JUDGMENT Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 28.2.2009, 22.11.2006 as well as the order dated 28.2.2009 rejecting the application for amendment filed by the petitioner. 2. The brief facts as stated in the writ petition are that a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent was filed by the respondent against the petitioner with an allegation that the petitioner is a tenant of pottery factory from 1996 on payment of Rs. 500/- per month as rent and he has not paid the rent and a claim was made that rent is due from 3 years. A notice was given and after that the suit was filed. In spite of filing the suit, the possession of the property has not been delivered. A written statement was filed and it was stated in the written statement that it is a factory with machinery, was handed over to the petitioner, therefore, it was necessary to give six months’ notice whereas only one month notice has been given. The petitioner has paid rent up to 2002. Thereafter it was not accepted. Even the money order which was sent, has not been accepted. Then the deposit was made under Section 30 of the Act No. XIII of 1972. Further an objection was made that the suit before the Judge Small Causes Court was not maintainable. After considering the evidence on record, oral as well as documentary filed on behalf of the parties, the trial Court framed 7 issues and ultimately vide its judgment and order dated 22.10.2006, decreed the suit for arrears of rent. The petitioner aggrieved by the aforesaid order, filed a revision which was ultimately dismissed vide its order dated 28.2.2009. Further an amendment application was also filed during the pendency of the revision, but the same was rejected. It was submitted before the Court that owner of the premises in dispute is Government and it was only let out to the respondent-landlord who in turn has given possession to the petitioner. Therefore, the respondent has got no right to file a suit for ejectment. An objection was also taken in the written statement that the suit is not maintainable in view of the fact that it has been flied by only one person though the property belong to three persons and all the co-owners have not filed the application, therefore, it is not maintainable. An objection was also taken in the written statement that the suit is not maintainable in view of the fact that it has been flied by only one person though the property belong to three persons and all the co-owners have not filed the application, therefore, it is not maintainable. 3. Sri Satish Mandhyanh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised two main points for consideration before this Court. First is that being a factory, the suit itself before the Judge Small Causes Court was not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Act and further being a factory, the notice should have been given under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act mentioning the time in the notice as 6 months but only one month has been mentioned, therefore, the suit itself is not maintainable in view of the fact that the notice itself was defective. He has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Munni Lal v. Ajai Kumar reported in 1983 ARC 282 and reliance has been placed upon para 5 of the said judgment which is quoted below : “5. It is thus apparent that the building was only one of the items which were leased out. Besides the building (Sheds) open piece of land and other properties in the shape of machinery of Saw Mill including mother and electric connection were also leased. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that in the Explanation “building” meant residential or non-residential structure. The Explanation further included land, garages, out houses appurtenant to such building and also included any fittings and fixtures affixed to the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. It is true that if a building is let out, it may included open piece of land for beneficial enjoyment thereof may be in the shape of lawn, drive or otherwise vacant land may be having fittings like fans, lights, air conditional or coolers, sanitary fittings, heaters and so on. Those fittings are meant for beneficial enjoyment of the building itself. But where the purpose is to run a factory and the building is merely to cover or protect the machinery, stocks etc. it cannot be said that the machinery fitted in it was for beneficial enjoyment of the building. Those fittings are meant for beneficial enjoyment of the building itself. But where the purpose is to run a factory and the building is merely to cover or protect the machinery, stocks etc. it cannot be said that the machinery fitted in it was for beneficial enjoyment of the building. In that case the building will be for the protection of the valuable machinery which is the subject-matter of lease. In the instant case I find that not only two tin sheds butt open piece of land and various machines for running the business were let out. All these things cannot be termed as building or building or cannot be said to be installed for beneficial enjoyment of the building which were two shes and a kothari. I agree with the view of the learned chief Justice in the case of Durga Prasad (supra) and hold that the lease in the present case was not of a building with open land and fitting for more beneficial enjoyment of the building. The lease was in respect of a factory which also had some covered portion necessary for running the same. The suit between landlord and tenant in respect of such a lease was not cognizable by the Small Causes Court. In the instant case the judgment and decree passed by the Court below has to be set aside. As it has been found that the Court of Small Causes has no jurisdiction to try the suit the decree falls.” 4. He has further placed reliance upon the case of Durga Prasad v. Moti Lal Gupta and others, 1981ARC 579 and reliance has been placed upon paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 which are quoted below : “4. In the present case it has been found that the subject-matter of the lease was the Dal mill. In the plaint, it has been stressed that the plaintiff had installed the Dal mill with its accessories and machineries mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ for manufacturing of Dal for industrial purposes in the aforesaid hall of the house. It was run by electric power. In the plaint, it has been stressed that the plaintiff had installed the Dal mill with its accessories and machineries mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ for manufacturing of Dal for industrial purposes in the aforesaid hall of the house. It was run by electric power. It was also stated that on the repeated request of defendant No. 1, the plaintiff gave the aforesaid Dal mill only as detailed in the plaint to defendant No. 1 to run wherein all the accessories and machineries as mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ are fitted along with the electric motor, on an yearly rent of Rs. 4,000 for the use of the same, which meant for the use of the Dal mill as distinguished from a flour mill which had been installed by the plaintiff in an adjoining part of the house. 5. In paragraph 8, it is stated that the plaintiff terminated the tenancy defendant No. 1 in respect the aforesaid Dal mill fitted in the aforesaid house and that he claims possession of the aforesaid Dal mill along with the machineries and accessories, etc. In the relief clause, the prayer was that the suit for ejectment of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 be decreed and they be ejected form the Dal mill and its machineries fitted in the portion of house No. 587/33, Mutthiganj, Allahabad, as detailed and bounded in Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ be given to him. Schedule ‘A’ gives the details of the plaintiff’s Dal mill, while Schedule ‘B’ gives the details of the machineries fitted in the aforesaid Dal mill. 6. From the averments in the plaint and also the findings, it is apparent that the dominant intention of the parties in entering in to the lease was to run the Dal mill. Of course the Dal mill had to be installed somewhere. The primary intention of the parties was in relation to the Dal mill and not the building. That is why we find the plaintiff laying so much emphasis on the Dal mill. Since the factory and the machineries were permanently fixed to the floor on the hall, it was obvious that the possession of the factory could be given only along with the building. The suit was primarily for ejectment from the mill itself. That is why we find the plaintiff laying so much emphasis on the Dal mill. Since the factory and the machineries were permanently fixed to the floor on the hall, it was obvious that the possession of the factory could be given only along with the building. The suit was primarily for ejectment from the mill itself. As held in Niranjan Prasad’s case (Supra) and the aforesaid Supreme Court decision the suit was not for ejectment from a building as defined under Article 4 of the Second Schedule to the Small Cause Courts Act. The Small Cause Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain or try it.” 5. He has further placed reliance upon a case Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, Dhabal Deb and another, AIR 1952 SC 23 and reliance has been placed upon paras 13, 15 and 16 which are quoted below: “13. The section lays down a rule of construction which is to be applied when there is no period agreed upon between the parties. In such cases the duration has to be determined by reference to the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created. The rule of construction embodied in this section applies not only to express leases of uncertain duration but also to leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance of rent and other circumstances. It is conceded that in the case before us the tenancy was no for manufacturing or agricultural purposes. The object was to enable the lessee to build structures upon the land. In these circumstances, it could be regarded as a tenancy from month to month, unless there was a contract to the contrary. The question now is, whether there was a contract to the contrary in the present case? Mr. Setalvad relied very strongly upon the fact that the rent paid here was an annual rent and he argues that from this fact it can fairly be inferred that the agreement between the parties was certainly not to create a monthly tenancy. It is not disputed that the contract to the contrary, as contemplated by Section 106, T.P. Act, need not be an express contract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract. If it is no contract in law, the section will be operative and regulate the duration of the lease. It is not disputed that the contract to the contrary, as contemplated by Section 106, T.P. Act, need not be an express contract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract. If it is no contract in law, the section will be operative and regulate the duration of the lease. It has no doubt been recognized in several cases tht the made in which a rent is expressed to be payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. Consequently, when the rent reserved is an annual rent, the presumption would arise that the tenancy was an annual tenancy unless there is something to rebut the presumption. But the difficulty in applying this rule to the present case arises from the fact that a tenancy from year to year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by registered instrument, as laid down in Section107, T.P. Act. The Kabuliya in the case before us is undoubtedly a registered instrument, but ex concesis it is not an operative document at all and cannot consequently fulfill the requirements of Section 107, T.P. Act. 15. But one serious objection to this view seems to be that this would amount to making a new contract for the parties. The parties here certainly did not intend to create a lease for on year. The lease was intended to be for a period exceeding one year, but as the intention was not expressed in the proper legal form, it could not be given effect to. It is one thing to say that in the absence of a valid agreement, the rights of the parties would be regulated by law in the same manner as if no agreement existed at all; it is quite another thing to substitute a new agreement for the parties which is palpably contradicted by the admitted facts of the case. 16. It would be pertinent to point out in this connection that in the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff against the dismissal of his earlier suit by the lower appellate Court, the High Court definitely held that the defendant’s tenancy was one from month to month under Section 106, T.P. Act, and the only question left open was whether payment to the Receiver amounted to payment to the plaintiff himself. In this suit the defendant admitted in his written statement that payment to the Receiver had the same effect as payment to the plaintiff, and the trial Judge took the same view as was taken by the High Court on the previous occasion, that by payment to and acceptance of rent by Received, the defendant became a monthly tenant under Section 106, T.P. Act. In his appeal before the District Judge, which was the last Court of facts, the only ground upon which the defendant sought to challenge this finding of the trial Judge was that the Receiver was an unauthorized person because of the decision of the Judicial Committee which set aside his appointment and consequently acceptance of rent by such person could not create a monthly tenancy. This shows that it was not the case of the defendant at any stage of this suit that became one year’s rent was paid, a tenancy for one year was brought into existence. We think, therefore, that on the facts of this case it would be quite proper to hold that the tenancy of the defendant was one from month to month since its inception in 1924,. This view finds support from a number of report cases vide Dabvendra Nath v. Shyama Prasanna, 11 Cal. W.N.1124; Akloo v. Emaman, 44 Cal. 403, and in all these cases the rent payable was a yearly rental. On this finding no other question would arise and as the validity of the notice has not been questioned before us, the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree in his favour. The appeal thus fails and is dismissed with costs. 6. Taking support of the aforesaid judgments, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that suit itself before the Judge small Causes Court Act was not maintainable being the fact that it was a factory and in this case it has been held that suit for ejectment is barred by Article 4 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and Judge Small Cause Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 7. The second point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is regarding validity of notice that as the premises was a commercial premises, therefore, the determination in the notice would be six months required under the law. 7. The second point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is regarding validity of notice that as the premises was a commercial premises, therefore, the determination in the notice would be six months required under the law. If the period of notice is not mentioned as six months, the suit itself will be bad. He has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in the case Sallomal v. Smt. Naina Bai (died) and after her Badri Prasad and others, 1978 AWC 585 and reliance has been placed upon para 8 which is quoted below : “8. In the light of the view taken in 1952 SC 23 at page 27 it cannot be held that the view taken in 1956 ALJ 625 (supra) or in 1955 All 679 (supra) was the correct view. As laid down in 1952 S.C. 23 (supra) the term of the lease should be determined according to the presumption of law raised under Section 106, T.P. Act. It is not claimed that the lease in question was not for manufacturing of soap. The lease, according to Section 106, T.P. Act would be presumed to be from year to year and wold require six months’ notice. It has been pointed out that the appellant had admitted in his statement that he paid rent from month to month. That, however, cannot be treated to be conclusive evidence of the fat that the lease was from month to month. The notice in this case, therefore, must be held to be invalid.” 8. Another judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is 1992 ARC (2) 110. Taking support of the aforesaid judgment learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit itself was not maintainable before the Judge Small Causes Court and the revisional Court has also committed the same error and rejected the claim of the petitioner. 9. Another judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is 1992 ARC (2) 110. Taking support of the aforesaid judgment learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suit itself was not maintainable before the Judge Small Causes Court and the revisional Court has also committed the same error and rejected the claim of the petitioner. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent Sri Krishna Mohan assisted by Sri V.S. Sinha appearing for the respondent submits that the contention of the petitioner is not correct to this effect that the suit before the Judge Small Causes Court was not maintainable in view of the fact that evidence on record prove that premises in dispute come within the ambit of Explanation Schedule to Article 4 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act and the suit has rightly been tried by the Court of Judge Small Causes Court. The specific assertion in the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was made to quit the accommodation treating the said accommodation not as a factory. The petitioner has not denied the factum of entries and a general allegation has been made regarding validity of the notice. In such a situation, it will be deemed that the petitioner had admitted the same and cannot be permitted to take the benefit of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. A finding has been recorded by both the Courts that it has clearly been admitted that it is not a factory and it does not come under the definition of “Factory” and this property has been given by the answering respondent as a pottery on 1.1.1996. From the evidence on record, even produced by the petitioner, it is clear that in the property the work of pottery is being done because D.W.1 has admitted this fact that immediately after taking the premises on rent, the work was started. A finding has been recorded by the Court below that on the basis of the relevant evidence, it is clear that the property in question was given on a monthly rent and in the property in dispute only the work of decoration of the pottery was being done which was being admitted by the defendant-witness. The Commissioner report has also verified this fact. The Commissioner report has also verified this fact. Therefore, it cannot be held and cannot cover in the definition of manufacturing, impliedly, it can be said “processing”. Admittedly the validity of the notice has not been challenged seriously by the defendant-petitioner. In such view of the matter, both the Courts have recorded a finding that when this pottery was given on rent, advance of Rs. 20,000/- was paid and the first rent was paid on 1.2.1996. This clearly goes to show that the tenancy was month to month. The respondent has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust, Agra v. Ram Swarup Jain (dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1995 SC 2482 . Taking support of the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the respondent submits that if the lease of the immovable property is from month to month and is not for a term exceeding one year, then deeming provision of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not attracted, then in that case the notice of 6 months is not required. Reliance has been placed upon para 6 of the said judgment which is being quoted below : 6. Section 106 provides, inter alia, that in the absence of a contract between the parties, a lease of immovable property for manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months’ notice. In the present case there is a clear finding to the effect that the lease in question was not from year to year or for a period exceeding one year. Therefore,even though the lease may be for a manufacturing purposes, since the lease was not form year to year, six months’ notice was not required. A manufacturing lease which is not from year to year does not require six months notice of termination. It will fall in the second half of Section 106, requiring fifteen days’ notice of termination. A lease from month to month or a lease other than a lease from year to year is terminable by fifteen days’ notice. Hence, the notice in the present case is a valid notice to quit. It will fall in the second half of Section 106, requiring fifteen days’ notice of termination. A lease from month to month or a lease other than a lease from year to year is terminable by fifteen days’ notice. Hence, the notice in the present case is a valid notice to quit. The High Court, having come to the conclusion that the lease was not for a period exceeding one year, and was not a lease from year to year erred in holding that six months’ notice to quit was required. Such a notice is required provided there is no contract to the contrary. Only when a manufacturing lease is or is deemed to be, from year to year. This not being the case, the lease is terminable by fifteen days’ notice even if the lease is a manufacturing lease.” 10. Another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rendered in the case of Parwati Bai v. Radhika, AIR 2003 SC 3995 and has placed reliance upon para 6 of the said judgment. The same is being quoted below : “6. The singular question to be examined in the present case is whether the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The receipt of notice by the defendant is admitted in the written statement. The defendant has not raised any specific objection as to the validity of the notice. An objection as to invalidity or infirmity of notice under Section 106, T.P. Act should be raised specifically and at the earliest; else it will be deemed to have been waived even if there exists one. It cannot, therefore, be said that the notice in the present case suffered from any infirmity. A copy of the notice was exhibited and proved by the plaintiff as Exh.P.4.” 11. Another judgment rendered in thecase of Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and others, AIR 1973 SC 425 has been relied upon and reliance has been place upon paras 7, 8 and 10 which are quoted below : 7. The expression ‘manufacturing purposes’ in Section 106 is used in its popular and dictionary meaning, the Transfer of Property Act not having supplied any dictionary of its own for that expression. The expression ‘manufacturing purposes’ in Section 106 is used in its popular and dictionary meaning, the Transfer of Property Act not having supplied any dictionary of its own for that expression. The burden of proving that the lease was for manufacturing purposes, must for the purposes of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, lie on the party who claims it to be so, in the present case the appellant-company. That burden is to establish that the exclusive or at least the dominant purposes of the lease was the manufacturing purpose. (see C. Mackertich v. Steuart and Co. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 839 ). 8. The word ‘manufacture’, according to its dictionary meaning, is the making of articles or material (now on a large scale) by physical labour or mechanical power. (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, 1203). According to the Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases. Vol. 26, ‘manufacture’ implies change but every change is not manufacture and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. The word ‘manufacture’ said Abbott, C. J., in R. v. Wheelar, (1819) 2 B and Ald. 345 (349), cited in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (3rd ed.) Vol. 3, p. 1734 “has been generally understood to denote, either a thing made which is useful for its own sake and vendible as such, as a medicine, a stove, a telescope, and many others; or to mean an engine or instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be employed either in the making of some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose, as a stocking frame, or a steam engine for raising water from mines; or, it may perhaps extend also to a new process to be carried on by known implements or elements acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better or more useful kind. No mere philosophical or abstract principle can answer to the word ‘manufacturers’. Something of a corporeal and substantial nature - something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, is required to satisfy the word”. No mere philosophical or abstract principle can answer to the word ‘manufacturers’. Something of a corporeal and substantial nature - something that can be made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, is required to satisfy the word”. In South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 21 : AIR 1968 SC 922 the Act with which the Court was concerned was the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, which furnished no special definition of the word ‘manufacture’. The question canvassed there was whether carbon di-oxide, one of the constituents of kiln gas produced as one of the processes necessary for refining sugar, could be said to have been manufactured, quite apart from the manufacture of sugar itself. This Court held that what was produced was kiln gas, a compound of different gases and not carbon dioxide, though it was one of the different gases which made up kiln gas and therefore did not attract item 14-H in the Schedule to the Act. Since the Excise duty was leviable under the Act on manufacture of goods, the Court explained the connotation of the word ‘manufacture’. In so doing, the Court said that the word ‘manufacture’ implied a change, but that a mere change in the material was not manufacture. There must be such a transformation that a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. This was also the meaning given to the word ‘manufacture’ in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, (1963) Supp 1 SCR 586 : AIR 1963 SC 791 . A notification issued by the Government of U.P. under Section 3-A of the U.P. State Tax Act, 1948 declared that the turnover in respect of medicines and pharmaceutical preparations would not be liable to tax except (a) in the case of medicines and pharmaceutical preparations imported into U.P., and (b) in the case of medicines and pharmaceutical preparations manufactured in U.P. The question was whether, when in a dispensary medicines and pharmaceutical preparations, as prescribed by a doctor, are mixed, the process of mixing results in manufacture of medicines. The question was answered in the negative on the ground that when a mixture of different drugs, as prescribed by a doctor, is prepared by a medical practitioner or his employee, specially for the use of a patient in the treatment of an ailment or discomfort diagnosed by such a medical practitioner by his professional skill, and which mixture is normally incapable of being passed from hand to hand as a commercial commodity, the medical practitioner supplying the medicine cannot be said to be a manufacturer of medicine and the mixture cannot be said to be manufactured within the meaning of the notification. In all these cases the statute or the notification concerned did not furnish any artificial meaning to the expression ‘manufacture’ and the Court applied, therefore, the ordinary meaning as commonly understood to that expression. The expression ‘manufacturing purposes’ in Section 106, thus, means purposes for making or fabricating articles or materials by physical labour, or skill, or by mechanical power, vendible and useful as such. Such making or fabricating does not mean merely a change in an already existing article or material, but transforming it into a different article or material having a distinctive name, character or use or fabricating a previously known article by a novel process. 10. Bearing in mind the connotation of the word ‘manufacture’ as understood in the decisions above-cited, we have to ascertain whether the appellant-company could be said to be carrying on operations in the premises in question which could properly be called manufacturing operations. On this question, the evidence on record is general in character and almost meagre in quantum. With Choradia, who was the managing director of the Bharat Insurance Co. between 1950 to 1954 and who used to reside in Delhi where the company had its headquarters, but occasionally used to visit its branch in Bombay, deposed that after the premises in question were purchased in 1953 by his company from Sir Shapurji Bharucha Mills, he visited them and found them to comprise an open land with sheds and a godown. There were lying there army automobiles, jeeps etc., but he did not notice at that time any manufacturing process going on. He again visited the premises in 1954 when also he found no manufacturing operations going on. Wit. V. G. Kannan was an accountant in Allenbury and Co. There were lying there army automobiles, jeeps etc., but he did not notice at that time any manufacturing process going on. He again visited the premises in 1954 when also he found no manufacturing operations going on. Wit. V. G. Kannan was an accountant in Allenbury and Co. Ltd. He used to go to the premises in 1950 and 1951 to pay wages to the workmen engaged there by his company. The premises had a workshop, a godown and a small office and the rest was open land. The company wound up its business in 1950, but there were lying in the premises steel racks belonging to his company, to inspect which he had to go there on several occasions. He also said that he did not see any manufacturing processes going on except that the workshop was used for repairing the disposal vehicles lying stored there. This was the position till July-August 1954 and till then there was no change in the user of the premises. Wit. J. P. Jain examined by the appellant-company was the Central Manager of the Bombay branch of Allenbury and Co. from 1946 to 1950. Thereafter he became the managing director of the appellant-company. According to him, Allenbury and Co. Ltd. had in 1948 purchased disposal vehicles which were stored for sale in the premises in question. The vehicles were in a damaged condition when they were purchased. In some cases chassis were missing or they were bent or broken; most of the parts were broken and missing. These used to be repaired and then sold. The company had put up a workshop where these vehicles were repaired, reconditioned and painted before they were sold. The repairs, according to him, involved in some cases making of new bodies and new parts. For that purpose, the appellant company had to have in the workshop lathes, drill machines, welders etc. and had employed some 200 to 250 workmen. When the appellant-company took over the business of Allenbury and Co. Ltd. in 1950-51, there were in all 189 vehicles of different types in the suit premises. The working, he said, of overhauling, reconditioning and repairing these vehicles went on until 1957 when reconditioning of vehicles stopped presumably because the vehicles were sold out. When the appellant-company took over the business of Allenbury and Co. Ltd. in 1950-51, there were in all 189 vehicles of different types in the suit premises. The working, he said, of overhauling, reconditioning and repairing these vehicles went on until 1957 when reconditioning of vehicles stopped presumably because the vehicles were sold out. The premises had on them a servicing station also with a trench in the centre for washing the vehicles and were spare parts needed for repairs used to be stored. There was also an office and a store room where spare parts, oils and other stores purchased locally were kept. He denied that the premises were used only for repairing the vehicles. Besides his oral testimony, there is one letter on record written by this witness to Allenbury and Co. Ltd., dated November 21, 1950 giving details of stocks lying on these premises when that company’s business was taken over by the appellant-company. The schedule to this letter gives particulars of these stocks, viz., 182 vehicles of different types, stores, accessories, spare parts purchased from the market or the Disposal Directorate, tools and other workshop equipment and three cars under repairs. The schedule shows that the premises were used till then for storing the Disposal Vehicles together with spare parts etc. acquired along with them or purchased from the market for repairing and reconditioning and making them fit for resale. There is no evidence except the bare word of wit. Jain that parts such as chassis and bodies etc. were actually manufactured and replaced for the old. No books of account or long books showing the work carried on on the premises or other documents were produced which would throw light on the activities carried on the premises. Even if the evidence of Jain were accepted in toto, and we were to find that some spare parts were being manufactured for repairing or reconditioning the vehicles, the dominant purpose of the lease would still have to be regarded as one for storage and resale of the vehicles and not for manufacturing purposes. Manufacturing of spare parts would then be merely incidental to the main purpose of disposal of these vehicles as without repairing or reconditioning them, such disposal could hardly have been possible. In our opinion, the appellants failed to establish that the dominant purpose of the lease was manufacturing purpose. Manufacturing of spare parts would then be merely incidental to the main purpose of disposal of these vehicles as without repairing or reconditioning them, such disposal could hardly have been possible. In our opinion, the appellants failed to establish that the dominant purpose of the lease was manufacturing purpose. In that view, the appellants could not have challenged the legality of the notice. The High Court, therefore, was right in the conclusion it arrived at and no reason has been shown justifying our interference with it. That being the position, it is not necessary to go into the question whether Section 107 has any impact on Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a question which the Division Bench, while referring this appeal to a larger Bench, thought the appeal raised. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgments, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the burden is upon the tenant that the lease was for manufacturing purpose. The Apex Court has held that even though some spare parts were being manufactured for repairing for reconditioning the vehicle, the dominant purpose of the lease would still have to be regarded as one of the storage and resale of the vehicle and not for manufacturing purposes. In view of the aforesaid fact the learned counsel for the respondents submits that burden was upon the petitioner to prove that the lease was for manufacturing purposes. 12. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. From the perusal of the judgment passed by the Court below it clearly appears that the premises in dispute was let out to the petitioner on a monthly rent because the rent was being paid month to month and the notice was given as there was a default. The Apex Court has interpreted that inspite of the fact that it was given for manufacturing purpose but if the rent is payable month to month, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, if not given for six months terminating the tenancy, then the notice will not be bad. The Apex Court has interpreted that inspite of the fact that it was given for manufacturing purpose but if the rent is payable month to month, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, if not given for six months terminating the tenancy, then the notice will not be bad. From the perusal of the judgment it appears that the petitioner himself has admitted this fact that in the property in dispute the work of decoration of the pottery is being done and in view of the judgment of this Court, such type of suit for ejectment is maintainable before the Judge Small Causes Court, therefore, the Court has recorded a finding that Judge Small Causes Court is having the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The Court below as well as the revisional Court has recorded a finding on the basis of cogent evidence that notice under the Transfer of Property Act not mentioning the six months period terminating the tenancy was invalid. There is an admission by the respondent-tenant that immediately after taking on rent, he had started the work. Therefore, there cannot be any presumption in law that the petitioner is involved in some manufacturing business. A specific issue was framed as Issue No. 5 regarding validity of the notice dated 20.12.2002. A finding has been recorded by the Courts below that by notice dated 20.12.2002, the tenancy was terminated but rent was not paid and the possession of the property was not given. The contention of the petitioner was not accepted that as the disputed property was given for manufacturing, therefore, only after giving a notice of six months, the tenancy can be terminated. The Court after placing reliance upon a judgment of this Court reported in 2005 (2) AWC 1774 , Ram Kishore Seth v. Ram Autar (through its heirs) has held that where the lease has been given for manufacturing purpose, but if there is an agreement that the rent has to be paid month to month, in that circumstance, the tenancy can be terminated after giving one month notice. Though there was no written agreement but as the rent was being paid month to month, which is admitted to the parties, therefore, it cannot be held that the notice itself was not valid. 13. Though there was no written agreement but as the rent was being paid month to month, which is admitted to the parties, therefore, it cannot be held that the notice itself was not valid. 13. I am of opinion that the finding recorded by the Court below is a finding of fact and need no interference by this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because each and every aspect of the matter has been considered by the Court.Therefore, in my opinion, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 14. The writ petition is hereby dismissed. 15. No order is passed as to costs. ————