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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 340 (HP)

CHUNI LAL v. HIMACHAL PRADESH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD

2009-04-17

RAJIV SHARMA

body2009
JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J.:- The petitioner was appointed as a Peon on 31.8.1989 in the respondent-Board. He was promoted/appointed as a Clerk on 4.1.1996. He was required to attain the speed of 30 words per minute in English typing and 25 words per minute in Hindi typing within two years from the date of his joining as per the conditions stipulated in his appointment letter. He appeared in the typing test on 28.11.1997. He could not qualify the same. He again appeared in the test on 30.12.1997. He qualified the same as per Annexure A-2 dated 29.1.1998. Consequently, he was granted annual increment. However, vide office order dated 26.2.2001, the earlier order dated 29.1.1998 was withdrawn. 2. Mr. M.L. Sharma, Advocate has strenuously argued that the petitioner had qualified the typing test within the prescribed period as per Annexure A-2 dated 29.1.1998. He then contended that once the petitioner had qualified the typing test successfully, the respondents were estopped from cancelling the same on the basis of Annexure A-4 dated 26.2.2001. 3. Mr. Shashi Shirshoo, Advocate has supported the issuance of Annexure A-4 dated 26.2.2001. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. 5. The petitioner was promoted vide order dated 4.1.1996. He had to attain 30 words per minute in English typing and 25 words per minute in Hindi typing within two years from the date of his joining. He was directed to appear in the typing test held on 30.12.1997 pursuant to letter dated 21.8.1997 and 24.12.1997. He had successfully qualified the test and on that basis he was granted increment. The precise case of the respondent-Board for withdrawal of Annexure A-2 dated 29.1.1998 is letter dated 27.11.1997 whereby the powers to conduct the typing test were vested in the office of the Chief Engineer instead of at Divisional level. These instructions were issued on 27.11.1997. He was permitted to sit in the typing test on the basis of letters dated 21.8.1997 and 24.12.1997 on 30.12.1997. The new condition imposed vide letter dated 27.11.1997 was to apply prospectively and not retrospectively. The letter dated 27.11.1997 was not relatable to the promotion of the petitioner, which was effected on 4.1.1996. He had qualified the typing test as per the conditions enumerated in the appointment letter within a period of two years. The new condition imposed vide letter dated 27.11.1997 was to apply prospectively and not retrospectively. The letter dated 27.11.1997 was not relatable to the promotion of the petitioner, which was effected on 4.1.1996. He had qualified the typing test as per the conditions enumerated in the appointment letter within a period of two years. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the typing test which the petitioner had qualified was void ab initio as projected by the respondent-Board in its reply. Once the petitioner had been permitted to appear in the typing test and he had qualified the same, the respondents could not cancel the same on the basis of Annexure A-4 dated 26.2.2001. The respondents knew about the letter dated 27.11.1997 and despite that he was permitted to appear in the typing test held on 30.12.1997. Moreover, the terms and conditions of the petitioner were required to be regulated as per the appointment letter dated 4.1.1996. The letter dated 27.11.1997 was prospective in nature and could not take away the vested right accrued to the petitioner on the basis of his appointment letter. The respondents have not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner before the issuance of impugned order dated 26.2.2001. The petitioner has been visited with the severe civil consequences after the withdrawal of letter dated 29.1.1998. 6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held in Rajesh Kumar and others versus Dy. CIT and others, 2007 (2) SCC 181 that when by reason of an action on the part of a statutory authority, civil or evil consequences ensure, principles of natural justice are required to be followed. Their Lordships have held as under: “15. Effect of civil consequences arising out of determination of lis under a statute is stated in State of Orissa v.Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors. (1967 (2) SCR 625). It is an authority for the proposition when by reason of an action on the part of a statutory authority, civil or evil consequences ensue, principles of natural justice are required to be followed. In such an event, although no express provision is laid down in this behalf compliance of principles of natural justice would be implicit. In case of denial of principles of natural justice in a statute, the same may also be held ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.” 7. In such an event, although no express provision is laid down in this behalf compliance of principles of natural justice would be implicit. In case of denial of principles of natural justice in a statute, the same may also be held ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.” 7. In view of the aforesaid reasoning, the petition is allowed. The impugned order Annexure A-4 dated 26.2.2001 is quashed and set aside. There will, however, be no order as to costs.