JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sabhajeet Yadav, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The order which I propose to pass in the writ petition I need not hear the respondents. 2. By this petition the petitioner has challenged the award of Labour Court dated 31st July, 1993 published in Gazette on 30.11.1993 (Annexure-1 of the writ petition), whereby Labour Court has adjudicated the industrial dispute referred to it and made award in favour of workman. 3. The brief facts leading to the case are that the respondent No. 3 was appointed as bus conductor in U.P. Government Roadways Establishment, Farrukhabad and after creation of U.P. Roadways Corporation the services of respondent No. 3 were placed on deputation with the services of the Corporation. In the year 1975 a departmental inquiry was held against the respondent No. 3 and his services were dispensed with on 21st June, 1976. Against the said order the respondent No. 3 filed appeal before next higher authority, wherein the appellate authority had given one more opportunity to the respondent No. 3 to serve the department Corporation vide order dated 28th July, 1976 on the post of bus conductor by re-appointing him afresh w.e.f. 6.8.1976 from initial stage of his earlier service. But the respondent No. 3 kept quiet for quite long time and after lapse of about 14 years raised industrial dispute before Conciliation Board with regard to termination of his services vide order dated 21.6.1976 passed by Assistant Regional Manager and his subsequent re-appointment w.e.f. 6.8.1976 vide order dated 28th July, 1976 passed by the appellate authority. The matter could not be settled before the Conciliation Board and it was sent to the State Government. Thereupon the State Government had referred the industrial dispute under Section 4K of U.P. Industrial Dispute Act 1947 for adjudication before the Labour Court vide reference order dated 14.11.1990. The reference reads as under : “Keya Sewa Yojako Dawara apne karmchari Tale Singh parichalak S/o Yaun Pal Singh ko aadesh denank 6.8.76 dawara vikhandit sewa denank (21.1.76 se 6.8.76) tak ke tartamayata varisdhata tatha puri sewa ke samast hit labh na diya jana anuchit awam vadhanik hai? Yadi han, to sambandhit akidari kaya hit labh/upsham pane ka adikari hai, tadha kis anya vivran sahit?” 4. Yadi han, to sambandhit akidari kaya hit labh/upsham pane ka adikari hai, tadha kis anya vivran sahit?” 4. It is not in dispute that before the Labour Court the parties had adduced their evidence and the Labour Court had made award in favour of respondent workman vide impugned award dated 31st July, 1993 published on 30.11.1993, whereby the interruption in the services of the respondent No. 3 from the date of his termination till the date of his re-appointment was directed to be ignored and the aforesaid period was to be counted towards his length of service, resulting which he was treated to be in continuous service, without any interruption in his service for the purposes of all benefits in service including seniority and other consequential benefits. It is against the aforesaid award of the Labour Court the petitioner U.P. State Corporation has filed the instant writ petition challenging the same, inter alia, on the ground that after lapse of 14 years from the date of re-appointment of respondent No. 3 there existed no industrial dispute to be referred by the State Government before Labour Court so as to enable the Labour Court to adjudicate the same and that in given facts and circumstances of the case the reference was bad, therefore, award made by the Labour Court without existence of any industrial dispute is wholly without jurisdiction and nonest, as such nullity. In support of the case of the petitioner learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in The Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavan Kutty and others, JT 2000 (1) SC 388 and two decisions of this Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 34947 of 2002, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Anil Kumar and others decided on 16.09.2008 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15435 of 1994 Regional Manager U.P.S.R.T.C., Jhansi Vs. Siddiq Khan and other decided on September 18, 2002. 5. I have considered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and also perused the records inasmuch as have gone through the aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Apex Court. Writ Petition No. 15435 of 1994 Regional Manager U.P.S.R.T.C., Jhansi Vs. Siddiq Khan and other decided on September 18, 2002. 5. I have considered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and also perused the records inasmuch as have gone through the aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Apex Court. From mere reading of para 5 of the aforesaid decision of Apex Court, it appears that in the aforesaid case, the reference made by the Government to the Labour Court was straightway challenged before High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, therefore, in the aforesaid factual backdrop of the case, in para 8 of the aforesaid decision the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : “It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that it is certainly subject to judicial review limited though it might be. High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, JT 1999 (9) SC 377, this Court observed : “It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the industrial dispute, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the industrial tribunal which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended appropriate government lacks power to make any reference.” 6. At this juncture, it is also necessary to point out that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. At this juncture, it is also necessary to point out that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. In this connection the observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Shekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647 in para 13 are as under : “A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it.” 7. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and others, (1987) 1 SCC 213 : AIR 1987 SC 1073 in para 18 Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under : “The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.” 8. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : AIR 2003 SC 511 in para 59 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : “It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of decision.” 9. Thus, from careful examination of observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of binding effect of decision as a precedent only this much can be deduced from the aforesaid decision of Supreme Court that if a reference of industrial dispute made to the Labour Court is challenged before the High Court, the judicial review of the reference of such industrial dispute is permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it is wrong notion of law to say that once a reference has been made under the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act to the Labour Court, the Labour Court has to decide the same and High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of Labour Court. An administrative order which does not take into consideration the statutory requirements or travels outside that it is certainly subject to judicial review. An administrative order which does not take into consideration the statutory requirements or travels outside that it is certainly subject to judicial review. In my opinion, the aforesaid observations of Hon’ble Apex Court cannot be further stretched to say that the propriety, validity and correctness of such reference of industrial dispute can still be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution, after award is made by Labour Court along with such award. In my view, the ratio of said decision has to be confined to the extent that where a reference of industrial dispute to the Labour Court is challenged straightway before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine the power of the Government making such reference within the parameters of judicial review of administrative action and can consider the question of very jurisdiction of Labour Court. But the aforesaid decision cannot be taken to be an authority for the cases where the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of Labour Court on a reference of industrial dispute made to it and participated in the proceeding before the Labour Court. In my considered opinion, after an award is made by the Labour Court, the correctness and validity of reference made by the Government to the Labour Court cannot be examined by the writ Court in judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India along with the validity of such award for the simple reason that the party challenging the reference has already submitted to the jurisdiction of Labour Court and on becoming unsuccessful in the Labour Court it is not open for such party to challenge the reference by turning round after the award made by the Labour Court. However, it is open for this Court to examine the correctness and validity of award made by the Labour Court on merits within the parameters available for judicial review of award under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in my opinion, even if the reference was made by the State Government after lapse of about 14 years and thereupon the Labour Court had adjudicated the dispute and made the award, the validity of reference made by the Government to the Labour Court cannot be questioned before this Court along with the validity of award itself. 10. Therefore, in my opinion, even if the reference was made by the State Government after lapse of about 14 years and thereupon the Labour Court had adjudicated the dispute and made the award, the validity of reference made by the Government to the Labour Court cannot be questioned before this Court along with the validity of award itself. 10. The facts of the instant case are quite distinguishable from the facts of the K.P. Madhavan Kutty’s case as in the said case the reference of industrial dispute was straightway challenged before the High Court directly under writ jurisdiction without submitting to the jurisdiction of Labour Court, whereas in instant case the petitioner has challenged the award of Labour Court after participation in the proceedings before the Labour Court, therefore, law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court has no application to the facts of the instant case. Thus view taken by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15435 of 1994 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34947 of 2002, in my opinion, does not lay down correct proposition of law for the simple reason that both the decisions did not consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter while deciding the aforesaid cases and did not follow the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court correctly. 11. On merits too I am of the considered opinion that the appellate authority in the appeal preferred by the respondent workman could not make reappointment of respondent No. 3 on the post of bus conductor w.e.f. 6.8.1976 from the stage of his initial appointment on the said post. In my opinion, once the disciplinary authority has dispensed with the services of respondent-workman after holding disciplinary inquiry against the respondent, the appellate authority could do one of three things. It could either affirm the order passed by the disciplinary authority or set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority or modify the order passed by the disciplinary authority, but it was not open for the appellate authority to reappoint the respondent No. 3 on the post of bus conductor at his initial stage of service. Re-appointment requires some sort of formalities to be taken by the appointing authority. Re-appointment requires some sort of formalities to be taken by the appointing authority. However, in given facts and circumstances of the case, the only course which was open for the appellate authority was to set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority and reinstate the respondent No. 3 in service with all consequential benefits of service including the continuity of service or without such benefit of continuity of service if the appellate authority was intended to continue the respondent No. 3 in service. As such if the Labour Court has made award in favour of respondent No. 3 by treating him in continuous service by ignoring short of interruption and break in his service i.e. w.e.f. 21.6.76 to 6.8.76, in such situation, even if the order passed by the Labour Court is otherwise erroneous and without jurisdiction, even then I am not inclined to exercise discretion in favour of writ petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed. ————