JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—The petitioner is functioning as an officiating Principal in Shri Raghubir Sahai Jauhari Adarsh Vidyapeeth Kanya Uchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Bhoor, Bareilly since 1st of July, 1991. The writ petition gives various details of a series of litigation between the petitioner and the management and between the petitioner and respondent No. 6, which, the Court is not concerned with. Suffice it to say, in a nutshell, the petitioner, the management of the institution and the respondent No. 6 are at logger heads and do not see eye to eye and, this is the main cause which has resulted in the filing of the present writ petition. 2. The facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition is, that the Committee of Management in its meeting dated 29th November, 2008 resolved to suspend the petitioner by exercising the powers under Section 16-G (5) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The requisite papers for necessary approval or disapproval of the action taken by the management was sent to the District Inspector of Schools on 3rd December, 2008, which is alleged to have been received in the office of the Inspector on 5th of December, 2008. It further transpires that simultaneously, papers were also sent by the management for approval of the signatures of the respondent No. 6, who was directed to function as the In-charge Principal during the interim period and whose signatures were duly attested by the Inspector on 3rd December, 2008. The District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 8th of December, 2008 approved the suspension of the petitioner under Section 16-G (7) of the Act holding that the charges levelled against the petitioner, prima facie, appears to be serious in nature. The petitioner, being aggrieved, has filed the present writ petition. 3. Heard Dr. R.G. Padia, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Prakash Padia, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Shri S.S. Sharma, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, Shri R.K. Ojha, the learned counsel for the Committee of Management and its Manager (respondent Nos. 4 and 5) and Dr. H.N. Tripathi, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 6. 4. 1, 2 and 3, Shri R.K. Ojha, the learned counsel for the Committee of Management and its Manager (respondent Nos. 4 and 5) and Dr. H.N. Tripathi, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 6. 4. By an order of the Court dated 13th January, 2009 the District Inspector of Schools was required to produce its record, which has been produced and which the Court has also perused. 5. Dr. R.G. Padia, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Committee of Management could only suspend the petitioner on such grounds as mentioned in Section 16-G (5) of the Act and that the Committee of Management must form an opinion to the effect that the charges levelled against the petitioner was serious enough to eventually warrant her dismissal or removal or reduction in rank or that her continuance in office could hamper or prejudice the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings or any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against her was under investigation, enquiry or trial. The learned counsel submitted that in the present case, no such opinion was formed by the Committee of Management on the gravity of the charge, and therefore, the entire action of suspending the petitioner was ex facie illegal and against the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel further submitted that assuming without admitting that the Committee of Management had expressed its opinion in its resolution, none-the-Iess, the requisite papers was not forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools as provided under Chapter III, Regulation 39 of the Regulations framed under the Act and, consequently, the non­-supply of the requisite papers also vitiates the suspension of the petitioner. The learned counsel also submitted, that even otherwise, the provision of Section 16-G (7) of the Act stipulates that the Inspector before approving or disapproving the action of the management, was required to give a bare minimum opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which was not done in the present case. The learned counsel also submitted, that even otherwise, the provision of Section 16-G (7) of the Act stipulates that the Inspector before approving or disapproving the action of the management, was required to give a bare minimum opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which was not done in the present case. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision in Satya Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (64) ALR 335, in which it was held that the District Inspector of Schools, while according approval or disapproval of the suspension order passed by the Committee of Management, was required to give reasons and was also required to give an opportunity of hearing to the suspended principal or the teacher, as the case may be. The learned counsel further submitted that the said judgment of the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench which is reported in (2006) 3 UPLBEC 2137 . The learned counsel also raised a submission that the Committee of Management could only suspend the petitioner after a formal charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner, as contemplated under Section 16-G (5) of the Act. It may be stated here that initially this plea was raised by the learned counsel, but subsequently, during the course of the hearing of the petition, this plea was withdrawn by the learned counsel. 6. Shri R.K. Ojha, the learned counsel for the Committee of Management submitted that the Committee of Management considered the gravity of the charge and, after being satisfied that the charges were serious, unanimously resolved to suspend the petitioner pending contemplation of an enquiry, and accordingly, forwarded the name of the respondent No. 6 to function as the In-charge Principal during the interim period. The learned counsel submitted that the signatures of the respondent No. 6 was duly attested so that the functioning of the institution was not hampered and that the said attestation by the Inspector was neither mala fide nor any adverse inference could be drawn from the said attestation. The learned counsel submitted that the signatures of the respondent No. 6 was duly attested so that the functioning of the institution was not hampered and that the said attestation by the Inspector was neither mala fide nor any adverse inference could be drawn from the said attestation. The learned counsel submitted that the order of suspension was passed by the Committee of Management in accordance with the provisions of Section 16-G (5) and that the requisite documents was duly sent within the stipulated period to the District Inspector of Schools, in compliance with the provisions of Section 16-G (6) read with Regulation 39 of Chapter III of Regulations framed under the Act. The learned counsel further submitted that the Inspector, after considering the evidence, has prima facie concluded that the charges were serious which warranted the suspension of the petitioner. The learned counsel submitted that the Inspector has prima facie found and was satisfied that the charges were serious, and consequently approved the order of the suspension. Shri R.K. Ojha also submitted that the Inspector was not required to give any opportunity of hearing under Section 16-G (7) to the petitioner. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Managing Committee, Dayanand Inter College, Gorakhpur (through Shri Uma Shankar, Manager) and another v. District Inspector of Schools and others, 1980 UPLBEC 1980. 7. Dr. H.N. Tripathi, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 submitted that pursuant to the resolution of the Committee of Management, the said respondent has been given the charge of officiating Principal and that her signatures have been duly attested by the Inspector and that the said respondent will abide by the decision of the Court. 8. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the District Inspector of Schools has produced the original record which the Court has also perused. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the provisions of Regulation 39 was duly complied with by the management and that as many as 80 documents was sent by the management, which was in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 39. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the provisions of Regulation 39 was duly complied with by the management and that as many as 80 documents was sent by the management, which was in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 39. The learned counsel further submitted that the Inspector had considered the entire matter and, after considering the record, was satisfied that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioner and since the charges were serious, the Inspector accorded the approval of the suspension of the petitioner. The learned Standing Counsel further submitted that no opportunity was required to be given to the petitioner by the Inspector under Section 16­G (7) of the Act. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, this Court is of the opinion that it is not necessary to go into various issues raised by the parties since the Court finds that the writ petition can be decided on one issue itself. For facility, the provisions of Section 16-G (5) to 16-G (7) are quoted hereunder : “(5) No Head of Institution or teacher shall be suspended by the management, unless in the opinion of the management— (a) the charges against him are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank; or (b) his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him; or (c) any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial. (6) Where any Head of Institution or teacher is suspended by the Committee of Management, it shall be reported to the Inspector within thirty days from the date of the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, in case the order of suspension was passed before such commencement, and within seven days from the date of the order of suspension in any other case, and the report shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed and be accompanied by all relevant documents. (7) No such order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by the Inspector, remain in force for more than sixty days from the date of commencement of Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, or as the case may be, from the date of such order, and the order of the Inspector shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court.” 10. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions indicates that no Head of Institution or teacher shall be suspended unless in the opinion of the management the charges against the head of the institution or the teacher are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The said provision casts a mandatory obligation on the management to consider the gravity of the charge or the charges levelled against the head of the institution or the teacher, as the case may be, and must form an opinion, namely, that the charges are so serious that eventually if it was found to be correct, it will merit dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The management, alternatively, has to consider that the continuation of the teacher or the head of the institution would likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings against the head of the institution or the teacher, as the case may be. 11. In the present case, the certified copy of the extract of the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 29.11.2008 has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the counter affidavit of the District Inspector of Schools. A perusal of the resolution of the Committee of Management does not indicate that the Committee has formed any opinion on the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner. The resolution indicates that on the basis of certain charges, the petitioner is being suspended with immediate effect. The resolution, however, records the words “prima facie". The use of the words “prima facie” does not indicate anything with regard to the opinion of the management that was formed on the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner. 12. In my opinion, in the absence of a definite opinion being formed by the Committee of Management, no suspension order could have been passed against the petitioner. The use of the words “prima facie” does not indicate anything with regard to the opinion of the management that was formed on the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner. 12. In my opinion, in the absence of a definite opinion being formed by the Committee of Management, no suspension order could have been passed against the petitioner. The resolution issued by the Committee of Management dated 29th November, 2008 suspending the petitioner is against the provisions of Section 16-G (5) of the Act. This Court is of the opinion that the provision of Section 16-G (5) is mandatory and is compulsorily required to be followed meticulously by the Committee of Management. Since no opinion on the gravity of the charges was formed by the Committee of Management, the resolution of the Committee of Management could not be sustained. Since the very basis of the suspension of the petitioner did not exist, the consequential approval of the suspension order made by the Inspector also falls through and cannot be sustained. In any case, the Court in Satya Pal Singh’s case (supra) has held that a bare minimum opportunity of hearing was required to be given by the Inspector to the petitioner before approving or disapproving the order of suspension, which, in the present case, admittedly, had not been done. Consequently, on this ground also, the order of approval passed by the District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G (7) cannot be sustained. 13. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned resolution of the Committee of Management suspending the petitioner under Section 16-G (5) and the consequential approval order of the District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G (7) are quashed. The writ petition is allowed. It has been stated that a charge-sheet has been issued to the petitioner. It will be open to the Committee of Management to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. 14. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. ————