Judgment : Challenging the detention order in C3.D.O. No. 42 of 2009 dated 25. 2009 whereby detenu Maha @ Mahalingam has been branded; as ‘Goonda’, under the provisions of Tamil Nadu prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, Forest-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (in short “Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982)”), father of the detenu has filed this Habeas Corpus Petition. 2. Detenu has involved two adverse murder cases. First adverse case is Crime No. 454 of 2003 of Bagayam Police Station’ under Section 302 IPC. In the first adverse case, detenu and his three associates viz., Bharath, Mutharasu and Ramesh Babu have allegedly committed murder of one Jilani @ Mamoo of Vellore and cut him into pieces and kept those pieces in three different bags and threw away in the railway track in Bagayam Police limit. 3. The second adverse case is Crime No. 26 of 2009 of Sathuvachari Police Station under Section 341, 324, 302 IPC. In the second adverse case detenu and his associate Bharat are alleged, to have committed murder of Sankar, brother of one Sooriya with whom detenu had grudge. Detenu is alleged to have indiscriminately inflicted cut injuries over the neck and throat of Shankar with knife. 4. The ground case relates to murder of John Sekar working as P.R.O in C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore in Crime No. 91 of 2009 of Viruthambut Police Station under Section 341, 302 IPC. One babu @ Paul Jayanandan was running ‘Amarar vans’ in C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore and his contract was withdrawn and therefore the said Babu @ Paul Jayanandan had developed enmity towards deceased John Sekar working as P.R.O. in C.M.C. Hospital. According to the prosecution, the said Babu @ Paul Jayanandan has engaged the detenu and his associate Appu @ Rajendran as hooligan to commit murder of John Sekar. On 13. 2009 at 5.45 p.m., when the deceased John Sekar was proceeding with his wife Rathna Ponmalar (working as Assistant Professor in the Department) of Physics at Vooies College, Vellore) and that they reached E.B. Nagar curve, 8th street in Sakthi Nagar, detenu and his associate Appu @ Rajendran wrongfully restrained them and detenu caught hold and stabbed on the back of John Sekar and fled away in, the same two wheeler. 5. 5. Investigation of the case revealed that act of the detenu committing brutal murder of John Sekar in the public road during day light has created insecurity in the minds of public in the area and created tense situation. Detenu was engaged as hooligan to commit murder of John Sekar. Based on the complaint lodged by Rathna Ponmalar, case was registered in Viruthambut Police Station Crime No. 91 of 2009 under Section 341, 302 IPC on 13. 2009. Detenu surrendered himself before XV Metropolitan Court, George Town, Chennai on 13. 2009 and he was taken to police custody on 23. 2009 and detenu is said to have given confession statement which led to recovery of incriminating articles. On being satisfied about the subsisting custody of the detenu and on further being satisfied that if the detenu comes out on bail, he will indulge in future activities which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the impugned detention order was clamped upon the detenu. 6. Mr. R. Sankara Subbu, learned counsel for the Petitioner firstly contended that detention order dated 25. 2009 was served upon the detenu on the same day 25. 2009, but the booklet was served on 6. 2009, Challenging the impugned order, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that as per Section 8 of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, the grounds on which detention order has been made has to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be, but not later than five days. Submitting; that the Booklet was served only on 6. 2009, learned counsel for the Petitioner mainly contended that because of the delay in supplying the Booklet, detenu could not make an effective representation to the Detaining Authority within twelve days as stated in the grounds of detention and thereby detenu was deprived of opportunity of making representation. 7. Placing reliance upon Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal and Others AIR 1975 SC 550 : (1975) SCC (Cr) 435, it was submitted that grounds does not merely mean a recital or mere grounds. But the basic facts and material particulars which are required to be furnished. Laying emphasis upon serving the ‘grounds’ ‘as soon as may be possible’ and that ‘grounds’ mean all material particulars, in the said decision, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “6. But the basic facts and material particulars which are required to be furnished. Laying emphasis upon serving the ‘grounds’ ‘as soon as may be possible’ and that ‘grounds’ mean all material particulars, in the said decision, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “6. The answer to those questions does not present any serious difficulty if only we consider the reason why the grounds are required to be communicated to the detenu ‘as soon as may be’ after the detention. Obviously the reason is two-fold. In the first place, the requirement of communications of grounds of detention acts as a check against arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. The detaining authority cannot whisk away a person and put him behind bars at its own sweet will. It must have grounds for doing so and those grounds for doing so and those grounds must be communicated to the detenu, so that, not only the detenu may know what are the facts and materials before the detaining authority on the basis of which he is being deprived of his personal liberty, but he can also invoke the power of judicial review, howsoever, limited and peripheral it may be. Secondly, the detenu has to be afforded an opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. But if the grounds of detention are not communicated to him, how can he make an effective representation? The opportunity of making a representation would be rendered illusory. The communication of the grounds of detention is, therefore, also intended to subserve the purpose of enabling the detenu to make an effective representation. If this be the true reason for providing that the grounds on which the order of detention is made should be communicated to the detenu, it is obvious that the ‘grounds’ mean all the basic facts and material which have been taken into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention and on which, therefore, the order of detention is based. To quote the words of one of us SARKARIA, J. in Golam alias Golam Mallick v. State of West Bengal, W.P.No. 270 of 1974, dated 19. 1974 (SC). “….. To quote the words of one of us SARKARIA, J. in Golam alias Golam Mallick v. State of West Bengal, W.P.No. 270 of 1974, dated 19. 1974 (SC). “….. in the context, ‘grounds’ does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Section 3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusions of fact. It means something more. That ‘something’ is the factual constituent of the ‘grounds’ on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. The basic facts and material particulars, therefore, which are the foundation of the order of detention, will also be covered by ‘grounds’ within the contemplation of Article 22(5) and Section 8, and are required to be communicated to the detenu unless their disclosure to the detenu is considered by the authority to be against the public interest.” 8. Section 8(1) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 cast a duty upon the Detaining Authority to communicate the detenu, the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and offer him an earliest, opportunity of making a representation to the State Government. All particulars of adverse cases as well as informing the detenu about his right to make representation and Booklet was served upon him on 6. 2009, 6. 2009 was the sixth day after passing the detention order (excluding 25. 2009). 30 and 35. 2009 were Saturday and Sunday. Booklet contains number of pages running to 403 pages. The contents in the Booklet containing number of pages, quite naturally, it would have consumer some time for preparation of Booklet. 9. Article 22(5) of Constitution of India and Section 8 of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 cast dual obligation on the Detaining Authority, viz., (i) to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the detention order has been made, and (ii) to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity/or making representation against the detention order. Consequent the failure to communicate the grounds promptly or to afford the detenu an opportunity of making a representation against the order would clearly violate the constitutional guarantee afforded to the detenu by Clause (5) of Article 22 of Constitution of India. In our considered view. ‘in the instant case, one day delay in supplying the Booklet would not amount to infraction of right detenu. In our considered view. ‘in the instant case, one day delay in supplying the Booklet would not amount to infraction of right detenu. As we have pointed out earlier, detention order was passed en 25. 2009 and the detention order served with grounds of detention containing all particulars. 10. The contention of the petitioner is that because of delay in supplying the Booklet, detenu was deprived of earliest opportunity of making representation. Drawing our attention to Para-3 of the detention order, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as stated thereon, detenu has been given right to make representation in writing to the Detaining Authority within twelve days from the date of detention order and detenu was deprived of making effective representation to the Detaining Authority. The insistence to communicate the grounds of detention order is for the purpose of making representation. As per Section 3(3) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, and as stated in Para (3) of the detention order, detenu was given right of making representation within twelve days to the Detaining Authority. From the date of detention order, twelve days expire on 6. 2009. Whereas, Booklet was served upon the even on 6. 2009. Detenu had sufficient time of making representation to the Detaining Authority and therefore, it cannot be said that detenu was deprived of his right to make representation to the Detaining Authority within the time stipulated. In fact, detenu had sent representation on 16. 2009 addressed to the Government and not to the detaining Authority. We, therefore find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that one day delay in supplying the Booklet has deprived the Petitioner of his opportunity of making representation. 11. Second submission urged on behalf of the Petition is that satisfaction of the Detaining Authority as to the real possibility of detenu being released on ball is not based on cogent materials. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that when the detenu was involved in number of murder cases, normally bail would not be granted and while so, there was no real possibility of detenu being released on bail and the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is not based on cogent materials. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that when the detenu was involved in number of murder cases, normally bail would not be granted and while so, there was no real possibility of detenu being released on bail and the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is not based on cogent materials. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Petition placed reliance upon A. Shanthi v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (2006) 3 SCC (Crl) 371 T.V. Saravanan @ S.A.R. prasana Venkatacharriar Chaturvedi (2006) 1 SCC (Crl) 593, Sokkalingam v. State of Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Prohibition and Excise Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 and Another (2007) 2 MLJ (Crl) 1138 (Mad): (2007) 2 LW (Cri) 658. 12. In T.V. Saravanan @ S.A.R Prasana Venkatacharriar Chaturvedi (supra) number of bail applications moved came to be dismissed. In such circumstances, Supreme Court has held as follows: “We are satisfied that for the same reason the order of detention jean not be upheld in this case. The bail applications moved by the appellant had been rejected by the Court and there is no material whatsoever to apprehend that he was likely to move a bail application or that there was imminent possibility of the prayer for bail being granted. The ‘imminent possibility’ of the applicant being out on bail is merely the ipse dixit, of the Detaining Authority unsupported by any material whatsoever. There was no cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which the detaining authority could be satisfied that the detenu was likely to be released on bail. The inference has to be drawn from the available material on record. In the absence of such material on record the mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority is not sufficient to sustain the order of detention. There was, therefore, no sufficient compliance with the requirements-as laid down by this Court.” 13. In Sokkalingam v. Stats of Tamil Nadu by its Secretary, Prohibition and Excise Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 and Another (supra) (in which one of us was a member – RBJ). Detention order was quashed on the ground that possibility of detenus coming out on bail was not based upon cogent materials. In the said case, ground case related to the occurrence on 12. 2005 under Section 392 IPC. George, Chennai-9 and Another (supra) (in which one of us was a member – RBJ). Detention order was quashed on the ground that possibility of detenus coming out on bail was not based upon cogent materials. In the said case, ground case related to the occurrence on 12. 2005 under Section 392 IPC. The adverse case – murder case in Crime No. 1645 of 2006 under Section 147, 148, 302 IPC related to the occurrence on 20.11.2006. Detenus were arrested on 12. 2006 and within short time, detention order was clamped. In such circumstances, on the date of passing of detention order, there was no real possibility of detenus coming out on bail. In such factual circumstances, detention order was quashed. 14. We are of the view that there could be no factual comparison with, the above cited case. In the instant case, occurrence was on 13. 2009. Detenus surrendered on 13. 2009 and detention order was passed on 25. 2009, two months after the arrest. Even though, detenu was involved in number of murder cases either in filing of charge sheet or by passage of time (statutory appeal), there are real possibility of the detenu being released on bail. While so, it cannot be said that the satisfaction of Detaining Authority as to the possibility of detenu being released on bail is not based on cogent materials. 15. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, statement of the Detaining Authority that there is real possibility of detenu coming out on bail by filing bail application cannot be held to be non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ibrahahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. and Another, (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 17: (2007) 1 MLJ (Crl) 228, wherein, while answering to a similar contention raised therein, It has been held by the Supreme Court as under at p.231 of MLJ (Crl): “5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant that the only plea raised was that the High Court was not justified in holding that the detaining authority’s view about imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail was correct. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant that the only plea raised was that the High Court was not justified in holding that the detaining authority’s view about imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail was correct. It was also submitted that since the detenu has not filed any bail application after withdrawal of the first petition, the detaining authority could not have inferred that there was possibility of his being released on bail.” 7. It is to be noted that whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on the circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail cannot be an ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before it, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. That is his subjective satisfaction based on materials. Normally, such satisfaction not to be interfered with. On the facts of the case, the detaining authority has indicated as to why he was of the opinion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. It has been clearly stated that in similar cases, orders granting bail are passed by various Courts. The appellant has not disputed the correctness of this statement.” ………. 16. Observing that when the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is based on materials, the same is not to be interfered with in A. Geetha v. State of T.N. and Others (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 324: (2006) 2 MLJ (Crl) 1149, the Supreme Court held as follows at p.1152 of MLJ (Crl): “10. It has to be noted that whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. That is his subjective satisfaction based on materials. Normally, such satisfaction is not to be interfered wit. On the facts of the case, the detaining authority has indicated as to why he was of the opinion that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail. It has been clearly stated that in similar cases orders granting bail are passed by various Courts. The appellant has not disputed the correctness of this statement. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on Rajesh Gulati v. Govt of NCT of Delhi (2002) 7 SCC 129 ; (2002) SCC (Cri) 1627. The factual scenario in that case was entirely different. In fact, five bail applications filed had been already rejected. In that background this Court observed that it was not a “normal” case. The High Court was justified in rejecting the stand of the appellant. (See Ibrahaim Nazeer v, State of T.N. (supra) and Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. (2006) 5 SCC 676 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 50: (2006) 2 MLJ (Crl) 1157). 17. Applying the above principles, in the instant case based on the materials placed before him, the Detaining Authority had satisfied himself about the real possibility of detenu coming out on bail by filing bail application, since in similar cases bails are granted by the concerned Court or higher Courts after a lapse of time. Based on the materials, Detaining Authority further satisfied himself that if the detenu comes out on bail, he will indulge in future activities which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that the recourse to normal criminal law will not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities. Applying the ratio of the above decision, in our considered view, such subjective satisfaction is based on cogent materials and the same cannot be interfered with. 18. In Para (3) of the detention order, Detaining Authority has expressed his awareness as to remand of the detenu in the ground case In Crime No. 91 of 2009 of Viruthambut Police Station. Applying the ratio of the above decision, in our considered view, such subjective satisfaction is based on cogent materials and the same cannot be interfered with. 18. In Para (3) of the detention order, Detaining Authority has expressed his awareness as to remand of the detenu in the ground case In Crime No. 91 of 2009 of Viruthambut Police Station. As seen from the arrest memo, detenu was also remanded to judicial custody in connection with adverse case Crime No. 26 of 2009 under Section 341, 324, 302 IPC of Sathuvachari Police Station. 19. Taking us through the grounds of detention, learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that even though, detenu was remanded in connection with adverse case in Crime No. 26 of 2009, the Detaining Authority has not recorded its awareness as to the custody of the detenu in connection with adverse case. Placing reliance upon Balasubramanian @ Subramanian @ Subbudu @ Subbu v. Commissioner of Police, Madurai City and Another 2006 (1) CTC 340 , it was contended that adverse case being grave in nature even if the detenu was released on bail in the ground case, there was no real possibility of the detenu being released on bail. 20. Placing reliance upon Vijayakumar @ Kallakurichi Vijayakumar v. Commissioner of Police, Salem City, Salem (2007) 2 MLJ (Crl) 1855, it was contended that non-reference to the custody of detenu in the adverse case is non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority which would have effect of vitiating the detention order. 21. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that Detaining Authority has clearly expressed its awareness as to the involvement of detenu in two murder cases. We have verified the detenu in two murder cases. We have verified the grounds of detention and materials on record. In the grounds of detention, there is clear reference on two adverse cases. That apart in Para (3) of the detention order, the Detaining Authority has expressed its awareness as to the involvement of the detenu in connection with two brutal murder cases and that those cases are under investigation. In the grounds of detention, there is clear reference on two adverse cases. That apart in Para (3) of the detention order, the Detaining Authority has expressed its awareness as to the involvement of the detenu in connection with two brutal murder cases and that those cases are under investigation. Adverse case in Crime No. 26 of 2009 of Sathuvachari Police Station under Section 341, 324, 302 IPC and the ground case in Crime No. 91 of 2009 of Viruthambut Police Station under Section 341, 302 IPC is of the same nature and the Detaining Authority has rightly referred to the same. Authority also took note of the fact that both ground case as well as adverse case are murder cases and based upon which arrived at the conclusion about the possibility of the detenu coming out on bail. In such circumstances, decision of the Detaining Authority cannot be faulted with. In similar factual situation, in H.C.P. No. 155 of 2006, Division Bench of this Court has observed that non-reference as to the remand in respect of adverse case would not have the effect of vitiating the detention order. 22. Learned counsel for the Petitioner nextly contended that Petitioner had sent representation on 16. 2009 wherein he sought for furnishing of remand order in the adverse case and non-furnishing of remand order would have effect of vitiating the detention order. In support of his contention, learned upon powanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu Another AIR 1999 SC 618 : (1999) SCC (Cr) 231: 1999 (1) CTC 349 wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: “13. Adverting to the facts of this case. The appellant has made a representation for supply of Tamil version of the copy of order of remand and specifically stated that the detenu could not understand English language. Admittedly, Tamil version of order of remand was not furnished to her. A perusal of the grounds shows that the order of remand was relied upon by the second respondent to reach subjective satisfaction, so the detenu need not show that any prejudice was caused to her due to non-supply of the Tamil version of order of remand. Therefore, the High Court is not correct in holding that non-furnishing of the copy of the order of remand would not in any way prejudice the detenu.” 23. Therefore, the High Court is not correct in holding that non-furnishing of the copy of the order of remand would not in any way prejudice the detenu.” 23. Countering the arguments, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that remand order in the adverse case is not referred to and therefore, non-furnishing of remand order in the adverse case would not vitally affect the detention order. As rightly submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, detenu surrendered himself in the ground case on 13. 2009 and he was taken to police custody on 23. 2009. Only on his confession statement, involvement in the adverse case came to light. Of course, in the representation, Petitioner has asked for remand extension order in connection with adverse case Crime No. 26 of 2009 of Sathuvachari Police Station. Adverse case not relating to the Police Station of Sponsoring Authority – Inspector of Police, Viruthambut Police Station. Therefore, in our considered view, non-furnishing of remand order in the adverse case would not have the effect of vitiating the detention order. 24. Detention order is nextly challenged on the ground of delay in consideration and disposal of representation. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon Harish Pahwa v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others AIR 1981 SC 1126 : (1981) SCC (Cr) 589: (1982) 1 MLJ (Crl) 59, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under: “3. ………. Where the liberty of a person is involved it is the duty of the State to determine his representations with the utmost expedition and deal with it continuously until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu……..” 25. Taking us through the Chart, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that there was no delay in consideration of the representation and that the time taken in consideration and disposal of representation was only the time taken in collecting the particulars and dealing with the file. 26. In the light of the above contentions, we have carefully perused the Chart produced before us. Representation dated 16. 2009 was received by the Collectorate on 16. 2009 and remarks were called for from the Collectorate on 16. 2009. That representation was received in the Collectorate on 26. 2009 and Parawar remarks were called for from the Sponsoring Authority on 26. 2009. Representation dated 16. 2009 was received by the Collectorate on 16. 2009 and remarks were called for from the Collectorate on 16. 2009. That representation was received in the Collectorate on 26. 2009 and Parawar remarks were called for from the Sponsoring Authority on 26. 2009. After calling for the remarks from the Sponsoring Authority, report was sent to the Government on 7. 2009. 20.6.2009 and 26. 2009 are Government Holidays. Remarks, received in the Secretariat and file was submitted on 7. 2009. The under Secretary dealt with the matter on 7. 2009. Additional secretary dealt with the matter on 7. 2009 and rejection letter was sent to the detenu on 7. 2009. 17. 2009 and 17. 2009 (Saturday and Sunday) are Government Holidays. Therefore, the time taken in consideration of representation was only a reasonable one in collection of particulars and moving of the file. 27. In Vinod K. Chawla v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 2701: (2007) 1 MLJ (Crl) 491, the Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 500 of MLJ (Crl): “10. The contention raised cannot be judged by any straitjacket formula divorced from facts. This has to be examined with reference to the facts of each case having regard to the volume and contents of the grounds of detention, the documents supplied along with the grounds, the inquiry to be made by the officers of different departments, the nature of the inquiry to be made by the officers of different departments, the nature of the inquiry, the time required for examining the various pleas raised, the time required in recording the comments by the authorities of the department concerned, and so on. 28. In L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 1191 : 1981 SCC (Crl) 72, the Supreme Court has held that there can be no doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition but as observed in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra AIR 1980 SC 849 : 1980 SCC (Crl) 419: (1981) 1 MLJ (Crl) 331, the time-imperative can never be absolute or obsessive’. 29. In Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 176 : 1990 SCC (Crl) 51, the Supreme Court held that the representation dated 11. 29. In Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 176 : 1990 SCC (Crl) 51, the Supreme Court held that the representation dated 11. 1989 of the detenu who was detained under COFEPOSA was rejected after more than a month on 20.2.1989. After referring to L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujarat (supra) case, it was held that the detaining authority had explained the delay in disposal of the representation and accordingly the order of detention cannot be faulted on that ground. 30. In Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. (2006) 5 SCC 676 : (2006) 3 SCC (Crl) 50: (2006) 2 MLJ (Crl) 1157, the Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 1159 of MLJ (Crl): “6. Coming to the plea that there was delay in disposal of the representation it is to be noted that the order of detention is dated 12. 2005. The representation was sent on 112. 2005 which was received by the respondents on 112. 2005. The details were called for on 112. 2005 which were received on 20.12.2005. The file was submitted on 212. 2005 and dealt with by the Under-Secretary and Deputy Secretary on 212. 2005. The Minister concerned passed an order on 212. 2005 and the order of rejection which was passed on 212. 2005 was issued on 212. 2005 which was sent to the Superintendent of the Jail where the detenu was incarcerated, which was communicated to the detenu. It was received by the-prison authorities and it was served on the detenu on the day it was received by the jail authority. The factual scenario indicated above indicates that the representation was dealt with utmost expedition. There can be no hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time and each case has to be considered from the facts of the case and if there is no negligence or callous inaction or avoidable red tapism on the facts of a case, the Court would not interfere. It needs to reiteration that it is the duty of the Court to see that the efficacy of the limited, yet crucial, safeguards provided in the law of preventive detention is not lost in mechanical routine, dull casualness and chill indifference, on the part of the authorities entrusted with their application. When there is remissness, indifference of avoidable delay on the part of the authority, the detention becomes vulnerable. When there is remissness, indifference of avoidable delay on the part of the authority, the detention becomes vulnerable. That is not the case, at hand. It may be noted that the writ petition was filed on 212. 2005, even before the order of rejection was served. That being so the detenu cannot make grievance that the State had not explained the position as to how his representation was dealt with.” 31. Applying the above principles and upon perusal of the Chart, in our considered view, the Collectorate collected the materials from the Sponsoring Authority. Since the detenu was involved in three murder cases of three different Police Stations, quite possibly it would have taken some time for the Sponsoring Authority/Collectorate to collect all the particulars and submit its remarks. Applying the ratio of Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. (supra) case and other decisions, we do not find any indifference or unavoidable delay in considering the representation. 32. Nextly, the detention order is challenged on the ground of delay in passing the detention order. The occurrence was on 13. 2009. Detenu surrendered himself on 13. 2009 and the detention order was passed on 25. 2009. Placing reliance upon Anand prakash v. State of U.P. and Others AIR 1990 SC 516 : (1990) SCC (Cr) 96: (1990) 1 MLJ (Crl) 86, it was contended that inordinate and unexplained delay in passing the detention order would vitiate the detention order. 33. As we have pointed out earlier, only from the confession statement recorded, involvement of detenu came to light and thereafter particulars were collected and thereafter detention order was passed and as such we do not find any delay in passing the detention order. 34. Submitting that large Volume of evidence to be collected and required to be examined and there was no delay in passing the detention order, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has placed reliance upon Sheetal Manoj Gore v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2006) 3 SCC (Crl) 314: (2007) 1 MLJ (Crl) 502. In the said case, detenu was arrested on 30.3.2005 and released on bail on 14. 2005 whereas detention order was passed on 1. 2006. Thus the file was processed from March 2005 till January 2006. Booklet contained 778 pages. In the said case, detenu was arrested on 30.3.2005 and released on bail on 14. 2005 whereas detention order was passed on 1. 2006. Thus the file was processed from March 2005 till January 2006. Booklet contained 778 pages. In such factual circumstances, observing that delay in passing ‘the detention order is not to be tested on the same standards as applied to the case of consideration of the report of detenu, Supreme Court has held as under: “7. We are satisfied that there was no delay on the part of the authorities in taking necessary steps in connection with issuance of the order of detention. Moreover, the time taken in completing the process for issuance of order of detention has not to be tested applying the same standard as is applied in the matter of consideration of representation of a detenu. This Court in several judgments has emphasised the promptness with representation received from the detenu. The right to represent and its fair and prompt consideration by the authority concerned is a constitutional right guaranteed to a detenu. The authorities dealing with such representations must be aware of the fact that the detenu is languishing in custody without a trial. Their conduct must, therefore, disclose a consciousness of the urgency in the matter. The norms and standards laid down by this Court in the matter of consideration of the representation of a detenu, cannot be strictly applied to the case of processing of a proposal for detention of a person under the Act. No doubt, if there is inordinate delay in issuing the order of detention, it may well be argued that the live link between the prejudicial activity of the detenu and the purpose for which the order of detention is issue is snapped, and being state there was no justification for issuance of an order of detention. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the details furnished by the detaining authority provide sufficient explanation for the time taken in issuing the order of detention. We are also satisfied that the detaining authority was conscious of the fact that the matter required immediate attention, but in view of the voluminous record which has to be scanned and scrutinised before issuance of the order of detention, the order could not be issued earlier.” 35. We are also satisfied that the detaining authority was conscious of the fact that the matter required immediate attention, but in view of the voluminous record which has to be scanned and scrutinised before issuance of the order of detention, the order could not be issued earlier.” 35. In the instant case, detenu was involved in three murder cases of three Police Stations – Bagayam, Sathuvachari and Viruthambut Police Station and the Booklet runs about 403 pages. Those of the records in English will have to be translated In our considered view, the Sponsoring Authority forwarded the proposal to the office of Detaining Authority on 25. 2009 and upon examination of the same, detention order came to be passed. We are satisfied that there was no delay on the part of the Authorities in issuance of the order of detention. There is no delay much less inordinate delay in passing the order to snap the live link. 36. Learned counsel for the Petitioner nextly contended that even though, the cases in which the detenu is involved are gave in nature, cases being murder cases concerning Law and order and no public order is involved. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon Arun Ghose v. State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 1228 : (1970) SCC (Cr) 67, wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: “Dr. Ram manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 : (1996) 1 SCR 709, pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, W.P. No. 179 of 1968, dated 11. 1968 (SC) and Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commr. Of Police, Calcutta, W.P. No. 102 of 1969, dated 8. 1969 (SC). In “Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (supra) case this Court pointed out the difference between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance. Public order was said to embrace more of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. Public order was said to embrace more of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order.” The said case relating to teasing of girls which is offending one individual. There could be no comparison of facts of the said case with the instant case. 37. Crucial issue is whether only ‘law and order’ was affected and the act would not have potential of disturbing the public order. Observing that true distinction between the areas of Law and Order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society, in State of U.P. and Another v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta @ Pappu and Others AIR 2004 SC 4703 : (2005) SCC (Cri) 366, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “7. The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression “law and order” is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, “public order” has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community of the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of “law and order” and “public order” is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting “public order” from that concerning “law and order.” The question to ask is: “Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?” This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. 8. “Public order” is what the French call “ordre publique” and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, is: does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? (See Kanu Biswas v. State of W.B. AIR 1972 SC 1656 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 16. 9. “Public order” is synonymous with public safety and tranquility: “it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contra-distinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State.” Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach – of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum, which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. (See Ram Manohar Lohia (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (supra)). 10. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum, which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. (See Ram Manohar Lohia (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (supra)). 10. “Public order”, law and order’ and the “security of the State” fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infarction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. (See Kishari Mohan Bera v, State of W.B. (1972) 3 SCC 845 : (1973) SCC (Cri) 30, Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of W.B. (1969) 1 SCC 10 : (1969) 2 SCR 635 Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B. (supra) and Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of W.B. (1972) 1 SCC 498 : (1972) SCC (Cri) 227) 11. The distinction between “law and order” and “public order” has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B. (supra) case. According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of “law and order” and “public order” is “one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society.” The Court pointed out that: (SCC p. 100, Para 3) “An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of “law and order” and “public order” is “one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society.” The Court pointed out that: (SCC p. 100, Para 3) “An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different.” (See Babul Mitra v. State of W.B. (1973) 1 SCC 393 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 353 and Milan Bank v. State of W.B. (1974) 4 SCC 504 : (1974) SCC (Cri) 540: (1975) 1 MLJ (Crl) 455).” 12. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. 13. The two concepts have well-defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganized crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infarctions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infarction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. Law and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. Infarctions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infarction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. Law and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. “Law and order” comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting “security of State.” (See Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar AIR 1974 SC 156 : (1974) 1 SCC 185 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 84: (1974) 1 MLJ (Crl) 543, Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1992 SC 979 : (1992) 2 SCC 177 : (1992) SCC (Cri) 370: (1992) 1 MLJ (Crl) 572, T.K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka AIR 2000 SC 1669 : (2000) 6 SCC 168 : (2000) SCC (Cri) 1037 and State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub AIR 1980 SC 1111 : (1980) 3 SCC 57 : (1980) SCC (Cri) 513).” 38. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects Law and Order or Public order is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed. 39. As discussed earlier, detenu is involved in two murder cases. On the date of occurrence – 13. 2005 at 5.45 p.m. when the deceased John Sekar was proceeding in his TVS-50 along with his wife, he was wrongfully restrained by the detenu and his associate Appu @ Rajendran and John Sekar was done to death in the public place. By perusal of page No. 188 of the Booklet, the Rough sketch filed in Crime No. 91 of 1999, we find that the place of occurrence is a public place surrounded by houses. In Para (3) of the detention order, Detaining Authority has clearly discussed as to how the act affected the public order which has created insecurity in the minds of the public in the area and created tense situation in the area and the public became panic even to come out from their houses. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has drawn our attention to Page Nos. 367 and 368 of the Booklet – statement recorded from witnesses K. Babu and Pazalur Rahman on 23. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has drawn our attention to Page Nos. 367 and 368 of the Booklet – statement recorded from witnesses K. Babu and Pazalur Rahman on 23. 2009 as to how the act of the detenu and his associate affect the public order. Based on the materials on record, the Detaining Authority rightly satisfied itself with the dangerous activities of Mala @ Mahalingam (detenu) and his associate has created a feeling of insecurity in the minds of public. The true distinction between the areas of Law and Order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Going by the act of the murder committed in the public place by hooligans is determinant of its own gravity. Murder committed by the detenu and his associate though prima facie appeared to be an act against the specific individual, it was committed with a view to wreak vengeance by the hooligans. Murder was committed in the public place in a broad daylight created insecurity in the minds of the public. Viewed from this angle, it is difficult to “accept the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that such an act is only a mere infarction of “law and order” 40. We, therefore, find no merit in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the detenu. Based upon the materials, the detention order was passed and we find no ground warranting interference. 41. In the result, the habeas corpus petition is dismissed.