JUDGEMENT 1. Heard counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for Union of India. 2. In this writ application the petitioner a discharged military personnel w.e.f. 25.1.1991 has made prayer to the following effect: "(i) To quash the letter dated 25.11.1991, letter dated 9.11.1998 and letter dated 28.2.2005. (ii) Arrear amount of rounding off disability (100% disability) w.e.f. 6.1.1993. (iii) Amount of Army Group Insurance covered by it due to 100% disability. (iv) Amount of ex-gratia Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs. Five lacs). (v) Amount of retaining fee w.e.f. 26.1.1991 to 26.1.1996 and any other dues in accordance with law with 18% compound interest." 3. The relief for quashing of the order dated 25.1.1991 or quashing of the order dated 9.11.1998 apart from the fact that they are based on stale materials and with no plausible explanation for such unexplained delay cannot be even otherwise entertained because no part of cause of action of these two reliefs i.e. quashing of the order dated 25.11.1991 and 9.11.1998 has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court which were passed by the authorities of Sena Police Corps at New Delhi and Bangalore respectively. Claim of such disability pension on the ground of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India in fact has been rejected by this Court in a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Amar Kant Choubey V/s. Union of India reported in 2009(1) PLJR 553 . Moreover if the petitioner slept over his right with regard to the aforementioned two orders, this Court would not allow the petitioner to agitate the same almost after 10 to 18 years of such cause of action. 4. That being so, the prayer of the petitioner for quashing of the order dated 25.11.1991 and the order dated 9.11.1998 is dismissed on ground of unexplained delay and laches. 5. Coming to the merits of third part of the relief against the order dated 28.2.2005 this Court would find that the same is neither a decision nor has in fact taken away any right of the petitioner. All that has been done by way of inter-departmental communication from one authority to another authority is that they have found certain discrepancy in an earlier order with regard to disability pension of the petitioner.
All that has been done by way of inter-departmental communication from one authority to another authority is that they have found certain discrepancy in an earlier order with regard to disability pension of the petitioner. From the order dated 5.1.1993 it would appear that the petitioner was granted 100% disability pension only by treating his disease of Leprosy. Somehow the said disability pension was sought to be changed on 9.11.1998 by also adding the disease of Hypertension to be the another reason for enabling the petitioner to draw disability pension. That has been only detected and found to be incorrect and Annexure-6 the order dated 28.2.2005 had been issued pointing out the aforesaid anomaly and advice from the authority at Bangalore to the authority at Military Hospital, Danapur Cantt. to get the case of the petitioner re-examined and amended as per the original discharge certificate. The petitioner has not brought on record as to what happened on this letter dated 28th February, 2005 and when a writ petition has been filed after four years for only assailing the recommendation of the authority by way of inter-departmental communication, this Court would not find any reason to interfere with the same. 6. That being so, the prayer of the petitioner for quashing of all the three orders are wholly misconceived. 7. Coming to the other entitlements being claimed by the petitioner, disability pension with effect from 6.1.1993, Army Group Insurance, amount of ex-gratia or the amount of retaining fee for the period 26.1.1991 to 26.1.1996 all of them stand settled and cannot be reopened only because the petitioner now feels that he has a better case. As a matter of fact for such part of cause of action pertaining to the aforementioned Relief Nos. (iii) to (iv) the petitioner had a cause of action beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, inasmuch as at no point of time prior to his retirement he was posted in the State of Bihar. This aspect of the matter in fact has been gone into by a Division Bench of this court pertaining to this very aspect of maintainability of the writ application on the ground of territorial jurisdiction in the case of Amar Kumar Choubey (supra). 8. That being so, this application is wholly misconceived and is dismissed.