JUDGMENT Honble Amitava Lala, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the Committee of Management of one Gajraula Singh Sabha, Gurudwara through its Secretary Sri Swaran Singh to establish before us that the order impugned passed by the concerned Asstt. Registrar, Bareilly under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter called as the Act) dated 29.6.2007 is bad in law and liable to be quashed. 2. We have heard the petitioner as well as the contesting respondent on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition as well as merit of the case only to the extent whether the writ Court can interfere with the matter in such type of disputes and passing of an order mechanically, or not. 3. Factually, one other society by the name of Sri Guru Singh Sabha, Gajraula Kala is also registered to discharge certain functions with regard to concerned Gurudwara at district Pilibhit, U.P. The petitioner is inclined to get registration of his Society to administer the same Gurudwara by the name of Gajraula Singh Sabha, the aforesaid Society. The petitioner has taken a plea before us that under the U.P. Amendment of Section 3 of the U.P. Registration Act, 1860, as applicable in the State of U.P., is to be carefully gone into to accept the position in this respect. Mr. A.K. Sachan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn our attention to Section 3(2) (a) of the Act to establish that under such Section the Registrar shall refuse to register a society if name of the society is “identical” with that of Society previously registered. Factually at one point of time existing Society failed to renew its registration but subsequently it has been renewed. Mr. Sachan has cited before us a Single Judge judgment of this High Court in Mahendra Pratap Shiksha Parishad, Firozabad v. Commissioner Agra Division, Agra and another, (1993) 3 UPLBEC 2081, to establish that there is a difference between the words “identical” and “similar” and in such circumstances the Court was pleased to direct both the Societies to function. Mr. Sachan has cited before us a Single Judge judgment of this High Court in Mahendra Pratap Shiksha Parishad, Firozabad v. Commissioner Agra Division, Agra and another, (1993) 3 UPLBEC 2081, to establish that there is a difference between the words “identical” and “similar” and in such circumstances the Court was pleased to direct both the Societies to function. He has also cited another judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Raghubar Dayal v. Commissioner Kanpur, Division, Kanpur and others, 2005(1) ESC 204 (All), to establish that it is true that apart from certain special statutes which entitle companies or persons to the exclusive use of a name or a mark, such as the Companies Act or the Trade Marks Act, a man has no exclusive proprietary rights in a fancy name or title, normally and principally. It is in relation to the user of a name associated with a certain business or trading concern or some profession that the Court affords protection and grants an injunction restraining the adoption and use of such a name by another when the Court is satisfied that damage has been caused or there is tangible risk or possibility of a damage resulting from confusion caused in the public mind or, in other words, by reason of the public being deceived by the use of such name. He further relied upon U. Sriniwas Malliah and another v. Krishna Kumar Chatterjee and others, AIR 1952 Cal 804, to establish that the name can be used by any company as trade mark when such type of right normally and principally can not be interfered with but later part of such judgment itself says that if there is tangible risk or possibility of a damage resulting from confusion caused in the public mind or in other words by reason of the public being deceived by the use of such name, then the Court can interfere with the matter. 4. We do not know how this judgment is supporting the submissions of Mr. Sachan. On the contrary, it clearly goes against his submissions. It will be far more clear from the submission of Mr. K.G. Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, as we want to discuss hereunder. A further question arose before this Court whether any appellate jurisdiction is available instead of filing any writ petition or not. Sachan. On the contrary, it clearly goes against his submissions. It will be far more clear from the submission of Mr. K.G. Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, as we want to discuss hereunder. A further question arose before this Court whether any appellate jurisdiction is available instead of filing any writ petition or not. Since it has been pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents on the earlier occasion, we have to go through it. We find that the appeal can be preferred under Section 12D (2) of the Act made for the State of U.P. but upon going through such Section we find that the cause of action for appeal will arise when the registration of the Society, is cancelled. This is not the case of cancellation of registration as rightly pointed out by Mr. Sachan. He has contended that it is a case of refusal to grant any registration and therefore, covered by Section 3B of the Act. We have to give composite reading of Sections 3, 3 (2)(a) and 3B in this respect because such State amendments are made for the purpose. It has been pointed out by learned Counsel appearing for contesting respondent that he is not at all saying that the case will be hit by Section 12D of the State Amendment of the Act but Section 3B clearly says that there should be reference to the State Government. Section 3B of the Act is quoted hereinafter : “3B. Reference to the State Government.—If any question arises whether any society is entitled to get itself registered in accordance with Section 3 or to get its certificate of registration renewed in accordance with Section 3-A the matter shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government thereon shall be final.” 5. Now the remaining questions available before us are whether writ in the present form, as made by the petitioner will be maintainable and secondly whether the authority will proceed with the word “identical” under Section 3 (2) (a) of the State Amendment of the Act, mechanically. So far as the maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, objection on the part of the respondent appears to be hyper-technical since the petitioner has no other alternative but to proceed with the case through the Committee of Management or Secretary of the unregistered Society. So far as the maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, objection on the part of the respondent appears to be hyper-technical since the petitioner has no other alternative but to proceed with the case through the Committee of Management or Secretary of the unregistered Society. In the alternative, it could have been moved only by the members of the Society at best. Against this background, we can not convince ourselves to accept such submission as made by the respondent and accordingly we want to proceed with the matter about the other question as raised before. It is true to say that the word “identical” as mentioned under Section 3 (2)(a) can not be treated as “similar” but it can not be interpreted in the manner that the authority will proceed with such word “identical” mechanically. The subjective satisfaction is very much required, otherwise mushroom growing Cooperative Societies will be encouraged in respect of one area. It can also be very difficult to understand by the writ Court whether the dispute is with regard to members bringing one party to the writ Court to get registration of the separate Society. Therefore, the word “identical” may not be “similar” but subjective satisfaction is required to avoid tangible risk or possibility of a damage resulting from confusion to be caused in the public mind or in other words by reason of the public being deceived by the use of such name. 6. Law is interpreted in this manner by this Court and henceforth whenever any consideration is to be made by the Registrar, this fact will be kept in the mind by such authority not to pass any order mechanically. In any event, such type of consideration can be made on the basis of various investigation of the facts for the reason when Section 3B clearly speaks that an aggrieved can proceed for the purpose of reference to the State Government, we sincerely believe that if the petitioner references the matter it can be heard and disposed of upon giving fullest opportunity of hearing as expeditiously as possible. However, we can not pass any affirmative order in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed without imposing any cost. 7. However, passing of this order will no way debar the petitioner from making the appropriate reference, if any. 8. No order is passed as to costs. However, we can not pass any affirmative order in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed without imposing any cost. 7. However, passing of this order will no way debar the petitioner from making the appropriate reference, if any. 8. No order is passed as to costs. Honble Ashok Srivastava, J.—I agree. ————