Hon'ble Shri Kant Tripathi,J. 1. By the instant petition under section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner Arun Chawla has prayed for quashing the proceedings of the criminal case no. 6736 of 2007 - State vs. Arun Chawla & others (case crime no. 516-B of 1998) under sections 406,420,467,468,471 and 120-B IPC, police station Hazaratganj, district Lucknow, pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate - II, Lucknow. 2. I have heard Mr. Satyendra Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned AGA for the State of U.P. and the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2 Smt. Neeru Tripathi and perused the record. 3. The opposite party no.2 Smt. Neeru Tripathi made a fixed deposit of Rs. Fifty thousand with M/s Rock Land Leasing Limited having its zonal office at 81, Halwasiya Market, 2nd Floor, Hazaratganj, Lucknow, which issued post-dated cheques in her favour regarding the maturity amount of the fixed deposit. When the opposite party no.2 tendered the cheques to her banker for encashment, the same were dishonoured. It is also alleged that the opposite party no.2 visited several times to the office of the company but no attempt was made by the officers and employees of the company to make the payment. When she visited third time to the office of the company, certain ante-social elements, who were present in the office, forcibly snatched away the post-dated cheques from the opposite party no.2 and told that she would not be paid even a single penni. On her repeated requests the cheques were however, returned to her. The petitioner happens to be one of the officers of the company is alleged to be responsible for the offences of criminal breach of trust, cheating and forgery. 4. The opposite party no.2 lodged an FIR at the police station Hazaratganj, Lucknow, on which basis the E.O.W. conducted the investigation and submitted charge sheet under sections 406,420,467,468,471 and 120-B IPC against the petitioner and the other accused. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and issued processes against the petitioner. 5. The opposite party no.2 Smt. Neeru Tripathi has filed counter affidavit and admitted in paragraphs 24 and 28 thereof that she has received her entire money with interest from the company. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and issued processes against the petitioner. 5. The opposite party no.2 Smt. Neeru Tripathi has filed counter affidavit and admitted in paragraphs 24 and 28 thereof that she has received her entire money with interest from the company. It may not be out of context to mention that the opposite party no.2 had filed a similar affidavit before the District & Sessions Judge, Lucknow and admitted receipt of the entire amount of Rs. 58,050/- vide the Bank Draft no. 139823 dated 25.1.2007 payable at the ICICI Bank, Hazratganj Branch, Lucknow, copies of the affidavit and bank draft have been filed respectively as Annexure no.3 and 4 to the petition. In the counter affidavit as well as the affidavit filed before the District & Sessions Judge, Lucknow, the opposite party no.2 has not only admitted receipt of the payment of the entire amount but has also stated that she has no grievance against the petitioner and the company and its officers and has settled her disputes with them. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the proceedings of the criminal case are liable to be quashed on the following grounds: Mere dishonour of a cheque does not constitute any offence under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with section 120-B IPC. The facts of the case, at most, may constitute an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act but the notice as required by the said section has not been given; There was no dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the company at the inception of the transaction of deposit of money by the opposite party no. 2 and issue of post dated cheques by the company; The intention of the company can not be said to be dishonest or fraudulent if due to any subsequent changed circumstances payment could not be made in time; The post dated cheques were genuine and were not in any way forged or fabricated; The entire money has been paid to the opposite party no. 2 and she has settled her disputes with the company; The dispute was of civil nature. 7. 2 and she has settled her disputes with the company; The dispute was of civil nature. 7. The Apex Court in the case of State of Hariyana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others 1992 SCC (Crl.) 426, has dealt with the ambit and scope of the inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. and propounded the following principles: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 8. The case of Bhajan Lal (supra) has been followed with approval in the cases of Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. and others (2006) 6 SCC-736, Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS and another (2006) 7 SCC 188 and State of Orissa and another vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 and in few other cases. 9. 9. In the case of V.Y. Jose and another vs. State of Gujarat and another (2009) 3 SCC 78 , the Apex Court has elaborated the scope of section 482 Cr.P.C. and has held that section 482 Cr.P.C. serves a salutary purpose that a person should not under go harassment of litigation for a number of years although no case has been made out against him. 10. The Apex Court has dealt with the consequence of a compromise in regard to non-compoundable offences in the case of B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675 and has held as follows: "If for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. Thus, the High Curt on exercise of its inherent power can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under section 482 of the Code." 11. The principles of law propounded in B. S. Joshi's case (supra) has been applied with approval in the case of Nikhil Merchant v. CBI and another (2008) 9 SCC 650. 12. In CBI Vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 591 the Apex Court upheld the order of the High Court quashing the criminal complaint after the civil action had been compromised between the parties. No doubt, Duncans Agro case (supra) was in regard to the offence under section 420 IPC, which was compoundable but the principles of quashment of the criminal proceeding on the basis of compromise was evolved. 13. Section 482 Cr.P.C. has conferred inherent power on the High Court which should be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution only when the exercise is necessary, firstly, to give effect to an order under the Code, secondly, to prevent abuse of the process of the court and thirdly, to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is also well settled that the inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. has no limits, which is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. It is also well settled that the inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. has no limits, which is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Exercise of such power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It amounts to abuse of the process of the Court if without prima facie case having been made out a person is summoned to face trial in a criminal proceeding. In exercising jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and the evidence collected during the investigation. If the facts and materials collected during the investigation are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute any offence, the proceedings of the criminal case should not be permitted to continue and must be quashed so as to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice. A tendency has ordinarily grown up to give colour of criminal nature, of civil disputes, particularly in money matters, so as to get immediate action and make recovery of the money etc. without availing the expensive and time taking civil remedies. This tendency should be deprecated. It is, therefore, desirable that the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and the materials put forth in support of such allegations, need to be given due consideration under section 482 Cr.P.C. without embarking upon any enquiry whether the allegations and the materials are trust-worthy and reliable, and if the allegations and the materials placed in support thereof, prima facie, reveal a case of civil nature with no criminal intent, the proceedings of the criminal case, should not be allowed to continue so that the valuable time of the heavily burdened criminal courts may be saved and abuse of the process of the court may be prevented. This procedure may be adopted even in the cases relating to non-compoundable offences, where the victim or the complainant has settled the entire dispute with the accused because the inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. being unfettered, can not be controlled, regulated or restricted by section 320 Cr.P.C. 14. This procedure may be adopted even in the cases relating to non-compoundable offences, where the victim or the complainant has settled the entire dispute with the accused because the inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. being unfettered, can not be controlled, regulated or restricted by section 320 Cr.P.C. 14. The instant petition has much substance not only on the ground that the opposite party no.2 has settled the entire disputes with the Company but also on the ground that the allegations made against the petitioner do not prima facie make out any criminal charge. It may not be out of context to mention that dishonour of a cheque by the Bank may, under certain circumstances, amount to the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which provides as follows: "Section 138. It may not be out of context to mention that dishonour of a cheque by the Bank may, under certain circumstances, amount to the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which provides as follows: "Section 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability." 15. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability." 15. It is, therefore, clear that whenever any cheque is dishonoured by the bank either for want of sufficient fund or otherwise the proper course for the aggrieved person is to invoke the provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Merely on account of the fact that any cheque has been dishonoured, no offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be said to have been made out unless the payee or the holder of the cheque makes a demand for payment of the amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid and drawer of the said cheque fails to make the payment of the amount of money to the payee or to the holder of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. In the instant case the opposite party no.2 has not proceeded with the matter under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and has not given any notice in writing to the company and its officers requiring them to make the payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. In absence of such notice, the fact that the post dated cheques issued by the company were dishonoured by the Bank, do not even constitute the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioner. 16. So far as the offences under sections 467,468 and 471 IPC are concerned, they are also not made out from the facts of the case. These offences pertain to forgery as defined in section 463 IPC, according to which, whoever makes any false document or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with any property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits "forgery". Section 464 IPC defines false document, according to which a person is said to make a false document or false electronic record,- firstly, who dishonestly or fraudulently, (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record, (c) affixes any digital signature on any electronic record; (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the digital signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or digital signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly, who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or any electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with digital signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly, who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his digital signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication can not, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration. 17. Section 467 IPC provides for the punishment of the offences regarding forgery of the security, will etc., section 468 IPC deals with the punishment for committing forgery for the purpose of cheating and section 471 IPC provides for punishment regarding use of forged document or electronic record as genuine. 18. In the instant case, there is no allegation nor material to show that the company or any of its officers prepared any forged document or used the same to cheat the opposite party no.2. At the most it can be said that the petitioner's company issued few post dated cheques which were not honoured by the bank for want of adequate fund. The post dated cheques issued by the company were genuine and were not in any way forged. At the most it can be said that the petitioner's company issued few post dated cheques which were not honoured by the bank for want of adequate fund. The post dated cheques issued by the company were genuine and were not in any way forged. There is also no allegation that the company was not a genuine company. If the cheques were dishonoured on the ground that no adequate fund was available in the account of the company, it can not be contended that the cheques were forged or fabricated. 19. In regard to the offence under section 420 IPC it may be mentioned that there is no allegation or material to show that the company and its officers had any dishonest or fraudulent intention at the inception of the transaction of deposit of money by the opposite party no.2. If due to any subsequent changed circumstance the company could not make payment to the opposite party no.2 within the stipulated period and the post dated cheques remained unpaid, it can not be contended that the company and its officers committed the offence of cheating. The money transaction that initially took place between the opposite party no.2 and the petitioner's company, in absence of any dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the company at the inception of the transaction, seems to be a mere contractual transaction of civil nature. A breach of contract or promise simplicitor does not constitute an offence under section 420 IPC. 20. Section 415 IPC defines cheating, which reads: "415. Cheating.-Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'." 21. An offence of cheating, therefore, is not made out unless the following ingredients exist: (i)deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission; (ii)fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or to consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit. 22. In the case of V.Y. Jose and another (supra), the Apex Court has held that for the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise, no offence under section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out. In para 21 and 28 the Apex Court further observed: "21. There exists a distinction between pure contractual dispute of a civil nature and an offence of cheating. Although breach of contract per se would not come in the way of initiation of a criminal proceeding, there can not be any doubt whatsoever that in the absence of the averments made in the complaint petition wherefrom the ingredients of an offence can be found out, the court should not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ........... 28. A matter which essentially involves dispute of a civil nature should not be allowed to be the subject- matter of a criminal offence, the latter being not a short cut of executing a decree which is non-existent. The superior courts, with a view to maintain purity in the administration of justice, should not allow abuse of the process of court. It has a duty in terms of section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to supervise the functionings of the trial courts." 23. A similar principle has been propounded in the case of S.V.L. Murthy vs. State represented by CBI, Hyderabad (2009) 6 SCC 77 . It has a duty in terms of section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to supervise the functionings of the trial courts." 23. A similar principle has been propounded in the case of S.V.L. Murthy vs. State represented by CBI, Hyderabad (2009) 6 SCC 77 . In that case the Apex Court has held that one of the ingredients of cheating, as defined in section 415 IPC, is existence of an intention to cheat at the time of making initial promise or existence thereof from the very beginning of formation of contract. 24. The offence under section 406 IPC, which provides for punishment for the criminal breach of trust, is also not made out against the petitioner. Section 405 IPC defines the criminal breach of trust, according to which whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits 'criminal breach of trust'. 25. It is, therefore, clear that to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in section 405 IPC, it was necessary to allege entrustment of money by the opposite party no. 2 to the company and dishonest misappropriation thereof by the company and its officers. Mere entrustment of money by one person to another does not constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust. It is also necessary to show that the money entrusted has been dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use by the person to whom it had been entrusted. 26. In the instant case the company has paid the entire amount of Rs. 56,050/- to the opposite party no.2 through the bank draft and as such the element of dishonest misappropriation or conversion to the company's own use of the entrusted money is lacking in this case. 26. In the instant case the company has paid the entire amount of Rs. 56,050/- to the opposite party no.2 through the bank draft and as such the element of dishonest misappropriation or conversion to the company's own use of the entrusted money is lacking in this case. Of course it can be contended that there was some delay on the part of the company to repay the amount to the opposite party no.2 but it is no ground to hold that the offence under section 406 IPC is made out specially when there was no dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the company at the time of the entrustment of the money. 27. There is also no material to make out a case of criminal conspiracy against the petitioner. 28. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the offences under sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC are not prima facie made out against the petitioner. 29. The instant petition is liable to be allowed on merit as well as on the basis of the compromise. 30. For the reasons discussed above, the petitioner's application under section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. The proceedings of the criminal case no. 6736 of 2007, State of U.P. vs. Arun Chawla & others (case crime no. 516-B of 1998, under sections 406,420,467,468,471 and 120-B IPC, police station Hazaratganj, district Lucknow) pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate - II, Lucknow against the petitioner are quashed.