Hon ble GUPTA, J.— This appeal was filed by the three appellants, out of which appellant No.3 Jannat is the wife of appellant No.1 Ajeem Khan, while the appellant No.2 Liyakat is the son of other two appellants. The appellants seek to challenge the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Churu dated 26.2.2003, passed in Sessions Case No.4/02 (45, 22/99), convicting the appellant Liyakat under Section 302 IPC, and sentencing to life imprisonment along with fine of Rs.1000/- in default to undergo 6 months S.I., and also convicting him for offences under Section 498A and sentencing to one year s R.I. with fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo three months further S.I., and also convicting him for offence under Section 201 and sentencing to one year s R.I. with fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo three months further S.I., while convicting the other two appellants Ajeem Khan and Jannat for offence under Section 302/34 and sentencing to life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to undergo six months S.I., and also convicting them under Section 498A and sentencing to one year s R.I. with fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo three months further S.I., and also convicting them for offence under Section 201 and sentencing to one year s R.I. with fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo three months further S.I. 2. The appeal was filed on 3.3.2003. However, during pendency of the appeal, the appellant No.1 Ajeem Khan died, and therefore, vide order dated 16.8.2007 his appeal was ordered to have abated. Thus, only two appellants Liyakat and Jannat remain. 3. The facts of the case are, that on 25.7.1999 at 2 PM, one Mustaq Khan resident of Rajpura submitted a written report (typed report) (Ex.P/1) at Police Station Dudwakhara, alleging inter-alia that his two daughters were married to Liyakat and Jakir of village Jhariya on 11.6.1993. After marriage, his daughters Jumila and Bulkesh told that their father-in-law Ajeem Khan and mother-in-law Jannat harassed them for dowry, and therefore, as and when they used to come, the informant was giving necessary articles of dowry. It was then alleged that some 3 years ago, Liyakat had gone abroad, at that time, his daughter demanded Rs.40,000/-, which he managed by pledging his household goods, and gave it, still daughters were treated with cruelty, inasmuch as, they were not even given food. It was then alleged that some 3 years ago, Liyakat had gone abroad, at that time, his daughter demanded Rs.40,000/-, which he managed by pledging his household goods, and gave it, still daughters were treated with cruelty, inasmuch as, they were not even given food. With this, it was then alleged that some 2 months ago, Liyakat came from abroad and raised a demand of shebuffalo, which was conveyed by Jumila to the effect that if she-buffalo is not given, she will be killed, however, he could manage a cow, and was sent with her, but the three accused persons gave out that they had demanded of shebuffalo and not cow, thereupon he gave out that presently they should rest contented with cow, and she-buffalo will be given later. With this it was alleged, that on 23.7.99 he received information that Jumila has died, thereupon he, along with his brother Sattar Khan, went to Jhariya, by which time it was already night and dark, and it started raining as well. The dead body of Jumila was already buried, and the body was not shown to him. It is alleged, that his other daughter Bulkesh was unconscious at that time, and therefore, they brought her with them. Then on 24.7.99, on gaining conscious, Bulkesh disclosed, that the three accused persons have murdered Jumila by throttling, which she has seen, and she become unconscious. She also disclosed that the accused planned to kill her also, but she does not know, as to how she is not killed, and that the three accused persons gave beating and killed Jumila, on account of her having taken cow instead of buffalo. On learning this, the informant Mustaq Khan along with his brother Sattar, Inayat Khan, Nawab Khan, Yakub Khan, Wahid Ali, Bhanwaru Khan and Kasam Khan went to Jhariya, and narrated the things disclosed by Bulkesh. Thereupon, the three accused confessed their guilt, that they had collectively killed Jumila, which was their mistake, and they should be pardoned. On this report, FIR No.76/99 was registered for offences under Section 498A, 304B and 201 IPC. Necessary investigation was conducted, and chargesheet was filed. Thereupon, the three accused confessed their guilt, that they had collectively killed Jumila, which was their mistake, and they should be pardoned. On this report, FIR No.76/99 was registered for offences under Section 498A, 304B and 201 IPC. Necessary investigation was conducted, and chargesheet was filed. Since the accused Liyakat was absconding, charge-sheet was filed against him under Section 299 Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court framed charges for the offences under Sections 302 or in the alternative 302/34 read with Section 201 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, and the trial was commenced. During trial, statements of some 5 witnesses were recorded upto 9.5.2000. Thereafter, accused Liyakat could be arrested from Air Port Delhi, and then fresh trial was conducted by re-examining the witnesses, whose statements had already been recorded. This fresh trial commenced on 9.10.2000, wherein the prosecution examined P.W.1 Mustaq Khan, P.W.2 Bulkesh, P.W.3 Bhanwaru Khan son of Habib Khan, P.W.4 Bhanwaru Khan son of Rahim Khan, P.W.5 Sadule Khan, P.W.6 Wahid Ali son of Bhanwaru Khan, P.W.7 Sattar Khan son of Kalu Khan, P.W.8 Dr. Satpal Bhuradia, who conducted the post mortem, P.W.9 Pradeep Kumar, who submitted the charge-sheet, P.W. 10 Rajesh Kumar Sharma, the Investigating Officer, P.W.11 Jagdev Singh, who carried the sealed articles to FSL, P.W. 12 Nawab Ali Khan, who had arrested the accused Liyakat and P.W. 13 Vishnu Narayan, who registered the FIR. 4. Then the statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313, wherein Ajeem Khan stated, that his son was living in Dubai for last 4-5 years before the incident, and whenever he used to come to Jhariya, Jumila always insisted to go with him to Dubai, but she was convinced, as there was no accommodation available in Dubai with Liyakat. Then he has stated that three months before the incident, Liyakat came from Dubai, and when he wanted to go back, Jumila insisted to accompany, and on Liyakat’s declining, sometime in the night, she committed suicide by hanging on the hook of fan in the room with the help of her Chunni. They sent intimation to her parental house, whereupon her father, and father s elder brother came to village Jhariya along with the mother and Bhabhi of the deceased, and in their presence, and with their consent, according to the customs, she was buried. They sent intimation to her parental house, whereupon her father, and father s elder brother came to village Jhariya along with the mother and Bhabhi of the deceased, and in their presence, and with their consent, according to the customs, she was buried. Thereafter, under some instigations, and under pressure of Sattar Khan, Mustaq has lodged a false report. He denied to have made any extra judicial confession, he stated that Bulkesh is married to his younger son Jakir, who live together, and live in commensality, the allegation of demand of dowry was denied, and that it was on account of Liyakat not taking Jumila to Dubai, that she committed suicide. 5. The other accused Liyakat in his statement under Section 313 stated, that he is living in Dubai for last 4-5 years before the incident, Jumila was insisting for going to Dubai with him, but he cannot keep her there because there is no accommodation to live. He has further stated that he came to village some 3 months before the incident and when he was to go back, his wife insisted to accompany, which he declined, annoyed thereof, after all inmates were asleep, sometime in the night, she committed suicide by hanging, and he is innocent. 6. Then Jannat also reiterated the version given out by Ajeem Khan. 7. In defence accused examined Nawab Khan, to depose, that at the behest of Ajeem Khan he had gone to the house of Mustaq, and informed about death of Jumila. Mustaq was not available at house, then he went to field, then went to house of Sattar Khan, who was said to have gone to Taranagar, then he along with Sadule Khan, Bhanwaru Khan, Wahid Ali, Mustaq Khan and his wife, daughter-in-law of Sarvar Khan, went in jeep to Taranagar. Sarvar Khan took his jeep also. Thus, some people boarded on jeep of Sarvar Khan and some people boarded on his jeep. Then they reached Jhariya at about 5-5.30 PM. He dropped all the persons at the house of Ajeem Khan. Then at about 7-7.30 PM, some 200 persons were there in the burial ceremony of Janaza of Jumila, Kazi had offered Namaz, and before that the relatives gave requisite consent, the mother of the deceased gave milk, and then she was buried. 8. The learned trial Court after completing the trial, convicted and sentenced the accused persons as above. Then at about 7-7.30 PM, some 200 persons were there in the burial ceremony of Janaza of Jumila, Kazi had offered Namaz, and before that the relatives gave requisite consent, the mother of the deceased gave milk, and then she was buried. 8. The learned trial Court after completing the trial, convicted and sentenced the accused persons as above. 9. Assailing the impugned judgment, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellants, that the wholly false case has been cooked up against the accused persons, which suffers from various inherent infirmities, and as such, the whole case is required to be thrown out. According to the learned counsel, the unfortunate incident of suicide by Jumila has been bolstered up into a case of murder by three persons, and unfortunately the three persons have been convicted also, which conviction is wholly unsustainable. It was contended by learned counsel that the prosecution case mainly rests on the evidence of Bulkesh, P.W.2, and the extra judicial confession, said to have been made by the three accused persons, and the learned trial Court has relied upon certain circumstances, said to have been found at the time of site inspection, as mentioned in the site inspection note, Ex.P/4, and they have been treated to be incriminating circumstances. It was submitted that thus in substance, Bulkesh P.W.2, is projected to be the solitary eye-witness. According to the learned counsel in order to place reliance on such solitary eye-witness, according to the established law, as repeatedly propounded by Hon ble the Supreme Court, such witness should be of sterling worth. It was submitted that thus in substance, Bulkesh P.W.2, is projected to be the solitary eye-witness. According to the learned counsel in order to place reliance on such solitary eye-witness, according to the established law, as repeatedly propounded by Hon ble the Supreme Court, such witness should be of sterling worth. As against this, a bare reading of her statement, in conjunction with the entire material available on record, including the evidence of other witnesses, it is clear, that she is a wholly unreliable witness, much less she cannot be said to be witness of sterling worth, according to learned counsel, from the tenor of her statement, it is clear, that the prosecution has projected her, rather made her as an eyewitness, inasmuch as, according to her, on the fateful day in the morning, when all persons got up the three accused persons told that she-buffalo was agreed to be given in dowry, then why has brought the cow, whereupon the deceased replied, that her father has given sufficient dowry, and therefore, now if cow has been brought instead of shebuffalo, how does it matter, she-buffalo would be given later. Thereafter, the three accused persons gave physical beating to the deceased, Jannat caught her feet, Ajeem Khan gave physical beating, and Liyakat strangulated her. When the deceased raised a cry, at that time, the witness was preparing tea. She came out and asked, as to why they are killing her sister, thereupon, the accused persons told, that in the first instance, Bulkesh should be killed, then Jumila should be killed, otherwise Bulkesh would raise hue and cry. Then when Jumila died, her father-in-law told, that she has already died, therefore she should be hanged. Then the Chunni of Jumila was taken off, and given to Liyakat, and all the three persons told, that she should be hanged. Then she was taken in the room and was hanged. The father-in-law and mother-in-law kept her holding, while Liyakat hanged her from upside, which incident she has seen with her own eyes, and as soon as she saw Jumila being hanged, she become unconscious, and gained conscious only in Rajpura, and then she narrated the whole story to her father, mother and father s elder brother. The father-in-law and mother-in-law kept her holding, while Liyakat hanged her from upside, which incident she has seen with her own eyes, and as soon as she saw Jumila being hanged, she become unconscious, and gained conscious only in Rajpura, and then she narrated the whole story to her father, mother and father s elder brother. According to the learned counsel this tenor shows, that she has been introduced on the scene, on hearing the cries of the victim, and then claims, that on her raising objection, the accused persons told, that in the first instance, the witness should be killed, then Jumila should be killed, else the witness will raise hue and cry, but then thereafter she does not say anything that the accused persons did anything untoward to her, and if this were state of mind of the accused persons about the witness, it does not at all stand to reason, that they would spare her, and allow her to witness the whole episode upto the deceased being hanged, so also they would handover the witness to her parents in an unconscious state of mind, exposing themselves to all risks of her narrating the things to the parents. In the ordinary course of things, this witness would have been liquidated first, or in any case, would not have been handed over, or even allowed to have been taken away by the parents. It was then submitted, that the FIR in the present case has been lodged at much belated hour, viz. it has been lodged on 25.7.99, though the incident is of 23rd, and it is in order to cover this delay, that the theory of Bulkesh falling unconscious, remaining unconscious till evening of 24th, and then on her gaining conscious to have narrated the things to the father etc. has been cooked up, while if Bulkesh had fallen unconscious on the spot, accused persons must have assumed her also to be dead, and should have buried her, or they would have taken care to get her treated, and in any case, even if it were to be assumed that Bulkesh was allowed to be taken away by Mustaq etc., then the parental family should have got panicky about unconsciousness, and should be taken effective steps for getting her treated. Probably realizing this, the entire story has been introduced, about Bulkesh having been got treated by one Vaidya Purshottam Lal, but then, this was never disclosed during investigation, nor Purshottam Lal has been produced, even to corroborate the factum of Bulkesh having fallen unconscious, or to depose about any prescription having been given by him etc. 10. It was submitted by the learned counsel that even after lodging of the FIR on 25.7.99, wherein it was clearly alleged that Bulkesh is the source of information for the informant about the incident, and the accused, still even though statement of some of the witnesses were recorded by the Investigating Officer on 25.7.99 itself, but then the statements of Bulkesh were not recorded till 27.7.99, for which no explanation whatever has been put-forward by the prosecution, and this delayed interrogation of sole witness by the investigation, in absence of any plausible explanation, casts serious doubt on the reliability of this witness. In this regard learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court, in Jagjit Singh alias Jagga vs.. State of Punjab, reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 893 and Gayadin vs. State of M.P., reported in (2006)1 SCC (Cri) 549. It was submitted that in Jagjit Singh s case there was only three days delay in recording statements. 11. It was then submitted that all said and done, even if it were to be assumed that Bulkesh made disclosure on 24th in the evening, still Police Station Dudwakhara was at much nearer point from village Rajpura, but then the FIR was not lodged, rather they claim to have gone in a vehicle being Sattar Khan, Inayat Khan, Kasam Khan, Wahid Ali, Bhanwaru Khan and Nawab Khan to Jhariya and to have narrated, as to what was disclosed by Bulkesh, whereupon the accused are said to have made extra judicial confession, still they have not lodged any First Information Report, and claim, that they returned to village Rajpura, even though the Police Station Dudwakhara was available en-route Jhariya to Rajpura, though on taking some diversion. Then the informant claims that in the next morning he went to village Taranagar and got the FIR typed, and then went to Police Station Dudwakhara, and lodged it at 2 PM. Then the informant claims that in the next morning he went to village Taranagar and got the FIR typed, and then went to Police Station Dudwakhara, and lodged it at 2 PM. Taranagar is wholly off the route place, and according to learned counsel this report was got prepared in consultation with one advocate Kaidar Swami, who admittedly was the counsel of Mustaq, in some other litigation. Thus, this long unexplained delay in lodging the FIR renders the prosecution case thoroughly doubtful. It was then submitted that admittedly two daughters of Mustaq, being Jumila and Bulkesh, were married to two sons of Ajeem Khan being Liyakat and Jakir. All the members of the family are living together, and even according to Bulkesh there is no whisper of any demand of dowry by Jakir from Bulkesh. In such circumstances, it does not stand to reason, that any demand of dowry would be raised from Jumila only, and that also of a she-buffalo after six years of marriage. Regarding the subsequent conduct of Bulkesh, it was also submitted, that notwithstanding the above, i.e. there being no demand of dowry from her, the relations being cordial, the family being living together, still she along with her two children, does not want to go back to in-laws house. Reasons are not far to seek, viz. when she has deliberately stated a false story, she has no face to stand in front of the in-law people. It was next submitted, that in this very sequence, it is significant to note, that the alleged eye-witness Bulkesh was for the first time examined by the police at much belated time, being 27.7.99 only, despite the fact that the report was lodged on 25th, which was based on revelations made by Bulkesh, and Bulkesh was available with Mustaq. Regarding FIR it was also submitted, that Mustaq and Sattar, both of them admitted that they are illiterates, in such circumstances, it cannot be believed, that they dictated the FIR to the typist. Then the FIR contains corrections and over-writings and Mustaq and Sattar do not own these corrections and over-writings, to have been done by them, the typist has not come in the witness-box, and looking to the nature of corrections and over-writings, it is clear, that they are not possible unless the typed FIR is read, and mistakes are detected. Then the FIR contains corrections and over-writings and Mustaq and Sattar do not own these corrections and over-writings, to have been done by them, the typist has not come in the witness-box, and looking to the nature of corrections and over-writings, it is clear, that they are not possible unless the typed FIR is read, and mistakes are detected. Thus it clearly shows, that the FIR was got scribed or dictated by some advocate, probably Kaidar Swami. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgments of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Shanker Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 579, and State of Punjab vs. Ajaib Singh & Ors., reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 43. 13. Then assailing the theory of extra judicial confession it has been submitted, that no witness being resident of village Jhariya had been produced, even though according to some of the witnesses, at the time the accused persons made extra judicial confession, some 20-30 people were there. The next limb of argument was, that according to the FIR extra judicial confession was said to have been made only once in presence of the persons, who accompanied Mustaq, being Sattar Khan, Inayat Khan, Yakub Khan, Bhanwaru Khan, and Kasam Khan, on it being disclosed that the things have been revealed by Bulkesh. While during trial the theory of extra judicial confession having been made twice, has been developed, being, once at the house in presence of these persons, who declined to forgive them and asking the accused to apologize in presence of the community people. Thereupon a meeting was convened outside the mosque, and there, in presence of all the persons again, extra judicial confession is said to have been made. Thereupon a meeting was convened outside the mosque, and there, in presence of all the persons again, extra judicial confession is said to have been made. It was also submitted that at some stage, the extra judicial confession was propounded to have been made only by Ajeem Khan, but then it has been improved to have been made by all the three accused persons, and on two occasions, likewise, learned counsel read to us the statements of the witnesses produced on the side of the prosecution to prove extra judicial confession, and submitted that some more persons have been introduced to be the witness of extra judicial confession, inasmuch as, according to Ex.P/1 8 persons are said to have gone, being Mustaq Khan, Sattar Khan, Inayat Khan, Nawab Khan, Yakub Khan, Wahid Ali, Bhanwaru Khan and Kasam Khan, and in their presence extra judicial confession is said to have been made, while according to Mustaq has stated as P.W.1, 7 persons had come and gone being himself, Sattar Khan, Inayat Khan, Kasam Khan, Wahid Khan, Bhanwaru Khan and Nawab Khan. Thus, name of Yakub Khan has been omitted, and on the other hand, during trial, two Bhanwaru Khans have been examined being P.W.3 and 4, to depose the making of extra judicial confession, apart from the fact that P.W.5 Sadule Khan son of Mahnu Khan has also been introduced to be witness of extra judicial confession, and to have gone along with Mustaq Khan, though the other witnesses by the prosecution being Yakub Khan has not been produced by the prosecution. It was then submitted, that even from reading of the evidence of witnesses, whosoever have been produced for deposing the extra judicial confession, it would be clear, that their evidence is also materially contradictory inter-se, inasmuch as, many persons have denied the suggestion about extra judicial confession having been made in sequence one by one, and maintained it to have been made by all the three accused persons together, while some of the witnesses have denied, all the three persons to have made extra judicial confession together, and maintained it to have been made in sequence one after another. 14. 14. It was next submitted that a look at the post mortem report being Ex.P/9 would show, that in the body, semi digested food was found, which completely belies the prosecution case, and supports the possibility of the deceased having committed suicide sometime in the night, inasmuch as, she had taken the dinner only in the night, as according to Bulkesh the time of incident was in the morning when she was preparing tea, and therefore, if the incident had taken place in the morning, no semi digested or undigested food could be found in the stomach, or in the intestines either, rather they should have been found empty, as in the morning she must have defecated. 15. It was then submitted that the prosecution has manipulated the things and has prepared the site plan to show as if the things were maintained as such right from the date of incident till the inspection of the site so much so that even Chunni has been shown to be hanging on the hook available to be seized by the police as late as on 26th of July 1999. This is wholly improbable, inasmuch as, even according to prosecution at least on 24th evening, Mustaq etc. had clearly given out their intentions not to foil up the matter to set legal machinery into motion. In that event, it does not stand to reason that despite knowing such intentions, the accused would allow the things to remain intact. 16. It was also submitted that the learned trial Court has relied upon the circumstance about the gate of the room to be openable by mere push, despite being bolted from inside. In this regard, the learned trial Court has relied upon the bare ipsi-dixit of the Investigating Officer P.W.10, but then according to learned counsel it is significant to note, that firstly the sliding bolt cannot be opened by mere push from outside if it is bolted from inside, then secondly, according to the Investigating Officer, the door was got pushed by one Police Jawan, but then the name of the Police Jawan has not been disclosed, much less has he been produced. This shows that this is a wholly cooked up story. This shows that this is a wholly cooked up story. According to learned counsel in Ex.P/4A it is mentioned that the door was got bolted from inside and then heavy kicks were got showered on the door by Yakub Khan Constable No.423 of the Police Station, and the door opened, while according to P.W.10 door was pushed by both the hands. In such circumstances, when identity of the person giving push is available in Ex.P/4A, his non-production is material circumstance to belie the theory. Thus, this circumstance could not be relied upon. It was also submitted that in the statement of the accused persons under Section 313 also, this circumstance was not put to the accused for obtaining their explanation. 17. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Basavaraj R. Patil & Others vs. State of Karnataka & Others reported in (2000)8 SCC 740 , State of Punjab vs. Naib Din reported in 2001 Cr.L.R. (SC) 666, Vikramjit Singh Alias Vicky vs. State of Punjab reported in 2006 AIR SCW 6197 (equivalent to (2007)1 SCC (Cri) 732), State of A.P. vs. Patnam Anandam reported in AIR 2005 SC 764 (equivalent to 2005 SCC (Cri) 1225), Ajay Singh vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2007 Cr.L.R. (SC) 548 and also relied upon the latest judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Asraf Ali vs. State of Assam reported in 2008 Cr.L.J. 4338, and highlighted the importance of putting the circumstances to the accused in his statement under Section 313, and also submitted, that in Vikramjit Singh s case, Ajay Singh s case and Asraf Ali s case solely on that ground, accused person had been acquitted, therefore, the conviction is bad. 18. In the last it was submitted that in any case, in view of the above circumstances, at least the possibility of the deceased having committed suicide is not altogether ruled out and, therefore, on the circumstances relied upon by prosecution, after discarding the statement of Bulkesh, the alleged eye-witness, it cannot be said, that the proved incriminating circumstances constituted a complete chain establishing the guilt of the accused, and also negativing the innocence of the accused on the hypothesis of the deceased committing suicide and, therefore, no conviction under Section 302 could be recorded. 19. 19. Regarding offence under Section 498A also it was contended, that the theory of demand of dowry has been projected simply as a motive, in order to give colors to the story of murder, otherwise the marriage of the two sisters had taken place six years ago, and admittedly there is no problem with the other daughter, who is married to the other son of the accused and all are living together. Likewise, it is not the prosecution case, that at the time of marriage it was ever agreed that Rs.40,000/- would be paid to Liyakat for his going abroad, nor is it believable, that the father of the girl agreed to give she-buffalo in dowry after six years, and if cow is given, there was any demand of dowry on the part of the accused persons, more so when it is not the case, that when the demand of Rs.40,000/- was made, which is said to have been satisfied by the father at that time, any demand of she-buffalo was even reiterated. Thus, the allegation of dowry, and cruelty on that count, is clearly an embroidery, on the part of the prosecution, and the conviction under section 498-A is altogether required to be set aside. 20. Learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the complainant on the other hand supported the impugned judgment. It was contended that the statements of Bulkesh are wholly reliable, there is no dispute about her presence in the house of the accused, being the daughterin- law, her presence in the house has not been disputed in the statements under Section 313 either, and she has given a natural account of the events, and therefore, there is no reason not to believe her evidence. It was also submitted, that apart from the evidence of Bulkesh, there are voluminous circumstances on record, which clearly establish the guilt of the accused, and negative the innocence, inasmuch as, even if it were to be assumed, that the deceased Jumila committed suicide, still it was the first and foremost duty of the accused persons to inform about the factum of death to the police, so also to the parental family of the deceased, either of which having not been done, it clearly constitutes to be an incriminating circumstance. In this regard, reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Ram Badan Sharma vs. State of Bihar reported in 2006 AIR SCW 4068. It was then submitted that similarly the conduct of the accused Liyakat in absconding after the incident is also clearly an incriminating circumstance. It has come on record that during investigation, the accused was not available as he had absconded, warrants (Ex.P/21) for his arrest were obtained from the Court, still he could not be apprehended, and was ultimately arrested at the Indira Gandhi Inter- National Air Port, Delhi on receiving information from there, vide Ex.P/22, and a charge-sheet under Section 299 Cr.P.C. had been filed against the accused Liyakat. The learned counsel relied upon judgment of Hon ble Supreme Court in Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam & Anr. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 1993 Cri.L.J. 1635, wherein Hon ble the Supreme Court found this to be an incriminating circumstance. Then learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohd. Omar & Ors., reported in AIR 2000 SC 2988 (equivalent to 2000(6) Supreme 172 ), to contend, that here the deceased was living in the house of the accused persons, and she has been found to have died an unnatural death. In such circumstances, in view of the provisions of Section 106, Evidence Act, it was the duty of the accused persons to explain, as to how she died, and mere giving explanation in the statement under Section 313, about her having committed suicide sometime in the night, is of no consequence, more particularly when this theory is not supported by any other material available on record, apart from the fact, that regarding the cause of alleged suicide, varying suggestions have been given to different prosecution witnesses by the defence, like her being frustrated on account of being issueless. Thus, Section 106, Evidence Act is clearly attracted, and the conviction is required to be upheld. 21. Thus, Section 106, Evidence Act is clearly attracted, and the conviction is required to be upheld. 21. To this learned counsel for the appellant again submitted, that even any of these circumstances about non- giving of information by the accused to the police, or to the parental family of the deceased, or the circumstance about the conduct of the accused Liyakat, in absconding after the incident, have also not been put to the accused in his statements under Section 313, to obtain his explanation, and reiterating the reliance placed on the judgments, in Vikramjit Singh s case, Ajay Singh s case and Asraf Ali s case. It was submitted that the accused is entitled to be acquitted. 22. We have heard learned counsel and have gone through the record closely. 23. From perusal of the record, this is of course clear that the learned trial Court has considered, at page 9 of the judgment, the fact that immediately after the alleged suicide accused persons did not give any report to the police about unnatural death, with the result that inquiry under Section 174 could not be done, and no reason has been put-forward by the accused for not lodging this report. Similarly the learned trial Court has relied upon Ex.P/4A and the statements of P.W.10, Investigating Officer, that in the Halat Mauka, Ex.P/4-A, the door was got bolted from inside, and did get opened on being pushed from outside. We also find, that the learned trial Court at page 10 has also considered, that in the site plan Ex.P/4 at point E, a 15 inch long and wide fresh hole has been made in 9 inch thick wall, alleging it to have been done for the purpose of attempting to save the deceased, while there was no justification for making this opening, and according to I.O., thus a false story of suicide has been projected. Then at page 11, the learned trial Court has also considered, that the accused Liyakat, despite being the husband of the deceased, could not be arrested after the incident, and could be arrested only on 15.5.2000, and this absconding of the accused also confirms his being guilty. 24. Then at page 11, the learned trial Court has also considered, that the accused Liyakat, despite being the husband of the deceased, could not be arrested after the incident, and could be arrested only on 15.5.2000, and this absconding of the accused also confirms his being guilty. 24. Then a perusal of the statements of the accused appellants Jannat and Liyakat does show, that any of these circumstances relied upon by the learned trial Court, have not been put to any of the two accused in their statements under Section 313. Likewise, we also find that circumstances pressed into service by the learned Public Prosecutor, and the learned counsel for the complainant, as deposed by Mustaq etc., that information about the death was not conveyed to them, and then she was buried, has of course not been relied upon by the learned trial Court, but then, this has also not been put to the accused in their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 25. Thus, we find that as a matter of fact, material circumstances, relied upon by the learned trial Court for recording conviction so also material circumstance emerging against the accused, have all not been put to the accused in their statements under Section 313, for obtaining their explanation. 26. The question then is as to what is the effect of this omission and what is the consequence flowing therefrom i.e. whether the whole trial is vitiated, or the conviction is vitiated, with the result, that either on this sole ground, both the accused persons are required to be acquitted, or the matter is required to be remanded back to the learned trial Court, for recording further statements of the accused under Section 313, by seeking their explanation on the above circumstances, as relied upon by the learned trial Court, so also as are further emerging from the record. 27. In this sequence we propose to take up the aspect of not obtaining explanation of the accused with regard to circumstance appearing against him, while recording the statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, if necessary we go into the other aspects of the matter. 28. In this regard, first of all we may refer to and consider the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 29. First of all, we take up the judgment in Patnam Anandam s case. 28. In this regard, first of all we may refer to and consider the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 29. First of all, we take up the judgment in Patnam Anandam s case. This is judgment rendered by a Bench comprised of two Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court. The case in that case was a murder case and was resting on circumstantial evidence as is clear from para 5 of the judgment. The prosecution relied upon 6 circumstances cataloged therein and the High Court allowed the appeal of the accused and acquitted him, which was challenged by the State. In this sequence, in para 7 it was observed by Hon ble the Supreme Court that Hon ble Supreme Court was not impressed by the reasons given by the High Court for setting aside the conviction but then the appeal before Hon ble the Supreme Court being appeal against acquittal, Hon ble the Supreme Court proceeded to itself scrutinize the evidence on record. Then in para 9 the circumstances of deceased being last seen in the company of the accused at 4 PM on the earlier day was decided against the prosecution. Then in para 10 circumstance of accused giving wrong information about the cause of death was also decided against the prosecution. Thus, virtually after negativing all the circumstances only one circumstance described by Hon ble the Supreme Court to be “most crucial circumstance”, which could have linked the accused with murder was the finding of a cloth piece and two buttons near the body of the deceased, which according to the prosecution were parts of the shirt worn by the accused on the date of occurrence and in para 11 it was held that unfortunately the prosecution has led no evidence to connect the shirt with the piece of cloth found near the place of occurrence. It was also considered that the seizure memo of the shirt shows that the shirt was a white shirt with red patterns of flowers and it appeared that the pocket of the shirt was torn apart. Two buttons were also missing. The site plan Ex.3 disclosed that near the dead body was found a torn shirt pocket with two white buttons, the colour of the shirt pocket found to be not disclosed in the panchnama. Two buttons were also missing. The site plan Ex.3 disclosed that near the dead body was found a torn shirt pocket with two white buttons, the colour of the shirt pocket found to be not disclosed in the panchnama. It was found, therefore, difficult to connect the torn shirt pocket with the shirt which was recovered at the instance of the accused. It was also found that that apart, no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to establish that the piece of cloth found at the place of occurrence was really a part of the shirt which was recovered at the instance of the accused. It is with recording this finding that it has been observed by Hon ble the Supreme Court in para 11 as under:- “Moreover, the circumstance that the pocket of the shirt worn by the accused at the time of committing the offence was found at the scene of occurrence, was not even put to the respondent in his examination under Section 313, Cr.P.C.” 30. With this, it has been concluded that it is difficult to rely upon it as an incriminating circumstance. In our view, thus, this shows that on merits Hon ble the Supreme Court did not find the circumstance to be proved and in addition it was found that it was not put to the accused. 31. Now we take up the judgment in Vikramjit Singh s case. This again is a judgment rendered by a Bench comprising of two Hon ble Judges. Like the case in Patnam Anandam s case. This again was a case resting on circumstantial evidence. In that case, accused was convicted and imposed death penalty and High Court affirmed the same. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are cataloged in para 10 of the judgment. The Hon ble Supreme Court in para 13 noticed that there are two ver-sions. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded to weigh the probability of both of them and opined that the appellant having not been able to prove its case, the prosecution case should be accepted. It was found that the approach of the learned Sessions Judge was not correct. The High Court also found to have appeared to have fallen into the same error. It was found that the approach of the learned Sessions Judge was not correct. The High Court also found to have appeared to have fallen into the same error. It invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act although opining: "The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference." 32. Then in para 15 it was found that in a situation of this nature, the Court may raise a strong suspicion that in all probabilities the accused was guilty but such suspicion cannot be a substitute for proof. Then the next circumstance considered was about information was given only that an incident had taken place, which was in fact a robbery, and this was again found to be not having direct nexus in proving the crime. Then the aspect of recovery of knife was considered and that was also found to be not a circumstance pointing towards the guilt of the accused. Thus, negativing all these circumstances, the last circumstance considered was the reaction of the family and was found to be not of much consequence to prove the guilt of the accused and with this in para 21 it was held as under:- “21. The reaction of the family is again a matter which is not of much consequence to prove the guilt of the appellant. It does not lead to a circumstance which forms the link in the chain. Again, no such question was put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 33. Then we may take up Ajay Singh s case. This again is a judgment of the Bench comprising of two Hon ble Judges. This case also rested on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances mainly relied upon were of extra judicial confession and Hon ble the Supreme Court in para 7 after discussing the evidence in detail found that it would not be safe to place any reliance on the so called extra judicial confession. This case also rested on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances mainly relied upon were of extra judicial confession and Hon ble the Supreme Court in para 7 after discussing the evidence in detail found that it would not be safe to place any reliance on the so called extra judicial confession. Then the only remaining circumstance was that kerosene was found on the dress of the accused and in para 9 it was noticed that no question in that regard was put to the accused while he was examined under Section 313 of the Code. Then the scope and object of Sec. 313 has been highlighted, reliance has been placed on the earlier judg-ment of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Hate Singh, Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1953 SC 468 . It was also observed in para 13 as under:- “the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 313 of the Code cannot be too strongly stressed. It is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material substance which is intended to be used against him...” 34. With holding this, the conviction was set aside and the accused was acquitted. 35. Much stress was given by learned counsel for the appellant that since in Ajay Singh s case solely on the ground of question having not been put to accused under Section 313, he has been acquitted, therefore, in the present case also, the accused should be acquitted. We will consider this aspect later, however, we may observe here that to say the least, the case was resting on circumstantial evidence and after excluding the extra judicial confession, the only circumstance of finding kerosene on the dress of the accused might not have been felt to be constituting a complete chain establishing guilt of the accused and negativing his innocence and, therefore, Hon ble the Supreme Court might not have thought it appropriate to remand the matter in absence of any other evidence against the accused. 36. 36. Then the last judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant is the recent judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court dated 17.7.2008 rendered in the case of Asraf Ali s case and in that case also, according to learned counsel, the accused was acquitted on account of the question having not been put to the accused in his statement under Section 313. This judgment is also rendered by the Bench of two Hon ble Judges and presided by the same Hon ble Judge, which Bench rendered the judgment in Ajay Singh s case. In this case there were injuries on the scalp and there were featured fracture of the skull parietal bone extending from above the right orbit backwards and posteriorly and ending in the landoid suceer. The deceased died of coma resulting from head injury, which was ante mortem and caused by blunt weapon. The Hon ble Supreme Court again referred to and relied upon the earlier judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh s case, another judgment of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 and that in Shamu Balu Chaugule vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1976) 1 SCC 438 . In those judgments it was held that where circumstances have not been put to the accused it cannot be used against him. Then judgment rendered by a Bench comprised of the three Hon ble Judges of Supreme Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2622 was also referred to about the importance of statements under Section 313 and it was held in para 16 as under:- “16. It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner s attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperial the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However, where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. However, where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied for its conviction.” 37. Then at the same time, it was also held in para 17 that it is not intended to nail him to any position, but to comply with the most salutary principle of natural justice enshrined in the maxim audi alteram partem and if the court fails to put the needed question under clause (b) it would result in a handicap to the accused and he can legitimately claim that no evidence without affording him the opportunity to explain can be used against him. Then in para 18 it was observed that in certain cases when there is perfunctory examination under Section 313 of the Code, the matter is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to retry from the stage at which the prosecution was closed. With this in para 19 it was found that in the case in hand, the question put was about the witnesses having stated that on the date and at the time of occurrence the accused caused severe injuries to the deceased on the head from behind with a piece of timber and that in the evening on that very day he succumbed to the injuries...”, and it was found in para 20 that no witness had stated that on the date of occurrence the accused had caused severe injuries to the deceased by assaulting him on the head from behind. With this it was observed that the circumstances, which were relied upon by the learned trial Court to find the guilt were not brought to the notice of the accused, therefore, in essence his examination under Section 313 was rendered an empty-formality and on that count the judgment again was set aside. 38. In our view, in this judgment apart from finding fault on the aspect of non-putting of circumstance to the accused in his statement under Section 313, it was also found that the witnesses did not state the thing put to the accused, otherwise in para 18 it was held that when there is perfunctory examination under Section 313 of the Code the matter is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to retry from the stage at which the prosecution was closed. 39. Then we may refer to few more judgments of Hon ble the Supreme Court. To start with we take up the judgment in Mir Mohd. Omar s case. In this case, the accused was convicted by the trial Court under Section 364 r/w Section 34 but not for murder. The High Court dismissed the State s appeal against the acquittal of murder and reduced the quantum of punishment and the State and convicts approached Hon ble the Supreme Court. It was a case of abduction and murder. Hon ble the Supreme Court proceeded to consider the evidence on record and in para 16 it was found “we have no difficulty to conclude that all the accused abducted Mahesh in order to murder him.” Then Hon ble the Supreme Court proceeded to consider the aspect of murder by the abductors and in that regard, noticed certain lapses of the prosecution and omission on the part of the prosecution to put the doctor and expected the Sessions Judge himself to have been an experienced Judicial Officer. Then the other aspects were considered and in that sequence, one circumstance was projected about the shirt, stained with human blood of the deceased, was recovered and in that regard it was observed in para 28 that when Hon ble the Supreme Court scrutinized the record it was noticed that no question was put to the accused on that score but then the only consequence found was that Hon ble Supreme Court fell disabled from using that feature on the shirt as a circumstance against the accused. Then in para 29 it was observed that even barring that the following circumstances have now been well set against the accused, the circumstances were cataloged, the matter was considered on merits, and the State appeals were allowed, the appeals filed by the accused were dismissed and six accuseds were convicted for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC and were sentenced to imprisonment for life. 40. Then next is the judgment in Basavaraj R. Patil s case. This is judgment rendered by Bench comprising of three Hon ble Judges. It was a typical case being for the offence under Section 498A and one of the accused was living in the USA, while the other was at the relevant time studying at Gadag and at the stage of recording statement under Section 313 their respective counsel endorsed that they have nothing to say by way of their statements. The trial Magistrate after hearing the arguments finally acquitted the accused, and that acquittal was challenged by the complainant and on the complainant s revision that order was set aside and the matter was sent back to the trial Court. This was challenged by the accused before Hon ble the Supreme Court and Hon ble Supreme Court considered the importance, purpose and object of recording of the statements under Section 313 and also considered the aspect of peculiar circumstances of the case about the accused being required to incur unnecessary huge expenses so also the aspect of permissibility of the advocate to give the statement etc. and then set aside the order of remand on the ground that in any case since the accused did not raise any grievance on that count complainant could not raise any grievance, with the result that, that order was set aside. 41. Then the yet another judgment of Hon ble the Supreme Court is in Naib Din s case. In this case, the evidence of some formal witnesses of the prosecution like those carrying the sample to the Forensic Science Laboratory etc. was tendered by affidavit and that evidence was not put to the accused under Section 313. In that case, again after referring to judgment in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade s case and Basavaraj R. Patil s case it was noticed that if such objection was not raised at the appellate stage, the revisional Court should not normally bother about it. was tendered by affidavit and that evidence was not put to the accused under Section 313. In that case, again after referring to judgment in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade s case and Basavaraj R. Patil s case it was noticed that if such objection was not raised at the appellate stage, the revisional Court should not normally bother about it. It was also found that the omission to put the question concerning that evidence, which is purely of formal nature is too insufficient for holding that the proceedings are vitiated . In that case it was also considered that question could be put to the counsel for the accused. 42. On a review of the above case law, in our view, the necessity of obtaining explanation of the accused on the evidence appearing against him during trial cannot be under assessed or under mind and in the present case, as noticed above, various material circumstances appearing against the accused from the material on record have not been put to the accused in his statement under Section 313. 43. The question then is as to what is the consequence i.e. whether notwithstanding any other material being there on record which by itself may or may not be sufficient to convict the accused, simply for the omission on the part of the learned trial Court to put certain or few important circumstance to the accused in his statement under Section 313, the accused should be allowed to go scot-free solely on that ground or whether in every case, where despite the fact that there is no reliable evidence on record to convict the accused still since he has been convicted by relying upon certain circumstances not put to the accused under Section 313, in every case as a rule, the trial should be held vitiated and the matter should be remanded back to the learned trial Court or whether the importance and significance of the circumstances omitted to be put to the accused is required to be considered in the sense that the conviction should be upheld if even after excluding those circumstances, the conviction can be upheld. We are to consider as to out of these various options, which is to be chosen in circumstances, where certain circumstances have not been put to the accused in his statement under Section 313. 44. We are to consider as to out of these various options, which is to be chosen in circumstances, where certain circumstances have not been put to the accused in his statement under Section 313. 44. As a legal proposition, in our view, after considering the above referred judgments of Hon ble the Supreme Court, it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, with the result that if after excluding the circumstances not put to the accused in his statement under Section 313, the Court finds that the material on record is sufficient to uphold the conviction or to record the conviction, the circumstances not put can be excluded from consideration and the matter can be decided. Likewise, if even after considering the circumstance not put to the accused, the Court feels that there is no material to convict the accused, then also the trial need not be prolonged by remanding the matter to the trial Court and the matter may be decided by excluding those circumstances more so because the prosecution or the complainant is not entitled to raise any objection on that count. 45. The difficulty arises in the remaining category of cases and for those cases also, in our view, if the material omitted to put to the accused is of formal character, then it is required to be considered by the appellate or revisional Court, as to whether any prejudice has been suffered by the accused by omitting to put that material to him and if it is found to be mere formal lapse, then it can be cured by putting the question even to counsel for the accused appearing in appeal or revision only in cases, where the offence is triable as summons case. 46. 46. However, where the circumstances are material in the sense that the question, as to whether the accused can be convicted or not, or his conviction or acquittal can be maintained, depends on the material already on record and put to the accused in conjunction with the material omitted to be put or possibility of finding him guilty solely on the basis of material omitted to be put under Section 313, in our view, the matter is required to be remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to retry from the stage of completion of the prosecution evidence, to seek explanation of the accused on the omitted material and thereafter to decide the matter afresh. 47. Laying down any other straight-jacket formula would cause great hardship sometime on the prosecution and sometime on accused. The accused cannot be allowed to go scott-free simply on the basis of the fact that all evidence has not been put to him under Section 313 even though there is sufficient material available on record as in that event the possibilities are not ruled out about unscrupulous accuseds managing to have omissions in the statement under Section 313 and claim immunity even in heinous offences. Likewise, where there is no material on record against the accused, then also the trial cannot be prolonged simply for the lapse of the officer in not putting the appropriate questions to the accused. 48. If the present case is considered from the above standpoint, as we have found that the learned trial Court has used against the accused and considered the circumstances viz., that immediately after the alleged suicide the accused persons did not give any report to the police about her unnatural death with the result that an inquiry under Section 174 could not be done and no reason has been put forward by the accused for not lodging the report. Similarly, th learned trial Court has relied upon Ex.P/4A and the statement of P.W.10 that in the Halat Mauka, the door was got bolted from inside and it did get opened on being pushed from outside. Similarly, th learned trial Court has relied upon Ex.P/4A and the statement of P.W.10 that in the Halat Mauka, the door was got bolted from inside and it did get opened on being pushed from outside. Likewise, the learned trial Court has also considered that in the site plan Ex.P/4 at Point E a 15 inch x 15 inch hole has been made anew in the 9 inch thick wall in an attempt to show it to be a case of suicide and hole having been made with a view to show an attempt on the part of the accused to save the deceased while there was no justification for making this opening and thus a false story of suicide has been projected. Similarly the learned trial Court has also considered that the accused Liyakat despite being husband of the deceased could not be arrested after the incident and could be arrested only on 15.5.2000 and this absconding of the accused also confirms his being guilty. In our view, in this regard there is material on record being Ex.P/21 the warrant having been obtained for arresting the accused, the fact is that challan was filed against the accused under Section 299 and in that trial statements of 5 witnesses were recorded and then after arrest of the accused Liyakat, the matter was retried. Then we also find that the learned Public Prosecutor has pressed into service the circumstance that as deposed by Mustaq P.W.1 that information about the death of Jumila was not conveyed to them and she was buried as a incriminating circumstance against the accused. We have found that all these circumstances have not been put to the accused in his statement under Section 313 and those circumstances by themselves so also in conjunction with the existing material on record with regard to which we do not propose to express any opinion either ways lest it should prejudice the case of either side, does have material bearing on the aspect, as to whether the accused/s can be convicted or are entitled to be acquitted. 49. 49. In view of the above, on the parameters propounded by us above, without going into the other contentions raised by either side and without commenting on the other material on record, in our view, the matter is required to be remanded to the learned trial Court to retry the matter from the stage of completion of the prosecution evidence. 50. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned trial Court to retry the matter from the stage of completion of prosecution evidence and to seek explanation of the accused with respect to all circumstances appearing against them on record including those highlighted above. The trial Court would be free to record fresh statements of the accused under Section 313 whole hog if it so likes and shall then decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. The appellant No.2 is already in custody, he may be produced before the trial Court on 2.3.2009 and the other appellant Jannat is also directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 2.3.2009 on which date, the learned trial Court shall fix date of its convenience for retrying the case as above. 51. It is clarified that if the appellant Jannat fails to appear on 2.3.2009, her bail bonds submitted before this Court shall stand forfeited and amount of bond shall be recovered and the attendance of the accused Jannat be procured by arrest warrant. 52. Since the matter is already very old and the accused is already in custody since 2000, the learned trial Court is directed to decide the matter utmost expeditiously. 53. Before parting with the case, it may be observed that it is on account of the perfunctory manner of recording statement under Section 313 that the matter is required to be remanded with the further result that one of the accused person, who is in jail and is to face the continued prolonged trial for no fault of his. The officers at least in R.H.J.S. cadres are supposed to know the importance of proper recording of the statements of the accused under Section 313 as highlighted in series of judgments, some of which have been noticed in this judgment. The officers at least in R.H.J.S. cadres are supposed to know the importance of proper recording of the statements of the accused under Section 313 as highlighted in series of judgments, some of which have been noticed in this judgment. This observation may be sent to the officer concerned and may also be brought to the Hon ble Chief Justice if His Lordships feels appropriate to take any disciplinary action.