decided in terms of compromise viz.-a-viz between the petitioners and respondent No. 3 on 11.9.2009. 4. The dispute relates to a shop situated on the ground floor of accommodation No. 106/93, K.P. Kakkar Road, Allahabad. The respondents are three different tenants occupying entire ground floor. The respondent No. 1 is a tenant at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are paying Rs. 4. The dispute relates to a shop situated on the ground floor of accommodation No. 106/93, K.P. Kakkar Road, Allahabad. The respondents are three different tenants occupying entire ground floor. The respondent No. 1 is a tenant at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are paying Rs. 200/- per month as rent. The petitioner No. 1 retired as eye surgeon from Sitapur Eye Hospital Trust and was living with his family in his ancestral house. The petitioner No. 2 is his only son who has now shifted from Sultanpur to Allahabad with his entire family in the year 1995 and is living in the residential accommodation situated above the shop. Petitioner No. 1 and his wife have also shifted to Allahabad and are living on the second floor with his son petitioner No. 2. 5. A release application was filed by the petitioners under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of three shops on the ground floor. The need and requirement pleaded in the release application is that the petitioner No. 2 was previously enrolled as an Advocate but did not practice and finally surrendered his registration certificate to the Bar Council of U.P. on 25.5.1995. He started printing business in partnership of one Sanjeev Misra in the name and style of M/s Printrite which was run from the house of Mr. Sanjeev Mishra, 523/450, Badshahi Mandi, Allahabad. The partnership was dissolved in the year 2001 and the petitioner No. 2 having no other option was compelled to take away the printing machines, computer, furniture etc. which are now kept on the second floor of the disputed shop. Since then the petitioner No. 2 is idle without any work and unemployed, therefore, he required the shops in dispute for his personal use to set up his printing business. The need of the petitioner No. 1 was also set up for the ground floor accommodation i.e. the disputed shop as petitioner No. 1 had suffered massive heart attack on 15.9.2002 and was admitted in Nazareth Hospital, Allahabad. The need of the petitioner No. 1 was also set up for the ground floor accommodation i.e. the disputed shop as petitioner No. 1 had suffered massive heart attack on 15.9.2002 and was admitted in Nazareth Hospital, Allahabad. He was referred to Escort Hospital, New Delhi and is also a patient of diabetes and high blood pressure and doctor has strictly advised him not to use stairs but having no other option but to ascend and descend the staircase on the second floor number of times during the day. The petitioner No. 1 also required job as he wanted to open a small clinic on the ground floor after shifting so that he may be engaged and also put his skill to good use. Thus the bonafide need set up in the release application was on the aforesaid two grounds. On perusal of the release application, it transpires that it was urgently required for both the petitioners. Request to the respondents to vacate the ground floor failed to yield any result. 6. The respondents-tenant filed their objection denying their bonafide need of the petitioners pleading comparative hardship in their favour. Specific objection was that the petitioner No. 1 and his wife did not reside in Allahabad and they are permanently residing at Sultanpur and they have two big houses at Sultanpur. He is rerunning his medical clinic at Sultanpur and claim by the petitioner that he had a massive heart patient and diabetes is concocted and not worth reliance. The ground for release of the disputed shop was also denied. Sales tax registration, partnership deed and dissolution deed were also denied. The petitioner had also filed affidavit of Sanjeev Mishra, erstwhile partner of the petitioner No. 2 which is numbered as Paper No. 48B supporting the contention of the petitioner No. 2 regarding partnership business of printing press for the period from 1995 to 2001. Subsequently when Sanjeev Mishra was got employed after death of his father in Allahabad University on compassionate ground, the partnership firm was dissolved. Neeraj Dhall, son of respondent No. 3 had given his affidavit on 1.7.2008 expressing willingness to vacate the back portion hall of the first floor of the disputed house. The petitioners had also offered an alternative accommodation to respondent Nos. Neeraj Dhall, son of respondent No. 3 had given his affidavit on 1.7.2008 expressing willingness to vacate the back portion hall of the first floor of the disputed house. The petitioners had also offered an alternative accommodation to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to shift their business to the first floor from the ground floor of the same building but they refused to agree and instead preferred to contest the release application. 7. The trial Court dismissed the release application vide its judgment dated 11.8.2008. The petitioners preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act challenging the judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority which was numbered as Rent Appeal No. 119 of 2008. 8. During pendency of the appeal, additional documentary evidence was also brought on record on behalf of the petitioner. A request was made by the landlord that documents brought on record at the stage of appeal were old documents and were misplaced and mixed up with the old unused papers and not traceable and, therefore, it could not be brought on record while the proceedings were pending before the Prescribed Authority. The said documents were refused by the appellate Court primarily on the ground that the petitioners failed to file the partnership deed which was very essential and, therefore, document relating to partnership with Sanjeev Mishra was not acceptable and thus the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the same were refused illegally. Another application was moved on behalf of the petitioners under Section 34 read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules framed under the Act bringing to the notice of the Court that the partnership deed was also on record of the trial Court and, therefore, the Court has wrongly rejected the application for taking the documents on record. However, this application was once again rejected by the appellate Court on 17.3.2009. However, the appellate Court required both the contesting parties to submit their written submissions and thereafter dismissed the appeal vide judgment and order dated 28.5.2009. Both the judgments are impugned in the instant writ petition. 9. The submission of learned counsels appearing for the landlordpetitioners is that both the Courts below have erred in law and also principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in its various decisions taking lop sided view in favour of the tenants on wholly irrelevant consideration. 9. The submission of learned counsels appearing for the landlordpetitioners is that both the Courts below have erred in law and also principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in its various decisions taking lop sided view in favour of the tenants on wholly irrelevant consideration. Besides refusal to accept documents relating to partnership with Sanjeev Mishra on one hand and taking an adverse view for want of those very documents are evidently erroneous. 10. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have contested the release application. Counter and rejoinder affidavits as well as written submissions have been filed by respective counsels. Two judgments of the Courts below have been supported by Ms. Shikha Singh and Nikhil Kumar Advocates. It is submitted on behalf of the tenants that both the Courts below have come to conclusion that the landlord does not require the accommodation in question and need is not bonafide therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 11. Learned counsels on behalf of the petitioners have challenged each and every findings of the two Courts and have laid emphasis that once the Prescribed Authority had taken into consideration and given findings on the partnership deed, the appellate Court could not have refused documents who is the last Court of fact. However, affidavit of partner Sanjeev Mishra was already on record and that was sufficient to substantiate that some printing business was carried out in the partnership of Sanjeev Mishra and petitioner No. 2. Besides the claim of the petitioner No. 1 that on every day he has to climb 50 steps on second floor and the Courts were completely misled while rejecting the release application. 12. I have heard the respective counsels at length and also examined two judgments in detail as well as various documents filed in support of the respective submissions. On a close scrutiny of the judgments and arguments advanced by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioners and respondents, it is apparent that the judgments are not legally balanced. 12. I have heard the respective counsels at length and also examined two judgments in detail as well as various documents filed in support of the respective submissions. On a close scrutiny of the judgments and arguments advanced by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioners and respondents, it is apparent that the judgments are not legally balanced. Both the Courts while holding that the petitioner No. 1 is having two big houses at Sultanpur as well as taking into consideration the fact that he is a retired eye surgeon at Sultanpur has completely lost sight of the fact that now the same retired man is living at Allahabad with his son on the second floor and he cannot be compelled to live in Sultanpur. He may have a number of houses in different cities but it is absolutely immaterial. It is not for the Court to direct the landlord to choose the place where he should reside, specially in the instant case where the Courts below have completely given a goodbye to the consideration that the petitioner No. 1 is an old ailing man having heart problem and if he wants to live with his son and his family, it ought to have been respected. The Courts cannot compel the petitioner to live and run business in a particular city or in a particular building, specially the Courts were liable to take into consideration that the petitioner No. 2 is the only son of the petitioner No. 1 and if he has preferred to live with him despite the misery of scaling steep stairs every day, the findings cannot be said to be justiciable, specially when both the Courts have accepted the fact that the petitioner No. 1 is a heart patient but declined to release on the basis of an assumption that he is living in Sultanpur. Some stray prescriptions have been relied upon to come to this conclusion whereas it is amply explained that he had gone to Sultanpur for a few days and some of his old acquaintances approached him and he had written out the said prescriptions. Some stray prescriptions have been relied upon to come to this conclusion whereas it is amply explained that he had gone to Sultanpur for a few days and some of his old acquaintances approached him and he had written out the said prescriptions. The ground of bonafide need has not been accepted only on account of the finding that he has two houses at Sultanpur but the Courts completely overlooked the fact that it is situated outside the municipal limit of Allahabad where the landlord has preferred to reside in his old age with his only son. The appellate Court has also gone to the extent of taking into consideration some family settlement which cannot be taken into consideration and it is something between the landlords interse. Both the Courts have completely failed to appreciate the grounds as well as evidence on record and also the fact that all the printing machineries and appliances are kept at the residence of petitioner No. 2 on the second floor. In fact while declining to accept the case of the landlord, the Courts have relied upon seal of the treasury on the back side of the stamp of first page of dissolution deed which mentions 19.5.1998. It is absolutely insignificant as this was not a case or objection set up by the tenant. It is not unusual, old stamps are in possession and there is no limitation for using them. No inference can be drawn on its basis. While coming to conclusion against the landlord the Courts below have taken into consideration that first floor portion was vacated by some tenant and was given to Neeraj Dhall. This has specifically been replied by the landlord on affidavit that he had agreed to vacate the ground floor portion and, therefore, the first floor was offered to him as an alternative accommodation but subsequently he declined from his own assurance. It is also stated on affidavit that the petitioner No. 2 is doing job work by getting orders from different Universities and is getting printing work from the market which is hardly profitable and he gets only nominal commission. Thus he is suffering in day to day business. 13. It is also stated on affidavit that the petitioner No. 2 is doing job work by getting orders from different Universities and is getting printing work from the market which is hardly profitable and he gets only nominal commission. Thus he is suffering in day to day business. 13. In fact after going through the judgment, I realize that the Courts have taken small and extraneous matter into consideration and not considered broadly the principles laid down for coming to definite conclusion whether the accommodation is required bonafidely or not and also regarding the comparative hardship. I have also noticed that the appellate Court though has halfheartedly come to a conclusion that the landlords are suffering hardship but since the finding on the bonafide need was recorded against the landlord, the appeal has also been dismissed. The Courts have strenuously tried to negate the case of the landlord ignoring specific assertions on affidavit. The Court has also disbelieved the assertion that partnership stands dissolved for want of the partnership deed on one hand while they have refused to accept the document in evidence. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100 has held that to deprive a landlord of the benefit of release on account of availability of alternative residential accommodation in another city is not a ground to disentitle the landlord from recovery of possession of tenanted accommodation. The Apex Court has categorically come to a conclusion that it is unnecessary to make endeavour as to how the landlords have adjusted in another accommodation. This is what exactly the Courts below have done in the instant case. They have tried to somehow advise the landlord and also grant heavy consideration to the tenant only because they have set up a goodwill since last 40-50 years or because they do not have any other place to go. The Courts below were liable to take into consideration that it is the landlord himself who is the best judge of his requirement. The Courts cannot dictate how and where he should live. Same view was expressed in the case of Nanak Chand (since deceased) and others v. Jai Bhagwan, 2009 (1) ARC 829. The Courts below were liable to take into consideration that it is the landlord himself who is the best judge of his requirement. The Courts cannot dictate how and where he should live. Same view was expressed in the case of Nanak Chand (since deceased) and others v. Jai Bhagwan, 2009 (1) ARC 829. In the said case the landlord had sought release on the ground that he is retired and wants to live in his hometown and also to do the research work and write articles and papers on the subject of science and also teach some students free of charge. This Court was of the view that it is a very valid ground and held that the landlord was entitled for his accommodation. Similar view was expressed in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others v. Tilak Raj Bajaj (d) by L.Rs. and others, 2008 (3) ARC 532. Extract of relevant paragraph is quoted below : “The Counsel is also right in submitting that admittedly, Matloob Ahmad had retired from service. Even if the tenant was right in submitting that the landlord belonged to a higher strata of society, it did not mean that all throughout his life after retirement, Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No. 6 should not do any work. If he wanted to get himself engaged in doing some business. It could not be held that he would not be entitled to possession of property for doing business since he was rich and even without doing any business, he could maintain himself. A finding as to bonafide requirement for doing ready made business by Matloob Ahmad has been expressly recorded by the Appellate Authority. The said finding was a finding of fact. Neither it could have been interfered with, nor it has been set aside by the writ Court. In view of the above position, the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition.” Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Company, (2000) 1 SCC 679 , 2000 SCFBRC, 24, is another authority for the proposition that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement for residential or commercial purpose and has complete freedom in the matter. In this authority the Apex Court has relied upon its earlier judgment in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 . 15. In this authority the Apex Court has relied upon its earlier judgment in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 . 15. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC, 397 : 2002 SCFBRC 388, the Apex Court with a reference to the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, on the question of bonafide need, after surveying its earlier pronouncements, has held that the requirement of a major son and a coparcener in a joint Hindu family intending to start a business is the requirement of the landlord himself as was held in B. Balaiah v. Chandoor Lachaiah, AIR 1965 AP 435 . The words “for his own use” must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. It has been further held that while casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. 16. In Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan and others, (1979) 1 SCC 273 : 1986 SCFBRC 346, it has been held that rent control laws must be construed reasonably. They should be interpreted in such a way as to achieve the object of enabling landlord to evict tenant where the statute grants such right in favour of landlord. 17. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Akhileshwar Kumar and others v. Mustaqim and others, JT 2002 (10) SC 203 : 2003 SCFBRC 137, that landlord has the right of choosing the accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy his requirements. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) it has been held by the Apex Court that the fact that landlady was in possession of another flat in another city is not a ground to disentitle her to seek recovery of possession of tenanted premises. 18. The Apex Court in Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Das and others, JT 2004 (Suppl. 1) SC 538 : 2004 SCFBRC 338, has held that there is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner. The basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all time to come. 19. 1) SC 538 : 2004 SCFBRC 338, has held that there is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner. The basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all time to come. 19. Smt. Sharda Devi v. Colonel Dinesh Chandra and others, 1977 ARC 46, is an authority for the proposition that if a landlord owns house at several places and needs one of several other houses to settle after retirement, need is genuine and landlord can settle at any place of his liking. Tenant cannot superimpose his wishes on landlord. 20. In the case of Raj Kumar v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 2007 (68) ALR, 555, the Court was of the view that it is settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose. 21. In the case of Mohd. Ayyub v. District Judge, Lucknow and another, 2007 (68) ALR 603, it was held that bonafide need and requirement of a premises for business purposes and augmentation of income for oneself and for the family cannot be negativated in any circumstances. The intention to establish son in his career and the requirement of the premises for the same purpose cannot be termed as malafide. Need of landlord to settle his son in independent business cannot be defeated on mere fact that the son was working in a tailoring shop. Every individual has a right to settle himself independently in business. 22. This Court in the case of Harish Bhatia v. Smt. Johra Begum, 2008 (71) ALR 857, has held that to establish her son in business the landlady could establish the business of her son from the room available on the second floor and it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord how he should adjust without getting possession of the tenanted premises. 23. In the case of Mohabbey Ali v. Tej Bahadur and others, 2009 (2) ARC 715 the Court declined to look and examine comparative hardship of the tenant. An identical situation appear in the instant case, the tenant has nowhere stated that he has tried to look an alternative accommodation whatsoever, after initiation of the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. 23. In the case of Mohabbey Ali v. Tej Bahadur and others, 2009 (2) ARC 715 the Court declined to look and examine comparative hardship of the tenant. An identical situation appear in the instant case, the tenant has nowhere stated that he has tried to look an alternative accommodation whatsoever, after initiation of the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority. In such a circumstance, I am of the view that the tenant is not entitled for comparison of his hardship while recording a finding on the question. In the case of Sushila v. IInd Additional District Judge, 2003 (1) ARC 256 similar view was adopted. Also in the case of Gulab Bai v. Nalin Narsimonia, (1993) 3 SCC 483 the Apex Court held that the tenant should make an effort to search for an alternative accommodation and a specific assertion is essential to establish his ‘hardship’. 24. The Apex Court held that the word ‘reasonable requirement’ undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need to a mere desire or wish. The view taken by the Apex Court was that the distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but it should not be extended so far as to make even a genuine need as a desire. Perusal of two judgments apparently has stretched its arms too long while declining to accept the need of the landlords as ‘bonafide’. Stray circumstances have been given tall meaning only to discard the evidence and the contention of the landlord. It is eloquent on the face of the two judgments of the Courts below that conscious and deliberate effort has been made to negate the valid contention of the petitioners. 25. In view of the aforesaid discussions, it is a foregone conclusion that the need of the landlord is genuine, bonafide and the landlords are defenitely suffering greater hardship and they are entitled for release of the two shops in possession of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Both the father and son have conclusively pleaded and affirmed their independent need for a vacant accommodation and therefore, both the shops are liable to be released in their favour. I am not inclined to remand the matter for afresh decision. Admittedly, father is a very old man and remand of the case might render the entire purpose of institution of the release application fruitless. I am not inclined to remand the matter for afresh decision. Admittedly, father is a very old man and remand of the case might render the entire purpose of institution of the release application fruitless. The Apex Court in the case of G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin and others, AIR 2002 SC 200 allowed the release application straightaway setting aside the findings of the Prescribed Authority, Appellate Authority and the High Court on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship. The Apex Court was of the view that no fruitful purpose will be solved in remanding the matter and thereby opening another gate of fresh series of litigation. Similar view was adopted by the Apex Court in the case of R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple and another, 2004 All. C.J., 304 (S.C.). 26. I am conscious of the fact that this Court cannot reevaluate the evidence and substitute its own findings because two views are possible. A bare perusal of the release application, objections filed by tenants and the various affidavits it is abundantly clear that the landlords (petitioners) who are owners require the shops for their personal need. They are the first and the rightful claimant to use their own property as they want it. This is a situation where father and son with their spouses are facing a number of problems and therefore the release of the shops cannot be refused. The very purpose of the Act stands frustrated if the two judgments of the Courts are left to stand. 27. In the circumstances and for the reasons detailed herein above the writ petition is allowed. The judgment and order dated 11.8.2008 passed by the Small Causes Court, Allahabad in P.A. Case No. 13 of 2005 and judgment and order dated 28.5.2009 passed by the Additional District and Session Judge, Court No. 12, Allahabad in Rent Control Appeal No. 119 of 2008 are quashed. 28. In the end, learned counsels for the tenants have made a request for granting some time to the tenants to vacate the shops in question. However, the request of the learned counsels for the tenants that some time may be allowed to vacate the shops in question appears to be reasonable and justified. 29. 28. In the end, learned counsels for the tenants have made a request for granting some time to the tenants to vacate the shops in question. However, the request of the learned counsels for the tenants that some time may be allowed to vacate the shops in question appears to be reasonable and justified. 29. The tenants are permitted six months’ time from today to vacate the shops in question and handover vacant possession to the landlord till 25.4.2010 provided they file an undertaking within a period of four weeks before the Prescribed Authority that they will continue to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 3000/- per month from the date of judgment till they hand over vacant possession and also they will not sublet or handover possession to any third person but for the landlords. In the event the tenants fail to file an undertaking in the shape of an affidavit within the aforesaid period, this liberty of six months shall automatically come to an end. ————