Judgment Rajesh Bindal, J. 1. The plaintiff has approached this Court by filing the present petition challenging the order dated 1.3.2007, passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kharar, whereby the application filed by respondent No. 1 under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short, the Act) for stay of execution proceedings was accepted and auction of the property of respondent No. 1 -judgment debtor and further proceedings were stayed. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the petitioner filed a suit against the respondents for recovery of price for supply of goods, which was decreed by the trial court on 10.2.2005. Even the appeal filed by respondent No. 1-JD was dismissed on 28.7.2005, meaning thereby that the decree under execution attained finality. The petitioner filed execution of the decree. The property in question was attached under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. In the execution, respondent No. 1-JD filed objections which were dismissed on 2.6.2005. The objections filed second time were also dismissed on 31.1.2006. While the execution proceedings were in progress, respondent No. 1-JD filed an application under Section 22 of the Act praying for stay of execution proceedings. The same having been accepted by the learned court below vide impugned order, the petitioner-decree holder is before this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the very basis on which the execution proceedings were stayed having wiped off with the dismissal of the reference by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short, the BIFR7) on 4.8.2008, the petition deserves to be allowed without any further arguments as no protection under the Act is available to respondent No. 1. He further submitted that as far as proceedings before the BIFR are concerned, any order passed therein could not have any bearing on the rights of the petitioner, as the petitioner is not a party before the BIFR. It will have effect only on the persons who are party before the BIFR. Though a decree had already been passed against respondent No. 1, still respondent No. 1 deliberately did not implead the petitioner as one of the parties before the BIFR. A perusal of the order passed by the BIFR shows that it is only the secured creditors who were party there. 4. Referring to Section 22 of the Act, the submission is that it is in two parts. A perusal of the order passed by the BIFR shows that it is only the secured creditors who were party there. 4. Referring to Section 22 of the Act, the submission is that it is in two parts. Execution of a money decree is not covered under its protection. The second part deals with only the loans and advances of secured creditors. In the case of the petitioner, it is not a loan or advance, rather, it is only the price for supply of goods. The word "execution", as is used in the first part of the section is only with regard to any execution under the company law and not the execution of a decree of a Civil Court. As far as execution is concerned, sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Act would be applicable and not sub-section (1) thereof.In the second part of Section 22(1) of the Act, it is only the suit which is barred and not the execution thereof. In the present case, what was sought to be stayed and has been stayed vide impugned order, is execution of the money decree. 5. Referring to the judgment of this Court in M/s Ashiana Paper Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Punjab State Electricity Board and others, AIR 2008 P&H119, it was submitted that this Court held that a suit for recovery of dues for consumption of electricity was held to be maintainable and could not be stayed in terms of Section 22 of the Act. Honble the Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank v. New Look Rubbers (P) Ltd. and others, JT 2008(6) SC 224 opined that Section 22(1) of the Act is in two parts. One deals with execution with reference to Companies Act of the secured creditors, whereas the second applies to the suits where the section provides for stay of suit for recovery of money. The execution proceedings are not provided therein. Further reliance was placed upon Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Anand V. Hegade, AIR 2007 Bombay 50 to submit that bar under Section 22 of the Act with regard to a suit against a guarantor of the loan is only restricted to the stay of suit and not to any other proceedings. Further reliance was placed upon Electrex (India) Ltd. v. Usha D. Rohra and others, (2007) 135 Comp. Further reliance was placed upon Electrex (India) Ltd. v. Usha D. Rohra and others, (2007) 135 Comp. Cases 157(Earn.), where a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court opined that a suit filed by the depositor of the company cannot be stayed on an application filed under Section 22 of the Act. In Garden Finance Ltd. v. Prakash Inds. Ltd., AIR 2002 Bombay 8, a suit for recovery of leased property and the money was held to be maintainable. In Carona Ltd. v. M/s Parvathy Swaminathan and sons, 2007(2) RCR(Rent) 490 : 2007(5) RAJ 429: AIR 2008 SC187, it was held that eviction proceedings against the company before the BIFR cannot be stayed under Section 22 of the Act. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the present case, as the reference filed before the BIFR was dismissed on 4.8.2008, respondent No. 1 had filed appeal before the appellate authority which is till pending. He further submitted that Section 22(1) of the Act is quite explicit. It clearly provides for stay of execution of proceedings. In the first part thereof, the word "execution" mentioned therein is not limited with any kind of execution, rather, it is execution proceedings against the properties of the company. It is only that the proceedings are suspended temporarily during the pendency of the reference before the BIFR or the appeal before the appellate authority. Reliance was placed upon a judgment of this Court in Sarup Chand v. M. K.Paper and Board Mills Pvt. Ltd., 1992(2) RRR 170 :1993(1) PLR 278, which dealt with an issue before the second part in Section 22(1) was added regarding stay of suit, where it was opined by this court that proceedings in a suit for recovery cannot be stayed, as it is only the execution proceedings which could be stayed in terms of the provisions of Section 22(1) of the Act. He further submitted that all other judgments, referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner, are clearly distinguishable on facts as there the issue under consideration was not as is in the present case. A suit for recovery of lease hold property is always maintainable as that property does not belong to the industrial company. Similar is the position with regard to a suit for eviction, as the property does not belong to the company. A suit for recovery of lease hold property is always maintainable as that property does not belong to the industrial company. Similar is the position with regard to a suit for eviction, as the property does not belong to the company. As far as judgment of Honble the Supreme Court in Syndicate Banks case (supra) is concerned, the same is also distinguishable on facts, where the facts were altogether different. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book. As the issue under consideration in the present case is regarding the scope of Section 22 of the Act, it would be appropriate to extract the same, which is as under : "22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. - (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding-up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof [and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance granted to the industrial company] shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. (3) Where an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to in section 17 is under preparation or during the period of consideration of any scheme under section 18 or where any such scheme is sanctioned thereunder, for due implementation of the scheme, the Board may by order declare with respect to the sick industrial company concerned that the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, to which such sick industrial company is a party or which may be applicable to such sick industrial company immediately before the date of such order, shall, remain suspended or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date, shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified by the Board : Provided that such declaration shall not be made for a period exceeding two years which may be extended by one year at a time so, however, that the total period shall not exceed seven years in the aggregate." *[Inserted by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Amendment Act, 1993 w.e.f. 1.2.1994]. 8 A perusal of the aforesaid section shows that where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation for consideration or sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 is pending, such an industrial company can seek protection from various proceedings under this section. The proceedings regarding which the protection has been granted is also enumerated in two parts, namely, (i) no proceedings for the winding-up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and (ii) no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance granted to the industrial company. The section provides that the proceedings so mentioned shall either not lie or in case the same have been filed be not proceeded with further except with the consent of the BIFR or the appellate authority, as the case may be. The section provides that the proceedings so mentioned shall either not lie or in case the same have been filed be not proceeded with further except with the consent of the BIFR or the appellate authority, as the case may be. It is further evident that in the section, non-obstante clause has been used giving it overriding effect. As far as the present case is concerned, it is a fact on record that the reference filed by respondent No. 1 before the BIFR was dismissed. However, an appeal filed by it before the appellate authority (AAIFR) is pending, meaning thereby respondent No. 1 company fulfills the first pre-requisite for seeking protection under Section 22 of the Act. 9. Now the second issue, which is more crucial, is as to whether the protection of the kind of proceedings sought is available under the Act or not. Both the counsels have addressed arguments at length on the same. Before dealing with the contentions, I deem it appropriate to refer to the judicial opinion on the issue. In The Gram Panchayat and another v. Shree Vallahh Glass Works Ltd. and others, AIR 1990 SC 1017, Honble the Supreme Court opined that it may be against the principles of equity if the creditors are not allowed to recover their dues from the company, but such creditors are required to approach BIFR for permission to proceed against the company for recovery of their dues and Section 22 of the Act is no absolute bar against any suit for recovery of money. However, the same cannot be proceeded with except with the consent of BIFR or AAIFR and both the aforesaid authorities are entitled to give such consent. In M/s Punjab United Forge Limited v. M/s Hindustan Hydraulics (P) Ltd, 1992(2) RRR 275 :1992(1) PLR 661, this Court directed for stay of proceedings before the executing court where decree in a civil suit for recovery was sought to be executed. In Sarup Chands case (supra), this Court in a case prior to the amendment carried out in Section 22 of the Act w.e.f. 1.2.1994, opined that it is only execution proceedings which can be stayed and not continuation of a suit for recovery. In Chhabi Rani Agro Industries Enterprises Ltd v. Shri Gubeshwari Solvent Pvt. Ltd, (1993) 78 Comp. In Sarup Chands case (supra), this Court in a case prior to the amendment carried out in Section 22 of the Act w.e.f. 1.2.1994, opined that it is only execution proceedings which can be stayed and not continuation of a suit for recovery. In Chhabi Rani Agro Industries Enterprises Ltd v. Shri Gubeshwari Solvent Pvt. Ltd, (1993) 78 Comp. Cases 503 (Patna), Patna High Court opined that even if the execution proceedings had started earlier, the provisions of the Act will have full play the moment the Act is in force and the proceedings will have to be stayed at the stage they are. In the aforesaid case as well, the execution was of a money decree. In similar line is the judgment of Calcutta High Court in Engineering Construction Services v. Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd., (1996) 85 Comp. Cases 53 (Cal). In Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd v. State of U.P. and others, 1997(89) Comp. Cases 420 (SC), Honble the Supreme Court, while considering an issue as to whether the provisions of Section 22 of the Act could be invoked to avoid payment of electricity charges to avail of uninterrupted supply of energy, it was opined that the consumer was not entitled to protection of Section 22 of the Act, as continuous supply of electricity is on the condition of payment of price therefor. In Real Value Appliances Ltd. v. Canara Bank and others, 1998(3) RCR(Civil) 457: (1998)5 SCC 554, Honble the Supreme Court considered the scheme of Section 22 of the Act. Paragraphs 20, 21 and 30 are extracted below : "20. For the purpose of understanding the above point, it is necessary to refer to sub-clauses (1) to (4) of Section 16 and Section 22(1) of the Act. They read as follows : "16. Inquiry into working of sick industrial companies. - (1) The Board may make such inquiry as it may deem fit for determining whether any industrial company has become a sick industrial company - (a) upon receipt of a reference with respect to such company under Section 15; or (b) upon information received with respect to such company or upon its own knowledge as to the financial condition of the company. (2) The Board may, if it deems necessary or expedient so to do for the expeditious disposal of an inquiry under sub-section (1), required by order any operating agency to enquiry into and make a report with respect to such matters as may be specified in the order. (3) The Board or as the case may be, the operating agency shall complete its inquiry as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to complete the inquiry within sixty days from the commencement of the inquiry. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, an inquiry shall be deemed to have commenced upon the receipt by the Board of any reference or information or upon its own knowledge reduced to writing by the Board. (4) Where the Board deems it fit to make an inquiry or to cause an inquiry to be made into any industrial company under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, under sub-section (2), it may appoint one or more persons to be a special director or special directors of the company for safeguarding the financial and other interests of the company or in the public interest. 22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. - (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority." 21. It is to be noticed that according to Section 22, in case an "inquiry under Section 16" is pending, then notwithstanding anything in the Companies Act or any other instrument etc., no proceedings for the winding up of the company or for execution or distress or the like against the property of the company or for the appointment of a receiver and no suit for recovery of money or enforcement of any security or of any guarantee - shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with consent of the Board or, as the case may be, by the appellate authority. Section 22-A permits the Board to pass certain condition orders. 30. There can, therefore, be no difficulty in holding that after the amendment to Regulation 19 w.e.f. 24.3.1994, once the reference is registered and when once it is mandatory simultaneously to call for information/documents from the informant and such a direction is given, then inquiry under Section 16(1) must- for the purposes of Section 22 - be deemed to have commenced. Section 22 and the prohibitions contained in it shall immediately come into play. In that view of the matter, we need not go into the correctness of the view expressed by the Calcutta, Rajasthan and Bombay High Courts which relied upon the unamended Regulation 19. Point 2 is decided accordingly." In State of U.P. and another v. Uptron Employees Union, CMD, 2006(3) SCT 188: (2006) 5 SCC 319, Honble the Supreme Court opined that proceedings before the BIFR should be concluded expeditiously, as hot only every days delay adversely affects the financial condition of the undertaking, but even the creditors there of are also in precarious position as they are not able to realise their dues. In Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322, the issue under consideration before Honble the Supreme Court was as to whether the expression "suit" includes arbitration proceedings within its scope and further execution proceedings in respect of an arbitral award can be proceeded with while a stay under Section 22 of the Act is in place. Answering the question, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: "43. For the foregoing discussion we hold : (ii) That execution proceedings in respect of the award cannot be proceeded with in view of the statutory stay under Section 22 of the SICA Act. Answering the question, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: "43. For the foregoing discussion we hold : (ii) That execution proceedings in respect of the award cannot be proceeded with in view of the statutory stay under Section 22 of the SICA Act. As such, no insolvency notice is liable to be issued against the appellant. (vii) It is a well-established rule that a provision must be construed in a manner which would give effect to its purpose and to cure the mischief in the light of which it was enacted. The object of Section 22, in protecting guarantors from legal proceedings pending a reference to BIFR of the principal debtor, is to ensure that a scheme for rehabilitation would not be defeated by isolated proceedings adopted against the guarantors of a sick company. To achieve that purpose, it is imperative that the expression "suit" in Section 22 be given its plain meaning, namely, any proceedings adopted for realisation of a right vested in a party by law. This would clearly include arbitration proceedings." 10. As far as reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ashiana Paper Mills case (supra) is concerned, it is a case where proceedings in a suit filed by the Electricity Board for recovery of amount on account of supply of energy were sought to be stayed by filing application under Section 22 of the Act. This Court held that proceedings in a suit for supply of energy cannot be stayed in an application filed under Section 22 of the Act. Similar is the view expressed by Honble the Supreme Court in Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd.s case (supra). But the facts in the present case are different. Other judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are also distinguishable on facts as in those cases action was not sought against the properties of the company. 11. Similar is the view expressed by Honble the Supreme Court in Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd.s case (supra). But the facts in the present case are different. Other judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are also distinguishable on facts as in those cases action was not sought against the properties of the company. 11. In the light of the aforesaid enunciation of law, if the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner are considered, prior to the amendment in Section 22 of the Act w.e.f. 1.2.1994, it is provided therein that where any proceedings under Sections 16,17 or 25 relating to an industrial company are pending "notwithstanding" anything contained in the Companies Act or any other law etc., no proceedings for winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the creditors of the industrial company or for appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall "lie" or "be proceeded with further" except with the consent of the BIFR or the appellate authority. After the amendment w.e.f. 1.2.1994, the bar was made applicable even on the suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial company. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the section is in two parts is borne out even from a plain reading thereof itself. 12. The first part, which was existing prior to the amendment w.e.f. 1.2.1994, did not cover suit for recovery, enforcement of securities or guarantees in respect of loans or advances granted to the industrial company. As far as first part of the Section is concerned, it provided for a restrain against winding up proceedings or execution, distress or the like against any of the creditors of the company. Restrain is not circumscribed in any limits, as it is not that certain specified proceedings could be stayed. Rather, first part of the section is widely worded and that includes execution proceedings against the properties of the industrial company. In the present case as well, what has been stayed by the learned court below is the execution of a money decree against the company during the pendency of an application before the BIFR which at this stage, though was dismissed, but appeal against that was pending before the AAIFR. 13. In the present case as well, what has been stayed by the learned court below is the execution of a money decree against the company during the pendency of an application before the BIFR which at this stage, though was dismissed, but appeal against that was pending before the AAIFR. 13. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that it is only suit for recovery of money which can be stayed, as is provided for in second part of the section, where according to him, there is no provision for stay of execution, is totally misconceived as the execution of any kind what so ever has been covered in the first part of the section itself. In the second part, even the proceedings in a suit for recovery are also required to be stayed. In any case, once even the suit for recovery cannot be permitted to be proceeded with, to state that execution thereof should be permitted would certainly be anomalous. 14. Even the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the second part applies only for protection in an action by the secured creditors has no legs to stand, as the application of the provisions is wide enough and not restrictive, as it is not talking about proceedings under the Companies Act only or under any Act specially dealing with the secured creditors. Rather, it is providing protection against winding-up or execution or even sale of property or appointment of receiver. The winding-up proceedings against an industrial company can be initiated by any of the creditors, may be secured or unsecured, there is no restriction on that. The word "execution" mentioned in first part of the section is not restricted to execution proceedings under certain specified Act. Rather, the first part, as is mentioned above, uses four terms with word "or" therein, namely, winding up or for execution, distress or the like against these properties or for appointment of receiver. As far as the insertion made vide Amendment Act, 1993 in the section is concerned, the same provided for even protection against the suit for recovery of money or for enforcement of any security or any guarantee in respect of the loans granted to the company. As far as the insertion made vide Amendment Act, 1993 in the section is concerned, the same provided for even protection against the suit for recovery of money or for enforcement of any security or any guarantee in respect of the loans granted to the company. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that in the second part of the section, it is only stay of suit which is provided and not execution proceedings in a decree by the court has no legs to stand. Firstly, the term "execution" has already been specifically covered in the first part of the section and secondly once even the suit for recovery cannot proceed, it would not mean that the execution which is subsequent, couldbe proceeded with. The amendment in the year 1994 was carried out to cover up even the suit for recovery and also the cases against the guarantors. 15. No doubt, it is a case where from the facts on record, it is evident that the respondent herein filed an application before the BIFR after the suit had already been decreed against him on 10.2.2005 and even the appeal before the lower appellate court was also dismissed on 28.7.2005, the object seems to be to delay the execution proceedings. Still the issue before this court is to see the effect of provisions of Section 22 of the Act as to what rights flow to the industrial company under the same. It clearly provides that during the pendency of an appeal before the BIFR, the execution proceedings cannot continue. 16. The only bar in terms of Section 22 of the Act is that proceedings cannot continue except with the permission of the BIFR or the appellate authority. The petitioner is certainly entitled to approach the appellate authority in the present case to seek permission for continuation of the execution proceedings. For the reasons mentioned above, I do not find any merit in the present petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.