JUDGMENT By the Court.—Sri Ashok Khare, counsel for the appellant and Sri Pankaj Naqvi appearing for the respondent University requested the Court to hear the appeal on merits since it is pending for the last almost six years and, therefore, we proceed accordingly. 2. It is submitted by Sri Ashok Khare that the allegation of forged transfer certificate of Junior High School was levelled against a large number of employees and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against them including the appellant. In all there were eleven such cases as per the information of the appellant and after completion of the inquiry, the respondent University despite having recorded a finding against those employees with respect to such School leaving certificate inflicted major penalty in three cases, six were let off with minor punishment permitting them to continue in service and rest two were exonerated. He submitted that in the matter of quantum of punishment the respondents have discriminated the petitioner qua others when similar charges were levelled against a number of employees and proved, it was arbitrary on the part of the respondents to impose minor penalty on most of them and major penalty on selected ones including the petitioner. He further submitted that the case of the petitioner in no manner is different than those persons who have been imposed minor punishment and, therefore, the University has acted illegally and arbitrarily violating Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. 3. Sri Pankaj Naqvi on the contrary submitted that once serious charge of fake school leaving certificate which was produced by the appellant in support of his age and qualification was found proved, the respondents were justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal and simply because some other persons have been administered a lesser punishment, that by itself would not mitigate the fault on the part of the appellant. 4. Normally in the matter of quantum of punishment once the charge is proved and punishment is not found to be shockingly disproportionate, this Court does not interfere with the discretion of the punishing authority in selecting the punishment and imposition thereof upon the employee concerned. 4. Normally in the matter of quantum of punishment once the charge is proved and punishment is not found to be shockingly disproportionate, this Court does not interfere with the discretion of the punishing authority in selecting the punishment and imposition thereof upon the employee concerned. It is also true that normally when a co delinquent is given lesser punishment, this itself is not treated to be a ground for interference as held by the Apex Court in Balbir Chand v. Food Corporation of India Limited and others, AIR 1997 SC 2229 , more so, where the allegations are slightly different. In Balbir Chand (supra), the Apex Court also observed that if the authorities wrongly gave lesser punishment, compared to others against whom there is a major punishment, that itself would not be a reason to ask for a similar lesser punishment but in our case it is also not the case of the University that those employees in whose matters similar charge had been found proved and have been given lesser punishment, the same is on account of any mistake or error on the part of the University. Therefore, where the charges are similar, found proved, and the employer neither pleaded any mistake nor error in giving lesser punishment to some of the employees, while severe one in other cases, nor is in a position to show any distinguishing features between the two sets of employees, in our view in such a case, distinction is a writ large, and, the action of the employer in giving two sets of punishment to the employees would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 5. We repeatedly gave opportunity to the learned counsel for the University to point out any distinction between the appellant and other six employees in whose cases despite having found similar charges proved, minor penalty was imposed though in the case of the appellant, maximum penalty of dismissal has been chosen. He failed to point out any such difference. In this regard he has also filed counter-affidavit in reply to the supplementary affidavit but therefrom also we do not find any such distinction to deal with the case of the appellant and some others differently than six others. He failed to point out any such difference. In this regard he has also filed counter-affidavit in reply to the supplementary affidavit but therefrom also we do not find any such distinction to deal with the case of the appellant and some others differently than six others. In the case of Mahendra Kumar Chowkidar who had admitted to have filed forged marks sheet of Junior High School, the punishment of withholding of five annual increments with cumulative effect with no promotion or career advancement for ten years had been imposed. Similarly in the case of others also wherever the authorities have found serious charge of forged document, proved, in their discretion have taken a lenient view but in other matters a very strict view has been taken. 6. Virtually a similar controversy came up for consideration in Sengara Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1983(4) SCC 225 , and, in the absence of any material finding distinction between the two sets of employees; one those dealt with leniently and others dealt with severely, the Apex Court held that those who were awarded serious punishment have been discriminated and in such a case, the Court must intervene. The relevant observations are reproduced as under : “Now if the indiscipline of a large number of personnel amongst dismissed personnel could be condoned or overlooked and after withdrawing the criminal cases against them, they could be reinstated, we see no justification in treating the present appellants differently without pointing out how they were guilty of more serious misconduct or the degree of indiscipline in their case was higher than compared to those who were reinstated. Respondents failed to explain to the Court the distinguishing features and therefore, we are satisfied in putting all of them in same bracket. On that conclusion the treatment meted to the present appellants suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and Article 14 forbids any arbitrary action which would tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court must accordingly interpose and quash the discriminatory action.” 7. The above decision has been followed by the Apex Court in Baldev Raj v. State of Punjab and others, 1984 (Suppl) 1 SCC 221 and Harminder Singh v. State of Punjab and others, 1984 (Suppl) 1 SCC 351. 8. The Court must accordingly interpose and quash the discriminatory action.” 7. The above decision has been followed by the Apex Court in Baldev Raj v. State of Punjab and others, 1984 (Suppl) 1 SCC 221 and Harminder Singh v. State of Punjab and others, 1984 (Suppl) 1 SCC 351. 8. In the above facts and circumstances we find it expedient that the respondent- competent authority be directed to reconsider the matter only in respect to quantum of punishment and pass a fresh order. The impugned judgment of learned Single Judge dated 2.12.2002 is accordingly set aside and the order of punishment challenged in the writ petition insofar as it relates to the petitioner appellant is quashed only to the extent of punishment. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to reconsider the question of quantum of punishment in respect to the petitioner-appellant in accordance with law and in the light of observations made above and pass a fresh order within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 9. However, before parting, we may place it on record that the counsel for the appellant has given an undertaking that in case any punishment other than termination is imposed upon the petitioner/appellant and he is reinstated in service, he would not claim any arrears of salary for the period he had been out of employment pursuant to the impugned order of termination. Considering this undertaking, we clarify that in case the punishment is modified with the result of putting the petitioner-appellant in service again, he shall not be entitled for payment of salary for the period he remained out of employment pursuant to the impugned order dated 4/5th February, 1997 but the said period shall be counted for the purpose of seniority, pensionary benefits etc., if any. 10. With the above directions, the appeal stands disposed of. No order as to costs. ————