JUDGMENT Rajes Kumar, J. - The Revenue has filed the present revision under section 11 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act") against the order of the Tribunal dated May 25, 1998 for the assessment year 1989-90. The applicant was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of hard coke. It is claimed that the manufactured hard coke was not liable to tax because it was manufactured out of the tax-paid coal and both coal and hard coke are the same commodities. The claim of the applicant has been denied on the ground that both coal and hard coke are two different commodities and the applicant being manufacturer of hard coke is liable to tax. Being aggrieved by the assessment order, the dealer/opposite party filed the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Trade Tax, Varanasi which has been rejected vide order dated November 15, 1995. The dealer filed second appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned order allowed the appeal and declared the turnover of hard coke as non-taxable. The Tribunal held that the coal and hard coke are not a different commodity but are the same commodity and since it is made out of the tax-paid coal the hard coke is not further liable to tax. Heard Sri B. K. Pandey, learned standing counsel for the applicant and Sri Piyush Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party. Sri B. K. Pandey, learned standing counsel, submitted that the assessing authority found that the hard coke was manufactured after the processing of coal breeze. He submitted that as against 12058 tons of coal, 8938 ton hard coke was manufactured. The difference has been shown as burning loss. He submitted that the Tribunal in its order has also observed that in the manufacturing of hard coke from coal a manufacturing process is involved in which its nature changes but there is no difference in fundamental nature, therefore, it has been admitted by the Tribunal also that in the manufacturing of hard coke from coal a manufacturing process is involved and the nature of the commodity changes. Therefore, treating both the items as one and the same is wholly unjustified. He submitted that coal and hard coke are two different commodities by its composition, nature and use. Therefore, treating both the items as one and the same is wholly unjustified. He submitted that coal and hard coke are two different commodities by its composition, nature and use. Though it is true that both coal and hard coke are used as a fuel but two commodities being different to each other and hard coke is manufactured and obtained as a manufactured product from the coal by a burning process. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the order of the Tribunal and authorities below. It appears that the coal breezes are being burnt at a specific temperature to remove the impurities from the coal and as a result of such burning process hard coke is obtained. Hard coke is a highly combustible item. Though breezes and hard coke both are used as fuel but hard coke is used for specific purposes being highly combustible. The "manufacture" as defined under section 2(e1) of the Act reads as follows : "'Manufacture' means producing, making, mining, collecting, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing, or otherwise processing, treating or adapting any goods, but does not include such manufacture or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed." The above definition is very wide as held by this court in B.P. Oil Mills Ltd. v. Sales Tax Tribunal [1998] 111 STC 188 (SC); AIR 1998 SC 3055 ; 1998 UPTC 1020 (SC). The definition of "manufacture" in section 2(e1) of the Act includes "processing, treating or adapting any goods". Thus, the meaning of "manufacture" in the U.P. Trade Tax Act is wider. A dealer will be liable to pay tax on sale of any goods he makes by processing, treating or adapting the goods he purchased. In B.P. Oil Mills [1998] 111 STC 188 (SC); AIR 1998 SC 3055 ; 1998 UPTC 1020 (SC), the Supreme Court held that refining crude oil amounts to "manufacture". In the case of Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in [1981] 47 STC 124; 1981 UPTC 702 the apex court observed that where any commodity is subjected to a process or treatment with a view to its development or preparation for the market it would amount to processing. In the case of Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in [1981] 47 STC 124; 1981 UPTC 702 the apex court observed that where any commodity is subjected to a process or treatment with a view to its development or preparation for the market it would amount to processing. The nature and extent of processing may vary from case to case; in one case the processing may be slight and in another it may be extensive; but in each process suffered the commodity would experience a change. The court further observed that whatever be the means employed for carrying out of processing operation, it is the effect of the operation on the commodity that is material for the purpose of determining whether the operation constitutes processing. In the case of Chowgule & Co. [1981] 47 STC 124; 1981 UPTC 702 the apex court has held as follows : "7. The Revenue however relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Nilgiri Ceylon Tea Supplying Co. v. State of Bombay [1959] 10 STC 500. The assessees in this case were registered dealers in tea under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, and they purchased in bulk diverse brands of tea and without the application of any mechanical or chemical process, blended these brands of different qualities according to a certain formula evolved by them and sold the tea mixture in the market. The question arose before the sales tax authorities whether the different brands of tea purchased and blended by the assessees for the purpose of producing the tea mixture could be said to have been 'processed' after the purchase within the meaning of the proviso to section 8(a), so as to preclude the assessees from being entitled to deduct from their turnover under section 8(a) the value of the tea purchased by them. The High Court of Bombay held that the different brands of tea purchased by the assessees could not be regarded as 'processed' within the meaning of the proviso to clause (a) of section 8, because there was 'not even application of mechanical force so as to subject the commodity to a process, manufacture, development or preparation', and the commodity remained in the same condition. The argument of the Revenue before us was that this decision of the Bombay High Court was on all fours with the present case and if the blending of different brands of tea for the purpose of producing a tea mixture in accordance with a formula evolved by the assessees could not be regarded as 'processing' of tea, equally on a parity of reasoning, blending of ore of different chemical and physical compositions could not be held to constitute 'processing' of the ore. Now undoubtedly there is a close analogy between the facts of the Nilgiri Tea Company's case [1959] 10 STC 500 and the facts of the present case, but we do not think we can accept the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Nilgiri Tea Company's case [1959] 10 STC 500 as laying down the correct law. When different brands of tea were mixed by the assessees in the Nilgiri Tea Company's case [1959] 10 STC 500 (Bom) for the purpose of producing a tea mixture of a different kind and quality according to a formula evolved by them, there was plainly and indubitably processing of the different brands of tea, because these brands of tea experienced, as a result of mixing, qualitative change, in that the tea mixture which came into existence was of different quality and flavour than the different brands of tea which went into the mixture. There are, it is true, some observations in the judgment of the Bombay High Court which seem to suggest that if instead of manual application of energy in mixing the different brands of tea, there had been application of mechanical force in producing the tea mixture, the court might have come to a different conclusion and these observations were relied upon by the assessee, since in the present case the blending was done by application of mechanical force, but we do not think that that is the correct test to be applied for the purpose of determining whether there is 'processing'. The question is not whether there is manual application of energy or there is application of mechanical force. Whatever be the means employed for the purpose of carrying out the operation, it is the effect of the operation on the commodity that is material for the purpose of determining whether the operation constitutes 'processing'. The question is not whether there is manual application of energy or there is application of mechanical force. Whatever be the means employed for the purpose of carrying out the operation, it is the effect of the operation on the commodity that is material for the purpose of determining whether the operation constitutes 'processing'. We are clearly of the view that the blending of ore in the course of loading through the mechanical ore handling plant amounted to 'processing' of ore within the meaning of section 8(3)(b) and rule 13 and the mechanical ore handling plant fell within the description of 'machinery, plant, equipment' used in the processing of ore for sale. It must therefore follow as a necessary corollary that if any items of goods were purchased by the assessee as being intended for use as 'machinery, plant, equipment, tools, spare parts, stores, accessories, fuel or lubricants' for the mechanical ore handling plant, they would be eligible for inclusion in the certificate of registration of the assessee." A perusal of the decision of the apex court in the case of Chowgule & Co. [1981] 47 STC 124; 1981 UPTC 702 it is apparent that the three judges' Bench has not approved the decision of the Bombay High Court and has held that "... Now undoubtedly there is a close analogy between the facts of Nilgiri Tea Company's case [1959] 10 STC 500 (Bom) and the facts of the present case, but we do not think we can accept the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Nilgiri Tea Company's case [1959] 10 STC 500 as laying down the correct law." It further held that "When different brands of tea were mixed by the assessee for the purpose of producing a tea mixture of a different kind and quality according to a formula evolved by them, there was plainly and indubitably processing of the different brands of tea, because these brands of tea experienced, as a result of mixing, qualitative change, in that the tea mixture which came into existence was of different quality and flavour then the different brands of tea which went into the mixture". It has been further held that "we are clearly of the view that the blending of ore in the course of loading through the mechanical ore handling plant amounted to 'processing' of ore within the meaning of section 8(3)(b) and rule 13. It has been further held that "we are clearly of the view that the blending of ore in the course of loading through the mechanical ore handling plant amounted to 'processing' of ore within the meaning of section 8(3)(b) and rule 13. ..." A Constitution Bench in Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 STC 430 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 1895 , while considering the case of extracting the oil from oil-seeds, held that the edible oils produced were different from the oil-seeds, and hence the edible oil produced is taxable though tax has already been paid on the oil-seeds. Apex court referred to the dictionary meaning of the "manufacture" as "to transform or fashion raw materials into a changed form for use" and held that oil is produced out of the seeds. The process certainly transforms the raw materials into different articles for use, and therefore is taxable as a new commercial commodity. This court further explained that in a case where the scrap iron ingots undergo a vital change in the process of manufacture and are converted into different commodities, i.e., rolled steel sections, during the process the scrap iron loses its identity and becomes a new marketable commodity and, therefore, the process is certainly one of manufacture. In Ashirwad Ispat Udyog v. State Level Committee [1999] 112 STC 207; [1998] 8 SCC 85; [1999] UPTC 93, apex court considered the scope of the definition of the term "manufacture" under the provisions of section 2(j) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, which is in pari materia with section 2(e1) of the Act, and held that manufacture is not confined to a new marketable commodity but also includes old articles made saleable. The court held as under : "Decisions construing the meaning of the word 'manufacture' as used in other statutes do not apply unless the definition of that word in the particular statute under consideration is similar to that construed in the decisions. The plain construction of the special definition of the word in a particular Act must prevail. In the special definition given in section 2(j) of the said Act 'manufacture' has been defined as including a process or manner of producing, collecting, extracting, preparing or making any goods. There can be no doubt whatsoever that 'collecting' goods does not result in the production of a new article. In the special definition given in section 2(j) of the said Act 'manufacture' has been defined as including a process or manner of producing, collecting, extracting, preparing or making any goods. There can be no doubt whatsoever that 'collecting' goods does not result in the production of a new article. There is, therefore, inherent evidence in the definition itself that the narrow meaning of the word 'manufacture' was not intended to be applied in the said Act. Again the definition speaks of 'the process of lopping the branches (of trees), cutting the trunks'. The lopping of branches and the cutting of trunks of trees also, self-evidently, does not produce a new article. The clear words of the definition, therefore, must be given due weight and cannot be overlooked merely because in other contexts the word 'manufacture' has been judicially held to refer to the process of manufacture of new articles." In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Coco Fibres [1991] 80 STC 249; AIR 1991 SC 378 , the apex court considered the provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 wherein the term "manufacturing process" was considered and held that conversion of coconut husk into a coconut fibre was a manufacturing process. This court held that by the process of manufacture, something is produced and brought into existence which is different from that out of which it is made, in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercial commodity capable of being sold or supplied. The material from which the thing or product is manufactured, may necessarily lose its identity or may become transformed into the basic or essential properties. The article that would emerge as a result of the process of manufacture must be a distinct and new article recognized or known as such in the commercial parlance for sale or supply. In Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Haryana State Board AIR 1992 SC 224 , the apex court explained the distinction between manufacture and processing observing that the construction of words and the meaning to be given for such words shall normally depend on the nature, scope and purpose of the statute in which it is occurring and to the fitness of the matter to the statute. Apex court held that if a matter is processed, the product may not lose its original character. Apex court held that if a matter is processed, the product may not lose its original character. For example, the vegetables may be processed which even after processing, retain its character as vegetable while in manufacturing, something is necessarily to be brought into existence which is different from that which originally existed in the sense that the thing produced is a commercially different article. Thus, a statute is required to be interpreted strictly and the definition clause must be examined in a correct perspective giving the meaning of each word contained therein. The court held as under : "Manufacture implies a change but every change is not manufacture, and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. ... The essential point thus is that in manufacture, something is brought into existence which is different from that originally existed in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercially different commodity whereas in the case of processing it is not necessary to produce a commercially different article. Processing essentially effectuates a change in the form, contour, physical appearance or chemical combination or otherwise by artificial or natural means and in its more complicated form involves progressive action in performing, producing or making something. (Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission [1944] C.C.A. 7; 144 F. 2d 211)." In Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 791 , the apex court explained the word "manufacture" used as a verb which is generally understood to mean bringing into existence of a new substance and does not mean merely to bring some change in a substance, however, minor in consequence the change may be. In a manufacture, there must be transformation and a different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. A similar view has been reiterated in Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Associated Stone Industries [2000] 6 SCC 141. In State of Maharashtra v. Mahalaxmi Stores [2003] 129 STC 79; [2003] 1 SCC 70; [2003] UPTC 453, the apex court held that processing or variation of the goods or finishing of goods would not amount to manufacture unless it results in emergence of a new commercial commodity. In State of Maharashtra v. Mahalaxmi Stores [2003] 129 STC 79; [2003] 1 SCC 70; [2003] UPTC 453, the apex court held that processing or variation of the goods or finishing of goods would not amount to manufacture unless it results in emergence of a new commercial commodity. In the case of Sonebhadra Fuels v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. reported in [2006] 147 STC 594 (SC); [2007] UPTC 628, the question for consideration was whether the conversion of coal breeze into coal briquettes amounts to manufacturing. The crushed coal below 2 mm. size are mixed with suitable binders and by a centrifugal process and such briquette obtained is given shape of 30-100 mm. which is called as coal briquettes. Such coal briquette is used as fuel and treated as coal. The apex court held as follows : "We may mention that, as noted above, decisions construing the word 'manufacture' in other statutes are not necessarily applicable when interpreting section 2(e1) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. As stated above, the definition of 'manufacture' in section 2(e1) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act is very wide, which includes processing, treating or adapting any goods. Hence, in our opinion, the expression 'manufacture' covers within its sweep not only such activities which bring into existence a new commercial commodity different from the articles on which that activity was carried on, but also such activities which do not necessarily result in bringing into existence an article different from the articles on which such activity was carried on. For example, the activity of ornamenting of goods does not result in manufacturing any goods which are commercially different from the goods which had been subjected to ornamentation, but yet it will amount to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(e1) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act since an artificial meaning of 'manufacture' is given in section 2(e1). Hence, whether the commercial identity of the goods subjected to the processing, treating or adapting changes or not, is not very material. ... The learned counsel for the appellant Shri Rakesh Dwivedi submitted that coal briquettes are produced merely by using a binding material such as clay or molasses along with the coal, and hence he submitted that the identity does not change. We regret, we cannot agree with his submission. Firstly, we do not agree that the coal briquettes are the same commercial commodity as coal. We regret, we cannot agree with his submission. Firstly, we do not agree that the coal briquettes are the same commercial commodity as coal. In our opinion, coal is a raw material for making coal briquettes. The method of manufacturing coal briquettes has been stated above, and this certainly is a processing, treating or adapting the coal. The appellant manufactures coal briquettes by compiling the hard coke breeze mechanically with the help of cinders which is usually five per cent of the total hard coke breeze. In the compilation of the hard coke breeze, 95 per cent of the hard coke breeze, which is known as coal-dust or breeze coke is taken which is compiled with the help of clay and molasses. Hence, in our opinion, coal briquettes is a different commercial commodity from coal. Moreover, even if it is not a different commercial commodity, the process of making coal briquettes will amount to a 'manufacture' as it is processing, treating or adapting coal. In our opinion, by the processing of coal to make coal briquette, the coal-dust loses its identity. Coal briquettes and coal-dust are two different commodities in substance as well as in characteristics. The coal briquettes are altogether in different shape, form and moisture as well as characteristics, as compared to coal-dust." Admittedly coal breeze is being burnt at a specific temperature to remove the impurities from the coal. It involves some process. By process of burning, the coal ceases its original character. Hard coke which is obtained out of the aforesaid process is highly combustible and is commercially known as a different commodity. Therefore, the process involved in converting the coal into hard coke is the process of manufacturing within the ambit of section 2(ee) of the Act and, therefore, sales made by the applicant of such hard coke is liable to tax. The Tribunal has erred in granting exemption on the turnover of hard coke. The order of the Tribunal is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. The Tribunal has erred in granting exemption on the turnover of hard coke. The order of the Tribunal is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon two decisions of this court; one in the case of Khanna Coke Industries Limited, Moradabad v. Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax reported in [1987] 64 STC 335 [App]; [1978] UPTC 473 and another in the case of Ashoka Industries, Saharanpur v. Commissioner of Sales Tax reported in 1989 UPTC 562, wherein this court has held that coal briquettes fall within the entry of all kinds of coal. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that hard coke is also one of the forms of the coal and, therefore, once the tax has been paid on the coal, the applicant is not liable for further tax on hard coke. In my view, the aforesaid two decisions are not relevant to the issue involved in the present case. Hard coke for the purposes of rate of tax may fall within the entry of "coal of all kinds" being one of the forms of coal but the question involved in the present case is whether the applicant is liable to tax on the sale of hard coke as a manufacturer and the process of converting the coal into hard coke amounts to manufacturing. If the process of conversion of coal into hard coke amounts to manufacturing and the hard coke is a different commercial commodity than the coal, the applicant is liable to tax on the sale of hard coke being the manufacturer. In view of above, in my view, the process of conversion of coal into hard coke amounts to manufacturing within the ambit of section 2(ee) of the Act. The applicant is liable to tax on the sale of hard coke being the manufacturer. For the reasons stated above, the revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the order of the assessing authority is restored.