JUDGMENT I. MAHANTY, J. — In the present revision application the petitioner has sought for quashing of an order dated 5.4.2008 passed by the Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack in T.R. Case no. 119 of 2007/V.Gr.122 of 1999, by which, a petition filed by the Special Public Prosecutor (Vigilance), Cuttack under Section 319 Cr.P.C. came to be allowed and the learned Special Judge came to a finding that, a prima facie case under, Sections 7/13 (2) read with Section 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act having been found against the petitioner (who was then working as Motor Vehicle Inspector, Cuttack) can be tried together with the co-accused in the pending trial and accordingly, directed for the issue of summons against the petitioner. 2. Mr. Mund, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had been posted as Motor Vehicle Inspector at Cuttack in the year 1997. One Md. Siddique submitted a written report on 9.12.1997 before the S.P. (Vigilance), Cuttack to the effect that one of the friends of the complainant, namely, Girija Prasanna Pattnaik had applied for issuance of the driving licence before the R.T.O., Cuttack and in his connection, it is alleged that the complainant met the petitioner who raised the demand of bribe of Rs. 500/- for issuing of such driving licence. It was further alleged that although the complainant paid a sum of Rs. 300/- to the petitioner on 21.12.1996, in support of the same, the petitioner did not issue the driving licence and demanded the balance amount of Rs. 200/- for release of the driving licence. On the basis of such complaint, Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 73 dated 9.12.1997 was registered. It appears that after regis¬tration of the case, a trap was laid against the petitioner and it is further alleged that the tainted money of Rs. 200/- was made over by the petitioner to his peon, one Noor Khan after accepting the same from the complainant. After conclusion of the investigation, the investigating agency sought for the sanction of the Government for prosecuting the accused persons but the Government in its Order No. 28120 dated 25.9.1998 refused to accord sanction as it found that the present case was not fit case to sanction prosecution under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After conclusion of the investigation, the investigating agency sought for the sanction of the Government for prosecuting the accused persons but the Government in its Order No. 28120 dated 25.9.1998 refused to accord sanction as it found that the present case was not fit case to sanction prosecution under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It fur¬ther appears that the investigating agency made a second request to the Government for sanction against the petitioner but the Government once again refused to reconsider the matter and commu¬nicated its decision under cover of its letter no. 33143 dated 9.11.1999. 3. From the pleadings, it further appears that after the refusal of the Government to accord sanction of the prosecution against the petitioner, yet the investigating agency went ahead and submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner as well as one Noor Khan. The Public Prosecutor vide petition dated 12.8.1999 prayed for two months time to obtain necessary sanction since they had already approached the Government to reconsider the matter of refusal of sanction. Thereafter, on the Government’s refusal to reconsider the matter, it appears that a further petition was filed by the public prosecutor on 29.3.2000, inti¬mating the learned counsel that sanction for prosecution against the petitioner could not be obtained from the Government, who instead, recommended Departmental Proceeding against him and accordingly, prayed for continuation of action against other accused, i.e., Noor Khan. Consequently, the learned Special Judge vide order dated 16.5.2000 took cognizance of offence against the accused Noor Khan and did not take cognizance against the peti¬tioner. 4. It further appears that on 25.09.2007, the prosecution examined the complainant Md. Siddique as P.W.1 who stated before the court that the petitioner, who was then working as Motor Vehicle Inspector, Cuttack, had demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 500/- and on 19.12.1997 he had been caught red-handed along with his Peon Noor Khan by a Vigilance trap team. Immediately, there¬after on 26.9.2007, it appears that the Special Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack praying for issuance of summons to the petitioner for his prosecution in the aforesaid case as an co-accused. The learned Special Judge, Vigilance vide impugned order dated 5.4.2008 allowed the aforesaid application by finding a prima facie case against the petitioner and accordingly directed issue of summons to the petitioner. 5. The learned Special Judge, Vigilance vide impugned order dated 5.4.2008 allowed the aforesaid application by finding a prima facie case against the petitioner and accordingly directed issue of summons to the petitioner. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order was unlawful/illegal, since the learned Spe¬cial Judge had lost sight of the requirement/mandate of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is contended that the aforesaid provision creates a complete bar on the power of the court to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7,10,11, 13 and 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act without the previous sanction of the competent authority. Further contention is that it is well settled that the Prevention of Corruption of Act is a special statute and the said Act had been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and the matters connected therewith. Therefore, it is asserted that the maxim “generalia specialibus non-derogant” would apply and since a special act/provision has been made under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the same would have an overriding effect over the general provi¬sions contained in Section 319 Cr.P.C.. Accordingly, it is sub¬mitted that the Special Judge while trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, cannot direct for issue of summons on any other person and proceed against him in the purported exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., if no sanction has been obtained from the appropriate authority for prosecution of such a person. It is contended that the existence of a sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of the of¬fence, qua that person. It is further submitted that by order dated 16.5.2000, the learned Special Judge had noted in his order that since sanction for prosecution against the petitioner could not be obtained from the Government, who have recommended for departmental action against him, hence cognizance against the petitioner is not taken. It is further submitted that pursuance to the aforesaid decision of the State Government, a Departmental Proceeding was initiated against the petitioner which has since been concluded by exonerating the petitioner from all the charges levelled with against him vide enquiry report dated 28.2.2000 (Annexure-5). It is further submitted that pursuance to the aforesaid decision of the State Government, a Departmental Proceeding was initiated against the petitioner which has since been concluded by exonerating the petitioner from all the charges levelled with against him vide enquiry report dated 28.2.2000 (Annexure-5). It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the application under Section 319 of Cr.P.C., filed by the Public Prosecutor would clearly indicate that the prosecution had sup¬pressed the fact of refusal to accord sanction by the Government and since the impugned order itself does not contain any refer¬ence to the requirement of sanction, as required under Section 19 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, silence estab¬lishes the complete non-application of judicial mind. In support of the contentions, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilawar Singh v. Parvinder Singh and anoth¬er, (2005) 12 SCC 709 in support of the contention. 6. Sri Mohapatra, learned Standing Counsel for the Vigi¬lance, on the other hand, agreed on facts that although the prosecution has sought for the sanction of the Government, the same had been turned down and, therefore, the prosecution pro¬ceeded against Noor Khan alone and cognizance against him was taken on 16.5.2000 but learned counsel for the petitioner submit¬ted that in the present case since the evidence of P.W.1-Md. Sid¬dique had been recorded by the court and since the said witness had himself stated about the demand and acceptance of bribe by the petitioner, the prosecution had a right as well as an obliga¬tion to bring this facts to the notice of the trial court by way of filing of an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C.. Learned counsel further submitted that even though the prosecution had failed to obtain sanction against the petitioner, there is no bar on the trial court from exercising its power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.. it is submitted that since the learned Special Judge in course of the trial found from the evidence of the prosecution witness that the present petitioner not being an accused had committed an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act for which he could be tried together with the other accused, namely, Noor Khan. The court decided to proceed against the petitioner for the offence which he appeared to have committed. Sri Mohapatra prays for consideration of the Misc. The court decided to proceed against the petitioner for the offence which he appeared to have committed. Sri Mohapatra prays for consideration of the Misc. Case No. 250 of 2009 (filed in the present revision) and prays that for the ends of justice, this Court may be pleased to pass any appropri¬ate order “for obtaining necessary sanction” against the peti¬tioner failing which, the prosecution will be highly prejudiced. 7. Sri Mohapatra in support of his contention placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala & others, (2007) 37 OCR (SC)-662 and stated that it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-10 of the said judgment observed that, Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the P.C. Act, operate in conceptually different fields. In cases covered under the Act, in respect of public servants, the “sanction is of automatic nature” and thus, factual aspects are of little or no conse¬quence. Conversely, in a case relatable Section 197 of the Code, the substratum and basis features of the case have to be consid¬ered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus to the discharge of public duties whereas, the position is not the same in the case under Section 19 of the Act. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submis¬sions made by the learned counsel appearing for both the sides. At the outset, I noted herein certain undisputed facts. (i) The State Government by its order No. 28120 dated 25.9.1998 refused to accord sanction as the case against the petitioner was found not to be a fit case for grant of sanction for prosecution. (ii) By further order No. 33143 dated 9.11.1999, the State Government refused to re-consider its earlier letter to accord sanction for prosecution against the petitioner. (iii) On 29.3.2000, Special Public Prosecutor files petition before the Special Judge praying for continuation of proceedings only against the other accused, namely, Noor Khan. (iv) On 25.9.2007, prosecution examined the complainant-Md.Siddique as P.W.1. (v) On 26.9.2007, the learned Special Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 319 C.P.C. which is quoted hereunder: “In the Court of the Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack. T.R. No. 119 of 2007/32 of 1999 STATE Vrs. Noor Mahammad ... (iv) On 25.9.2007, prosecution examined the complainant-Md.Siddique as P.W.1. (v) On 26.9.2007, the learned Special Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 319 C.P.C. which is quoted hereunder: “In the Court of the Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack. T.R. No. 119 of 2007/32 of 1999 STATE Vrs. Noor Mahammad ... Accused The humble petition of the prosecution submitted through Special P.P. Vigilance, U/s. 319 Cr.P.C. Most respectfully sheweth; 1) That, in the above noted trap case the complainant, Md. Siddique has been examined as P.W.1. Yesterday, i.e. on 25/9/2007, who stated on oath before this Hon’ble Court that Sri Jawaharlal Patra, the then MVI Cuttack had demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 500/- for issue of a driving licence and ac¬cepted Rs. 300/- in the 1st instalment and on 9/12/97 he was caught red-handed along with his peon accused Noor Khan by the Vigilance trap team in his office when demanding and accepting Rs. 200/- consisting of 2 nos. of tainted hundred rupee notes. The tainted money was recorded from-their possession along with other incriminating documents. He proved his FIR, preparation, Detection reports and other documents. 2) That, from the evidence of p.w.1, it clearly made out that Sri C.J. Patra, the then M.V.I., Cuttack has committed an offence u/s. 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act, who is not an accused before this Honourable Court in this trial. Under the above circumstances it is expedient that Sri C. Jawaharlal Patra, the then MVI, Cuttack who is also involved in commission of the offences is to be tried along with the present accused, Noor Mahammad in this case and it is prayed that the processes may kindly be issued for his appearance, for which act, prosecution shall ever pray. The prosecution through Spl. P.P.(V), CTK. Sd/- 26.9.2007" 9. On consideration of the aforesaid petition, the im¬pugned order dated 5.4.2008 was passed which is quoted herein below: “Date-5.4.2008 The record is put up today for consideration of the petition filed u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. by the Special P.P. (Vigilance), Cuttack. Heard. Perused the original petition. Went through the case record at length along with the available evidence. It is seen that the prosecution has so far examined a single witness i.e. P.W.1. Heard. Perused the original petition. Went through the case record at length along with the available evidence. It is seen that the prosecution has so far examined a single witness i.e. P.W.1. The evidence of P.W.1 reflects a prima-facie case u/ss.7/13(2) read with 13 (1) (d) P.C. Act, against C. Jawaharlal Patra, the then M.V.I. Cuttack who can be tried together with the present accused. The petition is disposed of accordingly. Hence issue summons to the said accused C. Jawaharlal Patra fixing 09.5.08 for his appearance. Accused Noor Khan is as before. Dictated. Sd. Illegible. 5/4 Special Judge (Vigilance) Cuttack.” 10. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid admitted facts the question that needs to be adjudicated is as to whether the learned Special Judge while passing the impugned order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. dated 5.4.2008 had taken into consideration the requirements of sanction, prior to taking cognizance as stipulated under Section 29 (1) of the P.C. Act, 1988. In the light of the above, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since in fact, no sanction had been granted under Section 19 of the P.C. Act for prosecution of the petition under Section 13 (2) of the said Act, in the absence of necessary sanction, the petitioner could not have been summoned to face the trial. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilawar Singh (supra) considered the ramification of Section 19 (1) of the P.C. Act and came to hold that this Section creates a complete bar on the power of court to take cognizance of offence punishable under Sections 7,10,11,13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. It is further held that if the said Sub-Section [Section 19 (1)] as read as a whole, it clearly shows that the sanction for prosecution has to be granted with respect to specific accused and only after sanction has been granted that the Court gets the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under the aforementioned provisions of the P.C. Act. Their Lordship of Hon’ble Supreme Court, referred with ap¬proval an earlier judgment rendered in the case of State v. Raj Kumar Jain, (1998) 6 SCC 551 wherein the Court came to hold that, it is clear that the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence mentioned therein, without sanction of the appropriate authority. Their Lordship of Hon’ble Supreme Court, referred with ap¬proval an earlier judgment rendered in the case of State v. Raj Kumar Jain, (1998) 6 SCC 551 wherein the Court came to hold that, it is clear that the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence mentioned therein, without sanction of the appropriate authority. Their Lordships in the aforesaid case also came to conclude that the legislative intention, in enacting the aforesaid provisions, was for providing a “reasonable protection to public servants in the discharge of their official functions” so that they may per¬form their duties and obligations undeterred by vexatious and unnecessary prosecutions. In the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 124 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that no cognizance could be taken for prosecution of the accused for an offence under the P.C. Act unless sanction is obtained from the competent authority with regard to a specific offence. Similarly, in the case of State of Goa v. Babu Thomas, (2005) 8 SCC 130 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “in the absence of a valid sanction on the date when the Special Judge took cognizance of the offence, the taking of cognizance was without jurisdiction and wholly invalid.” 11. The facts of the case of Dilawar Singh (Supra) are similar to the facts that arises for consideration in the present case. In that case, the charge-sheet was submitted against one A.S.I. Jasbir Singh. A closure report was submitted against Dila¬war Singh, SHO as in the opinion of the investigating officer he had not committed any offence. In course of the trial after the statement of the complainant Parvinder Singh had been record¬ed, he moved an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for summon¬ing Dilawar Singh, SHO as a co-accused in the case. The Special Judge therein had dismissed the application and being aggrieved by the same, the complainant filed a revision which came to be allowed by the High Court, by issuing directions to summon Dila¬war Singh and try him, in accordance with law. 12. In the present case, whereas investigation into the offence under the P.C. Act was taken up against the present petitioner-Chinar Jawaharlal Patra as well as his Peon-Noor Khan, the I.O. had sought for the sanction from the appropriate author¬ity for prosecuting both the accused persons. 12. In the present case, whereas investigation into the offence under the P.C. Act was taken up against the present petitioner-Chinar Jawaharlal Patra as well as his Peon-Noor Khan, the I.O. had sought for the sanction from the appropriate author¬ity for prosecuting both the accused persons. The State on con¬sideration of the facts refused to accord sanction for prosecu¬tion of the present petitioner. Therefore, ultimately, charge-sheet was filed only against Noor Khan. In course of the trial, the complainant Md. Siddique was examined and immediately the day after the Special Public Prosecutor filed a petition under Sec¬tion 319 Cr.P.C. and based on such application, the learned Special Judge sought to exercise his authority under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and directed issue of summons to the petitioner for his appearance. Therefore, it is clear that the essential facts of the present case are paramateria with the facts in the case of Dilawar Singh (supra) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case and in particular paragraph-8 thereof came to hold as follows: “xx xx xx The Prevention of Corruption Act is a special statute and as the preamble shows, this Act has been enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith. Here, the princi¬ple expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant would apply which means that if a special provision has been made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provisions. Therefore, the provisions of Section 19 of the Act will have an overriding effect over the general provisions of Section 19 of the Act will have an overriding effect over the general provisions contained in Section 190 or 319 Cr.P.C. A special Judge while trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, cannot summon another person and proceed against him in the purported exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., if no sanction has been granted by the appropriate authority for prosecution of such a person as the existence of a sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence qua that person.” 13. At this stage, it becomes important also to note herein that in the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the Vigilance Department in the case of Paul Varghese (supra) and in particular Paragraph-4 thereof, the following has been noted: “As has been rightly held by the High Court in view of what has been stated in Dilawar Singh’s case (supra), the Trial Court was not justified in holding that Section 319 of the Code has to get preference/primacy over Section 19 of the Act, and that matter stands concluded. But the other stand of Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned counsel, deserves consideration.” Both the aforesaid judgments referred hereinabove clearly establish the fact that the law on the subject of requirement of sanction as a pre-condition for prosecuting a public servant, even under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is well settled and beyond any pale of controversy. Therefore, in the facts of the present case since admittedly, sanction has not been accorded and in fact, has been refused twice. The impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge in allowing the petition filed by the Special Public Prosecutor under Section 319 C.P.C. arising out of T.R. No. 119 of 2007/32 of 1999 and consequently, summoning the petitioner-Chinar Jawaharlal Patro, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained. 14. Accordingly, the revision is allowed and the impugned order dated 5.4.2008 passed by the Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack in T.R. No. 119 of 2007/V. Gr.122 of 1999 is set aside/quashed. Revision allowed.