JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.P. Mehrotra, J.—A Division Bench consisting of two of us (R.K. Agrawal, J. and S.P. Mehrotra, J.) while dealing with Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 (Gaurav Tripathi v. State of U.P. and another) and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6733 of 2009 (Dr. Abha Pandey v. State of U.P. and another) by the Order dated 10th April, 2009, reported in 2009(4) ADJ 648 (DB) : 2009(3) ESC 1486 (DB) has referred the following question for decision by a larger bench : “Where in view of the provisions of the U.P. Higher Eduction Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983, particularly, Regulations 3 and 6 thereof, the Guide-lines framed by the U.P. Higher Eduction Services Commission in the year 2008 in regard to the selection pursuant to Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, wherein “teaching experience” has been provided as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates to be called for interview for the post of teachers/lecturers are valid.” Relevant facts leading to the reference 2. It is necessary to notice the relevant facts leading to the reference. 3. The above two writ petitions have been field by the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interalia, praying for quashing the Guidelines framed by the U.P. Higher Eduction Services Commission (in short ‘the Commission’) for the purpose of selection of lecturers in Degree Colleges and Post Graduate Colleges in pursuance of Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, and further, for directing the Commission to hold the interview of the petitioners in the above Writ Petitions for the post of lecturer in Political Science in pursuance of the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 4. It appears that the Commission issued an Advertisement No. 41 in the year 2007 whereby a large number of posts of lecturers in different disciplines were advertised. In Political Science, total number of 35 posts were advertised, out of which 18 posts were of general category. 5. The petitioner (Gaurav Tripathi) in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 submitted his application for the post of lecturer in Political Science pursuant to the aforesaid Advertisement. However, he was not called for interview, and was informed verbally that his name had been screened out. 6. 5. The petitioner (Gaurav Tripathi) in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 submitted his application for the post of lecturer in Political Science pursuant to the aforesaid Advertisement. However, he was not called for interview, and was informed verbally that his name had been screened out. 6. As it has transpired from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Commission, the said Gaurav Tripathi had not been called for interview as he had been short-listed inasmuch as his Screening Index Mark was 27.6 whereas the last candidate called for the interview had obtained the Screening Index Mark 27.8. 7. The petitioner (Dr. Abha Pandey) in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6733 of 2009 also applied for the post of lecturer in Political Science pursuant to the aforesaid Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. She was also screened out and was not called for interview. 8. As stated by Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Commission before the Division Bench, the Screening Index Mark of Dr Abha Pandey (petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6733 of 2009) was 27.4 whereas the Screening Index Mark obtained by the last candidate called for the interview in the general category for the post of lecturer in Political Science was 27.8 and, therefore, the said Dr. Abha Pandey was not called for interview. 9. The interview for the post of lecturer in Political Science commenced on 12.1.2009. The petitioners in the aforesaid Writ Petitions were screened out in view of their respective Screening Index Marks given on the basis of the Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2008 under Section 11 (a) of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (in short “the Services Commission Act”) in regard to the aforementioned Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 10. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 was filed by Gaurav Tripathi on 20.1.2009 while Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6733 of 2009 was filed by Dr. Abha Pandey on 4.2.2009. 11. The petitioners in the aforementioned Writ Petitions have challenged the validity of the aforementioned Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2008 in regard to the selection pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. The said Guidelines have been framed by the Commission for preliminary screening and shortlisting the candidates to be called for interview pursuant to the said Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 12. The said Guidelines have been framed by the Commission for preliminary screening and shortlisting the candidates to be called for interview pursuant to the said Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 12. The main ground for challenging the validity of the impugned guidelines was that the same provided Screening Index Marks in regard to “experience”. 13. It has been submitted before the Division Bench that in view of Regulation 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations 1983 (in short “the Teachers Selection Regulations”), the minimum qualifications for appointment on the post of lecturer/teacher are to be determined in accordance with the Statutes referred to in Section 50 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (in short “the State Universities Act”). The First Statutes framed under Section 50 of the State Universities Act, and as amended from time to time under various provisions of the said Section, deal with the minimum qualifications. In view of the Government Order dated 12-7-2006 (Annexure CA 4 to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Commission before the Division Bench) issued by the State Government in exercise of power conferred under sub-section (6) of Section 50 of the State Universities Act, and the consequent amendments in the Statutes referred to in Section 50 of the said Act, the minimum qualifications required for the post of lecturer/teacher are consistently good academic record with Post Graduation with,minimum 55% marks and NET. There is no requirement of “experience” in the minimum qualifications for appointment on the post of lecturer/teacher. Therefore, the submission proceeds, the Guidelines framed by the Commission under Section 11 (a) of the Services Commission Act cannot provide “experience” as an additional qualification for shortlisting the eligible candidates. 14. It has further been submitted that the provision for Screening Index Marks in regard to “experience”, as contained in the impugned Guidelines for screening and shortlisting of the candidates applying for the post of lecturer/teacher, is contrary to clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 15. In reply to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the Commission, interalia, placed reliance on various decisions of this Court wherein the guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 for preliminary screening and shortlisting were upheld. 15. In reply to the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the Commission, interalia, placed reliance on various decisions of this Court wherein the guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 for preliminary screening and shortlisting were upheld. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the Commission before the Division Bench that in the said guidelines framed in the year 2000, Screening Index Marks were awarded regarding “teaching experience”. 16. The Division Bench considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, and noted that the following two questions mainly cropped up for consideration : 1. Whether the impugned Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2008 in regard to the selection pursuant to Advertisement No. 41 of 2007 are valid? 2. Whether the decisions of this Court in regard to the validity of the Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 (wherein Screening Index Marks were awarded regarding ‘teaching experience’) are binding precedents, and the impugned Guidelines should be upheld in view of the said decisions? 17. In regard to the aforesaid Question No. 1, the Division Bench expressed its tentative opinion and prima facie conclusion as under : “Hence, we are of the opinion that the Commission could not provide “teaching experience” as a factor for preliminary screening and short-listing of the candidates at the threshold in order to restrict the number of candidates to be called for interview. Of course, once the candidates are called for interview, “teaching experience” may be considered as one of the relevant factors for selection. Therefore, we conclude that the impugned Guide-lines framed by the Commission in the year 2008 (Annexure CA-3 to the Counter Affidavit on behalf of the Commission) in regard to Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, are invalid in-so-far as these Guide-lines provide for taking into account “teaching experience” as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates to be called for interview for the post of teachers/lecturers, and allocate Screening Index Marks for the same.” 18. As regards Questions No. 2, mentioned above, the Division Bench noticed various decisions of this Court which upheld the validity of the guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 (wherein Screening Index Marks were awarded regarding “teaching experience”), and thereafter, observed as under : “Thus, the validity of the Guide-lines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 (Annexure CA-7 to the Counter Affidavit on behalf of the Commission) has been upheld in the above decisions given by various Division Benches of this Court. The said Guide-lines, as noted above, provided “teaching experience” as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing of the candidates for the post of teachers/lecturers, and allocated Screening Index Marks for the same. However, with deep respect for the learned Judges who gave decisions in the above cases, the question as to whether in view of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, or as to whether in view of Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, it was permissible for the Commission to provide in its Guide-lines, “teaching experience” as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing, and allocate Screening Index Marks for the same, was not considered in the above decisions. In our opinion, as discussed earlier, in view of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, as also in view of Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, it is not permissible for the Commission to provide in its Guide-lines, “teaching experience” as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing of the candidates to be called for interview, and allocate Screening Index Marks for the same. The impugned Guide-lines framed by the Commission in the year 2008 (Annexure CA-3 to the Counter Affidavit on behalf of the Commission) are invalid in-so-far as these Guide-lines provide for taking into account “teaching experience” as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates to be called for interview for the post of teachers/lecturers, and allocate Screening Index Marks for the same. However, as the validity of the Guide-lines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 wherein “teaching experience” was provided as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing of the candidates to be called for interview, and Screening Index Marks were allocated for the same, has been upheld by this Court in a series of decisions noted above, and the Commission has provided Screening Index Marks for “teaching experience” in its Guide-lines in regard to the Advertisement in question, namely, Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, and as the above question regarding validity of the Guide-lines framed in the year 2000 in the context of Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations or in the context of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, was not considered in the above decisions, we, sitting in a Division Bench, cannot take a different and contrary view. Therefore, it will be appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench. As we are of the view that the matter be referred to a larger Bench, we are not expressing any opinion on the questions as to whether the above decisions are binding precedents, or the same are per incurium as the provisions of Regulations 3 and 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations were not noticed, or the same are sub-silentio, or as to whether the doctrine of stare decisis applies. In view of the above, we refer the following question for decision by a larger Bench:” 19. The question referred by the Division Bench has already been reproduced in the beginning of this judgment. Other writ petitions connected with the aforesaid two writ petitions : 20. It appears that after the aforesaid reference was made to the Full Bench by the Order dated 10.4.2009, certain other Writ Petitions were also connected with the aforementioned Writ Petitions by the orders passed by the Court. Thus, the following other Writ Petitions have been connected with the aforementioned two Writ Petitions : (1) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15093 of 2009, Dr. Rajeev Kumar Pandey and another v. State of U.P. and others (pertaining to the post of lecturer in Botany and Mathematics respectively). (2) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15094 of 2009, Dr. Vijay Kumar Saraswat v. State of U.P. and others (pertaining to the post of lecturer in Horticulture). (3) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15093 of 2009, Dr. Rajeev Kumar Pandey and another v. State of U.P. and others (pertaining to the post of lecturer in Botany and Mathematics respectively). (2) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15094 of 2009, Dr. Vijay Kumar Saraswat v. State of U.P. and others (pertaining to the post of lecturer in Horticulture). (3) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 464 of 2009, Dr. Niti Kushwaha v. The State of U.P. and others (pertaining to the post of lecturer in Botany). (4) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 795 of 2009; Dr. Diwas Kant Samadhiya v. State of U.P. and others (pertaining to the post of lecturer in Political Science). (5) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5232 of 2009; Anjama Bhanti and others v. State of U.P. and others (pertaining to the post of lecturer in Botany). Proceedings before the Full Bench : 21. The matter came up before this Full Bench on 9.10.2009. By the Order dated 9.10.2009, the matter was directed to be put-up for further hearing on 12.10.2009. 22. On 12.10.2009, the Full Bench passed the following order : “It is an admitted position that during the pendency of these writ petitions, the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission had published the list of successful candidates. None of them have been impleaded as party. Any decision by us shall have bearing on their rights. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it expedient that Mr. H.N. Singh, learned counsel, who represents U.P. Higher Education Services Commission apprises the selected candidates about the pendency of these writ petitions. Those selected candidates, if so advised, may enter appearance on or before 3rd November, 2009. The U.P. Higher Education Services Commission, instead of giving notices to them, may publish the notice in the newspaper itself. The U.P. Education Services Commission shall be well advised to reproduce the order of the Court in the advertisement, if they so choose to publish. List it on 6th of November, 2009 for hearing.” 23. It appears that pursuant to the aforementioned Order dated 12.10.2009, the Commission issued advertisement in the newspaper. 24. Thereafter, various Impleadment Applications on behalf of the selected/appointed candidates were filed. 25. By the Order dated 6.11.2009, various Impleadment Applications were allowed, and the applicants in the said Impleadment applications were directed to be impleaded as respondents in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009. 24. Thereafter, various Impleadment Applications on behalf of the selected/appointed candidates were filed. 25. By the Order dated 6.11.2009, various Impleadment Applications were allowed, and the applicants in the said Impleadment applications were directed to be impleaded as respondents in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009. Time was granted to the newly impleaded respondents for filing counter-affidavit while petitioners were granted time for filing rejoinder affidavit. 26. The Order dated 6.11.2009 passed by the Full Bench is as under : “All these applications have been filed for impleadment of the applicants as respondents in the writ petition. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the applicants in all these applications have interest in the lis and, therefore, they be impleaded as respondents in the writ petition. Accordingly, these applications are allowed and the applicants be impleaded as respondents. Necessary amendment shall be carried out by the counsel for the applicants. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of newly added respondents prays for and are granted one week’s time to file counter-affidavit. Petitioners are also given a week’s time to file rejoinder affidavit to the counter-affidavit. It is made clear that no further adjournment shall be granted. List it on 27th of November, 2009 along with Writ Petition Nos. 795 of 2009, 464 of 2009, 5232 of 2009 and 15093 of 2009 and other connected matters. Names of the counsel for newly added respondents be shown in the cause list.” 27. Pursuant to the Order dated 6.11.2009, the case was listed before the Full Bench on 27.11.2009. On the said date i.e. 27.11.2009, certain other Impleadment applications were also allowed. 28. The matter was heard before the Full Bench on 27.11.2009, and thereafter on 30.11.2009. On 30.11.2009, the arguments were concluded, and the judgment was reserved. Relevant Statutory Provisions : 29. Before proceeding to consider the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the points arising therefrom, we may refer to certain Statutory Provisions which are relevant in the present case. 30. Section 50 of the State Universities Act (i.e., the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973) deals with the making of Statutes of Universities. The said Section 50 (as amended) is as under : “50. 30. Section 50 of the State Universities Act (i.e., the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973) deals with the making of Statutes of Universities. The said Section 50 (as amended) is as under : “50. Statutes how made.—The First Statutes of the University shall be made by the State Government by notification in the Gazette and in the case of any existing University, for so long as the First Statues are not so made, the Statutes as in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall, subject to such adaptations and modifications whether by way of repeal, amendment or addition as may be necessary or expedient, as the State Government may, by notification in the Gazette provide, continue in force, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be called in question. [(1-A) The State Government may by notification in the Gazette amend whether by way of addition, substitution or omission, the First Statutes at any time [up to December 31, 1990] and any such amendment may be retrospective to a date not earlier than the date of such commencement.] [(1-B) Until the First Statutes of the Purvanchal University are made under this section, the Statutes of the University of Gorakhpur, as in force immediately before the establishment of the said University shall apply to it subject to such adaptations and modifications as the State Government may, by notification, provide.] [(2) The Executive Council may, at any time [after December 31,1990], make new or additional Statutes or may amend or repeal the Statutes referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A).] (3) The Executive Counsel shall not propose the draft of any Statute affecting the status, power or constitution of any authority of the University until such authority has been given an opportunity of expressing its opinion upon the proposal and any opinion so expressed shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the Chancellor. (4) Every new Statute or addition to a Statute or any amendment or repeal of Statute shall be submitted to the Chancellor who may assent to it or withhold his assent therefrom or remit it to the Executive Council for further consideration. (4) Every new Statute or addition to a Statute or any amendment or repeal of Statute shall be submitted to the Chancellor who may assent to it or withhold his assent therefrom or remit it to the Executive Council for further consideration. (5) A Statute passed by the Executive Council shall have effect from the date it is assented to by the Chancellor or from such later date as may be specified by him. [(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-section the State Government may in order to implement any decision taken by it in the interest of learning, teaching or research or for the benefit of teachers, students or other staff or on the basis of any suggestion or recommendation of the University Grants Commission or the State or National Education Policy with regard to the qualifications of the teachers, require the Executive Council to make new or additional Statutes or amend or repeal the Statutes referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) within a specified time and if the Executive Council fails to comply with such requirement the State Government may, with the assent of the Chancellor, make new or additional Statutes or amend or repeal the Statutes referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A).] (7) The Executive Council shall have no power to amend or repeal the Statutes made by the State Government under sub-section (6) or to make new or additional Statutes inconsistent with such Statutes.]” 31. Section 4 of the Services Commission Act (i.e., the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980) deals with the composition of the Commission. The said Section 4 is as under : “4. Composition of the Commission.-(1) The Commission shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two and not more than four other members to be appointed by the State Government. The said Section 4 is as under : “4. Composition of the Commission.-(1) The Commission shall consist of a Chairman and not less than two and not more than four other members to be appointed by the State Government. [“(2) No person shall be qualified for appointment as Chairman unless he- (a) is or has been a member of Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service who has held the post of District Judge or any other post equivalent thereto; or (b) is or has been a member of the Indian Administrative Service who has held the post of a Secretary to the State Government or any other post under the State Government equivalent thereto; or (c) is or has been a Vice-Chancellor of any University; or (d) is or has been a Professor in any University; or (e) is in the opinion of the State Government an eminent person having made valuable contribution in the field of education. (2-a) No person shall be qualified for appointment as member unless he— (a) is or has been a member of Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service who has held the post of District Judge or any other post equivalent thereto; or (b) is or has been a member of the Indian Administrative Service who has held the post of a Secretary to the State Government or any other post under the State Government equivalent thereto; or (c) is or has been a Vice-Chancellor of any University; or (d) is or has been a Professor in any University; or (e) is or has been a Principal of a Post Graduate College for a period of not less than five years;or (f) is or has been a Principal of Degree College for a period of not less than ten years; or (g) is in the opinion of the State Government an eminent person having made valuable contribution in the field of education”]. (3) Every appointment under this Section shall take effect from the date on which it is notified by the State Government.” 32. Section 11 of the Services Commission Act deals with the powers and duties of the Commission. The said Section 11 provides as under : “11. (3) Every appointment under this Section shall take effect from the date on which it is notified by the State Government.” 32. Section 11 of the Services Commission Act deals with the powers and duties of the Commission. The said Section 11 provides as under : “11. Powers and duties.—The Commission shall have the following powers and duties, namely- (a) to prepare guidelines on matters relating to the method of recruitment of teachers in Colleges; (b) to conduct examinations where considered necessary, hold interviews and make selection of candidates for being appointed as such teachers; (c) to select and invite experts and to appoint examiners for the purposes specified in clause (b); (d) to make recommendation to the management regarding the appointment of selected candidates; (e) to obtain periodical returns or other informations from colleges regarding strength of the teaching staffs and the appointment, dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank of teachers therein; (f) to fix the emoluments and travelling and other allowance of the experts and examiners; (g) to administer the funds placed at the disposal of the Commission: (h) to perform such other duties and exercise such other powers as may be prescribed or as may be incidental or conductive to the discharge of the above functions.” 33. Section 12 of the Services Commission Act lays down the procedure for appointment of teachers. The said Section 12 is as under : “[12. Procedure for appointment of teachers.—(1) Every appointment as a teacher of any college shall be made by the management in accordance with the provisions of this Act and every appointment made in contravention thereof shall be void. The said Section 12 is as under : “[12. Procedure for appointment of teachers.—(1) Every appointment as a teacher of any college shall be made by the management in accordance with the provisions of this Act and every appointment made in contravention thereof shall be void. [“Provided that a permanent teacher of an affiliated or associated college, who has been appointed in accordance with the provisions of this Act and has completed ten years’ service as such and who wishes to be transferred to any other college, may be transferred in the manner prescribed by rules from one college to another, only when the respective management of the colleges concerned give their consents in writing.” [(1-a) Notwithstanding any decree or order of a Court, a teacher who has been appointed as such by transfer from one college to another in pursuance of the Government Orders No. 429 Shiksha Mantri/Sattar-6-98-15-95, dated August 17, 1998 or No. 393/Sattar-1-99-15(6)-99, dated October 28, 1999 shall be deemed to have been validly appointed as if the provisions of the principal Act as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Second Amendment) Act, 2004 were in force at all material times.” (2) The management shall intimate the existing vacancies and the vacancies, likely to be caused during the course of the ensuing academic year, to the Director at such time and in such manner, as may be prescribed. Explanation.—The expression “academic year” means the period of 12 months commencing on July 1. (3) The Director shall notify to the Commission at such time and in such manner as may be prescribed a subject-wise consolidated list of vacancies intimated to him from all colleges. (4) The manner of selection of persons for appointment to the posts of teachers of a college shall be such, as may be determined by regulations: Provided that the Commission shall with a view to inviting talented persons give wide publicity in the State to the vacancies notified to it under sub-section (3): Provided further that the candidates shall be required to indicate their order of preference for the various colleges vacancies wherein have been advertised.” 34. Section 13 of the Services Commission Act deals with the holding of interview (with or without written examination) of the candidates by the Commission, the sending of recommendation by the Commission to the Director of Education (Higher Education), and the placement of candidates by the Director in various institutions. The said Section 13 is as under : “13. Recommendation of Commission.—(1) The Commission shall, as soon as possible, after the notification of vacancies to it under sub-section (3) of Section 12, hold interview (with or without written examination) of the candidates and send to the Director a list recommending such number of names of candidates found most suitable in each subject as may be, so far as practicable, twenty-five percent more than the number of vacancies in that subject. Such names shall be arranged in order of merit shown in the interview, or in the examination and interview if an examination is held. (2) The list sent by the Commission shall be valid till the receipt of a new list from the Commission. (3) The Director shall having due regard in the prescribed manner, to the order of preference if any indicated by the candidates under the second proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 12, intimate to the management the name of a candidate from the list referred to in sub-section (1) for being appointed in the vacancy intimated under sub-section (2) of Section 12. (4) Where a vacancy occurs due to death, resignation or otherwise during the period of validity of the list referred to in sub-section (2) and such vacancy has not been notified to the Commission under sub-section (3) of Section 12, the Director may intimate to the management the name of a candidate from such list for appointment in such vacancy. (5) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions, where to abolition of any post of teacher in any college, services of the person substantively appointed to such post is terminated the State Government may make suitable order for his appointment in a suitable vacancy, whether notified under sub-section (3) of Section 12 or not in any other college, and thereupon the Director shall intimate to the management accordingly. (6) The Director shall send a copy of the intimation made under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) to the candidate concerned.” 35. (6) The Director shall send a copy of the intimation made under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) to the candidate concerned.” 35. Section 30 of the Services Commission Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act over the State Universities Act or the Statutes or Ordinances made thereunder. The said Section 30 is reproduced below : “30. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 or the Statutes or Ordinances made thereunder.” 36. Section 31 of the Services Commission Act deals with the power of the Commission to make regulations. The said Section 31 is as under : “31. Power to make regulations.—(1) Commission may, with the previous approval of the State Government, make regulations prescribing fees for holding selections, conducting examinations where necessary, holding interviews and laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under this Act. (2) The regulations made under sub-section (1) shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the rules made under Section 32.” 37. Section 32 of the Services Commission Act gives power to the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the said Act. The said Section 32 is as under : “32. Power to make Rules.- The State Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” 38. In exercise of power conferred under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act, the Commission has framed the Teachers Selections Regulations [i.e. the U.P. Higher Eduction Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983], which have been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. 39. Further, in exercise of power conferred under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act, the Commission has also framed the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations 1983 (in short “the Business Regulations”). 40. Regulation 4 of the Business Regulations [i.e., the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1983] deals with the allocation of work among members including Chairman and the constitution of Committee for performance of any specified work or transaction of any specified business. The said Regulation 4 is reproduced below : “4. 40. Regulation 4 of the Business Regulations [i.e., the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1983] deals with the allocation of work among members including Chairman and the constitution of Committee for performance of any specified work or transaction of any specified business. The said Regulation 4 is reproduced below : “4. Procedure generally.—(1) For convenient transaction of its business— (i) the allocation of work among members (including Chairman) shall, from time to time, be made by the Chairman. (ii) the Commission may constitute a committee or committee from amongst its members or authorize any member for performance of any specified work or transaction of any specified business. (2) The allocation made may be altered or modified as and when deemed necessary. (3) The senior-most member shall be the convenor of a committee. (4) Decisions of the Committee shall, except in matters in respect of which the Commission has otherwise directed, be subject to approval of the Commission.” 41. Regulation 5 of the Business Regulations deals with the Interview Board. The said Regulation 5 is as under : “5. Interview Board.—(1) Separate interview Board shall be constituted for the posts of Principals in Post-graduate Colleges. Principals in degree colleges and for the post of the other teachers in each subject. (2) The Chairman shall constitute an interview Board and, if necessary, more than one interview Board comprising three Experts and at least two Members : Provided that where the Expert invited for any selection has expressed his inability or has otherwise failed to come and there is no sufficient time to invite any other expert from the panel, the Chairman may invite any available Expert possessing qualifications set out by the Commission: Provided further that the proceedings of an interview Board shall not be invalid if at least two Experts and two members are present. (3) Ordinarily, a single Board shall be constituted for selection to a particular post or posts, but where the number of candidates at large, the Commission may constitute more than one Board for the purpose. (4) Where more than one multiple Member Board are constituted the constitution of the Boards may be changed by rotation as often as considered proper. (5) The programme of interview shall be fixed by the Commission. (6) The intimation for interview shall be sent to candidate at least 21 (twenty-one) days in advance. (4) Where more than one multiple Member Board are constituted the constitution of the Boards may be changed by rotation as often as considered proper. (5) The programme of interview shall be fixed by the Commission. (6) The intimation for interview shall be sent to candidate at least 21 (twenty-one) days in advance. (7) If member is unable to be present in an Interview Board, the Chairman may authorize any other Member to hold the interview in his place and this fact shall not invalidate the proceedings of such selection. (8) If a Member of a multiple Member Board is unable to attend, or has to leave the interview Board during the course of its sitting and an alternative arrangement cannot be made, then subject to the condition laid down in the second proviso to sub-regulation (2) of this regulation the other remaining Members may hold or continue to hold the interview and the proceedings of the Board shall not be vitiated on the ground that the Member was absent from the sittings of the Board. (9) The Senior-most Member shall preside over the Interview Board. The proceedings of the Interview Board shall be placed before the Commission for approval as early as possible whereafter the recommendation will be issued. Such approval may be obtained by circulation or in a meeting of the Commission.” 42. Regulation 6 of the Business Regulations provides for preparation of a panel of experts. The said Regulation 6 is as follows : “6. Experts.—(1) The Commission shall prepare a panel of Experts for the selection of Principal and separate subject-wise panels for selection of teachers other than Principal. Note.—The Experts for selection of teachers, not being the selection of Principal, shall be Experts in the subject for which a teacher has to be selected. (2) The panel so prepared and approved by the Commission may be reviewed by the Commission from time to time. (3) The panel of Experts shall be a secret document and it shall be kept in safe custody by the Secretary under sealed cover and shall be submitted to Member on requisition in writing.” 43. Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations [i.e., the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983] deals with the minimum qualifications for appointment of a teacher. The said Regulation 3 lays down as under : “3. Qualifications and experience, etc. Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations [i.e., the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983] deals with the minimum qualifications for appointment of a teacher. The said Regulation 3 lays down as under : “3. Qualifications and experience, etc. for appointment as teacher.—The minimum qualifications for appointment of a teacher shall be as given in the statutes referred to in Section 50 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973.” 44. Regulation 5 of the Teachers Selection Regulations deals with the notification of vacancies by the Commission, and the submission of application and indication of preference of colleges by the candidates. The said Regulation 5 provides as under : “5. Notification of vacancies, submission of application and indication of preference.—The Commission shall advertise the vacancies in three issues of at least three newspapers. The Commission shall send a copy of the advertisement to the Director and may, if it considers proper, also send a copy thereof to the District Inspector of Schools and to the Colleges. Such advertisement shall, interalia, indicate the total number of vacancies as also the number of vacancies in women’s colleges and other colleges separately, the names of the college(s) and where they are situate and shall require the candidates to apply in prescribed form and to give, if he so desires, the choice of not more than five colleges in order of preference. Where a candidate wishes to be considered for a particular college or colleges only, and for no other, he shall mention the fact in his application : Provided that where the number of colleges is large or for any other reason the Commission considers it inexpedient, it may, instead of mentioning the names and particulars of the colleges in the advertisement, send the copy thereof to the colleges and to the District Inspector of Schools and mention in the advertisement that particulars of the colleges may be seen in the office of the Commission, the office of District Inspector of Schools or in the Colleges : Provided also that the Commission shall not be bound by the choice given by the candidate and may, in its discretion, recommend him for appointment in a college other than indicated by him.” 45. Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations deals with the procedure for selection for the post of a teacher as well as for the post of the Principal. The said Regulation 6 is as under : “6. Procedure for selection.—(1) The Commission shall scrutinize the applications and call for interview such number of candidates as it may consider proper : Provided that, if on account of excess number of applications or for any other reasons, the Commission considers it desirable to limit the number of candidates to be called for interview, it may— (i) in the case of the post of a teacher, not being the post of Principal, either hold preliminary screening on the basis of academic record or hold a competitive examination, so however that no competitive examination shall be held before the recruitment year 1984. (ii) in the case of the post of the Principal, hold preliminary screening on the basis of academic record, teaching the administrative experience : Provided further that the number of candidates to be called for interview for any category of post shall, as far as possible, be between three to eight times the vacancies as the Commission may consider proper. (2) The Commission shall interview the candidates in accordance with the criteria, minimum standards and guidelines set out by it. The Commission may, if it considers necessary, hold practical test also as part of interview. (3) No candidate shall be recommended unless at least one expert concurs with the selection. (4) The Commission shall prepare two separate lists of selected candidates, one of the women candidates only and the other a ‘general list’ of all the candidates (including women candidates included in the first list). The names of women candidates who specifically opt not to be posted in women’s colleges shall not be included in the list of women candidates. The names of the candidates in the two lists shall be arranged in order of merit and the number of names shall not be more than three times the number of vacancies or the number of vacancies plus four whichever is more.” 46. The names of the candidates in the two lists shall be arranged in order of merit and the number of names shall not be more than three times the number of vacancies or the number of vacancies plus four whichever is more.” 46. The Hindi version of the aforesaid Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations is as under : “6-(1) vk;ksx vkosnu irzksa dh laoh{kk djsxk vkSj mrus vH;fFkZ;ksa dks lk{kkRdkj ds fy, cqyk;sxk ftrus og mfpr le>s % ijUrq ;fn vR;f/kd la[;k esa vkosnu irzksa ds dkj.k ;k fdUgha vU; dkj.kksa ls] vk;ksx lk{kRdkj ds fy, cqyk;s tkus okys vH;fFkZ;ksasa dh la[;k dks lhfer djuk okaNuh; le>s rks og& (,d) v/;kid ds in dh fLFkfr esa] tks izkpk;Z dk in u gks] ;k rks kSf{kd vfHkys[k ds vk/kkj ij izkjfEHkd vuqoh{k.k djsxk ;k izfr;ksfxrk ijh{kk dk vk;kstu bl izdkj djsxk fd HkrhZ ds o"kZ 1984 ds iwoZ fdlh izfr;ksfxrk ijh{kk dk vk;kstu u djuk iMs+A (nks) izkpk;Z ds in dh fLFkfr esa] kSf{kd vfHkys[k] v/;kiu vkSj iz’kklfud vuqHko ds vkèkkj ij izkjfEHkd vuqoh{k.k djsxk % ijUrq ;g vkSj fd fdlh Js.kh ds in ds fy, lk{kkRdkj ds fy, cqyk;s tkus okys vH;kfZFkZ;ksa dh la[;k] ;FkklaHko] fjfDr;ksa dh la[;k ds rhu ls vkB xqus ds chp mruh gksxh ftruh vk;ksx mfpr le>s A (2) vk;ksx vius }kjk LFkkfir ekun.M] U;wure Lrj vkSj ekxZn’kZd fl)kUrksa ds vuqlkj vH;fFkZ;ksa dk lk{kkRdkj djsxk A vk;ksx] ;fn vko’;d le>s] lk{kkRdkj ds Hkkx ds :i esa O;ogkfjd ijh{kk Hkh ys ldrk gS A (3) fdlh vH;FkhZ dh laLrqfr rc rd ugha dh tk;sxh tc rd de ls de,d fo’ks"kK p;u ls lger u gks A (4) vk;ksx p;u fd;s x;s vH;fFkZ;ksa dh nks i`Fkd&i`Fkd lwfp;ka rS;kj djsxk],d dsoy efgyk vH;fFkZ;ksa dh vkSj nwljh leLr vH;fFkZ;ksa dh ¼ftlds vUrxZr izFke lwph esa lfEefyr efgyk vH;FkhZ Hkh gksasxh½ “lkekU; lwph gksxhA ,slh efgyk vH;fFkZ;ksa ds uke ftUgksaus fofufnZ"V :i ls efgyk egkfo|ky;ksa esa rSukr u fd;s tkus dk fodYi fd;k gks] efgyk vH;fFkZ;ksa dh lwph esa lfEefyr ugha fd;s tk;saxs A nksuksa lwfp;ksa esa vH;fFkZ;ksa dk uke ;ksX;rk&dze esa j[kk tk;sxk vkSj ukeksa dh la[;k fjfDr;ksa dh la[;k ds rhu xqus ;k fjfDr;ksa dh la[;k ls pkj vf/kd] blesa tks Hkh vf/kd gks] ls vf/kd ugha gksxhA” Submissions 47. We have heard Sri P.S. Baghel, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Gautam Baghel, learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Misc. We have heard Sri P.S. Baghel, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Gautam Baghel, learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6733 of 2009, Smt. Arti Raje and Sri Satyawan Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15093 of 2009, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15094 of 2009, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5232 of 2009 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 795 of 2009. 48. We have also heard Sri Arvind Srivastava, who appears for the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13350 of 2009 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10734 of 2009 which are not connected with the bunch being considered by the Full Bench. 49. In reply, we have heard Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 (Commission), Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 3 to 8, Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 161 to 197, Sri Chandrashekhar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri R.C. Tiwari, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 13 and 19 to 122, Sri Shailendra, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent No. 11 and Sri Ramesh Sinha, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent No. 12. Points Involved 50. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration : (i) Objection regarding composition of the Full Bench. (ii) Consideration of the question referred to the Full Bench and other allied questions. (iii) Validity of the Teachers Selection Regulations, particularly, Regulation 6 thereof. (iv) Permissibility of challenge to the Guidelines by the petitioner(s). (v) Permissibility of judicial review of the Guidelines framed by the Commission. (vi) Nature of the Guidelines vis-a-vis the Teachers Selection Regulations. (vii) Applicability of the doctrine of prospective over-ruling in the present case. (viii) Equitable considerations, if any, in the way of Full Bench answering the question referred or requiring the Full Bench to mould the relief so as not to upset the selection mode pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. (ix) Other objections to the answering of the question referred or declining relief to the petitioners by the Full Bench. (viii) Equitable considerations, if any, in the way of Full Bench answering the question referred or requiring the Full Bench to mould the relief so as not to upset the selection mode pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. (ix) Other objections to the answering of the question referred or declining relief to the petitioners by the Full Bench. (x) Applicability of de-facto doctrine to the present case. Consideration of Points : POINT No. (i) : Objection regarding composition of Full Bench. 51. Shri Chandrashekhar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri R.C. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondents in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 has raised a preliminary objection to the composition of the present Full Bench. It is submitted by Shri Chandrashekhar that two of us (R.K. Agrawal, J. and S.P. Mehrotra, J.), who constituted the Division Bench, which made the reference, have already expressed their view regarding the validity of the Guidelines framed by the Commission in the Referring Order and, therefore, either the Full Bench should be re-constituted, or in the alternative, the number of Judges, constituting the Full Bench, should be so fixed that the two Judges, who made the reference, may be in minority. Shri Chandrashekhar suggested that the Bench should be composed of at least five Judges. 52. Shri Chandrashekhar has read-out various portions of the Referring Order to submit that the Division Bench making the reference has already expressed its view regarding the validity of the Guidelines. Shri Chandrashekhar has further referred to the provisions of Rules 6 and 13 of Chapter V of the Rules of the Court. 53. We have considered the submissions made by Shri Chandrashekhar, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 54. A perusal of the Referring Order shows that the Division Bench has expressed its tentative opinion and has recorded prima facie conclusion that the impugned Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2008 in regard to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, are invalid in so-far-as these Guidelines provide for taking into account “teaching experience” as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates to be called for interview for the post of Teachers/Lecturers and allocate Screening Index Marks for the same. The Division Bench has also given detailed reasons for its tentative/prima facie opinion/conclusion. The Division Bench has also given detailed reasons for its tentative/prima facie opinion/conclusion. After recording its tentative/prima facie opinion/conclusion, the Division Bench in the Referring Order has further considered various Division Bench decisions of this Court in which the validity of the Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 (wherein Screening Index Marks were awarded regarding “teaching experience”) was upheld. In the referring order, the Division Bench has, thereafter, observed as under : “However, as the validity of the Guide-lines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 wherein “teaching experience” was provided as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing of the candidates to be called for interview, and Screening Index Marks were allocated for the same, has been upheld by this Court in a series of decisions noted above, and the Commission has provided Screening Index Marks for “teaching experience” in its Guide-lines in regard to the Advertisement in question, namely, Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, and as the above question regarding validity of the Guidelines framed in the year 2000 in the context of Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations or in the context of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, was not considered in the above decisions, we, sitting in a Division Bench, cannot take a different and contrary view. Therefore, it will be appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench. As we are of the view that the matter be referred to a larger Bench, we are not expressing any opinion on the questions as to whether the above decisions are binding precedents, or the same are per incurium as the provisions of Regulations 3 and 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations were not noticed, or the same are sub-silentio, or as to whether the doctrine of stare decisis applies. In view of the above, we refer the following question for decision by a larger Bench.” 55. It will, thus, be noticed that the Division Bench making reference has declined to take a different and contrary view to that taken in various Division Bench decisions which dealt with the validity of the Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000, and has referred the question for decision by a Larger Bench. 56. It will, thus, be noticed that the Division Bench making reference has declined to take a different and contrary view to that taken in various Division Bench decisions which dealt with the validity of the Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000, and has referred the question for decision by a Larger Bench. 56. It is, thus, evident that the opinion/conclusion expressed/recorded by the Division Bench in regard to the impugned Guidelines framed in the year 2008 is only tentative/prima facie. It is noteworthy that the Division Bench has not passed any order granting any relief in the Writ Petitions considered by it in the Referring Order. 57. Reference to a Larger Bench may be made by a Division Bench in different situations. Thus, the Division Bench may be faced with two or more conflicting views on a question of law under consideration. In such a situation, the Division Bench may express its opinion on the question under consideration and refer the same to a Larger Bench so as to resolve the conflict of opinion on the question under consideration. 58. Again, there may be Division Bench decision on a question of law arising in a subsequent case before Division Bench. In case the Division Bench dealing with the subsequent case differs from the view taken by the earlier Bench on the question of law under consideration, it may make a reference to a Larger Bench. While making such reference, the Division Bench dealing with the subsequent case, will give its reasons for taking a different view on the question of law under consideration. This will enable the Larger Bench to know the precise nature of controversy and the reasons weighing with the Division Bench dealing with the subsequent case for taking a different view on the question of law than that taken by the earlier Division Bench. 59. Therefore, no objection can be taken on the ground that the Division Bench in making reference has given its reasons for its tentative opinion in regard to the validity of the impugned Guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2008. 60. As the two of us constituting the Division Bench, which made the reference, have expressed/recorded only tentative/prima facie opinion/conclusion, no objection can be taken to the composition of the present Full Bench. 60. As the two of us constituting the Division Bench, which made the reference, have expressed/recorded only tentative/prima facie opinion/conclusion, no objection can be taken to the composition of the present Full Bench. For the same reason, the suggestion of Shri Chandrashekhar that the Full Bench should be constituted by at least five Judges, cannot be accepted. 61. It is also noteworthy that in case the referring Judges sit in the Full Bench, the same avoids de-novo hearing of the entire matter before the Full Bench, and facilitates expeditious disposal of the matter by the Full Bench. 62. As regards the Rules of the Court, 1952, Chapter V of the said Rules deals with ‘Jurisdiction of Judges sitting alone or in Division Courts’. 63. Rule 1 of Chapter V of the Rules of the Court deals with ‘Constitution of Benches’ and provides as follows: “1. Constitution of Benches.—Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts as may be constituted from time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions.” 64. Thus, the constitution of Benches and allotment of work to such Benches is to be done by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions. 65. Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court deals with ‘Reference to a Larger Bench’, and provides as under : “6. Reference to a Larger Bench.—The Chief Justice may constitute a Bench of two or more Judges to decide a case or any question of law formulated by a Bench hearing a case. In the latter event the decision of such Bench on the question so formulated shall be returned to the Bench hearing the case and that Bench shall follow that decision on such question and dispose of the case after deciding the remaining questions, if any, arising therein.” 66. Rule 6, thus, provides that the Chief Justice may constitute a Bench of two or more Judges to decide a case or any question of law formulated by a Bench hearing a case. Rule 6, thus, provides that the Chief Justice may constitute a Bench of two or more Judges to decide a case or any question of law formulated by a Bench hearing a case. In case a Bench of two or more Judges has been constituted by the Chief Justice for deciding any question of law formulated by a Bench hearing the case, then the decision of such Bench on the question so formulated shall be returned to the Bench hearing the case and that Bench shall follow that decision on such question and dispose of the case after deciding the remaining questions, if any, arising therein. 67. There is, thus, no prohibition in Rule 6 of Chapter V of the Rules of the Court that Judges constituting the Bench, which formulated any question of law, cannot sit in the Bench constituted by the Chief Justice for deciding such question of law. The submission made by Shri Chandrashekhar, cannot, in our opinion, be accepted. 68. Rule 13 of Chapter V of the Rules of the Court, relied upon by Shri Chandrashekhar, lays down as follows : “13. Subsequent application on the same subject to be heard by the same Bench.- No application to the same effect or with the same object as a previous application upon which a Bench has passed any order other than an order of reference to another Judge or Judges, shall except by way of appeal, ordinarily be heard by any other Bench. The application when presented by or on behalf of the person by whom or on whose behalf such previous application was made shall give the necessary particulars of such previous application, the nature and the date of the order passed thereon and the name or names of the Judge or Judges by whom such order was passed.” 69. Rule 13, thus, provides that no application to the same effect or with the same object as a previous application upon which a Bench has passed any order shall ordinarily be heard by any other Bench. However, the said prohibition will not apply where a Bench has passed an order of reference to another Judge or Judges or where the matter is being heard in Appeal. 70. There is nothing in Rule 13 laying down that the Judges constituting the Bench making an order of reference cannot sit in the Bench hearing the reference. However, the said prohibition will not apply where a Bench has passed an order of reference to another Judge or Judges or where the matter is being heard in Appeal. 70. There is nothing in Rule 13 laying down that the Judges constituting the Bench making an order of reference cannot sit in the Bench hearing the reference. The submission made by Shri Chandrashekhar in this regard, cannot, in our view, be accepted. 71. Shri Chandrashekhar has relied upon the following two decisions of the Apex Court in support of his submissions : (1) Lala Shri Bhagwan and another v. Ram Chand and another, AIR 1965 SC 1767 . (2) Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others, (2008) 10 SCC 1 . 72. In Lala Shri Bhagwan case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered an Appeal by Special Leave against the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Allahabad High Court) in a Second Appeal arising out of the proceedings under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The question raised before the learned Single Judge of this Court in the Second Appeal was regarding the nature of the revisional power of the State Government under Section 7F of the said Act, namely, as to whether the said power was quasi-judicial in nature or was purely administrative in nature. The said question had earlier been considered by Division Benches of this Court and the consensus of the judicial opinion was in favour of the view that the revisional order which the State Government was authorized to pass under Section 7F, was not a quasi-judicial order but was a purely administrative order, and so, it was not necessary for the State Government to hear the parties before exercising its jurisdiction under the said Section. 73. 73. The learned Single Judge relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly the decision in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 436 , came to the conclusion that in exercising its authority under Section 7F of the said Act, the State Government was required to decide the matter in revision in a quasi-judicial manner, and it was absolutely essential that the principles of natural justice should have been followed by the State Government before reaching its decision and an opportunity should have been given by it to the parties to place their respective cases before it. In the result, the learned Single Judge allowed the Second Appeal and directed for dismissal of the Suit. 74. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court,and disagreed with the view taken by the earlier Division Benches of this Court. However, their Lordships observed as under (paragraph 18 of the said AIR) : “18. Before we part with this appeal, however, we ought to point out that it would have been appropriate if the learned single Judge had not taken upon himself to consider the question as to whether the earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court needed to be re-considered and revised. It is plain that the said decisions had not been directly or even by necessary implication overruled by any decision of this Court, indeed, the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge shows that he was persuaded to re-examine the matter himself and in fact he had substantially recorded his conclusion that the earlier decisions were erroneous even before his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar’s case (1964) 1 SCR 200 : AIR 1964 SC 436 (supra). It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself.” 75. This decision, thus, lays down that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a Larger Bench to examine the question. 76. The above decision is not applicable to the present case. It will be noticed that in the above case the learned Single Judge of this Court despite the decisions of earlier Division Benches taking a contrary view, decided the Second Appeal on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court and took a view contrary to the view of the earlier Division Benches of this Court. In the circumstances, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the proper course for the learned Single Judge of this Court was to refer the matter to a Larger Bench. 77. In the present case, the Division Bench keeping in view the decisions of the earlier Division Benches has not decided the writ petitions finally but has referred the matter to a Larger Bench after formulating the question of law. The Division Bench has thus acted in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case. 78. In Official Liquidator case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under (paragraph 90 of the said SCC) : “90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the Courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed.” 79. Thus, in the above decision their Lordships of the Supreme Court have disapproved the practice of the learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refusing to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. 80. The above decision is not applicable to the present case. In the present case the Division Bench has not finally decided the writ petitions by refusing to follow the decisions of the earlier Division Benches by citing any difference in the facts or by relying upon any other principle, but has referred the matter to a Larger Bench keeping in view the principles of judicial discipline. 81. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the objection raised by Shri Chandrashekhar in regard to the composition of the Full Bench, cannot be accepted. POINT NO. (II) : Consideration of the question referred to the Full Bench and other allied questions. 82. 81. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the objection raised by Shri Chandrashekhar in regard to the composition of the Full Bench, cannot be accepted. POINT NO. (II) : Consideration of the question referred to the Full Bench and other allied questions. 82. The question referred to the Full Bench, as noted earlier, is as under : “Whether in view of the provisions of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983, particularly, Regulations 3 and 6 thereof, the Guide-lines framed by the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission in the year 2008 in regard to the selection pursuant to Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, wherein “teaching experience” has been provided as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates to be called for interview for the post of teachers/lecturers are valid ?” 83. In order to answer the above question, it is necessary to discuss the STATUTORY PROVISIONS, reproduced above, and also certain factual aspects. 84. In exercise of power conferred under sub-section (6) of Section 50 of the State Universities Act, the State Government has issued a Government Order dated 12-7-2006 (Annexure CA-4 to the Counter Affidavit on behalf of the Commission in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009) requiring amendment in the Statutes of various Universities in regard to minimum qualifications as per the provisions of the said Government Order. As per the said Government Order, and the consequent amendments in the Statutes referred to in Section 50 of the State Universities Act, the minimum qualifications for appointment on the post of lecturer are consistently good academic record plus Post Graduation with minimum 55% marks or its equivalent with B Grade plus National Eligibility Test (NET). Therefore, there is no requirement of “experience” in the minimum qualifications for appointment on the post of lecturer. 85. Under Section 11 (a) of the Services Commission Act, the Commission has power to prepare guide-lines on matter relating to the method of recruitment of teachers in Colleges. Therefore, the power to frame guide-lines is there with the Commission. 86. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Services Commission Act lays down that the manner of selection of persons for appointment to the posts of teachers in a College shall be such, as may be determined by regulations. 87. Therefore, the power to frame guide-lines is there with the Commission. 86. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Services Commission Act lays down that the manner of selection of persons for appointment to the posts of teachers in a College shall be such, as may be determined by regulations. 87. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Services Commission Act gives power to the Commission to make regulations with the previous approval of the State Government. Accordingly, the Commission may make regulations prescribing fees for holding selections, conducting examinations where necessary, holding interviews and laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under the Services Commission Act. 88. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 lays down that the Regulations made under sub-section (1) shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Services Commission Act or the Rules made under Section 32 of the said Act. 89. Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations lays down that the minimum qualifications for appointment of a teacher shall be as given in the Statutes referred to in Section 50 of the State Universities Act. 90. Therefore, the above minimum qualifications, as laid down in the said Government Order dated 12-7-2006 and the consequent amendment in the Statutes, will be the minimum qualifications for appointment of a teacher. Accordingly, the minimum qualifications for appointment on the post of teacher/lecturer are consistently good academic record plus Post Graduation with 55 per cent marks or its equivalent with B Grade plus National Eligibility Test (NET). There is no requirement of experience in the minimum qualifications for appointment on the post of teacher/lecturer. 91. Under the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, the Commission has power of short- listing the number of candidates to be called for interview by holding preliminary screening or holding competitive examination in the case of the post of a teacher [clause (i) of the said proviso], or by holding preliminary screening in the case of the post of Principal [clause (ii) of the said proviso]. 92. Such preliminary screening under clause (i) of the said Proviso in respect of the post of a teacher is to be done “on the basis of academic record”. 92. Such preliminary screening under clause (i) of the said Proviso in respect of the post of a teacher is to be done “on the basis of academic record”. Preliminary screening under clause (ii) of the said Proviso in respect of the post of Principal is to be done “on the basis of academic record, teaching the administrative experience”. 93. The Commission has framed its guide-lines for holding preliminary screening for short-listing the number of candidates to be called for interview. Copy of the said guide-lines has been filed as Annexure CA-3 to the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Commission in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009. 94. A perusal of the said guide-lines shows that these contemplate award of Screening Index Marks for preliminary screening. Total 50 Screening Index Marks have been allocated as under : Sl. No. Particulars Maximum Screening Index Marks 1. For graduate Degree 10 2. For Post-Graduate Degree 30 3. For NET/SLATE/M Phil. (01 Screening Index 05 Mark), PH.D. (02 Screening Index Marks), JRF (03 Screening Index Marks), Gold Medal/Chancellor Medal (01 Screening Index Mark) 4. Experience 05 R.A./P.D.F. Working in Research Projects financially maintained by U.G.C./C.S.A.R./ I.C.A.R. (05 Screening Index Marks). Regularly selected teacher working in the Lecturer’s pay-scale in Degree Colleges on grant-in-aid, or J.R.F. and S.R.F. teaching in the Universities and Associated Degree Colleges - 01 Screening Index Mark for each year’s experience subject to maximum of 05 Screening Index Marks. Total 50 95. We may briefly refer to certain aspects of screening and shortlisting. 96. When the number of applicants as compared to the number of posts is very large, the practice of screening and short-listing is adopted so as to limit the number of candidates to be called for interview. 97. The object is to hold intensive interview of limited number of candidates, rather than holding casual interview of large number of candidates. This enables the Selection Body to make proper selection. 98. Two methods are generally adopted for screening and short-listing : (A) By holding competitive examination and then calling candidates for interview on the basis of merit in such competitive examination. (B) By screening the applications on the basis of certain procedure and criteria thereby limiting the number of candidates to be called for interview. 99. 98. Two methods are generally adopted for screening and short-listing : (A) By holding competitive examination and then calling candidates for interview on the basis of merit in such competitive examination. (B) By screening the applications on the basis of certain procedure and criteria thereby limiting the number of candidates to be called for interview. 99. In the present case, clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 contemplates both the above methods. However, the Commission has adopted method (B). 100. We may refer to legal position in regard to method (B), as emerges from various judicial decisions. 101. In The Government of A.P. v. P. Dilip Kumar and another, JT 1993 (2) SC 138 : (1993) 2 SCC 310 , the following propositions have been laid down (paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the said JT) : (i) Screening a candidate out of consideration at the threshold of the process of selection is neither illegal nor unconstitutional if a legitimate field demarcating the choice by reference to some rationale formula is carved out. (ii) There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the employer preferring a candidate with higher qualification for service. It is well settled that classification on the basis of higher educational qualification to achieve higher administrative efficiency is permissible under our constitutional scheme. (iii) It is always open to the recruiting agency to prescribe a minimum eligibility qualification with a view to demarcating and narrowing down the field of choice with the ultimate objective of permitting candidates with higher qualifications to enter the zone of consideration. 102. This may be done by restricting the field of choice on the basis of merit in regard to minimum qualifications. Thus, for example, the field of choice may be restricted by calling for interview the first class graduates only, and not calling for interview a second class or third class graduate. 103. Another method for narrowing the zone of consideration may be by holding a qualifying test, and calling for interview the candidates who succeed in such test. 104. Thus, for example, the field of choice may be restricted by calling for interview the first class graduates only, and not calling for interview a second class or third class graduate. 103. Another method for narrowing the zone of consideration may be by holding a qualifying test, and calling for interview the candidates who succeed in such test. 104. In M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar and another, AIR 1995 SC 77 , the following propositions have been laid down (paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of the said AIR) : (i) Whenever applications are invited for recruitment to the different posts, certain basic qualifications and criteria are fixed and the applicants must possess those basic qualifications and criteria before their applications can be entertained for consideration. (ii) (a) Where the selection is to be made only on basis of interview and the number of applicants as compared to the number of posts available is large, it would be impossible to carry out a satisfactory interview if large number of candidates are interviewed each day till all the applicants who had been found to be eligible on basis of the criteria and qualifications prescribed are interviewed. Therefore, in order to fix the limit of the applicants to be called for interview, the Commission or the Selection Board can adopt a rational procedure and a rational and objective basis so that personality and merit of the persons who are called for interview are properly assessed and evaluated. (b) The decision regarding short-listing is only to aid and help the process of selection of the best candidates among the applicants for the post in question. This process of short-listing does not amount to altering or substituting the eligibility criteria given in statutory rules or prospectus. This process of short-listing is part of process of selection. Once the applications are received and the Selection Board or the Commission applies its mind to evolve any rational and reasonable basis, on which the list of applicants should be short-listed, the process of selection commences. This process of short-listing is part of process of selection. Once the applications are received and the Selection Board or the Commission applies its mind to evolve any rational and reasonable basis, on which the list of applicants should be short-listed, the process of selection commences. (c) Where as per the requirement of Section 8 (3) (c) of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960, an applicant with five years of experience as an Advocate was eligible for the post of Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, and the Commission having regard to the large number of applicants, took a decision to call for interview only those who had completed seven and half years of practice, then such decision was neither violative of nor in conflict with the requirement of Section 8 (3) (c) of the Act. There was no fault in this process of short-listing by providing for a longer period of practice as the applicants having longer period of practice would be presumed to have better experience. (d) The Commission cannot ignore a statutory requirement for filling up a particular post and cannot opt a criterion whereby candidates fulfilling the statutory requirements are eliminated from being even called for interview. (e) As the eligibility for making an application for the post in question, as per Section 8 (3) (c) of the Act, was on the basis of “experience”, the adoption of a longer “experience” as a criterion for short-listing did not amount to altering or changing of the statutory criterion. 105. In State of Punjab and others v. Manjit Singh and others, (2003) 11 SCC 559 , it has been laid down (paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the said SCC) that the Punjab Public Service Commission has power of short-listing by screening out candidates. However, the Commission cannot lay down cut-off marks so as to exclude the candidates fulfilling the minimum qualifications as per the relevant Rules from being called for interview. This is not short-listing. This amounts to altering the minimum qualifications as laid down in the relevant Rules, and the Commission has no such power. 106. However, the Commission cannot lay down cut-off marks so as to exclude the candidates fulfilling the minimum qualifications as per the relevant Rules from being called for interview. This is not short-listing. This amounts to altering the minimum qualifications as laid down in the relevant Rules, and the Commission has no such power. 106. But it is open to the Commission to prepare a merit list of the candidates who fulfil the minimum qualifications as per the relevant Rules, and call the requisite number of candidates for interview in order of merit on the basis of such list from Serial No. 1 upto the number of candidates required. This method of short-listing is permissible. 107. In Inder Prakash Gupta v. State of J. & K. and others, (2004)6 SCC 786 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraph 28 of the said SCC): “28. The Jammu & Kashmir Medical Education (Gazetted) Services Recruitment Rules, 1979 admittedly were issued under Section 124 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution which is in pari materia with Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The said Rules are statutory in nature. The Public Service Commission is a body created under the Constitution. Each State constitutes its own Public Service Commission to meet the constitutional requirement for the purpose of discharging its duties under the Constitution. Appointment to service in a State must be in consonance with the constitutional provisions and in conformity with the autonomy and freedom of executive action. Section 133 of the Constitution imposes duty upon the State to conduct examination for appointment to the services of the State. The Public Service Commission is also required to be consulted on the matters enumerated under Section 133. While going through the selection process the Commission, however, must scrupulously follow the Statutory Rules operating in the field. It may be that for certain purposes, for example, for the purpose of short-listing, it can lay down its own procedure. The Commission, however, must lay down the procedure strictly in consonance with the Statutory Rules. It cannot take any action which per se would be violative of the Statutory Rules or make the same inoperative for all intent and purport. Even for the purpose of short-listing, the Commission cannot fix any kind of cut-off marks. The Commission, however, must lay down the procedure strictly in consonance with the Statutory Rules. It cannot take any action which per se would be violative of the Statutory Rules or make the same inoperative for all intent and purport. Even for the purpose of short-listing, the Commission cannot fix any kind of cut-off marks. [See State of Punjab v. Manjit Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 559 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 73].” (Emphasis supplied) 108. This decision thus lays down that while going through the selection process the J.&K. Public Service Commission must scrupulously follow the statutory rules operating in the field. It may be that for certain purposes, for example, for the purpose of short-listing, it can lay down its own procedure. The Commission, however, must lay down the procedure strictly in consonance with the statutory rules. It cannot take any action which per se would be violative of the statutory rules or make the same inoperative for all intent and purport. Even for the purpose of short-listing, the Commission cannot fix any kind of cut-off marks. 109. In B. Ramakichenin alias Balagandhi v. Union of India and others, (2008) 1 SCC 362 , the Union Public Service Commission issued an Advertisement dated 23-5-1998 for the post of Deputy Director (Agriculture) in the Agriculture Department, Government of Pondicherry. In paragraph 3.1 of the said Advertisement, the method of short-listing was given as follows :”The Commission may restrict the number of candidates on the basis of either qualifications and experience higher than the minimum prescribed in the Advertisement or on the basis of the experience higher than the minimum prescribed in the Advertisement or on the basis of experience in the relevant field.” 110. The Union Public Service Commission resorted to short-listing by laying down the criteria : “Only those who have two years’ experience after getting M. Sc. Degree will be considered, while those who have got such experience but only before getting M. Sc. Degree will not be called for the interview”. This criteria for short-listing was an objective and rational criteria. But the criteria was not in consonance with the Advertisement as the Advertisement did not mention that the two years’ experience must be after getting M.Sc. Degree in Agriculture, but the criteria laid down by the Union Public Service Commission specifically mentioned that experience must be after getting the Post Graduate Degree. Experience after getting M. Sc. But the criteria was not in consonance with the Advertisement as the Advertisement did not mention that the two years’ experience must be after getting M.Sc. Degree in Agriculture, but the criteria laid down by the Union Public Service Commission specifically mentioned that experience must be after getting the Post Graduate Degree. Experience after getting M. Sc. Degree could not be said to be higher than the experience before getting M. Sc. Degree. 111. It was held by the Supreme Court that as a particular method of short-listing was prescribed in Paragraph 3.1, it was not open to the Union Public Service Commission to resort to any other method of short-listing even if such other method could be said to be fair and objective. 112. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 23 of the said SCC) : “15. It is well settled that the method of short-listing can be validly adopted by the selection body vide M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar, (1994) 6 SCC 293 (vide paragraphs 6, 8, 9 and 13) and Government of A.P. v. P. Dilip Kumar, (1993) 2 SCC 310 . 16. Even if there is no rule providing for short-listing nor any mention of it in the advertisement calling for applications for the post, the selection body can resort to a short-listing procedure if there are a large number of eligible candidates who apply and it is not possible for the authority to interview all of them. For example, if for one or two posts there are more than 1000 applications received from eligible candidates, it may not be possible to interview all of them. In this situation, the procedure of short-listing can be resorted to by the selection body, even though there is no mention of short-listing in the rules or in the advertisement. 17. However, for valid short-listing there have to be two requirements— (i) it has to be on some rational and objective basis. For instance, if selection has to be done on some post for which the minimum essential requirement is a B.Sc. Degree, and if there are a large number of eligible applicants, the selection body can resort to short-listing by prescribing certain minimum marks in B.Sc. and only those who have got such marks may be called for the interview. For instance, if selection has to be done on some post for which the minimum essential requirement is a B.Sc. Degree, and if there are a large number of eligible applicants, the selection body can resort to short-listing by prescribing certain minimum marks in B.Sc. and only those who have got such marks may be called for the interview. This can be done even if the rule or advertisement does not mention that only those who have the aforementioned minimum marks, will be considered or appointed on the post. Thus the procedure of short-listing is only a practical via media which has been followed by the Courts in various decisions since otherwise there may be great difficulty for the selecting and appointing authority as they may not be able to interview hundreds and thousands of eligible candidates ; (ii) if a prescribed method of short-listing has been mentioned in the rule or advertisement then that method alone has to be followed. 18. In the present case, no doubt, U.P.S.C. had resorted to an objective and rational criteria that only those who have two years’ experience after getting M.Sc. Degree will be considered, while those who have got such experience but only before getting M.Sc. Degree will not be called for the interview. Ordinarily we should not have taken exception to this procedure since it is based on an objective criteria, and ordinarily this Court does not interfere with administrative decisions vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 : AIR 1996 SC 11 . As observed in the said decision, the modern approach is for Courts to observe restraint in administrative matters. 19. Hence, if the method of short-listing had not been prescribed by U.P.S.C. or in a statutory rule, it is possible that the argument of learned counsel for the respondents may have been accepted and we may not have interfered with the method of short-listing adopted by U.P.S.C. since it appears to be based on a rational and objective criteria. 20. However, in this case we have noticed that in Para 3.1 of the advertisement of U.P.S.C. dated 23-5-1998, the method of short-listing has been given. Hence U.P.S.C. cannot resort to any other method of short-listing other than that which has been prescribed in Para 3.1. 20. However, in this case we have noticed that in Para 3.1 of the advertisement of U.P.S.C. dated 23-5-1998, the method of short-listing has been given. Hence U.P.S.C. cannot resort to any other method of short-listing other than that which has been prescribed in Para 3.1. In the said paragraph of the advertisement, it is mentioned that the Commission may restrict the number of candidates on the basis of either qualifications and experience higher than the minimum prescribed in the advertisement or on the basis of the experience higher than the minimum prescribed in the advertisement or on the basis of experience in the relevant field. In other words, it was open to U.P.S.C. to do short-listing by stating that it will call only those who have Ph.D. Degree in Agriculture (although the essential degree was only M.Sc. Degree in Agriculture). Similarly, U.P.S.C. could have said that it would only call for interview those candidates who have, say, five years’ experience, although the essential requirement was only two years’ experience. However, experience after getting M.Sc. Degree cannot be said to be higher than the experience before getting M.Sc. Degree. Also, the advertisement dated 23-5-1998 does not mention that two years’ experience must be after getting M.Sc. Degree. 23. Had Para 3.1 not been in the advertisement of U.P.S.C. it is possible that we may have taken a view in favour of the respondents since in that case it was open to U.P.S.C. to resort to any rational method of short-listing of its choosing (provided it was fair and objective). However, in the present case, a particular manner of short-listing has been prescribed in Para 3.1. Hence, it is not open to U.P.S.C. to resort to any other method of short-listing even if such other method can be said to be fair and objective.” (Emphasis supplied) 113. The following propositions, amongst others, have been laid down in the above decision : (i) Even if there is no rule providing for short-listing nor any mention of it in the advertisement calling for applications for the post, the Selection Body can resort to a short-listing procedure if there are a large number of eligible candidates who apply and it is not possible for the authority to interview all of them. (ii) For valid short-listing there have to be two requirements— (a) It has to be on some rational and objective basis ; (b) If a prescribed method of short-listing has been mentioned in the rule or advertisement then that method alone has to be followed. In such a case, it is not open to the Selection Body to resort to any other method of short-listing even if such other method can be said to be fair and objective. 114. We may summarize the principles in regard to the question of screening and short-listing the applicants by laying down the procedure and the criteria in order to restrict the number of candidates to be called for interview : (1)(a) Even if it is not provided for in the Rules/Advertisement etc., the Selection Body may resort to screening and short-listing in order to restrict the number of candidates to be called for interview. (b) For this purpose, the Selection Body may lay down the procedure and the criteria. (c) The procedure and the criteria for screening and short-listing must be rational and reasonable. (d) In case, the relevant rules prescribe minimum qualifications for recruitment, the criteria for short-listing must be based on such minimum qualifications. Thus, if minimum qualifications contemplate “academic qualification”, the criteria may prescribe higher academic qualifications for short-listing. Similarly, if minimum qualifications contemplate “experience” then the criteria may provide for higher experience for short-listing. (e) “Experience” is an objective, reasonable and rational criterion. But if minimum qualifications do not require “experience” then this may not be a criterion for screening and short-listing. (f) The candidates who fulfil the minimum qualifications, cannot be excluded at the threshold by changing the minimum qualifications or providing for cut-off marks. However, it is open to the Selection Body to provide certain marks for higher qualifications - i.e., for higher academic qualifications where minimum qualifications provide for academic qualifications, or for higher experience where minimum qualifications provide for experience. It is also open to the Selection Body to prepare a merit list on the basis of minimum qualifications, and then call requisite number of candidates for interview on the basis of such merit list. 115. In short, the minimum qualifications cannot be changed by the Selection Body so as to exclude the candidates fulfilling such minimum qualifications. It is also open to the Selection Body to prepare a merit list on the basis of minimum qualifications, and then call requisite number of candidates for interview on the basis of such merit list. 115. In short, the minimum qualifications cannot be changed by the Selection Body so as to exclude the candidates fulfilling such minimum qualifications. However, for screening and short-listing, the Selection Body may provide marks for higher qualifications, or may prepare merit list on the basis of such minimum qualifications and call requisite number of candidates for interview on the basis of such merit list. 2. If the Rules/Advertisement provide for screening and short-listing, and lay down the procedure and the criteria in this regard, then such procedure and criteria must be strictly adhered to for screening and short-listing. No deviation is permissible from such procedure or criteria. 116. However, if the procedure and/or the criteria, as laid down in the Rules/Advertisement, are in general terms then the Selection Body may lay down the details of such procedure and/or criteria keeping in view the above-noted Principles No. (1)(b) to (f), provided such details do not in any manner deviate from the basic procedure or criteria as laid down in the Rules/Advertisement. 117. Keeping in view the above Principles under Category (1) and Category (2), let us consider the present case. 118. The present case falls under Category (2), as Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations provides the procedure as well as the criteria for screening and short-listing. 119. Clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations provides for short-listing the number of candidates to be called for interview by holding preliminary screening or holding competitive examination in the case of the post of a teacher/lecturer. In the present case, no competitive examination has been held. Instead, short-listing has been done by preliminary screening. 120. Such preliminary screening in the case of the post of a teacher/lecturer is to be done “on the basis of academic record”, as per clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 121. Hence, the criterion for preliminary screening and short-listing the number of candidates to be called for interview in the case of the post of a teacher/lecturer, as per the Teachers Selection Regulations, is “academic record”. 121. Hence, the criterion for preliminary screening and short-listing the number of candidates to be called for interview in the case of the post of a teacher/lecturer, as per the Teachers Selection Regulations, is “academic record”. However, the said Regulations do not lay down as to what factors are to be included in the “academic record” of a candidate. 122. It is true that Regulation 3 of the Teachers Selection Regulations provides that the “minimum qualifications” for appointment of a teacher shall be as given in the Statutes of the Universities. But the words “academic record” are wider in scope than the words “minimum qualifications” because “academic record” may include academic achievements beyond the minimum qualifications. 123. As the criterion “academic record” for preliminary screening and short-listing the number of candidates to be called for interview in the case of the post of a teacher/lecturer, as per the Teachers Selection Regulations, is in general terms, the Commission has framed Guide-lines in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act laying down various factors to be included in the “academic record” and allocating Screening Index Marks for such factors. 124. Such factors, as noted earlier, are as follows : (i) Graduate Degree. (ii) Post-Graduate Degree. (iii) NET/SLATE/M.Phil., Ph.D., J.R.F., Gold Medal/Chancellor Medal. (iv) Experience • R.A./P.D.F. working in Research Projects financially maintained by U.G.C./C.S.A.R./I.C.A.R. • Regularly selected teacher working in the Lecturer’s Pay-scale in Degree Colleges on grant-in-aid, or J.R.F. and S.R.F. teaching in the Universities and Associated Degree Colleges. 125. So far as factors (i), (ii) and (iii) above, are concerned, there can be no dispute that these are part of “academic record”. In fact, factors (i), (ii) and NET in (iii) are also part of minimum qualifications for appointment on the post of lecturer. 126. However, the difficulty arises in taking into account “teaching experience”, mentioned in factor (iv) above, and allocating Screening Index Marks (maximum 5) for such “teaching experience”. Normally, keeping in view the Principles mentioned above, “teaching experience” would be regarded as an objective, reasonable and rational factor/criterion for screening and short-listing. But in the present case, the criterion for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates for the post of teachers/lecturers, as laid down in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations is “academic record”. But in the present case, the criterion for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates for the post of teachers/lecturers, as laid down in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations is “academic record”. Question arises as to whether “teaching experience” can be said to be a part of “academic record.” 127. In our view, “academic record” and “teaching experience” are two distinct concepts. “Academic record” is a record of academic achievements of a person. On the basis of “academic record”, one enters the “teaching” profession, and gets “teaching experience”. Hence, “teaching experience” cannot be treated as a part of “academic record.” 128. This is also evident from the Hindi version of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, which uses the words “SHAIKSHIK ABHILEKH” (kSf{kd vfHkys[k) as equivalent of “academic record”. 129. In this regard we may refer to the meaning of the words “academic”, “academic qualification” and “record” as given in various Dictionaries. 130. Let us first refer to the Dictionary meaning of the word “academic” : (a) In Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged (Second Edition-Delux Color) on Page No. 9, one of the meanings of the word “academic” is as under : “academic, a. Of schools or colleges and their learning; scholastic; scholarly. (b) In Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) on Page No. 11, 0ne of the meanings given to the word “academic” is as under : “academic, adj. 1. Of or relating to a school or a field of study; esp.,of or relating to a field of study that is not vocational or commercial, such as the liberal arts................” (c) In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Volume-1 on Page No. 375, one of the meanings given to the word “academic” is as under: “ACADEMIC “Academic” means of or pertaining to an academy, college or university. Sisters of Mercy v. Town of Hooksett, 42 A.2d 222, 225, 93 N.H. 301.” (d) In Standard Dictionary Comprehensive International Edition on Page No. 8, one of the meanings given to the word “academic” is as under : “academic.adj1. Pertaining to an academy, college, or university; scholarly.” (e) In Advance Law Lexicon (3rd Edition 2005) on Page No. 34, one of the meanings given to the word “academic” is as under : “Academic. 1. Pertaining to an academy, college, or university; scholarly.” (e) In Advance Law Lexicon (3rd Edition 2005) on Page No. 34, one of the meanings given to the word “academic” is as under : “Academic. 1. Of or relating to a school or a field of study; especially of or relating to a field of study that is not vocational or commercial, such as the liberal arts (academic courses)” (f) In The Law Lexicon, The Encyclopedic Legal & Commercial Dictionary (Reprint 2002) on Page No. 18, one of the meanings given to the word “academic” is as under : “Academic. Pertaining to college, university, or preparatory school. Sisters of Mercy v. Town of Hook sett, 93N.H. 301, 42 A.2d 222, 225.” 131. Coming now to the words “academic qualification”, in Advance Lexicon (3rd Edition 2005) on Page No. 34, the meaning of the words “academic qualification” is as under : “Academic qualification. “That which makes a person eligible to do certain act or to hold office.” Mozley and Witeley’s Law Dictionary as cited in Basanti Gaur v. Regional Inspectress of Girls’ Schools VII Rejoin Gorakhpur, AIR 1987 All 191 , 194.” 132. Let us now refer to the meaning of the word “record” as given in various Dictionaries : (a) In Encyclopedic Law Lexicon (21st Century Unabridged) on Page No. 3994, one of the meanings given to the word “record” is as under : “Record.- A record undertakes amongst, other things, a formal writing of any fact or proceeding; (b) In Standard Dictionary Comprehensive International Edition on Page No. 1054, one of the meanings given to the word “record” is as under : “record, n.1. An account in written or other permanent form serving as a memorial or authentic evidence of a fact or event.” (c) In Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) on Page No. 1301, one of the meanings given to the word “record” is as under: “record, n.1. A documentary account of past events, usu. designed to memorialize those events.” 133. Reading the above Dictionary meanings of the words “academic” and “record”, it is evident as per the Dictionary meaning, the “academic record” is a documentary account of the facts and events pertaining to the field of study or an academy, college or university. A documentary account of past events, usu. designed to memorialize those events.” 133. Reading the above Dictionary meanings of the words “academic” and “record”, it is evident as per the Dictionary meaning, the “academic record” is a documentary account of the facts and events pertaining to the field of study or an academy, college or university. The Dictionary meaning of the words “academic qualification”, namely, “that which makes a person eligible to do certain act or to hold office” also shows that the words “academic record” have been used in the sense of the record of academic career/academic attainments/academic achievements of a person, and the same do not include “teaching experience”. 134. Again, a comparison of clause (i) and clause (ii) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations shows that the Regulations use the expressions “academic record” and “teaching experience” in distinct senses. 135. Clause (i) contemplates preliminary screening and short-listing on the basis of “academic record” in regard to the post of teachers/lecturers, while clause (ii) contemplates preliminary screening and short-listing on the basis of “academic record, teaching the administrative experience” [i.e.”SHAIKSHIK ABHILEKH, ADHYAPAN AUR PRASHASANIK ANUBHAV” (kSf{kd vfHkys[k, v/;kiu vkSj iz’kklfud vuqHko), as per the Hindi version of the Regulations]. 136. Thus, the Teachers Selection Regulations draw a clear distinction between “academic record” and “teaching experience”. Therefore, “teaching experience” cannot be treated as a part of “academic record” in the context of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the said Regulations. 137. Hence, “teaching experience” cannot be made a factor for preliminary screening and short-listing for the post of teachers/lecturers on the basis of “academic record”, as contemplated in clause (i) of the above proviso. 138. The impugned Guide-lines framed by the Commission for preliminary screening and short-listing for the post of teachers/lecturers, as noted above, provide for taking into account “teaching experience” as one of the factors and allocate Screening Index Marks for the same. This is evidently in conflict with the criterion “academic record” as provided in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 139. This is evidently in conflict with the criterion “academic record” as provided in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 139. In our view, the Guide-lines are framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act for supplementing the Regulations framed in exercise of power under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act so as to provide details where the Regulations are in general terms. Such Guide-lines cannot be inconsistent with, that is, cannot run counter to or come in conflict with the Regulations. If the Guide-lines are inconsistent with, i.e., run counter to and are in conflict with the Regulations then such Guide-lines are invalid to the extent of inconsistency. 140. Therefore, the impugned Guide-lines in-so-far as these provide for taking into account “teaching experience” as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing for the post of teachers/lecturers and allocate Screening Index Marks for the same, are invalid being inconsistent with clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 141. The above conclusion is supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Inder Prakash Gupta v. State of J.&K. and others, (2004) 6 SCC 786 (supra) and in B. Ramakichenin alias Balagandhi v. Union of India and others, (2008) 1 SCC 362 (supra), which have been mentioned above. 142. There is yet another aspect of the matter. 143. Even if the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations were not there, the Commission was required to keep in view the provisions of Regulation 3 of the said Regulations read with the Statutes of the Universities in regard to the minimum qualifications for the post of teacher/lecturer. As noted earlier, the Statutes of the Universities provide only academic qualifications as minimum qualifications. Therefore,for preliminary screening and short-listing, the Commission may provide marks for higher academic qualifications. But as “teaching experience” is not a requirement of minimum qualifications, “teaching experience” cannot be provided as a factor to be considered for preliminary screening and short-listing. This follows from Principle No. (2) read with Principles No. (1)(d), (e) & (f),noted above. 144. Before closing discussion on this point, it is necessary to consider the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for various newly impleaded respondents. 145. This follows from Principle No. (2) read with Principles No. (1)(d), (e) & (f),noted above. 144. Before closing discussion on this point, it is necessary to consider the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for various newly impleaded respondents. 145. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondents submits that clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 does not lay down that the preliminary screening will be done only on the basis of “academic record”. In the absence of the word “only”, it is permissible for the Commission to rely upon “teaching experience” also for the purpose of preliminary screening. 146. We have considered the submissions made by Sri R.N. Singh, and we find ourselves unable accept the same. 147. While it is true that in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, the word “only” has not been used but a comparison of clause (i) with clause (ii) of the said proviso clearly shows that while clause (i) contemplates preliminary screening on the basis of “academic record” in regard to the post of lectures/teachers, clause (ii) contemplates preliminary screening on the basis of “academic record” and “teaching and administrative experience” in regard to the post of the Principal. 148. Thus, while clause (ii) of the said proviso contemplates taking into consideration “teaching and administrative experience” besides “academic record” for preliminary screening in regard to the post of the Principal, clause (i) does not refer to “teaching and administrative experience” for preliminary screening in respect of the post of teachers/lecturers but refers merely to “academic record”. Hence, it is evident that preliminary screening as contemplated in clause (i) of the said proviso is to be done only on the basis of “academic record”, and “teaching experience” is not to be taken into consideration for such preliminary screening. 149. In view of the explicit language of the two clauses of the said proviso, it was not necessary to use the word “only” in clause (i) of the said proviso as suggested by Sri R.N. Singh. 150. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondents has further referred to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the said respondents. 151. 150. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondents has further referred to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the said respondents. 151. Para 11 of the said counter-affidavit refers to an advertisement issued by Banaras Hindu University, and the guidelines framed by the said University for shortlisting of the applications. Copies of the advertisement and the guidelines have been filed as annexure CA-2 to the said counter-affidavit. Referring to the said guidelines for shortlisting applicants to be called for interview for teaching positions in the said University, it is submitted that besides “academic career”, 5 marks for “teaching experience” at the level of lecturer have been allocated for the applicants for the post of lecturer. 152. Sri R.N. Singh, has further referred to paragraph No. 12 of the said counter-affidavit wherein mention has been made regarding the guidelines framed by the other universities. Thus, the guidelines framed by the Gurunanak Dev University, Amritsar for shortlisting the highest ranking candidates (copy whereof has been filed as annexure CA-3 to the said counter-affidavit) allocate 10 marks for “teaching/post doctoral experience”. Similarly, in the guidelines framed by the Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra (copy whereof has been filed as annexure CA-4 to the said counter-affidavit), the criteria for shortlisting for the post of lecturers (Category 2) provide for taking into consideration “teaching experience”. 153. It is submitted by Sri R.N. Singh, that in view of the guidelines framed by various universities for shortlisting the applicants applying for the post of lecturers, it is evident that “teaching experience” can be provided for as a consideration for shortlisting. 154. It is submitted that every procedure is permissible unless it is forbidden by law. Reliance in this regard is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited Versus R. Srinivasan, 2000 (3) SCC 242 (paragraph No. 17) wherein it has been laid down that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. 155. We have considered the submissions made by Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel. 156. A perusal of the guidelines framed by Banaras Hindu University (Annexure CA-2 to the said counter-affidavit) shows that the said guidelines make a distinction between “academic career” and “teaching experience”, and provide for taking into consideration “teaching experience” besides “academic career”. 157. 155. We have considered the submissions made by Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel. 156. A perusal of the guidelines framed by Banaras Hindu University (Annexure CA-2 to the said counter-affidavit) shows that the said guidelines make a distinction between “academic career” and “teaching experience”, and provide for taking into consideration “teaching experience” besides “academic career”. 157. Similarly, the guidelines framed by Gurunanak Dev University (Annexure CA-3 to the said counter-affidavit) and the guidelines framed by Kurukshetra University,Kurukshetra (Annexure CA-4 to the said counter-affidavit) provide for taking into consideration “teaching experience” also for shortlisting the applicants for the post of lecturers. 158. The above guidelines only show that besides “academic record/academic career/academic attainments/academic achievements”, “teaching experience” may also be provided as a relevant factor for shortlisting the applicants for the post of lecturers. This will be possible only if making of such provisions for shortlisting does not violate any provision contained the relevant Rules, Regulations etc. governing the appointment for the post of lecturers. However, in the present case, as discussed above, the provision contained in the impugned guidelines for Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience” is contrary to the provisions contained in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, and this is not permissible. 159. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that reference to the guidelines for shortlisting being followed by other universities is not relevant in the present case. 160. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission as well as other learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondents have placed reliance on the following clause occurring in the First Statutes of certain universities : “Where a confirmed teacher of an affiliated college having at least five years teaching experience who fulfilled the qualifications prescribed in the Statutes or Ordinances of the University at the time of his initial appointment to the post of Lecturer in that college, is a candidate for the post of a Lecturer in any other affiliated college, or is after retrenchment from the college where he served, a candidate for the post of Lecturer in the same or any other affiliated college, the qualifications laid down in this Statute shall not be insisted upon in this respect.” 161. It is submitted that the above clause is contained in clause (7) of Statute 11.13 of the First Statutes of the Agra University, clause (7) of Statute 11.13 of the First Statutes of the University of Meerut, clause (7) of Statute 11.13 of the First Statutes of the University of Kanpur, clause (7) of Statute 11.13 of the First Statutes of the University of Kumaun, clause (7) of Statute 10.01 of the First Statutes of the University of Bundelkhand and clause (7) of Statute 11.13 of the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University. 162. It is submitted that the above-quoted clause shows that “teaching experience” has been treated at par with the minimum qualifications as laid down in the First Statutes in regard to a confirmed teacher of an affiliated college, who fulfilled the qualifications prescribed in the Statutes or Ordinances of the University at the time of his initial appointment to the post of Lecturer in that college. 163. Sri P.S. Baghel, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the above-quoted clause no longer exists in the First Statutes of various universities, as the same has been deleted. 164. Without going into the controversy as to whether the above-quoted clause is still contained in the First Statutes of various universities or not, we are of the opinion that the above-quoted clause merely shows that for a confirmed teacher of an affiliated college having at least 5 years teaching experience, who fulfilled the qualifications prescribed in the Statutes or Ordinances of the University at the time of his initial appointment to the post of Lecturer in that college, exemption has been granted from the qualifications laid down in the First Statutes in case he is a candidate for the post of lecturer in any other affiliated college, or is after retrenchment from the college where he served, a candidate for the post of lecturer in the same or any other affiliated college. The said provision has evidently been made for a particular category of teachers, and the same merely provides for exempting them from the qualifications laid down in the First Statutes of various universities provided they fulfilled other requirements mentioned in the said clause. 165. The said provision has evidently been made for a particular category of teachers, and the same merely provides for exempting them from the qualifications laid down in the First Statutes of various universities provided they fulfilled other requirements mentioned in the said clause. 165. In our opinion, the above-quoted clause maintains the distinction between “academic qualifications”/“academic record” and “teaching experience”, and the said clause does not show that “teaching experience” can be treated at par with or as a substitute for the “academic record”. 166. As noted above, clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations provides for preliminary screening on the basis of “academic record” while clause (ii) of the said proviso provides for preliminary screening on the basis of “academic record”, “teaching and administrative experience”. 167. As consideration of “teaching experience” has been excluded under clause (i) of the said proviso, the said requirement cannot be brought in by referring to certain provisions made in regard to a special category of teachers. 168. Sri Chandrashekhar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri R.C. Tiwari, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 13 and 19 to 122 submits that in view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Services Commission Act, it is evident that the Commission is required to select “most suitable” candidates and recommend their names for appointment. The entire procedure including the impugned guidelines, has been devised by the Commission in order to find out “most suitable” candidates. 169. Sri Chandrashekhar, has referred to Statute 10 of the U.P. State Universities First Statutes (Age of Superannuation, Scales of Pay and Qualifications of Teachers), 1975, since repealed by the First Statutes framed by various universities in the year 1977. The said Statute 10, interalia, laid down the minimum qualifications for the post of a lecturer in the Faculties of Arts, Commerce, Science and Social Science, namely— “(a) a consistently good academic record (that is to say, the over all record of all assessments throughout the academic career of a candidate) with first or high second class (that is to say, with an aggregate of more than 54 per cent marks) Master’s degree in the subject concerned or equivalent degree of a foreign University in such subject;” 170. Sri Chandrashekar submits that in view of the above provisions, the entire “academic career” of a candidate is to be considered as part of the minimum qualifications. This will include “teaching experience” obtained by such candidates also. 171. We have considered the submissions made by Sri Chandrashekhar, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 172. Besides the fact that the aforementioned Statutes of 1975 have since been repealed by the First Statutes framed by various universities in the year 1977, Statute 10 of the aforesaid Statutes of 1975 does not indicate that “teaching experience” is also to be considered as part of the minimum qualifications. In fact, the said Statute requires consideration of “academic record” only, and does not refer to consideration of “teaching experience”. 173. Again, the requirement mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Services Commission Act regarding selection of “most suitable” candidates is not in any way affected in case the Commission frames guidelines for preliminary screening and shortlisting as are consistent with the Teachers Selection Regulations framed by the Commission itself. In case, the Screening Index Marks are not given for “teaching experience” for preliminary screening at the threshold itself, this will not in any manner affect the search for “most suitable” candidates who would be selected on the basis of their performance in the interview. POINT No. (III) : Validity of the Teachers Selection Regulations, particularly, Regulation 6 thereof. 174. Shri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 3 to 8 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 submits that various provisions of the Teachers Selection Regulations, particularly, Regulation 6 thereof, are beyond the Regulation-making power of the Commission as conferred by Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. 175. Shri Khare submits that under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act, Commission has been given power to make Regulations for four purposes, namely, (a) prescribing fees for holding selections; (b) conducting examinations where necessary; (c) holding interviews; and (d) laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under this Act. It is submitted that Regulation 6 framed by the Commission making provision for preliminary screening and the basis therefor does not fall within the Regulation-making power of the Commission as conferred under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. Commission has power to frame Regulations in regard to interviews only, and it has no power to frame Regulations making provisions for preliminary screening, and the basis therefor. 176. The provision for screening can be made by the Commission by framing Guidelines in exercise of its power conferred under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act, which gives power to the Commission “to prepare Guidelines on matters relating to the method of recruitment of teachers in colleges”. The impugned Guidelines have been framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act, and the validity of the said Guidelines cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of the provisions of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations as the said Regulation itself is invalid. 177. Alternatively, Shri Khare submits that Regulation 6 is liable to be ignored as the same is contrary to the First Statutes framed by various Universities under the State Universities Act. He has referred to the provisions of Statute 11.13, clause (4) of First Statute of the University of Agra, 1977, which deals with the minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer in the Faculty of Fine Arts. He points out that under the said provision, ‘a traditional or a professional artist with highly commendable professional achievement in the subject concerned’ has been treated to be fulfilling the minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer in the Faculty of Fine Arts. It is submitted that even though such a person fulfils the minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer in the Faculty of Fine Arts as per the provisions of the First Statutes of the University of Agra, 1977, he will be screened out from consideration in view of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations as he would be not having any academic qualifications, and, therefore, he would not be able to satisfy the requirement of having ‘academic record’. 178. 178. Shri Khare further refers to Statute 11.13, clause (4) of the First Statutes of the University of Meerut, 1977, which deals with minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer in the Departments of Music, Drawing and Painting. It is pointed-out that under the said provision ‘a traditional or a professional artist with highly commendable professional achievement in the subject concerned’ has been treated to be fulfilling the minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer in the Departments of Music, Drawing and Painting. It is submitted that even though such a person fulfils the minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer in the Departments of Music, Drawing and Painting as per the provisions of the First Statutes of the University of Meerut, 1977, he will be screened out from consideration in view of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations as he would not be having any academic qualifications, and, therefore, he would not be able to satisfy the requirement of having ‘academic record’. 179. As regards the phrase ‘laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under this Act’ occurring in Section 31 of the Services Commission Act, Shri Khare submits that in exercise of the said power, the Commission has framed the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1983 (i.e., the Business Regulations), and the said phrase does not give power to the Commission to frame Regulations making provisions for preliminary screening and the basis therefor. 180. As regards the question as to whether the newly impleaded respondents are entitled to question the validity of the Teachers Selection Regulations, Shri Khare submits that it is open to the said respondents to contend that the said Regulations be ignored as the same are invalid. Shri Khare has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Bharathidasan University and another v. All-India Council for Technical Education and others, (2001) 8 SCC 676 (paragraph 14). 181. We have considered the submissions made by Shri Ashok Khare. 182. In Bharathidasan University case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraph 14 of the said SCC) : “14. 181. We have considered the submissions made by Shri Ashok Khare. 182. In Bharathidasan University case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraph 14 of the said SCC) : “14. The fact that the Regulations may have the force of law or when made have to be laid down before the legislature concerned does not confer any more sanctity or immunity as though they are statutory provisions themselves. Consequently, when the power to make regulations is confined to certain limits and made to flow in a well-defined canal within stipulated banks, those actually made or shown and found to be not made within its confines but outside them, the Courts are bound to ignore them when the question of their enforcement arises and the mere fact that there was no specific relief sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires, particularly when the party in sufferance is a respondent to the lis or proceedings cannot confer any further sanctity or authority and validity which it is shown and found to obviously and patently lack. It would, therefore, be a myth to state that Regulations made under Section 23 of the Act have “constitutional” and legal status, even unmindful of the fact that any one or more of them are found to be not consistent with specific provisions of the Act itself. Thus, the Regulations in question, which AICTE could not have made so as to bind universities/UGC within the confines of the powers conferred upon it, cannot be enforced against or bind a university in the matter of any necessity to seek prior approval to commence a new department or course and programme in technical education in any university or any of its departments and constituent institutions.” 183. The above decision, thus, shows that when the Regulations are sought to be enforced, and the party in sufferance is a respondent to the lis or proceedings, such respondent may submit that the Regulations be ignored as the same are beyond the power conferred for making Regulations. 184. Thus, Shri Khare is right in submitting that the newly impleaded respondents may submit that the Teachers Selection Regulations being invalid be ignored. However, the question arises as to whether Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, as submitted by Shri Khare, is invalid. 185. 184. Thus, Shri Khare is right in submitting that the newly impleaded respondents may submit that the Teachers Selection Regulations being invalid be ignored. However, the question arises as to whether Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, as submitted by Shri Khare, is invalid. 185. The first submission, as noted above, made by Shri Khare regarding validity of Regulation 6 is that the said Regulation is beyond the Regulation-making power conferred on the Commission under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. 186. It has further been submitted that the provision for preliminary screening can be made by the Commission by framing Guidelines in exercise of its power conferred under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act. 187. We have considered the submissions made by Shri Ashok Khare, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 188. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 gives power to the Commission to make Regulations (a) prescribing fees for holding selections, (b) conducting examinations where necessary, (c) holding interviews, and (d) laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under this Act. One of the main functions of the Commission is to make selection of Teachers for appointment to the Colleges affiliated to or recognized by a University. In view of the last phrase occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Services Commission Act, namely, “laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under this Act”, the Commission has power to frame Regulations laying down procedure for performing its main function, namely, selection of Teachers for appointment to the Colleges affiliated to or recognized by a University. In our view, while laying down such procedure by framing Regulations, the Commission may also make provision in such Regulations for preliminary screening. Thus, Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations is within the ambit of power to frame Regulations, as contemplated in the aforesaid last phrase occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. The submission made by Shri Khare, cannot, in our view, be accepted. 189. Thus, Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations is within the ambit of power to frame Regulations, as contemplated in the aforesaid last phrase occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. The submission made by Shri Khare, cannot, in our view, be accepted. 189. As regards the power to frame Guidelines under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act, we are of the opinion that the Guidelines are framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under the said provision for supplementing the Regulations framed in exercise of power under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act so as to provide details where the Regulations are in general terms. The power conferred under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act to frame Guidelines is not a power independent of the power of the Commission to frame Regulations in exercise of its power under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. The power to frame Guidelines conferred under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act to supplement the power of the Commission to frame Regulations in exercise of its power under Section 31 of the said Act. The suggestion made by Shri Khare that while the provision for preliminary screening can be made by the Commission in exercise of its power to frame Guidelines but the same cannot be made by the Commission in exercise of its power to frame Regulations, cannot, in our view, be accepted. 190. The matter may be considered from another angle also. 191. Section 11 of the Services Commission Act deals with the powers and duties of the Commission. One of the powers or functions given to the Commission is “to prepare Guidelines on matters relating to the method of recruitment of Teachers in Colleges”. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the said Act gives power to the Commission to make Regulations to lay down “the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under this Act.” 192. Reading the two provisions together, it is evident that the Commission may frame Regulations laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission in discharging its function of framing Guidelines under clause (a) of Section 11 of the said Act on matters relating to the method of recruitment of Teachers in Colleges. Reading the two provisions together, it is evident that the Commission may frame Regulations laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission in discharging its function of framing Guidelines under clause (a) of Section 11 of the said Act on matters relating to the method of recruitment of Teachers in Colleges. Hence, the Regulations may, interalia, provide for the manner of framing Guidelines and the contents of such Guidelines. Therefore, the requirements laid down in Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations are to be kept in mind by the Commission while framing Guidelines in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the said Act on the matters mentioned in the said clause. 193. There is yet another aspect of the matter. 194. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Services Commission Act,interalia, provides that “the manner of selection of persons for appointment to the posts of teachers of a college shall be such, as may be determined by Regulations”. In view of the said provision, it is evident that the Commission was within its powers while framing Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 195. Let us now come to the alternative submission made by Shri Khare, namely, that the provisions of Regulation 6 are in contravention of the First Statutes framed by various Universities under the State Universities Act. 196. Shri Khare has, particularly, referred to clause (4) of Statute 11.13 of the First Statutes of the University of Agra, 1977 pertaining to the post of Lecturer in the Faculty of Fine Arts and clause (4) of Statute 11.13 of the First Statutes of the University of Meerut, 1977 dealing with the post of Lecturer in the Departments of Music, Drawing and Painting. It is submitted that under the said Statutes ‘a traditional or a professional artist with highly commendable professional achievement in the subject concerned’ has been treated to be fulfilling the minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer in the aforementioned disciplines. However, such a person would stand excluded from consideration in view of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations as he would fail to fulfil the requirement of ‘academic record’ as he would not be having any academic qualifications. 197. We have considered the submission made by Shri Ashok Khare, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 197. We have considered the submission made by Shri Ashok Khare, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 198. The words “with highly commendable professional achievement in the subject concerned” evidently refer to the “academic record” of such a person in the field of Fine Arts/Music/Drawing/Painting. Therefore, it is not correct to suggest that persons belonging to the aforesaid category and applying for the post of Lecturer in the aforesaid disciplines would stand excluded in view of clause (i) of proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 199. Let us now come to the submissions made by Shri Shailendra, learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondent No. 11 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 in regard to the validity of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. 200. It is submitted that the same criteria should be adopted for the purposes of screening and for the purposes of interview, as otherwise there would be violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 201. In case “experience” is to be considered at the time of interview, it should also be considered at the time of screening as otherwise there would be violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He submits that while taking interview under sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations, the Commission may take into account the “experience” of the candidates. Therefore, the same criteria should be adopted at the time of preliminary screening as contemplated in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the said Regulations. 202. We have considered the submissions made by Shri Shailendra, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 203. Preliminary screening of the applicants at the threshold for short-listing is different from the elimination of a candidate after undergoing interview. In the latter case, the person faces interview and he is eliminated as a result of his performance in the interview while in the former case the person is screened out at the threshold itself. Therefore, it is not necessary that the criteria for the interview should also be adopted as the criteria for preliminary screening. The criteria for preliminary screening and the criteria for interview may be different but both should be reasonable. Therefore, it is not necessary that the criteria for the interview should also be adopted as the criteria for preliminary screening. The criteria for preliminary screening and the criteria for interview may be different but both should be reasonable. In our opinion, as there is difference between the preliminary screening and the interview, the adoption of different criteria for the preliminary screening and that for the interview does not do any violence to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. POINT No. (IV) : Permissibility of challenge to the guidelines by the petitioner (s). 204. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission submits that once the petitioners submitted their applications pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007 and took their chance, it was not open to the petitioners to challenge the validity of the impugned guidelines framed for consideration of such applications. 205. It is pointed out that in the application form there was a specific column requiring the applicant to submit details regarding “experience”. Further, clauses 29 and 30 of the Note/Instructions provided for submission of details regarding “experience” by the applicants. Clause 13 of the Note/Instructions, interalia, provided that the application would be considered on the basis of “academic achievements and experience”. 206. It is submitted that the petitioners thus having full knowledge that “experience” would be taken into account while considering their applications and having taken chance by submitting their applications, were not entitled to challenge the validity of the impugned guidelines when they were screened out in preliminary screening on the basis of the said guidelines. 207. We have considered the submissions made by Sri H.N. Singh, and we find ourselves unable accept the same. 208. Clause 13 of the Note/Instructions, relied upon by Sri H.N. Singh, provides as under : “vkosnu djus dh vafre frfFk rd izkIr kS{kf.kd miyfC/k;ka ,oa vuqHko ¼ftuds Li"V izek.k&i= vkosnu i= ds lkFk layXu gS½ ds vk/kkj ij gh vkosnu ij fopkj fd;k tk;sxkA vkosnu dh vafre frfFk ds mijkUr izkIr fdlh Hkh kSf{kd vgZrk iznk;h vFkok vuqHko laca/kh miyfC/k dks laKku esa ugha fy;k tk;sxkA” 209. Clauses 29 and 30 of the said Note/Instructions are as under : “29- lsokjr vH;FkhZ vius egkfo|ky; ds izkpk;Z rFkk izcU/kd }kjk fuxZr vFkok kklu@funs’kky; }kjk fuxZr fu;qfDr&i=,oa f’k{k.k vuqHko ls lacaf/kr izek.k&i= vo’; layXu djsa A 30- v/;kiu vuqHko ds fy, fu;qfDr dk Lo:i rFkk óksr] osrueku] dqy osru rFkk vofèk dk Li"V ,oa iw.kZ fooj.k l{ke vf/kdkjh ¼jftLVªkj@izkpk;Z@izca/kd½ }kjk izekf.kr djokdj layXu djsaA fjlpZ,lksf’k,V vius v/;kiu vuqHko dh vof/k dks dqylfpo ls gh lR;kfir djok;sa A ;fn vH;FkhZ LFkk;h izoDrk gS rks LFkk;hdj.k ls lcaf/kr leLr vfHkys[k ¼’kklu@funs’kky;@egkfo|ky; Lrj ds½ layXu djsaA” 210. Clauses 29 and 30 of the Note/Instructions, quoted above, merely require submission of the details and certificates regarding teaching experience. Clause 13, quoted above, interalia, states that the applications received till the last date of submission of the applications would be considered on the basis of “academic achievements and experience”. 211. None of the clauses, quoted above, gives any indication that the applicants would be screened out at the threshold itself by giving Screening Index Marks in regard to “experience”. There is no indication in any of the above-quoted clauses regarding the stage at which “experience” of the applicants would be considered. Nothing is there in the above-quoted clauses or in any of the other clauses of the Note/Instructions regarding the contents of the impugned guidelines. 212. Thus there is nothing to show that the petitioners while submitting their applications pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007 were aware that there would be Screening Index Marks in regard to “experience” or that they could be screened out at the threshold itself on account of lack of such “experience”. 213. Further, the occasion for the petitioners to challenge the impugned guidelines could arise only when they were screened out on account of their lack of experience and thus not getting any mark under the category of Screening Index Marks in regard to “experience”. This was the stage when they could be said to have been aggrieved by the impugned guidelines. Any challenge by them at a stage prior to their having been screened out would have been premature. 214. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the impugned guidelines on account of their having submitted applications pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. Any challenge by them at a stage prior to their having been screened out would have been premature. 214. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the impugned guidelines on account of their having submitted applications pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. POINT No. (V) : Permissibility of judicial review of the guidelines framed by the Commission. 215. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri G.K. Singh, learned counsel for the newly impleaded respondent Nos. 161 to 197 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 submits that the Commission consists of experts, and its decision in framing impugned guidelines allocating Screening Index Marks in regard to “experience” should not normally be interfered with by the Court unless any legal principle is involved in the matter. 216. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission submits that the impugned guidelines for screening and shortlisting wherein Screening Index Marks have been allocated in regard to “experience” have been framed by the Commission which consists of experts. Decision of such an expert body should not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. It is pointed out that “experience” is an objective criteria. Reliance in this regard has been placed by Sri H.N. Singh on the following decisions : (1) Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha and others v. Chancellor, Allahabad University and others, AIR 1980 SC 2141 (paras 10 & 17). (2) M/s. Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 S.C. 1277 (paras 56 & 57). (3) Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, 2004 (55) ALR 319 (SC)(para 3). (4) P.M. Bhargava and others v. University Grants Commission and another, (2004) 6 SCC 661 (para 13). (5) Bihar Public Service Commission and others v. Kamini and others, (2007) 5 SCC 519 (para 8). 217. We have considered the submissions made by Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission. 218. In Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraph Nos. 10 and 17 of the said AIR) : “10. We may dispel two mystiques before we debate the real issues. Did the Selection Committee act illegally in resorting to the interview process to pick out the best? We think not. 218. In Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraph Nos. 10 and 17 of the said AIR) : “10. We may dispel two mystiques before we debate the real issues. Did the Selection Committee act illegally in resorting to the interview process to pick out the best? We think not. Any administrative or quasi-judicial body clothed with powers and left unfettered by procedures is free to devise its own pragmatic, flexible and functionally viable processes of transacting business subject, of course, to the basics of natural justice, fair play in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous considerations and otherwise keeping within the leading strings of the law. We find no flaw in the methodology of ‘interviews’. Certainly, cases arise where the art of interviewing candidates deteriorates from strategy to strategem and undetectable manipulation of results is achieved by remote control tactics masked as viva voce tests. This, if allowed, is surely a sabotage of the purity of proceedings, a subterfuge whereby legal means to reach illegal ends is achieved. So it is that Courts insist, as the learned single Judge has, in this very case, suggested on recording of marks at interviews and other fair checks like guidelines for marks and remarks about candidates and the like. If the Court is skeptical, the record of the selection proceedings, including the notes regarding the interviews, may have to be made available. Interviews, as such, are not bad but polluting it to attain illegitimate ends is bad. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was right when he wrote [The Negro is your Brother by Martin Luther King Jr. published in “119 years of the Atlantic” ed. by Louise Desaulniers, p. 515.] : “So I have tried to make it clear that it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends. But now I must affirm that it is just as wrong, or even more, to use moral means to preserve immoral ends.” 17. Rulings of this Court were cited before us to hammer home the point that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of academicians when the dispute relates to educational affairs. While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that Courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. Rulings of this Court were cited before us to hammer home the point that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of academicians when the dispute relates to educational affairs. While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that Courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. But university organs,for that matter any authority in our system, is bound by the rule of law and cannot be a law unto itself. If the Chancellor or any other authority lesser in level decides an academic matter or an educational question, the Court keeps its hands off; but where a provision of law has to be read and understood, it is not fair to keep the Court out. In Govinda Rao’s case (1964) 4 SCR 575 at p.586: ( AIR 1965 SC 491 ) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) struck the right note : “What the High Court should have considered is whether the appointment made by the Chancellor had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance and in doing so; the High Court should have shown due regard to the opinions expressed by the Board and its recommendations on which the Chancellor has acted.” (Emphasis added) The later decisions cited before us proudly conform to the rule of caution sounded in Govinda Rao. But to respect an authority is not to worship it unquestioningly since the bhakti cult is inept in the critical field of law. In short, while dealing with legal affairs which have an impact on academic bodies, the views of educational experts are entitled to great consideration but not to exclusive wisdom. Moreover, the present case is so simple that profound doctrines about academic autonomy have no place here.” (Emphasis supplied) 219. This decision thus lays down that normally the Courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. However, where a provision of law has to be read and understood, the Courts may intervene. Similarly if there is contravention of any statutory or binding rule or ordinance, the Courts may intervene in the matter. In short, the Courts may intervene in order to keep the academic bodies within the leading strings of the law. 220. In M/s Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 1277 (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraph Nos. In short, the Courts may intervene in order to keep the academic bodies within the leading strings of the law. 220. In M/s Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 1277 (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraph Nos. 56 and 57 of the said AIR) : 56. The Court has neither the means nor the knowledge to re-evaluate the factual basis of the impugned orders. The Court, in exercise of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence. In the words of Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Company, (1940) 311 US 570-577 : 85 Law ed. 358, 362 : “Nothing in the Constitution warrants a rejection of these expert conclusions. Nor, on the basis of intrinsic skills and equipment, are the federal Courts qualified to set their independent judgment on such matters against that of the chosen state authorities......When we consider the limiting conditions of litigation-the adaptability of the judicial process only to issues definitely circumscribed and susceptible of being judged by the techniques and criteria within the special competence of lawyers-it is clear that the Due Process Clause does not require the feel of the expert to be supplanted by an independent view of judges on the conflicting testimony and prophecies and impressions of expert witnesses.” This observation is of even greater significance in the absence of a Due Process Clause. 57. Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either. The Court does not supplant the “feel of the expert” by its own views. When the legislature acts within the sphere of its authority and delegates power to an agent, it may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. In all such cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. As stated by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Gupta Sugar Works ( AIR 1987 SC 2351 at p. 2352) (supra) : “the Court does not act like a chartered accountant nor acts like an income tax officer. The Court is not concerned with any individual case or any particular problem. The Court only examines whether the price determined was with due regard to considerations provided by the statute. And whether extraneous matters have been excluded from determination.” (Emphasis supplied) 221. This decision has thus laid down that in cases where an expert body has been entrusted with matters of economic policy, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 222. In Ranjeet Singh case, 2004 (55) ALR 319 (SC)(supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraph 3 of the said ALR) : “3. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Court, the respondent preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 and alternatively under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The High Court has set aside the judgment of the Appellant Court and restored that of the Trial Court. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the judgment of the Appellate Court. Though not specifically stated, the phraseology employed by the High Court in its judgment, goes to show that the High Court has exercised its certiorari jurisdiction for correcting the judgment of the Appellate Court. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , this Court has ruled that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the Court or Authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction, should be an error which is self-evident. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , this Court has ruled that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the Court or Authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction, should be an error which is self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging into a long drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai (supra) that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging into re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a Court of appeal. The High Court has itself recorded in its judgment that-”considering the evidence on the record carefully” it was inclined not to sustain the judgment of the Appellate Court. On its own showing, the High Court has acted like an Appellate Court which was not permissible for it to do under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 223. A perusal of the above-quoted paragraph shows that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ranjeet Singh’s case (supra) pertains to the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and the circumstances in which writ of certiorari may be issued by the High Court. Thus the said decision is not relevant so far as the controversy involved in the present case is concerned. 224. In P.M. Bhargawa case, (2004) 6 SCC 661 (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraph 13 of the said SCC): “13. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of UGC shows that UGC constituted a nine-member Committee which after discussion and deliberations recommended opening of the departments of “Jyotir Vigyan” in universities for award of degrees. The Committee has recommended to create such courses only in 20 out of 41 universities which had applied for the same and the degrees which would be awarded will be BA/BA (Hons.)/MA/PhD. The Committee has recommended to create such courses only in 20 out of 41 universities which had applied for the same and the degrees which would be awarded will be BA/BA (Hons.)/MA/PhD. The decision to start the course has been taken by an expert body constituted by UGC. The Courts are not expert in academic matters and it is not for them to decide as to what course should be taught in universities and what should be their curriculum. This caution was sounded in University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 , wherein Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Constitution Bench held that it would normally be wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the Courts generally can be. In this case challenge was made to certain appointments and the Bench held that what the High Court should consider is whether the appointment made by the Chancellor on the recommendation of the Board had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance, and in doing so, the High Court should show due regard to the opinion expressed by the Board and its recommendations on which the Chancellor has acted. This principle was reiterated in J.P. Kulshrestha (Dr.) v. Chancellor, Allahabad University, (1980) 3 SCC 418 , wherein it was held as under : (SCC p. 426, para 17) While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that Courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. But university organs, for that matter any authority in our system, are bound by the rule of law and cannot be law unto themselves. If the Chancellor or any other authority lesser in level decides an academic matter or an educational question, the Court keeps its hands off; but where a provision of law has to be read and understood, it is not fair to keep the Court out.” (Emphasis supplied) 225. Thus, in this decision the Supreme Court has reiterated the principles laid down in J.P. Kulshrestha case, AIR 1980 SC 2141 (supra). The principles laid down in J.P. Kulshrestha case have already been noted above. 226. Thus, in this decision the Supreme Court has reiterated the principles laid down in J.P. Kulshrestha case, AIR 1980 SC 2141 (supra). The principles laid down in J.P. Kulshrestha case have already been noted above. 226. In Bihar Public Service Commission case, (2007) 5 SCC 519 (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraph 8 of the said SCC) : “8. Again, it is well settled that in the field of education, a Court of law cannot act as an expert. Normally, therefore, whether or not a student/candidate possesses requisite qualifications, should better be left to educational institutions (vide University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao). This is particularly so when it is supported by an Expert Committee. The Expert Commission considered the matter and observed that a person can be said to be Honours in the subject if at the graduate level, he/she studies such subject as the principal subject having eight papers and not a subsidiary, optional or side subject having two papers. Such a decision, in our judgment, cannot be termed arbitrary or otherwise objectionable. The learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was, therefore, right in dismissing the petition relying upon the report of the Committee and in upholding the objection of the Commission. The Division Bench was in error in ignoring the well-considered report of the Expert Committee and in setting aside the decision of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench, while allowing the appeal, observed that the “litmus test” was the admission granted to the first respondent by the Central Institute of Fisheries Education, Mumbai. According to the Division Bench, if the first respondent did not possess Bachelor of Science degree with Zoology, the Institute would not have admitted her to the said course. The Division Bench observed that not only the first respondent was admitted to the said course, she had passed it with “fling colours”. In our opinion, the Division Bench was not right in applying “litmus test” of admission of the first respondent by the Central Institute of Fisheries Education, Mumbai. The controversy before the Court was whether the first respondent was eligible for the post of District Fisheries Officer, Class II. The correct test, therefore, was not admission by the Mumbai Institution. In our opinion, the Division Bench was not right in applying “litmus test” of admission of the first respondent by the Central Institute of Fisheries Education, Mumbai. The controversy before the Court was whether the first respondent was eligible for the post of District Fisheries Officer, Class II. The correct test, therefore, was not admission by the Mumbai Institution. If the requirement was of Honours in BSc with Zoology and if the first respondent had cleared BSc Honours with Chemistry, it could not be said that she was eligible to the post having requisite educational qualifications. By not treating her eligible, therefore, the Commission had not committed any illegality.” (Emphasis supplied) 227. Thus in the above case, the Supreme Court found that the decision of the expert body in regard to the question of student/candidate possessing requisite qualifications could not be termed arbitrary or otherwise objectionable, and therefore, no interference could be made with which decision. 228. The principles laid down in the above decisions show that while normally the Court will not exercise its power of judicial review to interfere with the decision of an expert body but the Court may exercise its power of judicial review to interfere with the decision of an expert body in various circumstances indicated in the above devisions. Thus, where interpretation of law is involved or where the expert body has exceeded the limits laid down in law or where the decision of the expert body is against the relevant law, rules, regulations etc. applicable to the case, the Court may exercise its power of judicial review to interfere with the decision of an expert body. 229. In the present case, the Teachers Selection Regulations have been framed by the Commission itself in exercise of its power under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. The impugned guidelines have been framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act. The question raised before the Court in the present case is as to whether the provision for Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience”, as contained in the impugned guidelines, is inconsistent with the provisions of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. The question raised before the Court in the present case is as to whether the provision for Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience”, as contained in the impugned guidelines, is inconsistent with the provisions of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 6 of the Teachers Selection Regulations. This is a question of law and pertains to the scope of power of the Commission to frame guidelines in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act. Thus, in view of the principles laid down in the above decisions, judicial review in the present case is permissible. POINT NO. (VI) : Nature of the Guidelines vis-a-vis the Teachers Selection Regulations. 230. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel appearing in support of the case of the petitioners submits that clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act gives power to the Commission to prepare guidelines on matters relating to the method of recruitment of teachers in colleges. 231. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Services Commission Act gives power to the Commission to make Regulations prescribing fees for holding selections, conducting examinations where necessary, holding interviews and laying down the procedure to be followed by the Commission for discharging its duties and performing its functions under the Act. 232. In view of the scope of powers conferred on the Commission under the aforementioned two provisions, the submission proceeds, it is evident that the guidelines prepared by the Commission under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act partake the nature of Regulations, and therefore, such guidelines must get previous approval of the State Government as required in case of Regulations framed by the Commission under sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. The impugned guidelines having been framed by the Commission without previous approval of the State Government, it is submitted, are in-valid. 233. We have considered the submissions made by Sri Arvind Srivastava, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 234. In our view, the guidelines are framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act for supplementing the Regulations framed in exercise of its power under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act so as to provide details where the Regulations are in general terms. 234. In our view, the guidelines are framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act for supplementing the Regulations framed in exercise of its power under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act so as to provide details where the Regulations are in general terms. Such guidelines cannot be inconsistent with, i.e., cannot run counter to or come in conflict with the Regulations. Thus, the nature and scope of the guidelines framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under clause (a) of Section 11 of the Services Commission Act are different from the nature and scope of the Regulations framed by the Commission in exercise of its power under Section 31 of the Services Commission Act. Therefore, to suggest that the guidelines partake the nature of the Regulations, and as such, require previous approval of the State Government, in our view, is not correct. POINT No. (VII) : Applicability of the doctrine of prospective over-ruling in the present case : 235. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission submits that by the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, 552 posts of lecturers in 38 subjects were advertised. Till now the Commission has already declared results for 486 posts in respect of 35 subjects. Results which remain to be declared are in regard to 66 posts in respect of 3 subjects. 236. Sri Singh, further submits that out of the results declared as above, 207 selected candidates have already been issued the placement orders, and they have joined their respective posts, and they are working. 237. Sri Singh, further submits that on earlier occasions also the Commission framed guidelines wherein Screening Index Marks were awarded regarding the “teaching experience”. Thus the guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 provided for Screening Index Marks in respect of “teaching experience” The validity of the said guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 was the subject-matter of various cases before this Court, and this Court upheld the validity of the said guidelines. Thus, when the Commission framed the impugned guidelines in regard to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, it was under bonafide impression that Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience” could be provided for in the guidelines. 238. Thus, when the Commission framed the impugned guidelines in regard to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, it was under bonafide impression that Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience” could be provided for in the guidelines. 238. In view of the above, it is submitted by Sri Singh that in case, this Court concludes that the impugned guidelines in so far as the same provide for Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience”, are in-valid, this Court may lay down that such decision will be prospective in operation and will not apply retrospectively. It is submitted that this Court may follow the doctrine of prospective over-ruling for making its decision prospective. 239. Sri Singh has relied upon the following decisions pertaining to the doctrine of prospective over-ruling : 1. Golak Nath and others v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (para 51). 2. Ashok Kumar Gupta and another v. State of U.P. and others, (1997) 5 SCC 201 (para 54). 3. Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others, (2002) 6 SCC 562 (paras 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45) 4. Sanjay Singh and another v. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and another, (2007) 3 SCC 720 (para 52). 5. P.V. George and others v. State of Kerala and others, (2007) 3 SCC 557 (para 14). 240. In Golak Nath case (supra), the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of prospective over-ruling and laid down that from the date of the decision i.e. 27.2.1967, the Parliament would have no power to amend any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the Fundamental Rights enshrined therein. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under (paragraph 51 of the said AIR) : “51. As this Court for the first time has been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circumstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under (paragraph 51 of the said AIR) : “51. As this Court for the first time has been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circumstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning. We would lay down the following propositions: (1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked only in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest Court of the country, i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the Courts in India; (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its “earlier decisions” is left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cause or matter before it.” (Emphasis supplied) 241. This decision has thus laid down that the doctrine of prospective over-ruling can be applied only by the highest Court of the country, i.e., the Supreme Court in matters arising under our Constitution. Hence, in view of this decision, the doctrine of prospective over-ruling cannot be applied by the High Court. 242. In Ashok Kumar Gupta case, (1997) 5 SCC 201 (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court examined the relationship between the doctrine of prospective over-ruling and the doctrine of stare decisis, and held as under (paragraph 54 of the said SCC) : “54. It is settled principle right from Golak Nath ratio [ (1967) 2 SCR 762 ] that prospective overruling is a part of the principles of constitutional canon of interpretation. Though Golak Nath ratio of unamendability of fundamental rights under Article 368 of the Constitution was overruled in Kesavananda Bharti case, (1973) 4 SCC 225 , the doctrine of prospective overruling was upheld and followed in several decisions. This Court negatived the contention in Golak Nath case that prospective overruling amounts to judicial legislation. Explaining the Blackstonian theory of law, i.e., Judge discovers law and does not make law, and the efficacy of prospective overruling at p. 808 placitum D to H, this Court by a Bench of eleven Judges had held that the doctrine of prospective overruling is a modern doctrine and is suitable for a fast-moving society. It does not do away with the doctrine of stare decisis but confines it to past transactions. It does not do away with the doctrine of stare decisis but confines it to past transactions. While in strict theory, it may be said that the doctrine involves the making of law, what a Court really does is to declare the law but refuses to give retrospectivity to it. It is really a pragmatic solution reconciling the two conflicting doctrines, namely, that a Court finds law and that it does make the law. It finds the law but restricts its operation to the future. It enables the Courts to bring about a smooth transition by correcting the errors without disturbing the impact of those errors on past transactions. By implication of this doctrine, the past may be preserved and the future protected. The Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implication speak against the doctrine of prospective overruling. Articles 32 (4) and 142 are designed with words of width to enable this Court to declare the law and to give such direction or pass such orders as are necessary to do complete justice. Declaration of law under Article 141 is wider than words found or made. The law declared by this Court is the law of the land. So, there is no acceptable reasons as to why the Court in dealing with the law in supersession of the law declared by it earlier could not restrict the operation of law, as declared, to the future and save the transactions, whether statutory or otherwise, that were effected on the basis of the earlier law. This Court is, therefore, not impotent to adjust the competing rights of parties by prospective overruling of the previous decision in Rangachari ratio. The decision in Mandal case postponing the operation for five years from the date of the judgment is an instance of, and an extension to the principle of prospective overruling following the principle evolved in Golak Nath case. In Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar a Constitution Bench of this Court, while overruling (sic affirming) Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan had held that the benefit of decisions would be given only to the parties to the cases pending before the authorities from the date of the judgment but not to the actions already taken by the date of that judgment. Ramzan Khan had held that the benefit of decisions would be given only to the parties to the cases pending before the authorities from the date of the judgment but not to the actions already taken by the date of that judgment. In that behalf in separate but partly dissenting judgment to a limited extent, on the issue of the need to give benefit to the party that approaches the Court in that case, one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., had held that as a matter of constitutional law retrospective operation of an overruling decision is neither required nor prohibited by the Constitution; it is a matter of judicial attitude depending on the facts and circumstances in each case; the nature and purpose the particular overruling decision seeks to serve are required to be taken into consideration. The Court would look into the justifiable reliance on the overruled case by the administration. All the factors, viz., ability to effectuate the new rule adopted in the overruling case, without doing injustice and whether the likelihood of its operation substantially burdens the administration or retards the purpose, are to be taken into account, while overruling the earlier decision or laying down a new principle. Equally, no distinction could be made between claims involving constitutional rights, statutory right or common law right. The Court is required to adjust the competing rights taking into consideration the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect and to find out whether retrospective operation will accelerate or retard its operation. Therefore, evolving of the appropriate rule to give effect to the decision of the Court overruling its previous precedent, is one of judicial craftsmanship with pragmatism and judicial statesmanship as a useful outline to bring about smooth transition of the operation of law without unduly affecting the rights of the people who acted upon the law operated prior to the date of the judgment overruling the previous law.” 243. This decision thus examines the justification for applying the doctrine of prospective over-ruling and the circumstances in which the said doctrine may be applied by the Supreme Court. 244. In Kailash Chand Sharma case, (2002) 6 SCC 562 (supra), their lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraphs 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the said SCC) : “39. This decision thus examines the justification for applying the doctrine of prospective over-ruling and the circumstances in which the said doctrine may be applied by the Supreme Court. 244. In Kailash Chand Sharma case, (2002) 6 SCC 562 (supra), their lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraphs 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the said SCC) : “39. Whether the judgment should be given prospective application so as not to affect the appointments made prior to the date of the judgment i.e. 18-11-1999 is one question that has been debated before us in the background of the direction given by the High Court. Counsel appearing for the original writ petitioners who succeeded in principle before the High Court contended that there is no warrant to invoke the theory of prospective overruling to validate unconstitutional appointments especially when such appointments were made during the pendency of the writ petitions and some of the appointments were made after the matter was referred to the Full Bench. At any rate, it is contended that the appointment orders issued after the first Full Bench judgment which was rendered on 21-10-1999 should not be validated. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the successful candidates who have been either appointed or yet to receive appointment orders that there is every justification for the prospective application of the judgment. While so contending, the learned counsel finds fault with the direction of the High Court insofar as it impliedly restrains further appointments subsequent to the date of the judgment. In this connection, it is pointed out that the selections were finalized long prior to the judgment-either of the first Full Bench or of the second Full Bench-and if there was delay in issuing appointment orders either on account of the stay order or administrative delays, the candidates selected should not be placed at a disadvantageous position when compared to the candidates appointed earlier. In other words, these parties contend that the creation of a cut-off date with reference to the appointments already made and yet to be made is unjustified and it would have been in the fitness of things if all the selected candidates are excluded from the rigour of the judgment as a one-time measure instead of creating two classes amongst them. 40. 40. Arguments were addressed before us on the contours and limitations of the doctrine of prospective overruling applied in our country for the first time in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab in the context of invalidity of certain constitutional amendments and extended gradually to the laws found un-constitutional or even to the interpretation of ordinary statutes. The sum and substance of this innovative principle is that when the Court finds or lays down the correct law in the process of which the prevalent understanding of the law undergoes a change, the Court, on considerations of justice and fair deal, restricts the operation of the new-found law to the future so that its impact does not fall on the past transactions. The doctrine recognises the discretion of the Court to prescribe the limits of retroactivity of the law declared by it. It is a great harmonizing principle equipping the Court with the power to mould the relief to meet the ends of justice. Justification for invoking the doctrine was also found in Articles 141 and 142 which as pointed out in Golak Nath case are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. In the aftermath of Golak Nath case we find quite an illuminating and analytical discussion of the doctrine by Sawant, J. in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 . The learned Judge prefaced the discussion with the following enunciation : (SCC p. 760, para 34) “It is now well settled that the Courts can made the law laid down by them prospective in operation to prevent unsettlement of the settled positions, to prevent administrative chaos and to meet the ends of justice.” 41. Law reports are replete with cases where past actions and transactions including appointments and promotions, though made contrary to the law authoritatively laid down by the Court were allowed to remain either on the principle of prospective overruling or in exercise of the inherent power of the Court under Article 142. The learned Senior Counsel Mr P.P. Rao reminds us that this power is only available to the Supreme Court by virtue of Article 142 and it is not open to the High Court to neutralize the effect of unconstitutional law by having resort to the principle of prospective overruling or analogous principle. The learned Senior Counsel Mr P.P. Rao reminds us that this power is only available to the Supreme Court by virtue of Article 142 and it is not open to the High Court to neutralize the effect of unconstitutional law by having resort to the principle of prospective overruling or analogous principle. The argument of the learned counsel, though not without force, need not detain us for the simple reason that as this Court is now seized of the matter, can grant or mould the relief, without in any way being fettered by the limitations which the High Court may have had. We are of the view that there is sufficient justification for the prospective application of the law declared in the instant cases for more than one reason and if so, the declaration of the High Court to that extent need not be disturbed. 42. For nearly one decade the selections made by applying bonus marks to the residents of the districts concerned and the rural areas therein were upheld by the High Court of Rajasthan. The first decision is the case of Baljeet Kaur decided in the year 1991 followed by Arvind Kumar Gochar case decided in 1994. By the time the selection process was initiated and completed, these decisions were holding the field. However, when the writ petition filed by Kailash Chand and others came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge, the correctness of the view taken in those two decisions was doubted and he directed the matters to be placed before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench. By the time this order was passed on 19-7-1999, we are informed that the select lists of candidates were published in many districts. On account of the stay granted for a period of three months and for other valid reasons, further lists were not published. It should be noted that in a case where the law on the subject was in a state of flux, the principle of prospective overruling was invoked by this Court. The decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar is illustrative of this viewpoint. In the present case, the legality of the selection process with the addition of bonus marks could not have been seriously doubted either by the appointing authorities or by the candidates in view of the judicial precedents. The decision in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar is illustrative of this viewpoint. In the present case, the legality of the selection process with the addition of bonus marks could not have been seriously doubted either by the appointing authorities or by the candidates in view of the judicial precedents. A cloud was cast on the said decisions only after the selection process was completed and the results were declared or about to be declared. It is, therefore, a fit case to apply the judgment of the Full Bench rendered subsequent to the selection prospectively. One more aspect which is to be taken into account is that in almost all the writ petitions the candidates appointed, not to speak of the candidates selected, were not made parties before the High Court. May be, the laborious and long-drawn exercise of serving notices on each and every party likely to be affected need not have been gone through. At least, a general notice by newspaper publication could have been sought for or in the alternative, at least a few of the last candidates selected/appointed could have been put on notice, but, that was not done in almost all the cases. That is the added reason why the judgment treading a new path should not as far as possible result in detriment to the candidates already appointed. We are not so much on the question whether the writ petitions were legally bound to implead all the candidates selected/appointed during the pendency of the petitions having regard to the fact that they were challenging the notification or the policy decision of general application; but, we are taking this fact into consideration to lean towards the view of the High Court that its judgment ought to be applied prospectively, even if the non-impleadment is not a fatal flaw. (Emphasis supplied) 245. In the above case, the Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court in concluding paragraph of its judgment, interalia, observed “we clarify that any appointment made earlier shall not be affected by this judgment and it would have prospective application”. The Supreme Court found force in the contention that it was not open to the High Court to neutralize the effect of unconstitutional law by having resort to the principle of prospective over-ruling or analogous principle. The Supreme Court found force in the contention that it was not open to the High Court to neutralize the effect of unconstitutional law by having resort to the principle of prospective over-ruling or analogous principle. However, it was observed that as the Supreme Court was now seized of the matter, it could grant or mould the relief, without in any way being fettered by the limitations which the High Court might have had. The Supreme Court found sufficient justification for the prospective application of the law declared in the cases under consideration. 246. This decision thus shows that the doctrine of prospective over-ruling is not applicable to the High Court. 247. In Sanjay Singh case, (2007) 3 SCC 720 (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraph 52 of the said SCC) : “52. The petitioners have requested that their petitions should be treated as being in public interest and the entire selection process in regard to Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination, 2003 should be set aside. We are unable to accept the said contention. What has been made out is certain inherent defects of a particular scaling system when applied to the selection process of the Civil Judges (Junior Division) where the problem is one of examiner variability (strict/liberal examiners). Neither mala fides nor any other irregularities in the process of selection are made out. The Commission has acted bona fide in proceeding with the selection and neither the High Court nor the State Government had any grievance in regard to selections. In fact, the scaling system applied had the seal of approval of this Court in regard to the previous selection in S.C. Dixit. The selected candidates have also been appointed and functioning as Judicial Officers. Further as noticed above, the scaling system adopted by the Commission has led to irrational and arbitrary results only in cases falling at the ends of the spectrum, and by and large did not affect the major portion of the selection. We, therefore, direct that our decision holding that the scaling system adopted by the Commission is unsuited in regard to Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination and directing moderation, will be prospective in its application and will not affect the selections and appointments already made in pursuance of the 2003 examination.” (Emphasis supplied) 248. We, therefore, direct that our decision holding that the scaling system adopted by the Commission is unsuited in regard to Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination and directing moderation, will be prospective in its application and will not affect the selections and appointments already made in pursuance of the 2003 examination.” (Emphasis supplied) 248. In the above decision, having regard to various circumstances mentioned in the above-quoted paragraph, the Supreme Court laid down that the decision would be prospective in its application and would not affect the selections and appointments already made in pursuance of 2003 examination. Thus, the doctrine of prospective over-ruling was applied by the Supreme Court in the above decision. 249. In P.V. George case, (2007) 3 SCC 557 (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraph 14 of the said SCC) : “14. For the views we propose to take, it is not necessary for us to consider all the decisions relief upon by Mr Rajan. The legal position as regards the applicability of doctrine of prospective overruling is no longer res integra. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 142 of the Constitution of India may declare a law to have a prospective effect. The Division Bench of the High Court may be correct in opining that having regard to the decision of this Court in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab the power of overruling is vested only in this Court and that too in constitutional matters, but the High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even without applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, indisputably may grant a limited relief in exercise of their equity jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied) 250. This decision thus lays down that the power of prospective over-ruling is vested in the Supreme Court and that too in Constitutional matters, but the High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even without applying the doctrine of prospective over-ruling, indisputably may grant a limited relief in exercise of their equity jurisdiction. 251. From the above decisions, it is evident that this Court cannot apply the doctrine of prospective over-ruling to its decision regarding the validity of the impugned guidelines but it may grant appropriate relief on equitable considerations. 252. 251. From the above decisions, it is evident that this Court cannot apply the doctrine of prospective over-ruling to its decision regarding the validity of the impugned guidelines but it may grant appropriate relief on equitable considerations. 252. The submissions made by Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission as well as other learned counsel appearing for various newly impleaded respondents in this regard, therefore, cannot be accepted. POINT No. (VIII) : Equitable considerations, if any, in the way of Full Bench answering the question referred or requiring the Full Bench to mould the relief so as not to upset the selections made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 253. As noted above, even though the doctrine of prospective over-ruling may not be applied by this Court, still this Court may grant appropriate relief taking into account the equitable considerations. The question therefore arises as to whether there are any equitable considerations which come in the way of the Full Bench answering the question referred to it or requiring the Full Bench to mould the relief so as not to upset the selections made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 254. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission submits that results in regard to 486 posts in respect of 35 subjects have already been declared by the Commission, and only results in regard to 66 posts in respect of 3 subjects remain to be declared. 255. Sri Singh, further submits that 207 selected candidates have already been issued the placement orders, and they have joined their respective posts, and they are working. Moreover, when the Commission framed the impugned guidelines in regard to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, it was under bonafide impression that Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience” could be provided for in the guidelines, as the guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 making similar provision had been upheld by this Court in various decisions. 256. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the Full Bench may decline to answer the question referred or may mould the relief so as not to upset the selections made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 257. Sri P.S. Baghel, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that there are no equitable considerations in favour of the respondents. He submits that Civil Misc. 257. Sri P.S. Baghel, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that there are no equitable considerations in favour of the respondents. He submits that Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 was filed by Gaurav Tripathi, who had submitted application for the post of lecturer in political science pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. The said Writ Petition was filed by Gaurav Tripathi on 20.1.2009 after he was screened out on the basis of the impugned guidelines. Similarly, Dr. Abha Pandey, who had also applied for the post of lecturer in political science, filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6733 of 2009 on 4.2.2009 after she was screened out on the basis of the impugned guidelines. The Division Bench hearing the said two Writ Petitions made reference to the Full Bench by the Order dated 10.4.2009. As per the chart filed on behalf of the Commission as Annexure 1 to the Supplementary Affidavit, sworn on 12th October, 2009, the results in regard to the posts of lecturers in political science were declared on 1st May, 2009. 258. Thus, the submission proceeds, the Commission having full knowledge that the matter had already been referred to the Full Bench declared results on 1st May, 2009 in regard to the posts of lecturers in political science. 259. It is further pointed out that as per the said chart filed on behalf of the Commission, while some results had been declared in the month of October, November and December, 2008, results in regard to 71 posts in 7 subjects were declared on 6th March, 2009 after the aforementioned Writ Petitions had been filed, while results in regard to 117 posts in 14 subjects were declared on 1st May, 2009 after the reference had been made to the Full Bench by the Order dated 10th April, 2009. Moreover, as per the said chart, the results in regard to 91 posts in respect of 7 subjects were declared on 3rd July, 2009. It is submitted that the Commission persisted in declaring the results despite reference having been made to the Full Bench and despite reservation having been expressed by the Secretary of the Commission by the Office Memorandum dated 1st May, 2009, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure SA-1 to the second supplementary affidavit, sworn on 9th October, 2009, filed on behalf of the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009. 260. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 261. A perusal of the aforementioned chart filed on behalf of the Commission shows that while result in regard to about 40% of the posts advertised had been declared in the month of October, November and December, 2008, results in regard to the remaining posts were declared on 6.3.2009, 1.5.2009 and 3.7.2009. Thus, the major portion of the results were declared on the said dates. The aforementioned Writ Petition, as noted above, were filed in the month of January/February, 2009 while reference was made to the Full Bench by the Order dated 10th April, 2009. The petitioners in the aforementioned Writ Petitions approached this Court at the earliest opportunity after having been screened out on the basis of the impugned guidelines. It is not disputed by Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission that the declaration of the results after filing of the aforementioned Writ Petitions wherein reference was made to the Full Bench, was subject to the results of the said Writ Petitions, and the appointment letters issued to the selected candidates contained recital to the said effect. 262. Thus, the selected candidates were having full knowledge that their selections/appointments were subject to the result of the aforementioned Writ Petitions, wherein reference had been made to the Full Bench. 263. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that there are no equitable considerations which may persuade us to decline to answer the question referred to the Full Bench or to mould the relief so as not to upset the selection made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 264. The submissions made by Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission as well as other learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondents, therefore, cannot be accepted. POINT No. (IX) : Other objections to the answering of the question referred or declining relief to the petitioners by the Full Bench. 265. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission submits that total 295 candidates were called for interview for the post of lecturer in Political Science. POINT No. (IX) : Other objections to the answering of the question referred or declining relief to the petitioners by the Full Bench. 265. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission submits that total 295 candidates were called for interview for the post of lecturer in Political Science. Out of the said 295 candidates, 280 candidates were called on the basis of their Screening Index Marks given to them only in regard to their academic qualifications while the remaining 15 candidates were called on the basis of their Screening Index Marks given to them taking into account their academic qualifications as well as their ‘experience’. 266. Thus, it is submitted that the selection has not been materially affected by making provision for awarding Screening Index Marks in regard to “experience” under the impugned guidelines. 267. Sri Singh has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Singh and another v. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and another, (2007) 3 SCC 720 . 268. We have considered the submissions made by Sri H.N. Singh, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 269. The question referred to the Full Bench is regarding the validity of the impugned guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2008. In case, the impugned guidelines are found to be in-valid, the selections and appointments pursuant thereto would stand vitiated. The question as to whether the selection has been materially affected or not, is not relevant in such circumstances. 270. In Sanjay Singh and another v. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and another, (2007) 3 SCC 720 , relied upon by Sri Singh, dealt with the validity of the scaling system adopted by the Commission on account of the problem of examiners variability (strict/liberal examiners). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed (paragraph 52 of the said SCC) that “the scaling system adopted by the Commission has led to irrational and arbitrary results only in cases falling at the ends of the spectrum, and by and large did not affect the major portion of the selection”, and accordingly, directed that the decision would be prospective in its application and would not affect the selections and appointments already made in pursuance of the 2003 examination. 271. Thus, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of prospective overruling. It is well settled that the High Court cannot apply the said doctrine to its decisions. 271. Thus, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of prospective overruling. It is well settled that the High Court cannot apply the said doctrine to its decisions. 272. Further, the above decision dealt with the validity of the scaling system applied by the U.P. Public Service Commission to the marks assigned by the examiners in written examinations while the present case is concerned with the validity of the impugned guidelines framed by the Commission for screening and shortlisting at the threshold itself. Thus, the above decision is not applicable to the present case. 273. Sri Shailendra, learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondent No. 11 submits that the petitioner Gaurav Tripathi in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3326 of 2009 is not a “person aggrieved” as even if “teaching experience” were to be ignored, still he could not be called for interview. 274. We have considered the submissions made by Sri Shailendra, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 275. The petitioner Gaurav Tripathi in the aforementioned Writ Petition was an applicant for the post of lecturer in Political Science. He was screened out at the threshold itself on the basis of the impugned guidelines, and was not called for interview. Thus, the said Gaurav Tripathi was a “person aggrieved” as he was screened out on the basis of the impugned guidelines which, as per his contention, were invalid. Therefore, the petitioner Gaurav Tripathi was entitled to file Writ Petition before this Court challenging the impugned guidelines on the basis of which he was screened out. POINT No. (X) : Applicability of de-facto doctrine to the present case. 276. Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for the Commission submits that in the present case, the question of the impugned guidelines being ultra-vires the power of the Commission is involved. The impugned guidelines have been framed by the Commission in the year 2008 in regard to the selection pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. The impugned guidelines framed by the Commission in the year 2000 (wherein Screening Index Marks were awarded regarding “teaching experience”) had been upheld by this Court in its various decisions. Thus, when the Commission framed the impugned guidelines in the year 2008, it was under bonafide belief that such guidelines providing for Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience”, were valid. Thus, when the Commission framed the impugned guidelines in the year 2008, it was under bonafide belief that such guidelines providing for Screening Index Marks in regard to “teaching experience”, were valid. There was no malice on the part of the Commission for framing the impugned guidelines. The impugned guidelines are thus de-facto guidelines under which selections and appointments pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007 have been made. Thus, in case, the impugned guidelines are declared to be void, the third party interests would be affected. In the circumstances, the submission proceeds, the de-facto doctrine may be applied so as to save the selections and appointments made under the impugned guidelines. 277. Sri H.N. Singh has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan and others v. D.R. Laxmi and others, (1996) 6 SCC 445 (paragraphs 9 & 10 of the said SCC). 278. We have considered the submissions made by Sri H.N. Singh, and we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 279. The de-facto doctrine is normally applied in case where an incumbent on a post is subsequently found to have been illegally appointed. In such a case, the actions taken by such incumbent during his working on the post are saved by applying the de-facto doctrine so that the interests of third parties affected by the actions taken by such incumbent while working on the post, may not be prejudiced. However, the de-facto doctrine will not validate the illegal appointment of the incumbent, and his appointment will come to an end in any case. 280. In the present case, the de-facto doctrine may be applied in regard to the actions taken by the persons, who have been appointed and permitted to join on the post of lecturers pursuant to their selection under the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. Thus, in case such persons while working as lecturers have taken classes in the respective institutions, given attendance to the students, taken their tests/examinations, and examined the answer books of any examinations then such actions of the said persons will be treated to be valid by applying the de-facto doctrine so as not to affect the interests of third parties (i.e. students). However, the de-facto doctrine will not validate their selections and appointments as suggested by Sri H.N. Singh. 281. However, the de-facto doctrine will not validate their selections and appointments as suggested by Sri H.N. Singh. 281. In our view, the de-facto doctrine cannot be applied to save the selections and appointments made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 41 of 2007. 282. As regards the decision in State of Rajasthan and others v. D.R. Laxmi and others, (1996) 6 SCC 445 relied upon by Sri H.N. Singh, the Supreme Court has laid down (Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said SCC), that even if an order or action being ultra-vires the power is void, still the High Court in exercise of its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution may decline to set at naught such order or action in case the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time. 283. In our view, the principle laid down in the aforesaid case is not applicable to the present case as the petitioners have approached this Court at the earliest opportunity. Other Connected Writ Petitions : 284. Smt. Arti Raje, learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5232 of 2009 and certain other Writ Petitions including Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 795 of 2009 submits that various irregularities have been committed by the Commission in the selection in question. It is pointed out that in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5232 of 2009 the respondent No. 4 had not been awarded Degree of Ph.D till the last date of filing of his application form i.e. 5.4.2007, still he was selected for the post of lecturer in Chemistry. 285. Again, in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 795 of 2009, no quality point marks were allocated/added in respect of the Chancellor’s Gold Medal awarded to the petitioner. 286. In our opinion, the controversy involved in the above Writ Petitions is not in regard to the question of award of Screening Index Marks in respect of “teaching experience” which is the subject-matter of the question referred to the Full Bench. Therefore, the controversy involved in the above Writ Petitions will be considered before the appropriate Division Bench. Answer to Question Referred : 287. Therefore, the controversy involved in the above Writ Petitions will be considered before the appropriate Division Bench. Answer to Question Referred : 287. In view of the above discussion our answer to the question referred is as under : In view of the provisions of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983, particularly, Regulations 3 and 6 thereof, the Guidelines framed by the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission in the year 2008 in regard to the selection pursuant to Advertisement No. 41 of 2007, wherein “teaching experience” has been provided as one of the factors for preliminary screening and short-listing the candidates to be called for interview for the post of teachers/lecturers are invalid. 288. The Writ Petitions will now be placed before the appropriate Division Bench with the above answer for consideration of the Writ Petitions. ————